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area handbook series 


a country study 


a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Eric Solsten 
Research Completed 
January 1991 

On the cover: Cypriot vase from seventh century B.C. 

Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1993. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Cyprus : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Eric Solsten. — 4th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA 
pam ; 550-22) 

"Supersedes the 1980 edition of Cyprus: a country study, 
edited by Frederica M. Bunge." — T.p. verso. 
"Research completed January 1991." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 265-279) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0752-6 

1. Cyprus. I. Solsten, Eric, 1943- . II. Library of Congress. 
Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA pam ; 

DS54.A3C955 1993 
956.45— dc20 


Headquarters, Department of the Army 

DA Pam 550-22 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D C. 20402 


This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/ Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the writers 
of the 1980 edition of Cyprus: A Country Study, edited by Frederica 
M. Bunge. Portions of their work were incorporated into this 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various United States 
government agencies and international, diplomatic, and private 
institutions who gave of their time, research materials, expertise, 
and photographs in the production of this book. Special thanks are 
owed to the Embassy of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot Office, 
both in Washington, D.C. Thanks are also due to Ralph K. 
Benesch, who oversees the area handbook program for the Depart- 
ment of the Army. The authors also wish to thank members of the 
Federal Research Division staff who contributed directly to the 
preparation of the manuscript. These people include Sandra W. 
Meditz, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the spon- 
soring agency; and Marilyn L. Majeska, who managed editing and 
book production. 

Also involved in preparing the text were editorial assistants Bar- 
bara Edgerton and Izella Watson; Duncan M. Brown, who edited 
chapters; Cissie Coy, who performed the prepublication editorial re- 
view; and Joan C. Cook, who compiled the index. Linda Peterson 
and Malinda B. Neale of the Library of Congress Composing Unit 
prepared the camera-ready copy under the supervision of Peggy 

Graphics were prepared by David P. Cabitto, who also designed 
the volume's cover. Gail Oring designed the illustrations on each 
chapter's title page. David P. Cabitto, Harriet R. Blood, and the 
firm of Greenhorne and O'Mara prepared the maps from Tim Mer- 
rill's drafts. 




Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xi 

Country Profile xiii 

Introduction xxi 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Eugene K. Keefe and Eric Solsten 



Byzantine Rule 10 

The Lusignan and Venetian Eras 13 



British Annexation 21 

World War II and Postwar Nationalism 23 

The Emergency 30 


Intercommunal Violence 35 

Political Developments after the Crisis of 1967 37 

The Greek Coup and the Turkish Invasion 41 

Developments since 1974 43 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 47 

Eleni Meleagrou and Birol Yesilada 


Geography 50 

Ethnicity 54 

Population 58 

Urbanization and Occupational Change 62 

Class Structure 64 

Family and Marriage 65 

Status of Women 68 

Religion 70 

Education 72 

Health and Welfare 75 




Population 82 

Ethnicity 85 

Social Structure 88 

Marriage and Family 90 

Religion 93 

Education 99 

Health and Welfare 102 

Chapter 3. The Economy 105 

Alex J. Kondonassis and Biro I Yesilada 


Development of the Economy since 

Independence 110 

The Government Sector 113 

Employment and Labor Relations 115 

Primary Sector 116 

Secondary Sector 125 

Tertiary Sector 132 

Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments 138 


The State and Economic Development 142 

The Work Force and Labor Unions 145 

Primary Sector 146 

Secondary Sector 152 

Tertiary Sector 154 

Foreign Trade 157 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 161 

Ellen Laipson 


1960 Constitution 165 

1963 Constitutional Breakdown 167 

1964-74 Situation: Separate Communal Life 170 

The 1974 Crisis and Division of the Island 171 


Milestones in the United Nations Settlement 

Process 174 

Prospects for Creation of a Federal Republic 

of Cyprus 184 


Political Institutions 184 


Political Parties 186 

Media 188 

Political Dynamics 188 

Political Culture in the Vassiliou Era 190 



Major Political Institutions in the "TRNC" 193 

Political Parties 195 

Media 197 

Rauf Denkta§ and Turkish Cypriot Politics 197 


The Republic of Cyprus 200 

The "TRNC" 207 

Chapter 5. National Security 211 

Jean R. Tartter 


The Struggle for Independence 214 

Intercommunal Violence, 1963-67 215 

Conflict Within the Greek Cypriot 

Community, 1967-74 217 

The Turkish Military Intervention, 

July- August 1974 219 

De Facto Partition, 1974- 220 



Forces in the Government-Controlled Area 225 

Forces in the Turkish- Administered Area 231 

British Forces on Cyprus 233 

United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus 234 


Organization of the Greek Cypriot 

Police 237 

Turkish Cypriot Police Organization 238 


Incidence of Crime 240 

The Criminal Justice System 241 

Appendix. Tables 245 

Bibliography 265 

Glossary 28 1 

Index 285 


List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions, 1991 xx 

2 Ancient and Medieval Sites 6 

3 Topography and Drainage , 52 

4 Ethnic Distribution of the Population, 1960, 1964, 

and 1990 56 

5 Republic of Cyprus: Population by Age and Sex, 

1988 60 

6 "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": Population 

by Age and Sex, 1989 86 

7 Economic Activity, 1990 118 

8 Minerals, 1990 126 

9 Transportation System, 1990 136 

10 Nicosia and the Green Line 220 



This edition of Cyprus: A Country Study replaces the previous edi- 
tion published in 1980. Like its predecessor, the present book 
attempts to treat in a compact and objective manner the dominant 
historical, social, economic, political, and national security aspects 
of contemporary Cyprus. Sources of information included scholarly 
books, journals, and monographs; official reports and documents 
of governments and international organizations; and foreign and 
domestic newspapers and periodicals. Researchers of Cypriot af- 
fairs face both feast and famine. There is much information about 
the origins and development of the island's complex intercommunal 
problem, some of it of a high quality. But readers curious about 
less vital political issues, or searching for economic or social data, 
often will find information sparse or of dubious validity. 

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief com- 
ments on some of the more valuable sources for further reading 
appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Measurements are given 
in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those 
who are unfamiliar with the metric system (see table 1 , Appendix). 

The contemporary place-names used in this study are those ap- 
proved by the United States Board on Geographic Names, as set 
forth in the official gazetteer published in 1953. The Turkish name 
of towns or geographic formations located in the Turkish Cypriot- 
administered area is provided in parentheses after the place-name's 
first appearance in a chapter. A list of place-names so identified 
is provided (see table 2, Appendix). Greek Cypriot names are trans- 
literated as they commonly appear in English-language publica- 
tions. Because the United States government does not recognize 
the Turkish Cypriot state created in November 1983, its name, 
the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"), is placed 
within quotation marks. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of Janu- 
ary 1991. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been 
updated. The introduction discusses significant events that have 
occurred since completion of research; the Country Profile includes 
updated information as available; and the Bibliography lists re- 
cently published sources thought to be particularly helpful to the 


Country Profile 


Formal Name: Republic of Cyprus. 

Short Form: Cyprus. 

Term for Nationals: Cypriot(s). 

Political Status: Former British colony. Achieved independence 
August 1960. Since mid- 1974, northern 37 percent of island un- 
der separate Turkish Cypriot administration. "Turkish Repub- 
lic of Northern Cyprus" ["TRNC"], proclaimed unilaterally 

NOTE: The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 


in November 1983, not recognized internationally except by Tur- 
key as of early 1992. 


Size: Third largest island in Mediterranean, after Sicily and 
Sardinia. 9,251 square kilometers, of which 1,733 square kilome- 
ters forested. Length, 225 kilometers; maximum breadth, 96.5 
kilometers. Situated in eastern Mediterranean, about 386 kilome- 
ters north of Egypt, 97 kilometers west of Syria, and 64 kilometers 
south of Turkey. 

Topography: Principal topographic features Troodos Mountains: 
dry limestone hills including Kyrenia Range; a broad inland 
plain — the Mesaoria; and narrow coasdands. Highest peak of Troo- 
dos Mountains, Mount Olympus, rises to 1,952 meters. Winter 
rivers starting in the Troodos flow rapidly in all directions. Two 
large salt lakes; many springs along the sides of Troodos Moun- 
tains and Kyrenia Range. 

Climate: Mediterranean, with cycle of hot, dry summers from June 
to September, rainy winters from November to March, and brief 
spring and fall seasons between. Substantial differences, both daily 
and seasonally, in temperatures of coastal and inland areas. 


Population: Republic of Cyprus estimate of 575,000 in the 
government-controlled area at the end of 1990. Turkish Cypriots 
estimate their number at about 171,000 at mid- 1990, about 40,000 
higher than estimates by the Republic of Cyprus. Difference may 
stem in part from the tens of thousands of Turks who settled on 
the island after 1974. No de facto census since 1960. 

Languages: Three principal languages: Greek, Turkish, and En- 
glish. Knowledge and use of Greek and Turkish as second language, 
never common, declining further owing to de facto partition of the 
island; English the standard second language for Cypriots of both 
ethnic communities. 

Religion: Virtually all Greek Cypriots Greek Orthodox Christians, 
adherents of the autocephalous Church of Cyprus, headed by a 
synod composed of bishops and an elected archbishop. The Arme- 
nian Apostolic Church — another of the eastern Christian religions 
that does not recognize the authority of the pope in Rome — has 
minor following. Also small numbers of members of churches in 
full communion with Rome — Maronites and Roman Catholics. 


Turkish Cypriots are Muslims and form the second largest reli- 
gious group. 

Education and Literacy: Republic of Cyprus level of education 
high; literacy rate of 99 percent; illiteracy confined to the old. Free 
and compulsory education offered at preprimary, primary, and at 
secondary levels in academic and technical/vocational high schools. 
Higher education available at specialized schools and at one univer- 
sity opened in early 1990s. Many Greek Cypriots studied at for- 
eign universities. 

[Turkish Cypriots established parallel system and also had high 
literacy rate. Although several universities in operation by 1990, 
some Turkish Cypriots received higher education abroad.] 

Health: Republic of Cyprus health care provided both through 
public heath service administered by Ministry of Health and pri- 
vate sector. Lower-income families entitled to free medical care 
and middle-income families to care at reduced rates. In 1990 six 
general hospitals and twenty-one rural health centers. Life expec- 
tancy 73.9 years for males and 77.8 years for females in 1990. 

[Turkish Cypriots had extensive health care system administered 
by Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. In late 1980s, five state 
and four private hospitals and ten public health centers in addi- 
tion to many clinics. Life expectancy 70 years for males and 72 
years for females in 1979.] 


Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$5.3 billion in 1990; per capita 
gross national product (GNP) US$7,200 in 1988. GDP grew at 
an average annual rate of 8.4 percent between 1976 and 1986, with 
slight downturn in late 1980s. 

[Turkish Cypriot GNP: US$425.4 million in 1989; per capita 
income US$2513. GDP grew at an average annual rate of 6.4 per- 
cent between 1977 and 1988; growth rate in 1989 was 7.1 percent.] 

Agriculture: Made up 7.7 percent of GDP in 1988 and accounted 
for 15.8 percent of employment in 1987. Important irrigation 
projects and government subsidies guaranteed continued strength 
of sector. Crops accounted for most agricultural production; 
livestock about one-fifth; fishing and forestry negligible. Agricul- 
tural exports important; potatoes accounted for 10 percent of ex- 
port earnings in some years; citrus and wine exports also 
noteworthy. Gradually evolving free-market trade with European 
Economic Community in 1990s could threaten branches of Cypriot 


[Turkish Cypriot agriculture accounted for about 9 percent of 
GDP in 1990 and provided employment for about 30 percent of 
work force. Citrus fruits most important export product. Short- 
age of year-round water an obstacle to sector's growth.] 

Manufacturing: Accounted for about 16 percent of GDP and 20 
percent of employment in late 1980s. Wide variety of light manufac- 
turing, with clothing and foods the most important products. Cloth- 
ing most important export. Dismantling of tariff protection and 
low Third World wages would challenge subsector in 1990s. 

[Turkish Cypriot manufacturing accounted for about 12 percent 
of GDP and 11 percent of employment in 1989. Almost entirely 
light industry, with clothing and textiles most important products. 
Clothing accounted for 30 percent of exports in late 1980s.] 

Services: Accounted for over half of GDP at end of 1980s. Tourism 
most important subsector, with over a million foreign visitors each 
year. Financial and business services also important. 

[Turkish Cypriot service sector accounted for well over half of 
GDP and nearly half of employment at end of 1980s. Tourism most 
dynamic element, with about 300,000 foreign visitors by 1990.] 

Balance of Payments: Persistent large negative trade balance. 
Large tourism earnings and positive capital account balances gener- 
ally yielded positive balance of payments. 

[Large negative Turkish Cypriot trade balance offset by earn- 
ings from tourism and import license fees.] 

Exchange Rate: Average exchange rate in 1990, Cyprus pound 
(C£) 0.46 to US$1. 

[Average exchange rate in 1990 for the currency used by Turk- 
ish Cypriots, the Turkish lira (TL), 2,608.6 to US$1.] 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Railroads: None. 

Roads: In 1989 roads in the government-controlled area amount- 
ed to 9,824 kilometers, of which 5,240 kilometers were asphalted 
or tarred and 4,584 kilometers were dirt or gravel. Some of the 
republic's roads were superhighways; more such roads under con- 
struction in the early 1990s. 

[In the mid-1980s, the "TRNC" possessed 6,080 kilometers of 
roads, 800 kilometers of which unpaved. Major roads connected 
Nicosia with some other urban areas.] 

Ports: Limassol, followed by Larnaca, important ports; Paphos 
and Vasilikos also received traffic. 


[Famagusta (Gazimagusa) most important Turkish Cypriot port, 
equipped with modern facilities. Small ports at Kalecik and Kyre- 
nia (Girne).] 

Civil Airports: As of the early 1990s, Nicosia International Air- 
port closed, a result of the Turkish invasion of 1974. Replaced by 
the international airports at Larnaca and Paphos. Also a number 
of smaller airports in the government-controlled area. 

[Turkish Cypriots operated two international airports, Ercan and 

Telecommunications: Excellent telecommunications facilities. 
More than 200,000 telephones, all with international direct dial- 
ing. Three submarine cables and three satellite ground stations con- 
nected to international systems guaranteed ready communication 
abroad. State television and radio network, in addition to private 
radio station. 

[Turkish Cypriots had a modern telecommunications system, 
with connections abroad going via Turkey. All villages connected 
to fully automated exchange services. Government operated two 
television and radio stations.] 

Government and Politics 

Form of Government: Elected president for five-year term, ap- 
pointed Council of Ministers, elected House of Representatives of 
fifty-six members for five-year term. Constitutional provision of 
Turkish Cypriot vice president, three members of Council of 
Ministers, and twenty-four members of House of Representatives 
in disuse for decades. 

[Turkish Cypriots nonparticipants in governance of Republic 
of Cyprus. State resulting from unilateral declaration of indepen- 
dence in 1983, "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," recognized 
only by Turkey. Elected president for five-year term, appointed 
Council of Ministers, elected Legislative Assembly of fifty mem- 
bers for five-year term.] 

Legal System: Supreme Court final appellate court; district and 
assize courts with civil and criminal jurisdictions. Supreme Coun- 
cil of Judicature — composed of attorney general, members of the 
Supreme Court, and others — deals with appointment and promo- 
tion of judges. 

[Turkish Cypriots employ a parallel system, with additional spe- 
cial courts for family matters.] 

Politics: Resolving intercommunal crisis major political issue. Four 
political parties represented in House of Representatives accounted 


for over 95 percent of vote; several right- and left-wing splinter 
parties accounted for the remainder. Moderate conservative 
Democratic Rally (DISY), founded by Glafkos Clerides in 1976, 
won 35.8 percent of vote and twenty seats in 1991 parliamentary 
election. Democratic Party (DIKO), founded by Spyros Kyprianou 
in 1976, won 19.5 percent of vote and eleven parliamentary seats 
in 1991 election. Long a government party, DIKO was center right 
and close to Archbishop Makarios III. The social-democratic United 
Democratic Union of the Center (EDEK) founded in 1969 by Vas- 
sos Lyssarides, still its leader in 1992. EDEK won 10.9 percent 
of the vote and seven seats in 1991 elections. The Progressive Party 
of the Working People (AKEL) dates from 1941 , but with histori- 
cal ties to communist movement of 1920s. Although long doctrinaire 
and subservient to the former Soviet Union, AKEL moderate left 
wing in practice. In 1991, elections won 30.6 percent of vote and 
eighteen seats. Flexible on intercommunal problem, it often allied 
with DISY on this issue. EDEK and DIKO frequently advocated 
a more traditional approach to end the island's division. 

[Three main Turkish Cypriot parties and a smaller right-wing 
party offered voters range of choices. For the 1990 Legislative As- 
sembly election, unsuccessful electoral alliance against governing 
party, the conservative National Unity Party (UBP). The UBP won 
55 percent of the vote and thirty-four seats in parliament. Found- 
ed in 1975 by Rauf Denkta§, this perennial governing party led 
in early 1990s by Prime Minister Dervis. Eroglu. Rightist New 
Dawn Party (YDP) formed in 1984 to represent Turkish settlers. 
Won two seats in 1990, which it subsequently occupied. Moder- 
ate Communal Liberation Party (TKP) often opposed UBP poli- 
cies, urging greater contacts with Greek Cypriots. Founded in 1976 
by Alpay Durduran, it was led in early 1990s by Mustafa Akinci. 
Some of the party boycotted the Legislative Assembly after the 1990 
elections, refusing to take all of its five seats. Left-wing Republi- 
can Turkish Party (CTP) dated from 1970. Led by Ozker Ozgur, 
it won seven seats in 1990, but like TKP boycotted parliament. 
By-elections in 1991 to fill fourteen empty parliamentary seats result- 
ed in UBP winning eleven of them. In 1992 ten UBP delegates 
left their party and founded the Democratic Party (DP).] 

International Memberships: United Nations and its affiliated or- 
ganizations; World Bank; International Monetary Fund; Common- 
wealth of Nations; Council of Europe; Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe; associate membership in European Com- 


["Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" an observer at the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference.] 

National Security 

Armed Forces: National Guard— 13,000 active in 1989, 1,800 of 
whom officers and NCOs seconded from the Greek Army; 66,000 
first-line and 30,000 second-line reserves as of 1990. Five active 
battalions: two mechanized; one armored; one artillery; one 

[The Turkish Cypriot Security Force consisted of an estimated 
4,000 men; most officers seconded from the Turkish Army; 5,000 
first-line and 10,000 second-line reserves as of 1989. The force or- 
ganized into seven infantry battalions equipped with light weapons. 
The Turkish Cypriot Security Force, supported by an estimated 
30,000 soldiers of the Turkish Army, organized into two infantry 
divisions and an armored brigade.] 

Military Equipment: As of 1990, National Guard's weapons in- 
cluded 30 AMX B-2 tanks, 27 armored infantry fighting vehicles, 
over 100 armored personnel carriers, several hundred howitzers, 
mortars, recoilless rifles and other pieces of artillery, 20 SA-7 mis- 
siles, 6 Gazelle helicopters, and 3 coastal patrol boats. 

[Turkish forces equipped with several hundred M-47 and M-48 
tanks, 105 mm, 155mm, and 203mm guns and howitzers, and Bell 
Uh- ID helicopters.] 

Other Forces: United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNICYP) consisted of about 2,000 men as of 1990, organized 
into four infantry battalions along national lines. As of 1990, Brit- 
ish Army and Royal Air Force had about 4,000 troops stationed 
in two Sovereign Base Areas. Army organized into one infantry 
battalion and two infantry companies and one armed reconnais- 
sance squadron; RAF unit consisted of one squadron with five Wes- 
sex helicopters. Army equipped with six Gazelle helicopters. 

Military Budget: In 1990 about US$325 million. 

[Planned Turkish Cypriot budget of US$3.9 million for 1990; 
most defense costs borne by Turkey.] 

Police: Cyprus Police Force personnel amounted to 3,700 in 1989. 



THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS came into being on August 16, 
1960. The reluctant republic, as it has often been termed, was seen 
as a necessary compromise by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypri- 
ots, the two peoples who would live within it, and the three for- 
eign powers who had been parties to its creation. Greek Cypriots 
preferred enosis, that is, the union of their island with the Greek 
motherland, rather than the creation of an independent state. Turk- 
ish Cypriots preferred that the island remain under British rule 
as it had been since 1878. If British governance were not possible, 
many Turkish Cypriots favored partition, or taksim, of the island 
and the union of the parts of the island in which they lived with 
Turkey — their ethnic motherland. Greece, for its part, preferred 
that enosis be achieved once again and that Cyprus, like a num- 
ber of other islands, be united with the Hellenic motherland. Tur- 
key's principal desire was that Cyprus not come under Greek control 
and be yet another island off the Turkish coast from which it could 
be attacked by its traditional enemy. Britain would have preferred 
a more measured cessation of its rule of the island, but the armed 
insurrection during the second half of the 1950s made the creation 
of an independent Cypriot republic seem a way out of a difficult 
situation. In addition, Britain's military needs could be met by ar- 
ranging for bases on the island, rather than keeping the island of 
Cyprus itself as a base. 

Negotiations between the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers 
in late 1958 and early 1959 resulted in three treaties that met to 
some degree the desires and needs of Greece, Turkey, and Brit- 
ain. Representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities signed the treaties, but without enthusiasm. The three 
treaties — the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the 
Treaty of Establishment — went into effect on August 16, 1960. 

The Treaty of Guarantee provides that Greece, Turkey, and Brit- 
ain will ensure the independence and sovereignty of the Repub- 
lic of Cyprus. It bans political or economic union of the republic 
with any foreign state and bans activities that would lead to such 
unions. Forty-eight of the basic articles of the constitution were 
incorporated into the Treaty of Guarantee, and the treaty's signa- 
tories were pledged to uphold the "state of affairs" established 
by the constitution. Article IV of the treaty states that if this "state 
of affairs" is endangered or altered, Greece, Turkey, and Brit- 
ain are obliged to consult together and act to restore it. If joint 


consultations or actions are not possible, these states may act in- 

The Treaty of Alliance involves Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. 
It establishes a tripartite headquarters on the island and permits 
the two latter states to deploy, respectively, 950 and 650 military 
personnel to Cyprus to protect the island and train its army. The 
Treaty of Establishment grants Britain sovereignty over a total of 
256 square kilometers of territory on the island's southern coast 
for two military bases, Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Between the sign- 
ing of these treaties in early 1959 and independence on August 16, 
1960, a long and intricate constitution was worked out, with 
elaborate protections for the rights of the smaller Turkish Cypriot 

Almost from the beginning, however, governing the island was 
difficult. Resentment within the Greek Cypriot community arose 
because Turkish Cypriots were given a larger share of government 
posts than the size of their population warranted. The dispropor- 
tionate number of ministers and legislators assigned to Turkish 
Cypriots meant that their representatives could veto budgets or legis- 
lation and prevent essential government operations from being car- 
ried out. A Cypriot army, to be composed of both ethnic groups, 
was not formed because of disagreements about organizational mat- 
ters. Nor was the crucial issue of municipal government settled to 
the satisfaction of Turkish Cypriots. 

The complicated governmental system established by the con- 
stitution would have had difficulty functioning well even under nor- 
mal conditions, but the withholding of support for the new republic 
on the part of many Cypriots made its smooth functioning even 
less likely. The acrimony, ill will, and suspicion that existed be- 
tween the two ethnic communities made impossible the spirit of 
cooperation needed for the system to succeed. Not surprisingly, 
the early 1 960s saw the resurgence of armed groups that had been 
active during the uprising against British rule. The Greek Cypriot 
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis 
Ky prion Agoniston — EOKA) rearmed, as did its Turkish Cypriot 
counterpart, the Turkish Resistance Organization (Turk Mukave- 
met Te§kilati — TMT). They were joined by growing contingents 
of Greek and Turkish soldiers from the mainland, whose numbers 
were much in excess of the limits set by the Treaty of Alliance. 
The frustrations of political impasse, coupled with the presence of 
armed bands, made for an explosive situation. 

In late 1963, the republic's president, Archbishop Makarios III, 
proposed a series of constitutional changes that, if enacted, would 
have reduced the political rights and powers of the Turkish Cypriot 


community. These proposals worsened an already tense situation, 
and in December 1963 serious intercommunal violence broke out. 
In the next months, hundreds died. In March 1964, the first mem- 
bers of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UN- 
FICYP) were deployed to Cyprus, but hostilities continued into 
August 1964. Only vigorous diplomacy from United States presi- 
dent Lyndon Johnson prevented a Turkish invasion in June 1964. 

Several years of relative peace ensued, but the governing sys- 
tem established in 1960 no longer functioned. Turkish Cypriots 
had withdrawn from the republic's politics and were fashioning 
a governing system of their own. In addition, a good part of the 
Turkish Cypriot community lived in enclaves because many Turk- 
ish Cypriots had abandoned their homes out of fear of Greek 
Cypriot violence. 

Intercommunal violence erupted in November 1 967 , when two 
dozen Turkish Cypriots were killed by Greek Cypriot forces un- 
der the command of Colonel George Grivas, the leader of the in- 
surgency against the British in the 1950s. The threat of a Turkish 
invasion led the Greek government to remove Colonel Grivas and 
thousands of its troops from the island. 

A coup d'etat in Athens in 1967 established a military dictator- 
ship that lasted until 1974. Elements of this regime pressed vigorous- 
ly for enosis. Some members of the junta were even willing to cede 
parts of Cyprus to Turkey in exchange for a joining of the island 
with Greece. Greek pro-enosists, joined by like-minded rightist 
Greek Cypriot groups, put pressure on Archbishop Makarios. In 
1970 there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the presi- 
dent. Makarios yielded to the junta on some points, once, for ex- 
ample, accepting the "resignations" of several members of his 
cabinet known to oppose the Athens government. He, however, 
would not compromise on the larger issue of the territorial integrity 
of the republic. Makarios, once a leading exponent of enosis, had 
come to place more value on the independence of Cyprus as a sover- 
eign state than on union with Greece. 

In July 1974, Greek Cypriot underground groups and the Greek 
Cypriot National Guard overthrew Archbishop Makarios and select- 
ed Nicos Sampson, a notorious EOKA terrorist, as his replace- 
ment. Makarios escaped with British help and appealed to world 
opinion at the United Nations (UN). Within a week of the rightist 
coup, Turkish forces invaded Cyprus. Turkish officials justified 
their country's actions by citing the terms of Article IV of the Treaty 
of Guarantee, noting the impossibility of joint action with Greece 
and the reluctance of Britain to use military force to restore the 
"state of affairs" established by the constitution of 1960. A brief 


truce permitted Turkish forces to consolidate their positions, and 
a quick second campaign in mid-August allowed them to occupy 
37 percent of the republic. 

The idea of enosis grew out of the successful Greek revolution 
of the 1820s. The dream of uniting all formerly Greek lands to the 
motherland spread during the nineteenth century. At first the move- 
ment was confined to the small educated segment of society, but 
as the general population became literate, the megali idea (grand 
idea in Greek), as it was often termed, found ever more adher- 
ents. The enosis movement had some notable successes. Crete was 
returned to Greece in the late nineteenth century, and after World 
War II a number of islands off the Turkish coast became Greek. 
The movement also suffered major reverses, most notably Kemal 
Atatiirk's beating back the Greek Army when it invaded Turkey 
in the early 1920s. 

By the mid- twentieth century, most Greek Cypriots desired that 
their island be united with Greece. The campaign for enosis was 
strengthened by the world-wide upsurge of anticolonialism after 
World War II. The enosis movement, which had become coupled 
with the goal of ending British rule of the island, erupted into armed 
rebellion in April 1955. 

Cyprus's unification with Greece faced two significant obstacles: 
the island's proximity to Turkey and distance from Greece, and 
the presence of a substantial Turkish Gypriot minority who had 
lived on the island for hundreds of years. Either obstacle by itself 
could conceivably have been overcome, but together they posed 
in the end an insurmountable barrier to enosis. 

The island's size and closeness to Turkey meant that the Turk- 
ish military would be opposed to its being occupied by Greek forces. 
In addition, the 800 kilometers that lay between Cyprus and the 
Greek mainland made it nearly impossible for Greek forces to seize 
and hold the island successfully. 

The Turkish Cypriot community was the other significant bar- 
rier to enosis. Present on the island since it had been seized in 1571 
from Venice, Turkish Cypriots were adamantly opposed to living 
as a minority under Greek rule. Few Turkish Cypriots had ob- 
jected to British rule, and British policy had been to use them as 
a counterweight in colonial institutions in order to block Greek 
Cypriot efforts for enosis. The growing virulence of the enosist 
movement was noted with concern by the smaller community, and 
during the 1950s a Turkish Cypriot nationalism emerged that 
rivalled that of the enosists in intensity. Some Turkish Cypriots 
came to advocate taksim, that is, partition of the island, as a way 
to prevent their becoming a minority in a Greek state. 


The gradually widening division of the two communities dur- 
ing the twentieth century was new to the island. For centuries the 
two groups had lived together in mixed villages or in separate vil- 
lages close to villages of the other group. Intercommunal relations 
were harmonious if reserved; intermarriage was rare, but interethnic 
violence was even rarer. The two groups had even joined together 
at times to protest despotic rule from Constantinople. 

During the twentieth century, however, the number of mixed 
villages declined, and the first instances of intercommunal violence 
occurred. Mounting pressure for enosis was the main cause of es- 
trangement between the communities. Another cause was the in- 
crease in schooling and literacy. The two communities used 
textbooks from their respective motherlands, texts laden with chau- 
vinistic comments emphasizing the rapacity, cruelty, and duplici- 
ty of the other community. Centuries of conflict between Greece 
and Turkey afforded an ample stock of atrocities to strengthen the 
aversion felt for the "traditional" enemy, be it Greek or Turkish. 
The commonly practiced British colonial policy of "divide and 
rule," of setting the two communities' interests against one another 
to maintain London's hold on Cyprus, also engendered intercom- 
munal animosity. Some writers have charged that the British poli- 
cy of emphasizing the role of the communities in governing 
encouraged the growth of ethnic as opposed to Cypriot national- 
ism. Some scholars have noted that the absence of Cypriot nation- 
alism was perhaps the most fateful legacy of British rule and that 
it doomed the Republic of Cyprus from the outset. A sense of na- 
tionalism might well have muted ethnic differences and bound the 
island's inhabitants together. 

As a result of these disparate factors, in the late 1950s intercommu- 
nal violence became common for the first time in Cypriot history. 
Violence of Cypriot against Cypriot flared even stronger in the 
1960s and ended hopes that the Republic of Cyprus could work as 
planned in the elaborate and carefully crafted constitution of 1960. 

At the end of his life, Archbishop Makarios stated in an inter- 
view with a Norwegian journalist that of all the mistakes he had 
made in his life, he most regretted the role he had played in the 
movement for enosis. Even before he became the first president 
of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, Makarios was the dominant 
figure on Cyprus. His dominance extended from the early 1950s 
when he became head of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus 
until his death in 1977. He had begun agitating for enosis as a young 
bishop. As archbishop he was the ethnarch or leader of the Greek 
Cypriot community, and in that role he continued working for 
union with Greece, even enduring exile for his role in the rebellion 


against British rule. He regarded the imposition of the Republic 
of Cyprus on the island by outside powers as a temporary setback 
on the way to enosis, and a setback that he could undo. In the late 
1960s, however, Makarios stated publicly that he had come to 
regard enosis as still desirable but impossible to achieve, at least 
in the near future. Opposed in the 1969 presidential election by 
a die-hard enosist, Makarios won over 95 percent of the Greek 
Cypriot vote. The movement's extremists resorted to violence in 
the early 1970s, even mounting an assassination attempt against 
him. The movement to which Makarios had given so much had 
turned against him. In 1974 enosists and the Greek-led National 
Guard staged a coup d'etat that caused Makarios to flee the coun- 
try. The Turkish invasion a week later partitioned the country and 
resulted in one-third of the island's population being driven from 
their homes. The powerfully seductive ideal of enosis furthered by 
Makarios during most of his career had, in his words, ' 'destroyed 
Cyprus" and made of him a tragic figure. 

As of late 1992, Cyprus remained partitioned. The southern por- 
tion of the island was governed by the internationally recognized 
Republic of Cyprus and was home to the island's Greek Cypriot 
community. This community had made a remarkable recovery since 
1974, despite the great material and psychological damage it had 
suffered from the Turkish invasion. Its economy had flourished 
and modernized and created a standard of living superior to that 
of some West European nations. This achievement was made pos- 
sible by a versatile and skilled work force, a well-established en- 
trepreneurial class, a sophisticated program of government 
planning, and a highly successful tourist industry that welcomed 
over a million tourists a year by the early 1990s. Foreign econom- 
ic aid also contributed to the striking economic recovery, as did 
the collapse of Beirut as an international business center in the Mid- 
dle East. 

Prosperity led to social changes and permitted an expansion of 
the education system. Although Greek Cypriot society remained 
more traditional than most European societies, women worked more 
outside the home than their mothers did and young people dis- 
played many of the characteristics of their West European counter- 
parts. Education was widely available and esteemed. The Republic 
of Cyprus had one of highest rates of university graduates in the 
world. This was true despite the fact that, until the early 1990s, 
all Greek Cypriots wishing to study at the university level had to 
do so abroad because the Republic of Cyprus had no university. 

Greek Cypriot politics matured after the invasion. During the 
first years of the republic's history, political parties more closely 


resembled groupings or factions around dominant individuals than 
organizations with political programs. After the events of 1974, 
new parties with a more clearly defined political ideology formed. 
Only the two left-wing parties pre-dated 1974: the Progressive Party 
of the Working People (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou 
Laou — AKEL), a doctrinaire yet in practice a moderate and prag- 
matic communist party; and the United Democratic Union of 
Cyprus (Eniea Dimokratiki Enosis Kyprou — EDEK), usually 
referred to as the Socialist Party EDEK (Sosialistiko Komma 
EDEK), a left-wing party consisting mainly of urban white-collar 
employees and professionals. In 1976 two right-wing parties were 
formed: the Democratic Rally (Dimokratikos Synagermos— -DISY), 
led by Glafkos Klerides; and the Democratic Party (Dimokratiko 
Komma — DIKO), headed by Spyros Kyprianou, who succeeded 
Archbishop Makarios as president. Kyprianou remained president 
until his defeat in 1988 by George Vassiliou, a businessman not 
tied to any party, who had the backing of AKEL and EDEK. In 
addition to these four main parties, several smaller groups were 
active as well. 

Domestic politics mirrored those of most other prosperous demo- 
cratic countries, with individual parties advocating policies in con- 
sonance with their political philosophy. The overriding issue in 
Cypriot politics, however, was the question of dealing with the de 
facto partition of the island. Here the parties' course was unusual. 
The right-wing DISY and the communist AKEL generally advo- 
cated a more flexible approach to negotiating with the Turkish 
Cypriots. These two parties favored making greater concessions 
than had former President Kyprianou, and they were frequently 
harsh in their criticism of what they regarded as his intransigence 
or insufficient sense of reality. DIKO and EDEK, for their part, 
were less willing to yield up long-held positions no matter how un- 
acceptable they were to Turkish Cypriot negotiators. They often 
condemned what they saw as President Vassiliou 's insufficient pro- 
tection of the country's interests. 

Greek Cypriot politics were stable. There were four main par- 
ties in the House of Representatives; the changing majorities in 
this body reflected the public's evolving opinion on main issues. 
Most analysts believed, for example, that the results of the May 
1991 parliamentary elections indicated that overall the public sup- 
ported President Vassiliou 's willingness to break new ground in 
intercommunal negotiations. In the elections, DISY won twenty 
seats in the House of Representatives, one more than in the last 
parliamentary elections in 1985, and received 35.8 percent of the 
vote. AKEL increased its number of seats to eighteen, a gain of 


three, and got 30.6 percent of the vote. AKEL's win was all the 
more impressive because in May 1990 a faction of its membership, 
frustrated by a reform of AKEL that seemed too slow to them, had 
formed a new party, the Democratic Socialist Renewal Movement 
(Anorthotiko Dimokratiko Sosialistiko Kinima — ADISOK). The 
new party got 2.4 percent of vote, but won no seats. DIKO took 
a drubbing, losing eight of its nineteen seats and polling only 19.5 
percent of the vote, compared with 27.6 percent in 1985. Although 
EDEK's share of the vote remained almost the same, falling slighdy 
to 10.9 percent, it gained one parliamentary seat for a total of seven. 

President Vassiliou's popularity would again be put the test by 
the presidential elections scheduled for February 1993 in which, 
as of late 1992, there were four candidates. Running once again 
as an independent, President Vassiliou had the support of AKEL. 
Glafkos Clerides, unsuccessful in several earlier attempts to win 
the republic's highest political office, had the support of DISY, the 
party he had founded and had led since the mid-1970s. DIKO and 
the Socialist Party EDEK formed an electoral front to back Paschalis 
Paschalides, a businessman active in Cypriot public affairs since 
the rebellion against British rule. The fourth candidate was an in- 
dependent, Yiannakis Taliotis, a former deputy mayor of the 
western port of Paphos. 

In the northern part of the island, 37 percent of Cyprus' s terri- 
tory was occupied by the * 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" 
("TRNC"), unilaterally proclaimed in November 1983 by the 
Turkish Cypriots and recognized by no state other than Turkey. 
(Because this state is not recognized by the United States govern- 
ment, its name is within quotation marks.) Protected by an esti- 
mated 30,000 Turkish troops based on the island and bolstered by 
much Turkish aid, the Turkish Cypriot community had formed 
its own governing institutions, fashioned a functioning democracy 
with a free press, put in place an education system that extended 
from the pre- school to the university level, and laid the ground- 
work of an economy that, despite a Greek Cypriot economic block- 
ade, had registered respectable growth rates and benefited from 
the visits of over 300,000 tourists a year. 

As of late 1992, the Turkish Cypriot community was headed by 
the veteran politician Rauf Denkta§, a leading figure in Cypriot 
affairs since the mid-1950s. Denkta§ was elected president of the 
"TRNC" in 1983 and again in 1990. Until mid-1992, he was sup- 
ported by the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi— UBP), 
which had been the Turkish Cypriot governing party since its found- 
ing in 1975. After by-elections in 1991 , the UBP controlled forty-four 


of the fifty seats in the National Assembly, the Turkish Cypriot 
legislative body. 

Despite the UBP's virtual monopoly of parliamentary seats, there 
was a vigorous political opposition in the "TRNC." Two left-of- 
center parties, the Communal Liberation Party (Toplumcu Kur- 
tulu§ Partisi — TKP) and the Republican Turkish Party (Cum- 
huriyetci Turk Partisi — CTP), along with the centrist New Dawn 
Party (Y eni Dogus. Partisi — YDP) and several smaller parties, force- 
fully condemned the policies, both foreign and domestic, pursued 
by the government and Denkta§. These parties generally recom- 
mended greater flexibility in negotiating with the Republic of 
Cyprus over issues relating to the island's partition. The TKP and 
CTP were also concerned about the role settlers from the Turkish 
mainland (estimated between 30,000 and 50,000) had in the 
"TRNC" and might have in a possibly negotiated new federal, 
bicommunal, and bizonal republic that could eventually replace 
the Cypriot state that had come into being in 1960. 

The TKP, the CTP, and the YDP had formed an electoral alli- 
ance, the Democratic Struggle Party (Demokratik Miicadele 
Partisi — DMP), for the 1990 parliamentary elections. The party 
won sixteen seats. The TKP and CTP charged election irregulari- 
ties and refused to occupy their fourteen seats. The 1991 by-election 
to fill these seats resulted in ten for the UBP, the remainder going 
to several smaller parties and independents. Many Turkish Cypriots 
were appalled at the results of this election, fearing that the elec- 
tion endangered the survival of democratic politics in their coun- 
try. In the latter half of 1992, ten of the UPB's delegates withdrew 
from the party and formed a new group, the Democratic Party 
(Demokratik Parti — DP), headed by Hakki Atun and having Serdar 
Denkta§, a son of Rauf Denktag, as a member. Atun and his part- 
ners were generally in agreement with the UBP on the national 
issue, but charged the party's leadership with extensive financial 
and political corruption. At the end of 1992, the UBP still con- 
trolled thirty-four seats of the fifty-seat Legislative Assembly, but 
its political dominance and its leader, Dervis, Eroglu, were under 
vigorous attack from the DP, the TKP, the CTP, and some smaller 

This upheaval in Turkish Cypriot politics occurred against 
a backdrop of international controversy over the failure of in- 
tercommunal negotiations, sponsored by the UN in the summer 
and fall of 1992, to resolve the island's de facto partition. In the 
first half of 1992, there was more optimism than usual that these 
negotiations would yield a settlement of the island's division that 
was acceptable to both ethnic communities. Working from a 


"set of ideas" that incorporated many hard-won compromises from 
earlier negotiations, the new UN secretary general, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, thought that an agreement was finally within reach. 
Meetings in the summer and fall in New York between President 
Vassiliou and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denkta§ ended in early 
November, however, without success. Lack of agreement on the 
degree of sovereignty each component part of the new federal state 
was to possess, how much territory Turkish Cypriots would relin- 
quish, and under what conditions Greek Cypriot refugees from 
areas remaining under Turkish Cypriot control were to return to 
their homes caused the failure. The secretary general issued a report 
that unequivocally blamed the Turkish Cypriot side for the failed 
negotiations. The Turkish Cypriots rejected his judgements as un- 
fair. Talks were scheduled to resume in March 1993 after presiden- 
tial elections in the Republic of Cyprus in February. 

Intercommunal negotiations to arrange a new bicommunal, bi- 
zonal federal republic had been underway since 1975. In 1977 
Makarios had agreed that the new Cypriot state would consist of 
the two communities, each with extensive local autonomy in dis- 
crete regions, but united via some degree of federation into a sin- 
gle state. In 1979 procedures that facilitated further dialogue were 
worked out by negotiators from the two communities. Aided by 
the good offices of the UN, negotiations continued at numerous 
venues through the 1980s and into the 1990s, but without signifi- 
cant accomplishments. In early 1985, an agreement was nearly 
achieved, but President Kyprianou backed off at the last moment. 
Although Kyprianou was censured in the House of Representa- 
tives for failure to reach an agreement, his party won the ensuing 
parliamentary elections. Voter discontent removed him from office 
in 1988. George Vassiliou, an independent, was elected president, 
probably because Greek Cypriots hoped he could bring a new open- 
ness and fresh initiatives to the negotiating process. 

Over the years, Greek Cypriots had come to accept the concept 
of a bicommunal, bizonal, federal republic. This meant that some 
of Cyprus would remain under Turkish Cypriot control. Greek 
Cypriots would be allowed to return to properties they owned in 
this area before 1974, or be compensated for them, but attention 
would be paid to "certain practical difficulties." Also accepted was 
the principal Turkish Cypriot demand that the two communities 
be seen as political equals despite their differences in size. The Turk- 
ish Cypriot community was not to be seen as a minority, although 
it made up less than 20 percent of the island's population. It was 
to have exclusive management of its own communal affairs. Fre- 
quent demands that Turkish troops be withdrawn from the island 


before negotiations began had been abandoned because of hopes 
that intercommunal talks could have positive results. 

As broad as these concessions were, Greek Cypriots remained 
adamant on a number of points. They demanded the eventual 
removal of Turkish troops from the island. Of even greater im- 
portance and more difficult to resolve was how to undo the losses 
suffered by Greek Cypriot refugees. An estimated 180,000 Greek 
Cypriots had fled or been driven from their homes and lost much 
property in what became the "TRNC," as compared with about 
40,000 Turkish Cypriots who had moved out of areas under the 
control of the Republic of Cyprus. Greek Cypriot insistence on 
realizing the "three freedoms" of movement, setdement, and 
ownership throughout Cyprus for all Cypriots was intended to ex- 
punge the results of the Turkish invasion. 

Greek Cypriot demands that the three freedoms eventually be 
realized throughout Cyprus challenged negotiators. The degree and 
quality of federation, or confederation, that Turkish Cypriots saw 
as a necessary underpinning for their political freedom also received 
much discussion. 

Reconciling these varied aims would work only if both commu- 
nities manifested patience, flexibility, and good faith. Given the 
great stakes involved and the power of pressure groups within com- 
munities (most notably refugee groups), these qualities were often 
lacking. Observers noted that both parties on occasion demonstrated 
a desire to win on all points rather than conceding some. A negotiat- 
ing team having made some gains might suddenly renounce earli- 
er concessions. Concessions granted often resulted in vitriolic attacks 
from within the negotiators' own community. Confidentiality of 
negotiations was rare; within hours full accounts of closed talks were 
available to the public. 

As always in Cypriot history, the success of a new settlement 
would be affected by external forces. Turkey and Greece would 
almost certainly be involved in the final agreement and would sign 
treaties similar to the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. For both 
political and military reasons, neither Greek nor Turkish elites could 
ignore Cyprus because in recent decades events there had affected 
the larger states, sometimes in ways not to their liking. To reach 
his objectives, Archbishop Makarios, for example, frequently ap- 
pealed to the Greek people over the heads of the Greek political 
leadership. Rauf Denkta§, for his part, had so much personal sup- 
port among Turkey's political and military elites that only the stron- 
gest of Turkish governments could coerce him. In effect, he was 
to some degree independent of Turkey, the country that guaran- 
teed his survival and that of the "TRNC." Conversely, Greek and 


Turkish politicians often found the Cyprus issue a ready tool with 
which to attack their domestic opponents; hence there was a nar- 
rowing of the range of policy decisions relating to Cyprus availa- 
ble to the leaders of the two nations. 

The end of the Cold War has lessened international concern with 
Cyprus, The disappearance of the Soviet Union meant, at least 
in the early 1990s, that Western Europe's security would no longer 
be threatened by a rupture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation's southeastern flank in the event of a war between Greece 
and Turkey over Cyprus, as could have happened in 1964, 1967, 
and 1974. Cyprus's reduced geopolitical significance was reflect- 
ed in the increasing reluctance of the UN to maintain forces on 
the island. In addition, instability elsewhere on the globe has taxed 
the resources of the organization and its member states. As part 
of a planned reduction of UNFICYP forces, the Danish contin- 
gent of several hundred personnel was scheduled to depart from 
Cyprus by mid-January 1993, leaving 1,500 UN soldiers to man 
the buffer zone that cuts across the island. 

In the short run at least, the end of the Cold War would most 
likely benefit Turkey because its size and location made its good- 
will and cooperation crucial to the Western powers, as was demon- 
strated in the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 . Given the continuing instability 
in the Middle East, in the Balkans, and in some of the former Soviet 
republics bordering these areas, Turkey's strategic importance 
would probably endure and make unlikely sustained and signifi- 
cant outside pressures to resolve the Cyprus question. Greece re- 
tained, however, its trump card: its ability to block Turkey's 
membership in the European Community if the Cyprus problem 
were not settled in a way it found satisfactory. 

Despite the obstacles to a mutually acceptable settlement, hope 
remained that the creation of a new bicommunal, bizonal, federal 
state might someday be agreed on. In 1992 after the nearly twenty 
years of division, the younger members of each community had 
little or no first-hand knowledge of one another. Some observers 
believed this lack of familiarity would facilitate polite intercommunal 
relations along the formal lines established by a new settlement. 
Young Cypriots had an advantage their parents and grandparents 
had not had: they knew well how terrible the results would be of 
another failure to live together peacefully on their small island. 
Blessed with hindsight and aware of the immense gains a reason- 
able settlement would bring, perhaps young Cypriots would make 
their island whole again. 

Eric Solsten December 17, 1992 


Chapter 1. Historical Setting 

Artist's rendition of a sphinx, carved in ivory, from Salamis, eighth century 

THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS was established in 1960, after 
the former colony gained independence from Britain. Since 1974, 
however, a de facto division of the island has existed, with the Greek 
Cypriot community controlling 63 percent of the territory, and the 
Turkish Cypriots, backed by Turkish Army units, 37 percent. The 
scene of anticolonial and intercommunal strife from the mid-1950s 
to the mid-1970s, Cyprus assumed an importance out of propor- 
tion to its size and population because of its strategic location and 
its impact on the national interests of other nations. The island's 
location in the eastern Mediterranean Sea has made it easily ac- 
cessible from Europe, Asia, and Africa since the earliest days of 
ships. Its timber and mineral resources made it important as a 
source of trade goods in the ancient world, but attracted conquerors, 
pirates, and adventurers in addition to merchants and settlers. 
About the middle of the second millennium B.C., Cyprus was sub- 
jected to foreign domination for the first time, and from then until 
1960, almost without interruption, outside powers controlled the 
island and its people. 

Christianity was introduced early in the Christian Era, when 
Cyprus was under Roman rule, by the apostles Paul, Mark, and 
Barnabas. The martyrdom of Barnabas and the later discovery of 
his tomb are particularly important events in the history of the 
Church of Cyprus and were instrumental in the church's becom- 
ing autocephalous rather than remaining subordinate to the patri- 
archate of Antioch. After doctrinal controversies split Christianity 
between East and West, the church survived 400 years of attempts 
by Roman Catholic rulers to force recognition of the authority of 
the pope in Rome. After Cyprus' s conquest by Ottoman Turks 
in the sixteenth century, the sees of the Orthodox bishops were 
reestablished, according to the Ottoman practice of governing 
through a millet (a community distinguished by religion) system. 
Provided a millet met the empire's demands, its leaders enjoyed 
a degree of autonomy. The head of the Greek Cypriot millet, the 
archbishop, was therefore both a religious and a secular leader, 
and it was entirely consistent with historical tradition that, in the 
anticolonial struggle of the mid-1950s, Archbishop Makarios III 
emerged as the leader of the Greek Cypriots and was subsequently 
elected president of the new republic. 

After Greece had won its independence from the Ottoman Em- 
pire in 1821 , the idea of enosis (union with Greece) took hold among 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

ethnic Greeks living in the Ionian and Aegean islands, Crete, 
Cyprus, and areas of Anatolia. Britain ceded the Ionian Islands 
to Greece in 1864, and after control of Cyprus passed from the 
Ottoman Empire to the British Empire in 1878, Greek Cypriots 
saw the ceding of the Ionian Islands as a precedent for enosis for 
themselves. Under British rule, agitation for enosis varied with time. 
After World War II, in the era of the breakup of colonial empires, 
the movement gained strength, and Greek Cypriots spurned Brit- 
ish liberalization efforts. In the mid-1950s, when anticolonial guer- 
rilla activities began, Turkish Cypriots — who until that time had 
only rarely expressed opposition to enosis — began to agitate for tak- 
sim, or partition, and Greece and Turkey began actively to sup- 
port their respective ethnic groups on the island. 

After four years of guerrilla revolt by Greek Cypriots against 
the British, a compromise settlement was reached in Zurich be- 
tween the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey and later in Lon- 
don among representatives of Greece, Turkey, Britain, and the 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. As a result of 
this settlement, Cyprus became an independent republic. Indepen- 
dence was marked on August 16, 1960. In separate communal elec- 
tions, Makarios became president, and Fazil Kuciik, leader of the 
Turkish Cypriots, became vice president. In the early 1960s, po- 
litical arguments over constitutional interpretation continually dead- 
locked the government. Greek Cypriots insisted on revision of the 
constitution and majority rule. Turkish Cypriots argued for strict 
constructionism, local autonomy, and the principle of minority veto. 
The result was stalemate. Intercommunal violence broke out in 
December 1963, and resulted in the segregation of the two ethnic 
communities and establishment of the United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Even with United Nations 
(UN) troops as a buffer, however, intermittent conflict continued 
and brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war in 1964 and 

The irony of the divided Cyprus that has existed since 1974 is 
that the Greek government set the stage for Turkish intervention. 
The military junta that controlled Greece had come to view Arch- 
bishop Makarios as an obstacle to setdement of the Cyprus problem 
and establishment of better relations between Athens and Ankara. 
A successful coup was engineered in Cyprus in July 1974: Makarios 
was ousted, and a puppet president installed. Turkey, as one of 
the guarantor powers according to the agreements that led to Cypri- 
ot independence, sent troops into Cyprus to restore order. Britain, 
as another guarantor power, refused to participate. Meanwhile, 
in Greece the junta had collapsed, and a new government was being 


Historical Setting 

established. After a short cease-fire and a few days of hurried negoti- 
ations, the Turkish government reinforced its troops and ordered 
them to secure the northern part of the island. 

Turkish forces seized 37 percent of the island and effected a de 
facto partition that was still in existence at the beginning of the 
1990s. Turkish Cypriots declared the establishment of their own 
state in 1983, but as of 1990 only Turkey had recognized the "Tur- 
kish Republic of Northern Cyprus." Although more populous and 
considerably richer than the Turkish Cypriot state, and enjoying 
international recognition, the Republic of Cyprus had not been 
able to regain its lost territory. Increased military expenditures could 
not offset the considerable Turkish military presence on the island. 
Years of laborious negotiations at numerous venues had also 
achieved little toward ending the island's tragic division. 

The Ancient Period 

Human settlements existed on Cyprus as early as 5800 B.C., 
during the Neolithic Era or New Stone Age. The Neolithic Cypri- 
ots' origin is uncertain. Some evidence, including artifacts of 
Anatolian obsidian, suggests that the setters were related to the peo- 
ples of Asia Minor (present-day Turkey). The discovery of copper 
on the island around 3000 B.C. brought more frequent visits from 
traders. Trading ships were soon bringing settlers to exploit the 
mineral wealth. 

During the long progression from stone to bronze, many Ne- 
olithic villages were abandoned, as people moved inland to settle 
on the great plain (the Mesaoria) and in the foothills of the moun- 
tains. Also during this era of transition, Cypriot pottery became 
distinctive in shape and design, and small figurines of fertility god- 
desses appeared for the first time. During the same period, Cypri- 
ots were influenced by traders from the great Minoan civilization 
that had developed on Crete, but, although trade was extensive, 
few settlers came to Cyprus. The Minoan traders developed a script 
for Cypriot commerce, but unfortunately extant examples still await 
decipherment. The cultural advances, thriving economy, and rela- 
tive lack of defenses invited the attention of more powerful neigh- 
bors, and during the Late Bronze Age (about 1500 B.C.), the forces 
of the Egyptian pharaoh, Thutmose III, invaded the island. 

After 1400 B.C., Mycenaean and Mycenaean- Achaean traders 
from the northeastern Peloponnesus began regular commercial visits 
to the island. Settlers from the same areas arrived in large num- 
bers toward the end of the Trojan War (traditionally dated about 
1184 B.C.). Even in modern times, a strip of the northern coast 
was known as the Achaean Coast in commemoration of those early 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Historical Setting 

settlers. The newcomers spread the use of their spoken language 
and introduced a script that greatly facilitated commerce. They 
also introduced the potter's wheel and began producing pottery 
that eventually was carried by traders to many mainland markets. 
By the end of the second millennium B.C., a distinctive culture 
had developed on Cyprus. The island's culture was tempered and 
enriched by its position as a crossroads for the commerce of three 
continents, but in essence it was distinctively Hellenic. It is to this 
3,000 years of Hellenic tradition that the present-day Greek Cypriots 
refer when arguing either for enosis or for their own dominance 
in an independent state. 

Later Greek poets and playwrights frequently mention the ear- 
ly influences of Cyprus. Aphrodite, Greek goddess of love and beau- 
ty, was said to have been born out of the sea foam on the island's 
west coast. The most important of many temples to Aphrodite was 
built at Paphos, where the love goddess was venerated for centu- 
ries, and even in modern times young women visited the ruins to 
make votive offerings and to pray for good marriages or fertility 
(see fig. 2). Aphrodite is mentioned by Homer in the Iliad and Odys- 
sey, as is a Cypriot king, Kinyras, of Paphos. 

The Late Bronze Age on Cyprus was characterized by a fusion 
of the indigenous culture and the cultures brought by settlers from 
the mainland areas. This fusion took place over a long period and 
was affected by shifting power relationships and major movements 
of peoples throughout the eastern Mediterranean area. Cyprus was 
affected particularly by the introduction of iron tools and weapons, 
signaling the end of the Bronze Age and the beginning of the Iron 
Age, near the end of the second millennium B.C. Iron did not dis- 
place bronze overnight, any more than one culture immediately 
displaced another (pockets of native Cypriot culture, for example, 
existed for several more centuries). The introduction of iron, 
however, heralded major economic changes, and the numbers of 
Greek setders ensured the dominance of their culture. 

An important eastern influence during the early part of the first 
millennium B.C. came from a Phoenician settlement. The prin- 
cipal Phoenician concentration was at Kition, the modern city of 
Larnaca, on the southeast coast. Three thousand years later some 
Turks and Turkish Cypriots would try to use such influences to 
prove that eastern cultures predated Greek influence on the island. 
On this basis, modern Cypriots were said to be descended from 
Phoenician Cypriot forebears. Greek Cypriots responded that, even 
though visits by Phoenician traders probably occurred as early as 
the third millennium B.C., colonists did not arrive until about 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

800 B.C. The Phoenicians settled in several areas and shared po- 
litical control with the Greeks until the arrival of the Assyrians. 

In 708 B.C. Cyprus encompassed seven independent kingdoms 
that were conquered by the Assyrian king, Sargon II. During the 
Assyrian dominance, about 100 years, Cypriot kings maintained 
considerable autonomy in domestic affairs and accumulated great 
wealth. The number of city-kingdoms increased to ten, one of which 
was Phoenician. The Cypriot kings were religious as well as secu- 
lar leaders and generally commanded the city's defense forces. 
When Assyrian power and influence began to decline near the end 
of the seventh century B.C., Egypt filled the resulting vacuum in 
eastern Mediterranean affairs. 

The Egyptian pharaohs had built a powerful fleet of warships 
that defeated the combined fleets of Phoenicia and Cyprus, set- 
ting the stage for Egypt's domination of the eastern Mediterrane- 
an. During the Egyptian ascendancy, the Cypriot kings were again 
allowed to continue in power after pledging themselves vassals of 
the pharaoh. The main impact of Egyptian domination was the 
reorientation of commerce, making Egypt the principal market for 
Cypriot minerals and timber. 

When Egypt fell to the Persians in the late sixth century B.C., 
Cyprus was made part of a satrapy of King Darius. By the time 
of Persian domination, Salamis outshone the other city-kingdoms 
in wealth and splendor, and its kings were looked on as first among 
equals. Petty kings ruled at Amathus, Kition, Kyrenia, Lapithos, 
Kourion, Marion, Paphos, Soli, and Tamassos, but leadership in 
the fifth- and fourth-century struggles against the Persians stemmed 
from Salamis. The king of Salamis, Onesilos, is remembered as 
the hero who died leading the revolt against the Persians in 498 B.C. 

The Cypriot kings continued to enjoy considerable autonomy 
while paying tribute to Persia, and were even allowed to strike their 
own coinage. They remained culturally oriented toward Greece, 
and when the Ionians revolted against the Persians, those of the 
Cypriot kings who were Greek also rebelled. The revolt was sup- 
pressed quickly, apparently without retaliation. 

In 41 1 B.C. another Greek Cypriot, Evagoras, established him- 
self as king of Salamis and worked for a united Cyprus that would 
be closely tied to the Greek states. By force and by guile, the new 
king brought other Cypriot kingdoms into line and led forces against 
Persia. He also allied the Cypriots with Athens, and the Atheni- 
ans honored him with a statue in the agora. As the Salamisian king 
gained prominence and power in the eastern Mediterranean (even 
attacking Persian positions in Anatolia), the Persians tried to rid 
themselves of this threat and eventually defeated the Cypriots. 


Historical Setting 

Through diplomacy Evagoras managed to retain the throne of Sala- 
mis, but the carefully nurtured union of the Cypriot kingdoms was 
dissolved. Although Cyprus remained divided at the end of his 
thirty- seven-year reign, Evagoras is revered as a Greek Cypriot 
of uncommon accomplishment. He brought artists and learned men 
to his court and fostered Greek studies. He was instrumental in 
having the ancient Cypriot syllabary replaced by the Greek al- 
phabet. He issued coins of Greek design and in general furthered 
the integration of Greek and Cypriot culture. 

Cypriot freedom from the Persians finally came in 333 B.C. when 
Alexander the Great decisively defeated Persia at the Battle of Is- 
sus. A short time later, the Cypriot kings were granted autonomy 
in return for helping Alexander at the siege of Tyre. The death 
of Alexander in 323 B.C. signaled the end of that short period of 
self-government. Alexander's heirs fought over Cyprus, a rich prize, 
for several years, but in 294 B.C. it was taken by Ptolemy, one 
of Alexander's generals, who had established himself as satrap (and 
eventual king) of Egypt. Under the rule of the Ptolemies, which 
lasted for two and one-half centuries, the city-kingdoms of Cyprus 
were abolished and a central administration established. The 
Ptolemaic period, marked by internal strife and intrigue, was ended 
by Roman annexation in 58 B.C.. 

At first Rome governed the island as part of the province of 
Cilicia, and for a time Cicero, the famous orator, was governor. 
Later, when administration was vested in the Roman Senate, the 
island was governed by a proconsul and divided into four districts: 
Amathus, Lapithos, Paphos, and Salamis. The government seat 
was at Paphos, and the center of commerce at Salamis. 

Although the object of Roman occupation was to exploit the is- 
land's resources for the ultimate gain of the Roman treasury, the 
new rulers also brought a measure of prosperity, as their enforced 
peace allowed the mines, industries, and commercial establishments 
to increase their activities. The Romans soon began building new 
roads, harbors, and public buildings. Although Paphos supplant- 
ed Salamis as the capital, the latter retained its glory, remaining 
a center of culture and education as well as of commerce. An earth- 
quake leveled much of Salamis in 15 B.C., but the Emperor Au- 
gustus bestowed his favor on the city and had it rebuilt in the grand 
Roman fashion of the time. 

Salamis was shattered by earthquakes again in the fourth cen- 
tury. Again reconstructed, although on a smaller scale, the city 
never achieved its former magnificence. When its harbor silted up 
in medieval times, it was abandoned to the drifting coastal sand 
that eventually buried it. Twentieth-century archaeologists have 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

uncovered much of ancient Salamis, revealing glories from every 
epoch, from the Bronze Age to its final abandonment. 

The single most important event during Roman rule was the 
introduction of Christianity during the reign of the Emperor 
Claudius. According to tradition, the apostle Paul landed at Sala- 
mis in A.D. 45, accompanied by Barnabas, also a convert to Chris- 
tianity and an apostle. Barnabas 's arrival was a homecoming; he 
was a native of Salamis, of Hellenized Jewish parentage. The two 
missionaries traveled across Cyprus preaching the new religion and 
making converts. At Paphos they converted the Roman procon- 
sul, Sergius Paulus, who became the first Roman of noble birth 
to accept Christianity, thus making Cyprus the first area of the 
empire to be governed by a Christian. 

In 285 the Emperor Diocletian undertook the reorganization of 
the Roman Empire, dividing its jurisdiction between its Latin- 
speaking and Greek- speaking halves. Diocletian's successor, Con- 
stantine, accepted conversion and became the first Christian Roman 
emperor. In 324 he established his imperial residence at Byzantium, 
on the shore of the Bosporus. Byzantium was renamed Constan- 
tinople and eventually became the capital of the Byzantine (Eastern) 

The Medieval Period 

From Constantine's establishment of the Byzantine Empire until 
the crusaders arrived more than 800 years later, the history of 
Cyprus is part of the history of that empire. Under Byzantine rule, 
the Greek orientation that had been prominent since antiquity de- 
veloped the strong Hellenistic-Christian character that continues 
to be a hallmark of the Greek Cypriot community. 

Byzantine Rule 

By the time Constantine accepted Christianity for himself, the 
new religion was probably already predominant on Cyprus, ow- 
ing mainly to the early missionary work of Paul, Barnabas, and 
Mark. Earthquakes in the early fourth century created havoc on 
the island, and drought seriously damaged the economy. However, 
the most significant event of the century was the struggle of the 
Church of Cyprus to maintain its independence from the patri- 
archs of Antioch. Three bishops represented Cyprus at the first 
Ecumenical Council of Nicaea in 325. At the second council (Sardi- 
ca, 343), there were twelve Cypriot bishops, indicating a great in- 
crease in the number of communicants in the intervening years. 

A major struggle concerning the status of the Church of Cyprus 
occurred at the third council, at Ephesus, in 431. The powerful 


Kourion Theater, west of Limassol on Episkopi Bay, dates from the 
second century B. C. and was later enlarged by the Romans. 

Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 

patriarch of Antioch argued forcefully that the small Cypriot church 
belonged in his jurisdiction, but the Cypriot bishops held their 
ground, and the council decided in their favor. Antioch still did 
not relinquish its claim, however, and it was not until after the 
discovery of the tomb of Saint Barnabas containing a copy of the 
Gospel of St. Matthew allegedly placed there by the apostle Mark 
that Emperor Zeno intervened and settled the issue. The Church 
of Cyprus was confirmed as being autocephalous, that is, ecclesiasti- 
cally autonomous, enjoying the privilege of electing and consecrat- 
ing its own bishops and archbishops and ranking equally with the 
churches of Antioch, Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Constantinople. 

Except for the religious disputes, a period of calm prevailed on 
Cyprus during the early Byzantine centuries. The social structure 
was rigid and codified in law. Under a law issued by Constantine, 
tenant farmers were made serfs and forbidden to leave the land 
on which they were born. A later law allowed runaways to be 
returned in chains and punished. Administration was highly cen- 
tralized, with government officials responsible direcdy to the em- 
peror. The wealthy landlord and merchant classes retained their 
age-old privileges. The connection between church and state grew 
closer. The pervasive organization and authority of the church, 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

however, sometimes benefited the common man by interceding in 
cases of abuse of power by public officials or wealthy persons. Dur- 
ing the fifth and sixth centuries, the level of prosperity permitted 
the construction of major cathedrals in several of the island's cit- 
ies and towns. Salamis, renamed Constantia, again became the 
capital and witnessed another era of greatness. Archaeologists have 
uncovered an enormous fourth-century basilica at the site. 

The peace that many generations of Cypriots enjoyed during 
the middle centuries of the first millennium A.D. was shattered 
by Arab attacks during the reign of Byzantine emperor Constans 
II (641-68). Sometime between 647 and 649, Muawiyah, the amir 
of Syria (later caliph of the Muslim empire), led a 1,700-ship in- 
vasion fleet against Cyprus. Constantia was sacked, and most of 
its population massacred. Muawiyah 's destructive raid was only 
the first of a long series of attacks over the next 300 years. Many 
were merely quick piratical raids, but others were large-scale at- 
tacks in which many Cypriots were slaughtered and great wealth 
carried off or destroyed. No Byzantine churches survived the Mus- 
lim attacks. In 965, General Nicephorus Phocas (later emperor), 
leading the Byzantine imperial forces, drove the Arabs out of Crete 
and Cilicia and scored a series of victories on land and sea that 
led to the liberation of Cyprus after more than three centuries of 
constant turmoil. 

The pitiable condition of the Cypriots during the three centu- 
ries of the Arab wars can only be imagined. Thousands upon thou- 
sands were killed, and other thousands were carried off into slavery. 
Death and destruction, rape and rampage were the heritage of un- 
numbered generations. Many cities and towns were destroyed, 
never to be rebuilt. 

In the twelfth century, Isaac Comnenos, a Byzantine governor, 
set himself up in the capital as the emperor of Cyprus, and the 
authorities in Constantinople were either too weak or too busy to 
do anything about the usurper. When an imperial fleet was even- 
tually sent against Cyprus, Comnenos was prepared and, in league 
with Sicilian pirates, defeated the fleet and retained control of the 
island. Comnenos, a tyrant and murderer, was unlamented when 
swept from power by the king of England, Richard I the Lion- 

After wintering in Sicily, Richard set sail en route to the Holy 
Land as a leader of the Third Crusade. But in April 1191 his fleet 
was scattered by storms off Cyprus. Two ships were wrecked off 
the southern coast, and a third, carrying Richard's fiancee Beren- 
garia of Navarre, sought shelter in Lemesos (Limassol). The 
wrecked ships were plundered and the survivors robbed by the forces 


Historical Setting 

of Comnenos, and the party of the bride-to-be was prevented from 
obtaining provisions and fresh water. When Richard arrived and 
learned of these affronts, he took time out from crusading, first 
to marry Berengaria in the chapel of the fortress at Lemesos and 
then to capture Cyprus and depose Comnenos. The capture of 
Cyprus, seemingly a footnote to history, actually proved benefi- 
cial to the crusaders whose foothold in the Holy Land had almost 
been eliminated by the Muslim commander Saladin. Cyprus be- 
came a strategically important logistic base and was used as such 
for the next 100 years. 

When Richard defeated Comnenos, he extracted a huge bounty 
from the Cypriots. He then appointed officials to administer 
Cyprus, left a small garrison to enforce his rule, and sailed on to 
the Holy Land. A short time later, the Cypriots revolted against 
their new overlords. Although the revolt was quickly put down, 
Richard decided that the island was too much of a burden, so he 
sold it to the Knights Templars, a Frankish military order whose 
grand master was a member of Richard's coterie. Their oppres- 
sive, tyrannical rule made that of the avaricious Comnenos seem 
mild in comparison. The people again rebelled and suffered a mas- 
sacre, but their persistence led the Templars, convinced that they 
would have no peace on Cyprus, to depart. Control of the island 
was turned over to Guy de Lusignan, the controversial ruler of 
the Latin (see Glossary) kingdom of Jerusalem, who evidently 
agreed to pay Richard the amount still owed him by the Templars. 
More than 800 years of Byzantine rule ended as the Frankish Lu- 
signan dynasty established a Western feudal system on Cyprus. 

The Lusignan and Venetian Eras 

Guy de Lusignan lived only two years after assuming control 
in 1192, but the dynasty that he founded ruled Cyprus as an in- 
dependent kingdom for more than three centuries. In religious mat- 
ters, Lusignan was tolerant of the Cypriot adherence to Orthodoxy, 
but his brother Amaury, who succeeded him, showed no such liber- 
ality. The stage was hence set for a protracted struggle, which domi- 
nated the first half of the Lusignan period. At issue was the 
paramountcy of the Roman Catholic Church over the Orthodox 
church. Latin sees were established at Famagusta, Limassol, Nico- 
sia, and Paphos; land was appropriated for churches; and authority 
to collect tithes was granted to the Latins. The harshness with which 
the Latin clergy attempted to gain control of the Church of Cyprus 
exacerbated the uneasy relationship between Franks and Cypri- 
ots. In 1260 Pope Alexander IV issued the Bulla Cypria, declaring 
the Latin church to be the official church of Cyprus, forcing the 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Cypriot clergy to take oaths of obedience, and claiming the right 
to all tithes. The papal ordinance had no more effect than the con- 
stant persecution or the frequent visits of high-ranking papal legates 
sent to convert the islanders. The Cypriots remained loyal to their 
Orthodox heritage, and by the middle of the fourteenth century 
the Latin clergy had become less determined in its efforts to Latinize 
the population. The dominance of the Latin church officially con- 
tinued for another 200 years, but Cypriots followed the lead of their 
own clergy and refused to accept the imposition of their Western 
rulers' form of Christianity. 

In the thirteenth century, the kings of Cyprus, particularly Hugh 
III (reigned 1267-84), tried to assist the Latin Christians of the Syri- 
an mainland in their final efforts to retain their holdings. The Mam- 
luks of Egypt, however, proved to be the decisive defeating factor, 
capturing Christian fortresses one after another as they moved along 
the eastern Mediterranean littoral toward Acre. With the fall of 
Acre in 1291, the remaining Christian positions were given up, 
and the Frankish lords and merchants retreated to Cyprus, which 
became a staging area for spasmodic and unprofitable attacks on 

For a century after the fall of Acre, Cyprus attained and held 
a position of influence and importance far beyond that which such 
a small kingdom would normally enjoy. As the only remaining 
eastern base of operations against the Muslims, the island 
prospered, and its kings gained importance among the ruling fam- 
ilies of Europe. Under the rigid feudal system that prevailed, 
however, the new-found prosperity fell to the Franks; the native 
Cypriots, who were mostly serfs, benefited little or not at all. This 
was a period of great architectural achievement, as the Frankish 
lords directed the construction of beautiful castles and palaces, and 
the Latin clergy ordered the building of magnificent cathedrals and 
monasteries. The prosperity of the island attracted adventurers, 
merchants, and entrepreneurs. Two Italian trading conglomerates 
from the republics of Genoa and Venice gained particular impor- 
tance in the kingdom's economy. Through intrigue, force, and 
financial power, the two Italian republics gained ever-increasing 
privileges, and at one point in the fourteenth century Famagusta 
was ceded to Genoa, which exercised suzerainty over the thriving 
port for ninety-one years. 

The Lusignans' ability to control Cypriot cultural, economic, 
and political life declined rapidly in the first half of the fifteenth 
century. The situation was particularly desperate after the capture 
of King Janus I by the Mamluks in 1426. The captors demanded 
an enormous ransom, putting Cyprus again in the position of paying 


St. Chryssostomos Monastery near the Castle of Bujfavento in the 
Kyrenia Range was built in the eleventh century. 

Kolossi Castle and its domed sugar storehouse, west of Limassol, 
were built by Crusaders in the thirteenth century. 
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

tribute to Egypt. Janus was succeeded by his son John II, whose 
reign was marked by dissension and intrigue. 

The most important event in the reign of John II was his mar- 
riage to Helena Palaeologos, a Greek who was a granddaughter 
of a Byzantine emperor and a follower of the Orthodox faith. Queen 
Helena, stronger in character than her husband, took over the run- 
ning of the kingdom and brought Greek culture out of the obliv- 
ion in which it had languished for three centuries. Her actions in 
favor of the Orthodox faith and Greek culture naturally disturbed 
the Franks, who came to consider her a dangerous enemy, but she 
had become too powerful to attack. Greek Cypriots have always 
revered Queen Helena as a great heroine because of her boldness. 
John II and Helena died within a few months of each other in 1458 
and were succeeded by their seventeen-year-old daughter Charlotte, 
but the succession was contested by John's illegitimate son. After 
six years of treachery and conniving (even with the Mamluks), 
James ousted his half sister and ascended the throne as James II. 
He is generally known as James the Bastard and was renowned 
for his political amorality. 

After years of enduring rapacious forays by neighboring states, 
the weakened Kingdom of Cyprus was forced to turn to its ally 
Venice to save itself from being dismembered. In 1468, by virtue 
of a marriage between James II and Caterina Cornaro, daughter 
of a Venetian noble family, the royal house of Cyprus was formal- 
ly linked with Venice. James died in 1473, and the island came 
under Venetian control. Caterina reigned as a figurehead until 
1489, when Venice formally annexed Cyprus and ended the 
300-year Lusignan epoch. 

For ordinary Cypriots, the change from Lusignan to Venetian 
rule was hardly noticeable. The Venetians were as oppressive as 
their predecessors and aimed to profit as much as possible from 
their new acquisition. One difference was that the wealth that had 
been kept on the island by the Frankish rulers was taken to 
Venice — Cyprus was only one outpost of the far-flung Venetian 
commercial empire. 

During the long Lusignan period and the eighty-two years of 
Venetian control, foreign rulers unquestionably changed the Cypri- 
ot way of life, but it was the Cypriot peasant with his Greek religion 
and Greek culture who withstood all adversity. Throughout the 
period, almost three centuries, there were two distinct societies, 
one foreign and one native. The first society consisted primarily 
of Frankish nobles with their retinues and Italian merchants with 
their families and followers. The second society, the majority of 
the population, consisted of Greek Cypriot serfs and laborers. Each 


Historical Setting 

of these societies had its own culture, language, and religion. 
Although a decided effort was made to supplant native customs 
and beliefs, the effort failed. 

Ottoman Rule 

Throughout the period of Venetian rule, Ottoman Turks raid- 
ed and attacked at will. In 1489, the first year of Venetian con- 
trol, Turks attacked the Karpas Peninsula, pillaging and taking 
captives to be sold into slavery. In 1539 the Turkish fleet attacked 
and destroyed Limassol. Fearing the ever-expanding Ottoman Em- 
pire, the Venetians had fortified Famagusta, Nicosia, and Kyre- 
nia, but most other cities were easy prey. 

In the summer of 1570, the Turks struck again, but this time 
with a full-scale invasion rather than a raid. About 60,000 troops, 
including cavalry and artillery, under the command of Lala Mustafa 
Pasha landed unopposed near Limassol on July 2, 1570, and laid 
siege to Nicosia. In an orgy of victory on the day that the city fell — 
September 9, 1570 — 20,000 Nicosians were put to death, and ev- 
ery church, public building, and palace was looted. Word of the 
massacre spread, and a few days later Mustafa took Kyrenia without 
having to fire a shot. Famagusta, however, resisted and put up 
a heroic defense that lasted from September 1570 until August 1571 . 

The fall of Famagusta marked the beginning of the Ottoman 
period in Cyprus. Two months later, the naval forces of the Holy 
League, composed mainly of Venetian, Spanish, and papal ships 
under the command of Don John of Austria, defeated the Turkish 
fleet at Lepanto in one of the decisive battles of world history. The 
victory over the Turks, however, came too late to help Cyprus, 
and the island remained under Ottoman rule for the next three 

The former foreign elite was destroyed — its members killed, car- 
ried away as captives, or exiled. The Orthodox Christians, i.e., 
the Greek Cypriots who survived, had new foreign overlords. Some 
early decisions of these new rulers were welcome innovations. The 
feudal system was abolished, and the freed serfs were allowed to 
acquire land and work their own farms. Although the small land- 
holdings of the peasants were heavily taxed, the ending of serfdom 
changed the lives of the island's ordinary people. Another action 
of far-reaching importance was the granting of land to Turkish sol- 
diers and peasants who became the nucleus of the island's Turk- 
ish community. 

Although their homeland had been dominated by foreigners for 
many centuries, it was only after the imposition of Ottoman rule 
that Orthodox Christians began to develop a really strong sense 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

of cohesiveness. This change was prompted by the Ottoman prac- 
tice of ruling the empire through millets, or religious communities. 
Rather than suppressing the empire's many religious communi- 
ties, the Turks allowed them a degree of automony as long as they 
complied with the demands of the sultan. The vast size and the 
ethnic variety of the empire made such a policy imperative. The 
system of governing through millets reestablished the authority of 
the Church of Cyprus and made its head the Greek Cypriot lead- 
er, or ethnarch. It became the responsibility of the ethnarch to ad- 
minister the territories where his flock lived and to collect taxes. 
The religious convictions and functions of the ethnarch were of no 
concern to the empire as long as its needs were met. 

In 1575 the Turks granted permission for the return of the arch- 
bishop and the three bishops of the Church of Cyprus to their respec- 
tive sees. They also abolished the feudal system, for they saw it 
as an extraneous power structure, unnecessary and dangerous. The 
autocephalous Church of Cyprus could function in its place for the 
political and fiscal administration of the island's Christian inhabi- 
tants. Its structured hierarchy put even remote villages within easy 
reach of the central authority. Both parties benefited. Greek Cypri- 
ots gained a measure of autonomy, and the empire received 
revenues without the bother of administration. 

Ottoman rule of Cyprus was at times indifferent, at times op- 
pressive, depending on the temperaments of the sultans and local 
officials. The island fell into economic decline both because of the 
empire's commercial ineptitude and because the Atlantic Ocean 
had displaced the Mediterranean Sea as the most important avenue 
of commerce. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, infestations 
of locusts, and famines also caused economic hardship and con- 
tributed to the general condition of decay and decline. 

Reaction to Turkish misrule caused uprisings, but Greek Cypriots 
were not strong enough to prevail. Occasional Turkish Cypriot up- 
risings, sometimes with their Christian neighbors, against confis- 
catory taxes also failed. During the Greek War of Independence 
in 1821 , the Ottoman authorities feared that Greek Cypriots would 
rebel again. Archbishop Kyprianos, a powerful leader who worked 
to improve the education of Greek Cypriot children, was accused 
of plotting against the government. Kyprianos, his bishops, and 
hundreds of priests and important laymen were arrested and sum- 
marily hanged or decapitated on July 9, 1821. After a few years, 
the archbishops were able to regain authority in religious matters, 
but as secular leaders they were unable to regain any substantial 
power until after World War II. 


Historical Setting 

The military power of the Ottomans declined after the sixteenth 
century, and hereditary rulers often were inept. Authority gradu- 
ally shifted to the office of the grand vizier, the sultan's chief 
minister. During the seventeenth century, the grand viziers acquired 
an official residence in the compound that housed government 
ministries in Constantinople. The compound was known to the 
Turks as Babiali (High Gate or Sublime Porte). By the nineteenth 
century, the grand viziers were so powerful that the term Porte 
became a synonym for the Ottoman government. Efforts by the 
Porte to reform the administration of the empire were continual 
during the nineteenth century; similar efforts by local authorities 
on Cyprus failed, as did those of the Porte. Various Cypriot move- 
ments arose in the 1820s and the 1830s and worked to gain great- 
er self-government, but because the imperial treasury took most 
of the island's wealth and because local officials were often cor- 
rupt, reform efforts failed. Cypriots had littie recourse through the 
courts because Christian testimony was rarely accepted. 

The Ottoman Turks became the enemy in the eyes of the Greek 
Cypriots, and this enmity served as a focal point for uniting the 
major ethnic group on the island under the banner of Greek iden- 
tity. Centuries of neglect by the Turks, the unrelenting poverty 
of most of the people, and the ever-present tax collectors fueled 
Greek nationalism. The Church of Cyprus stood out as the most 
significant Greek institution and the leading exponent of Greek na- 

During the period of Ottoman domination, Cyprus had been 
a backwater of the empire, but in the nineteenth century it again 
drew the attention of West European powers. By the 1850s, the 
decaying Ottoman Empire was known as "the sick man of Eu- 
rope," and various nations sought to profit at its expense. Cyprus 
itself could not fight for its own freedom, but the centuries of 
Frankish and Turkish domination had not destroyed the ties of lan- 
guage, culture, and religion that bound the Greek Cypriots to other 
Greeks. By the middle of the nineteenth century, enosis, the idea 
of uniting all Greek lands with the newly independent Greek main- 
land, was firmly rooted among educated Greek Cypriots. By the 
time the British took over Cyprus in 1878, Greek Cypriot nation- 
alism had already crystalized. 

British Rule 

The sultan ceded the administration of Cyprus to Britain in ex- 
change for guarantees that Britain would use the island as a base 
to protect the Ottoman Empire against possible Russian aggression. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

The British had been offered Cyprus three times (in 1833, 1841, 
and 1845) before accepting it in 1878. 

In the mid- 1870s, Britain and other European powers were faced 
with preventing Russian expansion into areas controlled by a 
weakening Ottoman Empire. Russia was trying to fill the power 
vacuum by expanding the tsar's empire west and south toward the 
warm- water port of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. British 
administration of Cyprus was intended to forestall such an expan- 
sion. In June 1878, clandestine negotiations between Britain and 
the Porte culminated in the Cyprus Convention, by which "His 
Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the island 
of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England." 

There was some opposition to the agreement in Britain, but not 
enough to prevent it, and colonial administration was established 
on the island. Greek Cypriot nationalism made its presence known 
to the new rulers, when, in a welcoming speech at Larnaca for the 
first British high commissioner, the bishop of Kition expressed the 
hope that the British would expedite the unification of Cyprus and 
Greece as they had previously done with the Ionian Islands. Thus, 
the British were confronted at the very beginning of their adminis- 
tration with the reality that enosis was vital to many Greek Cypriots. 

The terms of the convention provided that the excess of the is- 
land's revenue over the expenditures for government should be paid 
as an "annual fixed payment" by Britain to the sultan. This proviso 
enabled the Porte to assert that it had not ceded or surrendered 
Cyprus to the British, but had merely temporarily turned over ad- 
ministration. Because of these terms, the action was sometimes 
described as a British leasing of the island. The "Cyprus Trib- 
ute" became a major source of discontent underlying later Cypri- 
ot unrest. 

Negotiations eventually determined the sum of the annual fixed 
payment at exactly 92,799 pounds sterling, eleven shillings, and 
three pence. The governor of the island, Ronald Storrs, later wrote 
that the calculation of this sum was made with "all that scrupulous 
exactitude characteristic of faked accounts." The Cypriots found 
themselves not only paying the tribute, but also covering the ex- 
penses incurred by the British colonial administration, creating a 
steady drain on an already poor economy. 

From the start, the matter of the Cyprus Tribute was severely 
exacerbated by the fact that the money was never paid to Turkey. 
Instead it was deposited in the Bank of England to pay off Turkish 
Crimean War loans (guaranteed by both Britain and France) on 
which Turkey had defaulted. This arrangement greatly disturbed 
the Turks as well as the Cypriots. The small sum left over went 


Historical Setting 

into a contingency fund, which further irritated the Porte. Public 
opinion on Cyprus held that the Cypriots were being forced to pay 
a debt with which they were in no way connected. Agitation against 
the tribute was incessant, and the annual payment became a sym- 
bol of British oppression. 

There was also British opposition to the tribute. Undersecretary 
of State for the Colonies Winston Churchill visited Cyprus in 1907 
and, in a report on his visit, declared, "We have no right, except 
by force majeure, to take a penny of the Cyprus Tribute to relieve 
us from our own obligations, however unfortunately contracted." 
Parliament soon voted a permanent annual grant-in-aid of 50,000 
pounds sterling to Cyprus and reduced the tribute accordingly. 

British Annexation 

Britain annulled the Cyprus Convention and annexed the island 
when Turkey joined forces with Germany and its allies in 1914. 
In 1915 Britain offered the island to Greece as an inducement to 
enter the war on its side, but King Constantine preferred a policy 
of benign neutrality and declined the offer. Turkey recognized the 
British annexation through the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. The treaty 
brought advantages to the new Turkish state that compensated it 
for its loss of the island. In 1925 Cyprus became a crown colony, 
and the top British administrator, the high commissioner, became 
governor. This change in status meant little to Greek Cypriots, 
and some of them continued to agitate for enosis. 

The constitution of 1882, which was unchanged by the annexa- 
tion of 1914, provided for a Legislative Council of twelve elected 
members and six appointees of the high commissioner. Three of 
the elected members were to be Muslims (Turkish Cypriots) and 
the remaining nine non-Muslims. This distribution was devised 
on the basis of a British interpretation of the census taken in 1881 . 
These arrangements favored the Muslims. In practice, the three 
Muslim members usually voted with the six appointees, bringing 
about a nine to nine stalemate that could be broken by the vote 
of the high commissioner. Because Turkish Cypriots were gener- 
ally supported by the high commissioners, the desires of the Greek 
Cypriot majority were thwarted. When Cyprus became a crown 
colony after 1925, constitutional modifications enlarged the Legis- 
lative Council to twenty-four, but the same balance and resulting 
stalemate prevailed. 

There also remained much discontent with the Cyprus Tribute. 
In 1927 Britain had raised the annual grant-in-aid to cover the entire 
amount, but on the condition that Cyprus pay the crown an an- 
nual sum of 10,000 pounds sterling toward "imperial defense." 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Cypriots, however, were not placated. They pressed two further 
claims for sums they considered were owed to them: the unexpended 
surplus of the debt charge that had been held back and invested 
in government securities since 1878 and all of the debt charge pay- 
ments since 1914, which, after annexation, the Cypriots considered 

The British government rejected those pleas and made a proposal 
to raise Cypriot taxes to meet deficits brought on by economic con- 
ditions on the island and throughout the world at the beginning 
of the 1930s. These proposals aroused dismay and discontent on 
Cyprus and resulted in mass protests and mob violence in October 
1931. A riot resulted in the death of six civilians, injuries and 
wounds to scores of others, and the burning of the British Govern- 
ment House in Nicosia. Before it was quelled, incidents had oc- 
curred in a third of the island's 598 villages. In ensuing court cases, 
some 2,000 persons were convicted of crimes in connection with 
the violence. 

Britain reacted by imposing harsh restrictions. Military reinforce- 
ments were dispatched to the island, the constitution suspended, 
press censorship instituted, and political parties proscribed. Two 
bishops and eight other prominent citizens directly implicated in 
the riot were exiled. In effect, the governor became a dictator, em- 
powered to rule by decree. Municipal elections were suspended, 
and until 1943 all municipal officials were appointed by the govern- 
ment. The governor was to be assisted by an Executive Council, 
and two years later an Advisory Council was established; both coun- 
cils consisted only of appointees and were restricted to advising on 
domestic matters only. 

The harsh measures adopted by the British on Cyprus seemed 
particularly incongruous in view of the relaxation of strictures in 
Egypt and India at the same time. But the harsh measures con- 
tinued; the teaching of Greek and Turkish history was curtailed, 
and the flying of Greek or Turkish flags or the public display of 
portraits of Greek or Turkish heroes was forbidden. The rules ap- 
plied to both ethnic groups, although Turkish Cypriots had not 
contributed to the disorders of 1931. 

Perhaps most objectionable to the Greek Cypriots were British 
actions that Cypriots perceived as being against the church. After 
the bishops of Kition and Kyrenia had been exiled, only two of 
the church's four major offices were occupied, i.e. , the archbishopric 
in Nicosia and the bishopric of Paphos. When Archbishop Cyril 
III died in 1933 leaving Bishop Leontios of Paphos as locum ten- 
ens, church officials wanted the exiled bishops returned for the elec- 
tion of a new archbishop. The colonial administration refused, 


Historical Setting 

stating that the votes could be sent from abroad; the church authori- 
ties objected, and the resulting stalemate kept the office vacant from 
1933 until 1947. Meanwhile, in 1937, in an effort to counteract 
the leading role played by the clergy in the nationalist movement, 
the British enacted laws governing the internal affairs of the church. 
Probably most onerous was the provision subjecting the election 
of an archbishop to the governor's approval. The laws were repealed 
in 1946. In June 1947, Leontios was elected archbishop, ending 
the fourteen-year British embarrassment at being blamed for the 
vacant archbishopric. 

Under the strict rules enforced on the island, Cypriots were not 
allowed to form nationalist groups; therefore, during the late 1930s, 
the center of enosis activism shifted to London. In 1937 the Com- 
mittee for Cyprus Autonomy was formed with the avowed pur- 
pose of lobbying Parliament for some degree of home rule. But 
most members of Parliament and of the Colonial Office, as well 
as many colonial officials on the island, misread the situation just 
as they had sixty years earlier, when they assumed administration 
from the Ottoman Turks and were greeted with expressions of the 
Greek Cypriot desire for enosis. The British were still not able to 
understand the importance of that desire to the majority com- 

Although there was growing opposition to British rule, colonial 
administration had brought some benefits to the island. Money 
had gone into modernization projects. The economy, stagnant un- 
der the Ottomans, had improved, and trade increased. Financial 
reforms eventually broke the hold money lenders had over many 
small farmers. An honest and efficient civil service was put in place. 
New schools were built for the education of Cypriot children. 
Whereas only one hospital had existed during the Ottoman era, 
several were built by the British. Locusts were eradicated, and af- 
ter World War II malaria was eliminated. A new system of roads 
brought formerly isolated villages into easy reach of the island's 
main cities and towns. A reforestation program to cover the colo- 
ny's denuded hills and mountains was begun. Still, there was much 
poverty, industry was almost nonexistent, most manufactures were 
imported from Britain, and Cypriots did not govern themselves. 

World War II and Postwar Nationalism 

Whatever their misgivings about British rule, Cypriots were 
staunch supporters of the Allied cause in World War II. This was 
particularly true after the invasion of Greece in 1940. Conscrip- 
tion was not imposed on the colony, but 6,000 Cypriot volunteers 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

fought under British command during the Greek campaign. Be- 
fore the war ended, more than 30,000 had served in the British 

As far as the island itself was concerned, it escaped the war ex- 
cept for limited air raids. As it had twenty-five years earlier, the 
island became important as a supply and training base and as a 
naval station. This time, however, its use as an air base made it 
particularly significant to the overall Allied cause. Patriotism and 
a common enemy did not entirely erase enosis in the minds of Greek 
Cypriots, and propagandists remained active during the entire war, 
particularly in London, where they hoped to gain friends and in- 
fluence lawmakers. Hopes were sometimes raised by the British 
government during the period when Britain and Greece were prac- 
tically alone in the field against the Axis. British foreign secretary 
Anthony Eden, for example, hinted that the Cyprus problem would 
be resolved when the war had been won. Churchill, then prime 
minister, also made some vague allusions to the postwar settlement 
of the problem. The wartime governor of the island stated without 
equivocation that enosis was not being considered, but it is proba- 
ble that the Greek Cypriots heard only those voices that they wanted 
to hear. 

During the war, Britain made no move to restore the constitu- 
tion that it had revoked in 1931 , to provide a new one, or to guaran- 
tee any civil liberties. After October 1941, however, political 
meetings were condoned, and permission was granted by the gover- 
nor for the formation of political parties. Without delay Cypriot 
communists founded the Progressive Party of the Working People 
(Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou — AKEL) as the suc- 
cessor to an earlier communist party that had been established in 
the 1920s and proscribed during the 1930s. Because of Western 
wartime alliances with the Soviet Union, the communist label in 
1941 was not the anathema that it later became; nevertheless, some 
Orthodox clerics and middle-class merchants were alarmed at the 
appearance of the new party. At the time, a loose federation of 
nationalists backed by the church and working for enosis and the 
Panagrarian Union of Cyprus (Panagrotiki Enosis Kyprou — PEK), 
the nationalist peasant association, opposed AKEL. 

In the municipal elections of 1943, the first since the British crack- 
down of 1931, AKEL gained control of the important cities of 
Famagusta and Limassol. After its success at the polls, AKEL sup- 
ported strikes, protested the absence of a popularly elected legisla- 
ture, and continually stressed Cypriot grievances incurred under 
the rigid regime of the post- 1931 period. Both communists and con- 
servative groups advocated enosis, but for AKEL such advocacy 


Historical Setting 

was an expediency aimed at broadening its appeal. On other 
matters, communists and conservatives often clashed, sometimes 
violently. In January 1946, eighteen members of the communist- 
oriented Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labor (Pankypria Ergatiki 
Omospondia — PEO) were convicted of sedition by a colonial court 
and sentenced to varying prison terms. Later that year, a coali- 
tion of AKEL and PEO was victorious in the municipal elections, 
adding Nicosia to the list of cities having communist mayors. 

In late 1946, the British government announced plans to liber- 
alize the colonial administration of Cyprus and to invite Cypriots 
to form a Consultative Assembly for the purpose of discussing a 
new constitution. Demonstrating their good will and conciliatory 
attitude, the British also allowed the return of the 1931 exiles, 
repealed the 1937 religious laws, and pardoned the leftists who had 
been convicted of sedition in 1946. Instead of rejoicing, as expect- 
ed by the British, the Greek Cypriot hierarchy reacted angrily be- 
cause there had been no mention of enosis. 

Response to the governor's invitations to the Consultative As- 
sembly was mixed. The Church of Cyprus had expressed its dis- 
approval, and twenty-two Greek Cypriots declined to appear, 
stating that enosis was their sole political aim. In October 1947, 
the fiery bishop of Kyrenia was elected archbishop to replace Leon- 
tios, who had died suddenly of natural causes. 

As Makarios II, the new archbishop continued to oppose Brit- 
ish policy in general and any policy in particular that did not ac- 
tively promote enosis. Nevertheless, the assembly opened in 
November with eighteen members present. Of these, seven were 
Turkish Cypriots, two were Greek Cypriots without party affilia- 
tions, one was a Maronite from the small minority of non-Orthodox 
Christians on the island, and eight were AKEL-oriented Greek 
Cypriots — usually referred to as the "left wing." The eight left- 
wing members proposed discussion of full self-government, but the 
presiding officer, Chief Justice Edward Jackson, ruled that full self- 
government was outside the competence of the assembly. This rul- 
ing caused the left wing to join the other members in opposition 
to the British. The deadlocked assembly adjourned until May 1948, 
when the governor attempted to break the deadlock by advancing 
new constitutional proposals. 

The new proposals included provisions for a Legislative Coun- 
cil with eighteen elected Greek Cypriot members and four elected 
Turkish Cypriot members in addition to the colonial secretary, the 
attorney general, the treasurer, and the senior commissioner as ap- 
pointed members. Elections were to be based on universal adult 
male suffrage, with Greek Cypriots elected from a general list and 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Turkish Cypriots from a separate communal register. Women's 
suffrage was an option to be extended if the assembly so decided. 
The presiding officer was to be a governor's appointee, who could 
not be a member of the council and would have no vote. Powers 
were reserved to the governor to pass or reject any bill regardless 
of the decision of the council, although in the event of a veto he 
was obliged to report his reasons to the British government. The 
governor's consent was also required before any bill having to do 
with defense, finance, external affairs, minorities, or amendments 
to the constitution could be introduced in the Legislative Council. 

In the political climate of the immediate post-World War II era, 
the proposals of the British did not come close to fulfilling the ex- 
pectations and aspirations of the Greek Cypriots. The idea of ' Gno- 
sis and only enosis" became even more attractive to the general 
population. Having observed this upsurge in popularity, AKEL 
felt obliged to shift from backing full self-government to support- 
ing enosis, although the right-wing government in Greece was bit- 
terly hostile to communism. 

Meanwhile, the Church of Cyprus solidified its control over the 
Greek Cypriot community, intensified its activities for enosis and, 
after the rise of AKEL, opposed communism. Prominent among 
its leaders was Bishop Makarios, spiritual and secular leader of the 
Greek Cypriots. Born Michael Christodoulou Mouskos in 1913 to 
peasant parents in the village of Pano Panayia, about thirty kilo- 
meters northeast of Paphos in the foothills of the Troodos Moun- 
tains, the future archbishop and president entered Kykko Monastery 
as a novice at age thirteen. His pursuit of education over the next 
several years took him from the monastery to the Pancyprian Gym- 
nasium in Nicosia, where he finished secondary school. From there 
he moved to Athens University as a deacon to study theology. Af- 
ter earning his degree in theology, he remained at the university 
during the World War II occupation, studying law. He was or- 
dained as a priest in 1946, adopting the name Makarios. A few 
months after ordination, he received a scholarship from the World 
Council of Churches that took him to Boston University for ad- 
vanced studies at the Theological College. Before he had complet- 
ed his studies at Boston, he was elected in absentia bishop of Kition. 
He returned to Cyprus in the summer of 1948 to take up his new 

Makarios was consecrated as bishop on June 13, 1948, in the 
Cathedral of Larnaca. He also became secretary of the Ethnarchy 
Council, a position that made him chief political adviser to the arch- 
bishop and swept him into the mainstream of the enosis struggle. 
His major accomplishment as bishop was planning the plebiscite 


Historical Setting 

that brought forth a 96 percent favorable vote for enosis in Janu- 
ary 1950. In June Archbishop Makarios II died, and in October 
the bishop of Kition was elected to succeed him. He took office 
as Makarios III and, at age thirty-seven, was the youngest arch- 
bishop in the history of the Church of Cyprus. At his inaugura- 
tion, he pledged not to rest until union with "Mother Greece" had 
been achieved. 

The plebiscite results and a petition for enosis were taken to the 
Greek Chamber of Deputies, where Prime Minister Sophocles 
Venizelos urged the deputies to accept the petition and incorporate 
the plea for enosis into national policy. The plebiscite data were 
also presented to the United Nations (UN) Secretariat in New York, 
with a request that the principle of self-determination be applied 
to Cyprus. Makarios himself appeared before the UN in Febru- 
ary 1951 to denounce British policy, but Britain held that the Cyprus 
problem was an internal issue not subject to UN consideration. 

In Athens, enosis was a common topic of coffeehouse conversa- 
tion, and Colonel George Grivas, a Cypriot native, was becoming 
known for his strong views on the subject. Grivas, born in 1898 
in the village of Trikomo about fifty kilometers northeast of Nico- 
sia, was the son of a grain merchant. After elementary education 
in the village school, he was sent to the Pancyprian Gymnasium. 
Reportedly a good student, Grivas went to Athens at age seven- 
teen to enter the Greek Military Academy. As a young officer in 
the Greek army, he saw action in Anatolia during the Greco- 
Turkish War of 1920-22, in which he was wounded and cited for 
bravery. Grivas 's unit almost reached Ankara during the Anatolian 
campaign, and he was sorely disappointed as the Greek campaign 
turned into disaster. However, he learned much about war, par- 
ticularly guerrilla war. When Italy invaded Greece in 1940, he was 
a lieutenant colonel serving as chief of staff of an infantry division. 

During the Nazi occupation of Greece, Grivas led a right-wing 
extremist organization known by the Greek letter X (Chi), which 
some authors describe as a band of terrorists and others call a 
resistance group. In his memoirs, Grivas said that it was later British 
propaganda that blackened the good name of X. At any rate, Gri- 
vas earned a reputation as a courageous military leader, even though 
his group was eventually banned. Later, after an unsuccessful try 
in Greek politics, he turned his attention to his original home, 
Cyprus, and to enosis. For the rest of his life, Grivas was devoted 
to that cause. 

In anticipation of an armed struggle to achieve enosis, Grivas 
toured Cyprus in July 1951 to study the people and terrain (his 
first visit in twenty years). He discussed his ideas with Makarios 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

but was disappointed by the archbishop's reservations about the 
effectiveness of a guerrilla uprising. From the beginning, and 
throughout their relationship, Grivas resented having to share 
leadership with the archbishop. Makarios, concerned about Grivas 's 
extremism from their very first meeting, preferred to continue diplo- 
matic efforts, particularly efforts to get the UN involved. Entry 
of both Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation (NATO) made settlement of the Cyprus issue more impor- 
tant to the Western powers, but no new ideas were forthcoming. 
One year after the reconnaissance trip by Grivas, a secret meeting 
was arranged in Athens to bring together like-minded people in 
a Cyprus liberation committee. Makarios chaired the meeting. Gri- 
vas, who saw himself as the sole leader of the movement, once again 
was disappointed by the more moderate views of the archbishop. 
The feelings of uneasiness that arose between the soldier and the 
cleric never dissipated. In the end, the two became bitter enemies. 

In July 1954, Henry L. Hopkinson, minister of state for the colo- 
nies, speaking in the British House of Commons, announced the 
withdrawal of the 1948 constitutional proposals for Cyprus in favor 
of an alternative plan. He went on to state, "There are certain 
territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their peculiar 
circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent." Hop- 
kinson' s "never" and the absence of any mention of enosis doomed 
the alternative from the beginning. 

In August 1954, Greece's UN representative formally request- 
ed that self-determination for the people of Cyprus be included on 
the agenda of the General Assembly's next session. That request 
was seconded by a petition to the secretary general from Archbishop 
Makarios. The British position continued to be that the subject 
was an internal issue. Turkey rejected the idea of the union of 
Cyprus and Greece; its UN representative maintained that "the 
people of Cyprus were no more Greek than the territory itself. ' ' 
The Turkish Cypriot community had consistently opposed the 
Greek Cypriot enosis movement, but had generally abstained from 
direct action because under British rule the Turkish minority sta- 
tus and identity were protected. The expressed attitude of the 
Cyprus Turkish Minority Association was that, in the event of Brit- 
ish withdrawal, control of Cyprus should simply revert to Turkey. 
(This position ignored the fact that Turkey gave up all rights and 
claims in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.) Turkish Cypriot identifi- 
cation with Turkey had grown stronger, and after 1954 the Turk- 
ish government had become increasingly involved as the Cyprus 
problem became an international issue. On the island, an under- 
ground political organization known as Volkan (volcano) was 


Turkish quarter of Nicosia 
Courtesy Office of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, " Washington 

formed. Volkan eventually established in 1957 the Turkish 
Resistance Organization (Turk Mukavemet Te§kilati — TMT), a 
guerrilla group that fought for Turkish Cypriot interests. In Greece, 
enosis was a dominant issue in politics, and pro-enosis demonstra- 
tions became commonplace in Athens. Cyprus was also bombard- 
ed with radio broadcasts from Greece pressing for enosis. 

In the late summer and fall of 1954, the Cyprus problem inten- 
sified. On Cyprus the colonial government threatened advocates 
of enosis with up to five years' imprisonment and warned that an- 
tisedition laws would be strictly enforced. The archbishop defied 
the law, but no action was taken against him. 

Anti-British sentiments were exacerbated when Britain concluded 
an agreement with Egypt for the evacuation of forces from the Suez 
Canal zone and began moving the headquarters of the British Mid- 
dle East Land and Air Forces to Cyprus. Meanwhile, Grivas had 
returned to the island surreptitiously and made contact with 
Makarios. In December the UN General Assembly, after consider- 
ation of the Cyprus item placed on the agenda by Greece, adopt- 
ed a New Zealand proposal that, using diplomatic jargon, 
announced the decision "not to consider the problem further for 
the time being, because it does not appear appropriate to adopt 
a resolution on the question of Cyprus." Reaction to the setback 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

at the UN was immediate and violent. Greek Cypriot leaders called 
a general strike, and schoolchildren left their classrooms to demon- 
strate in the streets. These events were followed by the worst riot- 
ing since 1931 . Makarios, who was at the UN in New York during 
the trouble, returned to Nicosia on January 10, 1955. At a meet- 
ing with Makarios, Grivas stated that their group needed a name 
and suggested that it be called the National Organization of Cypriot 
Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston — EOKA). 
Makarios agreed, and, within a few months, EOKA was widely 

The Emergency 

On April 1 , 1955, EOKA opened a campaign of violence against 
British rule in a well-coordinated series of attacks on police, mili- 
tary, and other government installations in Nicosia, Famagusta, 
Larnaca, and Limassol. In Nicosia the radio station was blown up. 
Grivas circulated his first proclamation as leader of EOKA under 
his code name Dighenis (a hero of Cypriot mythology), and the 
four-year revolutionary struggle was launched. According to cap- 
tured EOKA documents, Cypriot communists were not to be ac- 
cepted for membership and were enjoined to stand clear of the 
struggle if they were sincerely interested in enosis. The Turkish 
Cypriots were described as compatriots in the effort against an alien 
ruler; they too were simply asked to stand clear, to refrain from 
opposition, and to avoid any alliance with the British. 

During a difficult summer of attacks and counterattacks, the 
Tripartite Conference of 1955 was convened in London in August 
at British invitation; representatives of the Greek and Turkish 
governments met with British authorities to discuss Cyprus — a rad- 
ical departure from traditional British policy. Heretofore the Brit- 
ish had considered colonial domestic matters internal affairs not 
to be discussed with foreigners. Greece accepted the invitation with 
some hesitation because no Cypriots had been invited, but reluc- 
tantly decided to attend. The Turks also accepted. The meeting 
broke up in September, having accomplished nothing. The Greeks 
were dissatisfied because Cypriot self-determination (a code word 
for enosis) was not offered; the Turks because it was not forbidden. 

A bombing incident at the Turkish consulate in Salonika, Greece, 
a day before the meeting ended led to serious rioting in Istanbul 
and Izmir. It was later learned that the bombing had been carried 
out by a Turk, and that the riots had been prearranged by the 
government of Turkey to bring pressure on the Greeks and to show 
the world that Turks were keenly interested in Cyprus. The Turk- 
ish riots got so out of hand and destroyed so much Greek property 


Historical Setting 

in Turkey that Premier Adrian Menderes called out the army and 
declared martial law. Greece reacted by withdrawing its represen- 
tatives from the NATO headquarters in Turkey, and relations be- 
tween the two NATO partners became quite strained. 

Shortly after the abortive tripartite meeting, Field Marshal John 
Harding, chief of the British imperial general staff, was named 
governor of Cyprus and arrived on the island to assume his post 
in October 1955. Harding immediately began talks with Makarios, 
describing a multimillion-pound development plan that would be 
adopted contingent on acceptance of limited self-government and 
postponement of self-determination. Harding wanted to leave no 
doubt that he was there to restore law and order, and Grivas wanted 
the new governor to realize that a get-tough policy was not going 
to have any great effect on EOKA. In November Harding declared 
a state of emergency, banning public assemblies, introducing the 
death penalty for carrying a weapon, and making strikes illegal. 
British troops were put on a wartime footing, and about 300 Brit- 
ish policemen were brought to the island to replace EOKA sym- 
pathizers purged from the local force. 

Further talks between Harding and Makarios in January 1956 
began favorably but degenerated into a stalemate and broke up 
in March, with each side accusing the other of bad faith and in- 
transigence. A few days later, Makarios was seized, charged with 
complicity in violence, and, along with the bishop of Kyrenia and 
two other priests, exiled to the Seychelles. This step removed the 
archbishop's influence on EOKA, leaving less moderate forces in 
control. The level of violence on Cyprus increased, a general strike 
was called, and Grivas had political leadership thrust on him by 
the archbishop's absence. 

In July the British government appointed Lord Radcliffe, a jurist, 
to the post of commissioner for constitutional reform. Radcliffe 's 
proposals, submitted in December, contained provisions for a 
balanced legislature, as in former schemes. But the proposals also 
included an option of self-determination at some indefinite time 
in the future and safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot minority. Tur- 
key accepted the plan, Greece rejected it outright, and Makarios 
refused to consider it while in exile. 

Makarios was allowed to leave the Seychelles in April, but could 
not return to Cyprus. In Athens he received a tremendous wel- 
come. During the rest of the year, Grivas kept the situation boil- 
ing through various raids and attacks. Makarios also went once 
again to New York to argue his case before the UN. Harding re- 
tired to be replaced by Hugh Foot. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

In early 1958, intercommunal strife became severe for the first 
time, and tension mounted between the governments of Greece 
and Turkey. Grivas tried to enforce an island-wide boycott of British 
goods and increased the level of sabotage attacks. In June 1958, 
British prime minister Harold Macmillan proposed a seven-year 
partnership scheme of separate communal legislative bodies and 
separate municipalities, which became known as the Macmillan 
Plan. Greece and Greek Cypriots rejected it, calling it tantamount 
to partition. 

The Macmillan Plan, although not accepted, led to discussions 
of the Cyprus problem between representatives of Greece and Tur- 
key, beginning in December 1958. Participants for the first time 
discussed the concept of an independent Cyprus, i.e., neither enosis 
nor partition. This new approach was stimulated by the under- 
standing that Makarios was willing to discuss independence in ex- 
change for abandonment of the Macmillan Plan. Subsequent talks 
between the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey, in Zurich in 
February 1959, yielded a compromise agreement supporting in- 
dependence. Thus were laid the foundations of the Republic of 
Cyprus. The scene then shifted to London, where the Greek and 
Turkish representatives were joined by representatives of the Greek 
Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots, and the British. In London 
Makarios raised certain objections to the agreements, but, failing 
to get Greek backing, he accepted the position papers. The Zurich- 
London agreements, which were ratified by the official participants 
of the London Conference and became the basis for the Cyprus 
constitution of 1960, were the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty 
of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance. 

The Republic of Cyprus 

The general tone of the agreements was one of compromise. 
Greek Cypriots, especially members of organizations such as 
EOKA, expressed disappointment because enosis had not been at- 
tained. Turkish Cypriots, however, welcomed the agreements and 
set aside their earlier defensive demand for partition. According 
to the Treaty of Establishment, Britain retained sovereignty over 
about 256 square kilometers, which became the Dhekelia Sover- 
eign Base Area, to the northwest of Larnaca, and the Akrotiri Sover- 
eign Base Area, to the west of Limassol. Britain also retained certain 
access and communications routes. 

According to constitutional arrangements, Cyprus was to become 
an independent republic with a Greek Cypriot president and a 
Turkish Cypriot vice president; a council of ministers with a ratio 
of seven Greeks to three Turks and a House of Representatives of 


Historical Setting 

fifty members, also with a seven-to-three ratio, were to be separately 
elected by communal balloting on a universal suffrage basis. The 
judicial system would be headed by a Supreme Constitutional 
Court, composed of one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot 
and presided over by a contracted judge from a neutral country. 
In addition, separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Com- 
munal Chambers were provided to exercise control in matters of 
religion, culture, and education. The entire structure of govern- 
ment was strongly bicommunal in composition and function, and 
thus perpetuated the distinctiveness and separation of the two com- 

The aspirations of the Greek Cypriots, for which they had fought 
during the emergency, were not realized. Cyprus would not be unit- 
ed with Greece, as most of the population had hoped, but neither 
would it be partitioned, which many had feared. The unsatisfac- 
tory but acceptable alternative was independence. The Turkish 
Cypriot community, which had fared very well at the bargaining 
table, accepted the agreements willingly. The provisions of the con- 
stitution and the new republic's territorial integrity were ensured 
by Britain, Greece, and Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee. 
The Treaty of Alliance gave Greece and Turkey the rights to sta- 
tion military forces on the island (950 and 650 men, respectively). 
These forces were to be separate from Cypriot national forces, num- 
bering 2,000 men in a six-to-four ratio of Greek Cypriots to Turk- 
ish Cypriots (see Armed Forces, ch. 5). 

Makarios, accepting independence as the pragmatic course, 
returned to Cyprus on March 1 , 1959. Grivas, still an ardent sup- 
porter of enosis, agreed to return to Greece after having obtained 
amnesty for his followers. The state of emergency was declared over 
on December 4, 1959. Nine days later, Makarios was elected presi- 
dent, despite opposition from right-wing elements who claimed that 
he had betrayed enosis and from AKEL members who objected 
to the British bases and the stationing of Greek and Turkish troops 
on the island. On the same day, Fazil Kiicuk, leader of the Turk- 
ish Cypriot community, was elected vice president without oppo- 

The first general election for the House of Representatives took 
place on July 31, 1960. Of the thirty-five seats allotted to Greek 
Cypriots, thirty were won by supporters of Makarios and five by 
AKEL candidates. The fifteen Turkish Cypriot seats were all won 
by Kiicuk supporters. The constitution became effective August 
16, 1960, on the day Cyprus formally shed its colonial status and 
became a republic. One month later, the new republic became a 
member of the UN, and in the spring of 1961 it was admitted to 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

membership in the Commonwealth. In December 1961, Cyprus 
became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary) and the World Bank (see Glossary). 

Independence did not ensure peace. Serious problems concern- 
ing the working and interpretation of the constitutional system 
appeared immediately. These problems reflected the sharp bi- 
communal division in the constitution and the historical and con- 
tinuing distrust between the two communities. Turkish Cypriots, 
after eight decades of passivity under the British, had become a 
political entity. In the words of political scientist Nancy Crawshaw, 
"Turkish Cypriot nationalism, barely perceptible under British 
rule, came to equal that of the Greeks in fanaticism." One major 
point of contention concerned the composition of units under the 
six-to-four ratio decreed for the Cypriot army. Makarios wanted 
complete integration; Kuciik favored segregated companies. On 
October 20, 1961 , Kuciik used his constitutional veto power as vice 
president to halt the development of an integrated force. Makarios 
then stated that the country could not afford an army anyway; plan- 
ning and development of the national army ceased. Other problems 
developed in the application of the seven-to-three ratio of employ- 
ment in government agencies. 

Underground organizations of both communities revived dur- 
ing 1961 and 1962. EOKA and the TMT began training again, 
smuggling weapons in from Greece and Turkey, and working close- 
ly with national military contingents from Greece and Turkey that 
were stationed on the island in accordance with the Treaty of Alli- 
ance. Friction increased in 1962 regarding the status of munici- 
palities. Each side accused the other of constitutional infractions, 
and the Supreme Constitutional Court was asked to rule on munic- 
ipalities and taxes. The court's decisions were unsatisfactory to both 
sides, and an impasse was reached. Government under the terms 
of the 1960 constitution had come to appear impossible to many 

Some Greek Cypriots believed the constitutional impasse could 
be ended through bold action. Accordingly, a plan of action — the 
Akritas Plan — was drawn up sometime in 1963 by the Greek Cypri- 
ot minister of interior, a close associate of Archbishop Makarios. 
The plan's course of action began with persuading the international 
community that concessions made to the Turkish Cypriots were 
too extensive and that the constitution had to be reformed if the 
island were to have a functioning government. World opinion had 
to be convinced that the smaller community had nothing to fear 
from constitutional amendments that gave Greek Cypriots politi- 
cal dominance. Another of the plan's goals was the revocation of 


Historical Setting 

the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance. If these aims 
were realized, enosis would become possible. If Turkish Cypriots 
refused to accept these changes and attempted to block them by 
force, the plan foresaw their violent subjugation "in a day or two" 
before foreign powers could intervene. 

On November 30, 1963, Makarios advanced a thirteen-point 
proposal designed, in his view, to eliminate impediments to the 
functioning of the government. The thirteen points involved con- 
stitutional revisions, including the abandonment of the veto pow- 
er by both the president and the vice president, an idea that certainly 
would have been rejected by the Turkish Cypriots, who thought 
of the veto as a form of life insurance for the minority community. 
Kiicuk asked for time to consider the proposal and promised to 
respond to it by the end of December. Turkey rejected it on De- 
cember 16, declaring the proposal an attempt to undermine the 

Intercommunal Violence 

The atmosphere on the island was tense. On December 21 , 1963, 
serious violence erupted in Nicosia when a Greek Cypriot police 
patrol, ostensibly checking identification documents, stopped a 
Turkish Cypriot couple on the edge of the Turkish quarter. A hostile 
crowd gathered, shots were fired, and two Turkish Cypriots were 
killed. As the news spread, members of the underground orga- 
nizations began firing and taking hostages. North of Nicosia, 
Turkish forces occupied a strong position at St. Hilarion Castle, 
dominating the road to Kyrenia on the northern coast. The road 
became a principal combat area as both sides fought to control it. 
Much intercommunal fighting occurred in Nicosia along the line 
separating the Greek and Turkish quarters of the city (known later 
as the Green Line). Turkish Cypriots were not concentrated in one 
area, but lived throughout the island, making their position precar- 
ious. Vice President Kiicuk and Turkish Cypriot ministers and 
members of the House of Representatives ceased participating in 
the government. 

In January 1964, after an inconclusive conference in London 
among representatives of Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the two 
Cypriot communities, UN Secretary General U Thant, at the re- 
quest of the Cyprus government, sent a special representative to 
the island. After receiving a firsthand report in February, the Secu- 
rity Council authorized a peace-keeping force under the direction 
of the secretary general. Advance units reached Cyprus in March, 
and by May the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) totaled about 6,500 troops. Originally authorized for 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

a three-month period, the force, at decreased strength, was still 
in position in the early 1990s. 

Severe intercommunal fighting occurred in March and April 
1964. When the worst of the fighting was over, Turkish Cypriots — 
sometimes of their own volition and at other times forced by the 
TMT — began moving from isolated rural areas and mixed villages 
into enclaves. Before long, a substantial portion of the island's Turk- 
ish Cypriot population was crowded into the Turkish quarter of 
Nicosia in tents and hastily constructed shacks. Slum conditions 
resulted from the serious overcrowding. All necessities as well as 
utilities had to be brought in through the Greek Cypriot lines. Many 
Turkish Cypriots who had not moved into Nicosia gave up their 
land and houses for the security of other enclaves. 

In June 1964, the House of Representatives, functioning with 
only its Greek Cypriot members, passed a bill establishing the Na- 
tional Guard, in which all Cypriot males between the ages of eigh- 
teen and fifty-nine were liable to compulsory service. The right 
of Cypriots to bear arms was then limited to this National Guard 
and to the police. Invited by Makarios, General Grivas returned 
to Cyprus in June to assume command of the National Guard; 
the purpose of the new law was to curb the proliferation of Greek 
Cypriot irregular bands and bring them under control in an or- 
ganization commanded by the prestigious Grivas. Turks and Turk- 
ish Cypriots meanwhile charged that large numbers of Greek regular 
troops were being clandestinely infiltrated into the island to lend 
professionalism to the National Guard. Turkey began military 
preparations for an invasion of the island. A brutally frank warn- 
ing from United States president Lyndon B. Johnson to Prime 
Minister Ismet Inomi caused the Turks to call off the invasion. 
In August, however, Turkish jets attacked Greek Cypriot forces 
besieging Turkish Cypriot villages on the northwestern coast near 

In July veteran United States diplomat Dean Acheson met with 
Greek and Turkish representatives in Geneva. From this meeting 
emerged what became known as the Acheson Plan, according to 
which Greek Cypriots would have enosis and Greece was to award 
the Aegean island of Kastelorrizon to Turkey and compensate Turk- 
ish Cypriots wishing to emigrate. Secure Turkish enclaves and a 
Turkish sovereign military base area were to be provided on 
Cyprus. Makarios rejected the plan because it called for what he 
saw as a modified form of partition. 

Throughout 1964 and later, President Makarios and the Greek 
Cypriot leadership adopted the view that the establishment of 
UNFICYP by the UN Security Council had set aside the rights of 


Historical Setting 

intervention granted to the guarantor powers — Britain, Greece, 
and Turkey — by the Treaty of Guarantee. The Turkish leader- 
ship, on the other hand, contended that the Security Council ac- 
tion had reinforced the provisions of the treaty. These diametrically 
opposed views illustrated the basic Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot positions; the former holding that the constitution and the 
other provisions of the treaties were flexible and subject to change 
under changing conditions, and the latter, that they were fixed 
agreements, not subject to change. 

Grivas and the National Guard reacted to Turkish pressure by 
initiating patrols into the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Patrols sur- 
rounded two villages, Ayios Theodhoros and Kophinou, about 
twenty-five kilometers southwest of Larnaca, and began sending 
in heavily armed patrols. Fighting broke out, and by the time the 
Guard withdrew, twenty-six Turkish Cypriots had been killed. Tur- 
key issued an ultimatum and threatened to intervene in force to 
protect Turkish Cypriots. To back up their demands, the Turks 
massed troops on the Thracian border separating Greece and Tur- 
key and began assembling an amphibious invasion force. The ul- 
timatum's conditions included the expulsion of Grivas from Cyprus, 
removal of Greek troops from Cyprus, payment of indemnity for 
the casualties at Ayios Theodhoros and Kophinou, cessation of pres- 
sure on the Turkish Cypriot community, and the disbanding of 
the National Guard. 

Grivas resigned as commander of the Greek Cypriot forces on 
November 20, 1967, and left the island, but the Turks did not 
reduce their readiness posture, and the dangerous situation of two 
NATO nations on the threshold of war with each other continued. 
President Johnson dispatched Cyrus R. Vance as his special en- 
voy to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Vance arrived in Ankara in 
late November and began ten days of negotiations that defused the 
situation. Greece agreed to withdraw its forces on Cyprus except 
for the contingent allowed by the 1960 treaties, provided that Tur- 
key did the same and also dismounted its invasion force. Turkey 
agreed, and the crisis passed. During December 1967 and early 
January 1968, about 10,000 Greek troops were withdrawn. 
Makarios did not disband the National Guard, however, some- 
thing he came to regret when it rebelled against him in 1974. 

Political Developments after the Crisis of 1967 

Seizing the opportune moment after the crisis had ended, Turk- 
ish Cypriot leaders, in late December 1967, announced the es- 
tablishment of a ' 'transitional administration" to govern their 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

community's affairs ''until such time as the provisions of the Con- 
stitution of 1960 have been fully implemented. ' ' The body's presi- 
dent was Fazil Kiicuk, vice president of the republic; the body's 
vice president was Rauf Denkta§, president of the Turkish Cypri- 
ot Communal Chamber. Nineteen governing articles, called the 
Basic Principles, were announced, and the provisional adminis- 
tration organized itself along lines that were similar to a cabinet. 
The provisional administration also formed a legislative assembly 
composed of the Turkish Cypriot members-in- absentia of the repub- 
lic' s House of Representatives and the members of the Turkish 
Cypriot Communal Chamber. The provisional administration did 
not state that the Communal Chamber was being abolished. Nor 
did it seek recognition as a government. Such actions would have 
been contrary to the provisions of the constitution and the Zurich- 
London agreements, and the Turkish Cypriots as well as the Turks 
scrupulously avoided any such abrogation. The Greek Cypriots 
immediately concluded that the formation of governing bodies was 
in preparation for partition. U Thant was also critical of the new 

President Makarios, seeking a fresh mandate from his constit- 
uency, announced in January 1968 that elections would be held 
during February. Kiicuk, determined to adhere to the constitu- 
tion, then announced that elections for vice president would also 
be held. Elections, which the Greek Cypriot government considered 
invalid, were subsequendy held in the Turkish Cypriot communi- 
ty; Kiicuk was returned to office unopposed. Two weeks later, 
Makarios received 220,911 votes (about 96 percent), and his op- 
ponent, Takis Evdokas, running on a straight enosis platform, 
received 8,577 votes. Even though there were 16,215 abstentions, 
Makarios 's overwhelming victory was seen as a massive endorse- 
ment of his personal leadership and of an independent Cyprus. At 
his investiture, the president stated that the Cyprus problem could 
not be solved by force, but had to be worked out within the frame- 
work of the UN. He also said that he and his followers wanted to 
live peacefully in a unitary state where all citizens enjoyed equal 
rights. Some Cypriots opposed Makarios 's conciliatory stance, and 
there would be an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate him in 1970. 

In mid- 1968 intercommunal talks under UN auspices began in 
Beirut. Glafkos Clerides, president of the House of Representa- 
tives, and Rauf Denkta§ were involved in the first stages of these 
talks, which lasted until 1974. Although many points of agreement 
were arrived at, no lasting agreements were reached. Turkish Cypri- 
ot proposals emphasized the importance of the local government 
of each ethnic community at the expense of the central government, 


Archbishop Makarios III, first president of the Republic of Cyprus 
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

whereas the Greek Cypriot negotiating teams stressed the 
dominance of the central authorities over local administration. 

In the parliamentary elections that took place on July 5, 1970, 
fifteen seats went to the Unified Democratic Party (Eniaion), nine 
to AKEL, seven to the Progressive Coalition, two to a socialist coa- 
lition, and two to the Independents. The enosis opposition did not 
capture any seats. Eniaion, led by Clerides and based on an ur- 
ban constituency, was a moderate party of the right that generally 
supported Makarios. The Progressive Coalition had an ideologi- 
cal base almost the same as Eniaion' s, but was based in the rural 
areas. The socialist group was led by Vassos Lyssarides, personal 
physician to Makarios; its two seats in the House of Representa- 
tives did not reflect its significant influence in Cypriot affairs and 
the personal power of its leader. The Independents were a left-wing 
noncommunist group similar to EDEK but lacking its dynamic 
leadership. The fifteen seats reserved for Turkish Cypriots went 
to followers of Denkta§. 

In the early 1970s, Cyprus was in fact a partitioned country. 
Makarios was the president of the republic, but his authority did 
not extend into the Turkish enclaves. The House of Representa- 
tives sat as the legislature, but only the thirty-five Greek Cypriot 
seats were functioning as part of a central government. De facto, 
the partition sought for years by Turks and Turkish Cypriots ex- 
isted, but intercommunal strife had not ended. 

In the summer of 1971, tension built up between the two com- 
munities, and incidents became more numerous. Sometime in the 
late summer or early fall, Grivas (who had attacked Makarios as 
a traitor in an Athens newspaper) returned secretly to the island 
and began to rebuild his guerrilla organization, which became 
known as the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki 
Organosis Kyprion Agoniston B — EOKA B). Three new news- 
papers advocating enosis were also established at the same time. 
All of these activities were funded by the military junta that con- 
trolled Greece. The junta probably would have agreed to some form 
of partition similar to the Acheson Plan to settle the Cyprus ques- 
tion, but at the time the overthrow of Makarios was the primary 
objective, and the junta backed Grivas toward that end. From hid- 
ing, Grivas directed terrorist attacks and propaganda assaults that 
shook the Makarios government, but the president remained a 
powerful, popular leader. 

In January 1972, a new crisis rekindled intercommunal tensions 
when an Athens newspaper reported that the Makarios government 
had received a shipment of Czechoslovakian arms. The guns were 
intended for Makarios' s own elite guard; the Greek government, 


Historical Setting 

hoping to overthrow Makarios through Grivas, EOKA B, and the 
National Guard, objected to the import of the arms. The authori- 
ties in Ankara were more than willing to join Athens in such a pro- 
test, and both governments demanded that the Czechoslovakian 
munitions be turned over to UNFICYP. Makarios was eventual- 
ly forced to comply. 

Relations between Nicosia and Athens were at such a low ebb 
that the colonels of the Greek junta, recognizing that they had 
Makarios in a perilous position, issued an ultimatum for him to 
reform his government and rid it of ministers who had been criti- 
cal of the junta. The colonels, however, had not reckoned with the 
phenomenal popularity of the archbishop, and once again mass 
demonstrations proved that Makarios had the people behind him. 
In the end, however, Makarios bowed to Greek pressure and reshuf- 
fled the cabinet. 

Working against Makarios was the fact that most officers of the 
Cypriot National Guard were Greek regulars who supported the 
junta and its desire to remove him from office and achieve some 
degree of enosis. Grivas was also a threat to the archbishop. He 
remained powerful and to some extent was independent of the junta 
that had permitted his return to Cyprus. Whereas the Greek colonels 
were at times prepared to make a deal with Turkey about Cyprus, 
Grivas was ferociously opposed to any arrangement that did not 
lead to complete enosis. 

In the spring of 1972, Makarios faced an attack from another 
quarter. The three bishops of the Church of Cyprus demanded that 
he resign as president because his temporal duties violated canon 
law. Moving astutely, Markarios foiled the three bishops and had 
them defrocked in the summer of 1973. Before choosing their 
replacements, he increased the number of bishoprics to five, thereby 
reducing the power of individual bishops. 

Grivas and his one-track pursuit of enosis through terrorism had 
become an embarrassment to the Greek Cypriot government, as 
well as to the Greek government that had sponsored his return to 
the island. His fame and popularity in both countries, however, 
prevented his removal. That problem was solved on January 27, 
1974, when the general died of a heart attack. Makarios granted 
his followers an amnesty, hoping that EOKA B would disappear 
after the death of its leader. Terrorism continued, however, and 
the 100,000 mourners who attended Grivas 's funeral indicated the 
enduring popularity of his political aims. 

The Greek Coup and the Turkish Invasion 

A coup d'etat in Athens in November 1973 had made Brigadier 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

General Dimitrios Ioannides leader of the junta. Rigidly anticom- 
munist, Ioannides had served on Cyprus in the 1960s with the Na- 
tional Guard. His experiences convinced him that Makarios should 
be removed from office because of domestic leftist support and his 
visits to communist capitals. During the spring of 1974, Cypriot 
intelligence found evidence that EOKA B was planning a coup and 
was being supplied, controlled, and funded by the military govern- 
ment in Athens. EOKA B was banned, but its operations continued 
underground. Early in July, Makarios wrote to the president of 
Greece demanding that the remaining 650 Greek officers assigned 
to the National Guard be withdrawn. He also accused the junta 
of plotting against his life and against the government of Cyprus. 
Makarios sent his letter (which was released to the public) to the 
Greek president on July 2, 1974; the reply came thirteen days later, 
not in the form of a letter but in an order from Athens to the Cypriot 
National Guard to overthrow its commander in chief and take con- 
trol of the island. 

Makarios narrowly escaped death in the attack by the Greek- 
led National Guard. He fled the presidential palace and went to 
Paphos. A British helicopter took him to the Sovereign Base Area 
at Akrotiri, from where he went to London. Several days later, 
Makarios addressed a meeting of the UN Security Council, where 
he was accepted as the legal president of the Republic of Cyprus. 

In the meantime, the notorious EOKA terrorist Nicos Samp- 
son was declared provisional president of the new government. It 
was obvious to Ankara that Athens was behind the coup, and major 
elements of the Turkish armed forces went on alert. Turkey had 
made similar moves in 1964 and 1967, but had not invaded. At 
the same time, Turkish prime minister Biilent Ecevit flew to Lon- 
don to elicit British aid in a joint effort in Cyprus, as called for 
in the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, but the British were either un- 
willing or unprepared and declined to take action as a guarantor 
power. The United States took no action to bolster the Makarios 
government, but Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Po- 
litical Affairs, went to London and the eastern Mediterranean to 
stave off the impending Turkish invasion and the war between 
Greece and Turkey that might follow. The Turks demanded 
removal of Nicos Sampson and the Greek officers from the Na- 
tional Guard and a binding guarantee of Cypriot independence. 
Sampson, of course, was expendable to the Athens regime, but Sisco 
could get an agreement only to reassign the 650 Greek officers. 

As Sisco negotiated in Athens, Turkish invasion ships were al- 
ready at sea. A last-minute reversal might have been possible had 
the Greeks made concessions, but they did not. The intervention 


Historical Setting 

began early on July 20, 1974. Three days later, the Greek junta 
collapsed in Athens, Sampson resigned in Nicosia, and the threat 
of war between NATO allies was over. The Turkish army, however, 
remained on Cyprus. 

Constantinos Karamanlis, in self-imposed exile in France since 
1963, was called back to head the Greek government once more. 
Clerides was sworn in as acting president of the Republic of Cyprus, 
and the foreign ministers of the guarantor powers met in Geneva 
on July 25 to discuss the military situation on the island. Prime 
Minister Ecevit publicly welcomed the change of government in 
Greece and seemed genuinely interested in eliminating the tensions 
that had brought the two countries so close to war. Nevertheless, 
during the truce that was arranged, Turkish forces continued to 
take territory, to improve their positions, and to build up their sup- 
plies of war materiel. 

A second conference in Geneva began on August 10, with Cler- 
ides and Denkta§ as the Cypriot representatives. Denkta§ proposed 
a bizonal federation, with Turkish Cypriots controlling 34 percent 
of the island. When this proposal was rejected, the Turkish for- 
eign minister proposed a Turkish Cypriot zone in the northern part 
of the island and five Turkish Cypriot enclaves elsewhere, all of 
which would amount once again to 34 percent of the island's area. 
Clerides asked for a recess of thirty-six to forty-eight hours to con- 
sult with the government in Nicosia and with Makarios in Lon- 
don. His request was refused, and early on August 14 the second 
phase of the Turkish intervention began. Two days later, after hav- 
ing seized 37 percent of the island above what the Turks called 
the "Atilla Line," the line that ran from Morphou Bay in the north- 
west to Famagusta (Gazimagusa) in the east, the Turks ordered 
a cease-fire. 

Developments since 1974 

The de facto partition of Cyprus resulting from the Turkish in- 
vasion, or intervention, as the Turks preferred to call their mili- 
tary action, caused much suffering in addition to leaving thousands 
dead, many of whom were unaccounted for even years later. An 
estimated one-third of the population of each ethnic community 
had to flee their homes. The island's economy was devastated. 

Efforts were undertaken immediately to remedy the effects of 
the catastrophe. Intensive government economic planning and in- 
tervention on both sides of the island soon improved living stan- 
dards and allowed the construction of housing for refugees. Both 
communities benefited gready from the expansion of the tourist 
industry, which brought millions of foreign visitors to the island 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

during the 1980s. The economic success of the Republic of Cyprus 
was significant enough to seem almost miraculous. Within just a 
few years, the refugees had housing and were integrated into the 
bustling economy, and Greek Cypriots enjoyed a West European 
standard of living. Turkish Cypriots did not do as well, but, working 
against an international embargo imposed by the Republic of 
Cyprus and benefiting from extensive Turkish aid, they managed 
to ensure a decent standard of living for all members of their 
community — a standard of living, in fact, that was higher than that 
of Turkey. Both communities established government agencies to 
provide public assistance to those who needed it and built modern 
education systems extending to the university level. 

Both communities soon developed political systems on the Eu- 
ropean model, with parties representing mainstream political opin- 
ion from right to the left. Greek Cypriots had two older parties 
dating from before 1970, the Progressive Party of the Working Peo- 
ple (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou — AKEL) and the 
United Democratic Union of Cyprus (Eniea Dimokratiki Enosis 
Kyprou— EDEK), generally called the Socialist Party EDEK (So- 
cialistiko Komma EDEK), and some formed after the events of 
1974. The two most important of these newer parties were the 
Democratic Party (Dimokratiko Komma — DIKO) and the 
Democratic Rally (Dimokratikos Synagermos — DISY). Both of 
these parties were on the right, with DIKO headed by Spyros Kypri- 
anou, who replaced Makarios as president after the latter' s death 
in 1977, and DISY led by veteran politician Glafkos Clerides. 
Parliamentary elections held in 1976, 1981, and 1985 resulted in 
stable patterns in the House of Representatives that permitted 
coalition-building and a serious opposition to the government in 
power (see table 3, Appendix). Kyprianou was reelected president 
in 1983, but lost in 1988 to George Vassiliou, a successful business- 
man and a political outsider who had the support of AKEL and 
EDEK. Vassiliou won election by promising to bring a new spirit 
to politics and break the deadlocked negotiations to end the island's 

The Turkish Cypriots' progress to parliamentary democracy was 
not as easy. First they had to build a new state. In 1975 the * 'Turk- 
ish Federated State of Cyprus" was proclaimed. In 1983, by means 
of a unilateral declaration of independence, Turkish Cypriots 
created the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"), 
but by the early 1990s, only Turkey had recognized it as a nation. 
Rauf Denkta§, who had been the political leader of the Turkish 
Cypriot community since the 1970s, was elected president of the 
"TRNC." A number of political parties were active in the area 


Historical Setting 

occupied by the "TRNC." They included both left- and right- 
wing parties, which both supported and opposed the settlement of 
mainland Turks on the island and the politics of partition. The 
largest party, the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi — 
UBP), was founded and controlled by Denkta§ (see table 4, Ap- 
pendix). The UBP supported a resolutely separatist stance. The 
second party of the 4 'TRNC," the Communal Liberation Party 
(Toplumcu Kurtulu§ Partisi — TKP) advocated closer relations with 
the Greek Cypriot community. The left-wing Republican Turkish 
Party (Cumhuriyetci Turk Partisi — CTP) was even more forthright 
in its opposition to the government's policy of restricted relations 
with the Republic of Cyprus. 

Negotiations began in the mid-1970s to end the de facto parti- 
tion and to bring the two communities together again. Two major 
compromises on the part of the Republic of Cyprus occurred in 
the second half of the 1970s. First, in 1977, four guidelines for fu- 
ture intercommunal talks were accepted by both communities; their 
thrust was that Cyprus would become a bicommunal federal repub- 
lic, a departure from the terms of the constitution of 1960. Second, 
the ten-point agreement of 1979, achieved at a meeting between 
Kyprianou and Denkta§, worked out policies to ease further inter- 
communal talks. 

A possible settlement was missed in 1985 when Kyprianou re- 
fused to sign a recently worked-out accord, fearing it conceded too 
much to the other side. The stalemate continued up to the election 
of Vassiliou in 1988. Agreement on some major points had slowly 
evolved, but the practical steps to realize an actual settlement were 
still not attainable. Differences in the two communities' view of 
the desirable mixture of federation or confederation and the pow- 
ers of a central government seemed unbridgeable. 

* * * 

The four- volume work by the British historian George Hill, The 
History of Cyprus, although completed in 1952, is still considered 
the most definitive history of the island. Stavros Panteli's A New 
History of Cyprus covers events up to the mid-1980s. H.D. Purcell's 
Cyprus, available in many libraries, is a balanced but dated survey 
of Cypriot history. Footprints in Cyprus, edited by Sir David Hunt, 
is also a good introduction to the island's past. 

Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics by Michael Attalides 
is a thoughtful analysis of the background and development of 
Cypriot nationalism. The Cyprus Revolt by Nancy Crawshaw is a 
detailed study of the struggle against British rule. Also valuable 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

is The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic by Kyriacos C. Markides, 
which covers the period of independence and events after the Turk- 
ish invasion of 1974. Makarios: A Biography by Stanley Mayes is 
a sympathetic yet objective portrait of the republic's first president. 
Pierre Oberling's The Road to Bellapais presents a Turkish Cypriot 
perspective on the island's recent history. John Reddaway, a former 
British colonial official in Cyprus, examines many of the controver- 
sies surrounding recent history in Burdened with Cyprus. Parker T. 
Hart's Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War offers a first-hand 
American account of diplomatic efforts to defuse the crisis of 1967. 
A highly controversial account of the international background of 
the events of 1974 is Christopher Hitchens's Cyprus. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 


Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 

Mosque of Lala Mustafa Pasha (once the Cathedral of Saint Nicholas), 
built by the Lusignans, Famagusta (Gazimagusa) 

CYPRUS WAS BITTERLY DIVIDED at the beginning of the 
1990s. The island's 9,200 square kilometers encompassed two 
separate societies: one Greek Cypriot and the other Turkish Cypri- 
ot. Until 1974 the two peoples had lived side by side throughout 
the island. Although they had kept their separate languages and 
religions, they had become in many respects similar, most of the 
two peoples being small farmers or peasants. Relations were gener- 
ally harmonious, if reserved, during the four centuries they shared 
the island. 

The rise of Greek Cypriot nationalism, most clearly demonstrated 
in the ever-increasing strength of the dream of enosis — the unifi- 
cation of Cyprus with the Greek motherland — engendered a Turk- 
ish reaction, the doctrine of taksim, or partition. The Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot communities became estranged within a single 
generation. The Greek-backed coup of 1974 resulted in a Turkish 
invasion and the de facto partition of the island. Afterward, the 
two communities lived virtually without contact. Greek and Turk- 
ish Cypriot societies appeared relatively successful at the begin- 
ning of the 1990s, but their centuries-long intercourse was ended. 

Republic of Cyprus 

The Turkish invasion of 1974 was a calamity, but Greek Cypri- 
ot society was able to overcome its effects. The economy of the 
Republic of Cyprus quickly recovered, and went on to flourish into 
the early 1990s. Greek Cypriot society also withstood the loss of 
homeland and broken social relations. Greek Cypriots built shelters 
and found work for the 180,000 displaced people who had fled their 
homes and villages. During the 1980s, a more prosperous and 
modern society emerged. Education was made more accessible, and 
government help to those needing it was improved. Like other so- 
cieties, Greek Cypriot society became more urbanized, yet mostly 
avoided the ill effects of a too rapid transition to city life. Ties to 
the countryside remained strong, even as Greek Cypriots became 
better connected with the world beyond the island. 

As the Republic of Cyprus modernized, social relations changed, 
but not as quickly as in Western Europe. The Church of Cyprus, 
rather conservative in its doctrine, remained the dominant religion, 
although it played a smaller role than formerly in the lives of most 
Greek Cypriots. Marriage and family remained stronger than in 
the United States, and relations between the sexes were not as 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

relaxed. However, Greek Cypriot women were better educated than 
their mothers and were more likely to work outside the home. 
Although they were well represented in some professions, Greek 
Cypriot women suffered some sex discrimination in employment, 
and the republic's feminist movement was not yet influential. 

These developments occurred against the backdrop of the tragedy 
of partition. The barrier between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was 
virtually impenetrable. The older generation of the two peoples 
had experienced the terrors of intercommunal conflict, but they 
had had some contact with one another. A new generation of Greek 
Cypriots did not know members of the other community. Some 
had never seen a Turkish Cypriot. 


The physical setting for life on the island is dominated by the 
mountain masses and the central plain they encompass, the Mesaor- 
ia (see fig. 3). The Troodos Mountains cover most of the southern 
and western portions of the island and account for roughly half 
its area. The narrow Kyrenia Range, extending along the north- 
ern coastline, occupies substantially less area, and elevations are 
lower. The two mountain systems run generally parallel to the Tau- 
rus Mountains on the Turkish mainland, whose silhouette is visi- 
ble from northern Cyprus. Coastal lowlands, varying in width, 
surround the island. 


The rugged Troodos Mountains, whose principal range stretches 
from Pomos Point in the northwest almost to Larnaca Bay on the 
east, are the single most conspicuous feature of the landscape. In- 
tensive uplifting and folding in the formative period left the area 
highly fragmented, so that subordinate ranges and spurs veer off 
at many angles, their slopes incised by steep-sided valleys. In the 
southwest, the mountains descend in a series of stepped foothills 
to the coastal plain. 

Whereas the Troodos Mountains are a massif formed of molten 
igneous rock, the Kyrenia Range is a narrow limestone ridge that 
rises suddenly from the plains. Its easternmost extension becomes 
a series of foothills on the Karpas Peninsula. That peninsula points 
toward Asia Minor, to which Cyprus belongs geologically. 

Even the highest peaks of the Kyrenia Range are hardly more 
than half the height of the great dome of the Troodos massif, Mount 
Olympus (1,952 meters), but their seemingly inaccessible, jagged 
slopes make them considerably more spectacular. British writer 
Lawrence Durrell, in Bitter Lemons, wrote of the Troodos as 4 'an 


Mediterranean Sea 


Figure 3. Topography and Drainage 

The Society and Its Environment 

unlovely jumble of crags and heavyweight rocks" and of the Kyrenia 
Range as belonging to "the world of Gothic Europe, its lofty crags 
studded with crusader castles." 

Rich copper deposits were discovered in antiquity on the slopes 
of the Troodos. Geologists speculate that these deposits may have 
originally formed under the Mediterranean Sea, as a consequence 
of the upwelling of hot, mineral-laded water through a zone where 
plates that formed the ocean floor were pulling apart. 


Deforestation over the centuries has damaged the island's 
drainage system and made access to a year-round supply of water 
difficult. A network of winter rivers rises in the Troodos Moun- 
tains and flows out from them in all directions. The Yialias River 
and the Pedhieos River flow eastward across the Mesaoria into 
Famagusta Bay; the Serakhis River flows northwest through the 
Morphou plain. All of the island's rivers, however, are dry in the 
summer. An extensive system of dams and waterways has been 
constructed to bring water to farming areas. 

The Mesaoria is the agricultural heartland of the island, but its 
productiveness for wheat and barley depends very much on winter 
rainfall; other crops are grown under irrigation. Little evidence 
remains that this broad, central plain, open to the sea at either end, 
was once covered with rich forests whose timber was coveted by 
ancient conquerors for their sailing vessels. The now-divided cap- 
ital of the island, Nicosia, lies in the middle of this central plain. 


The Mediterranean climate, warm and rather dry, with rainfall 
mainly between November and March, favors agriculture. In gener- 
al, the island experiences mild wet winters and dry hot summers. 
Variations in temperature and rainfall are governed by altitude 
and, to a lesser extent, distance from the coast. 

The higher mountain areas are cooler and moister than the rest 
of the island. They receive the heaviest annual rainfall, which may 
be as much as 1,000 millimeters. Sharp frost also occurs in the 
higher districts, which are usually blanketed with snow during the 
first months of the year. Plains along the northern coast and in 
the Karpas Peninsula area average 400 to 450 millimeters of an- 
nual rainfall. The least rainfall occurs in the Mesaoria, with 300 
to 400 millimeters a year. Variability in annual rainfall is charac- 
teristic for the island, however, and droughts are frequent and some- 
times severe. Earthquakes, usually not destructive, occur from time 
to time. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Summer temperatures are high in the lowlands, even near the 
sea, and reach particularly uncomfortable readings in the Mesaoria. 
Because of the scorching heat of the lowlands, some of the villages 
in the Troodos have developed as resort areas, with summer as 
well as winter seasons. The mean annual temperature for the is- 
land as a whole is about 20°C. The amount of sunshine the island 
enjoys enhances the tourist industry. On the Mesaoria in the eastern 
lowlands, for example, there is bright sunshine 75 percent of the 
time. During the four summer months, there is an average of eleven 
and one-half hours of sunshine each day, and in the cloudiest winter 
months there is an average of five and one-half hours per day. 


Cyprus has been home to many peoples in its history. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, five ethnic communities lived on the is- 
land: Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians, 
and Latins. The events of 1974 resulted in a de facto partition of 
the island, and by the early 1990s virtually all Turkish Cypriots 
lived in the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"). 
Nearly all members of the other groups lived in the Republic 
of Cyprus; only about 600 Greek Cypriots lived outside the 
government-controlled area. 

Greek Cypriots 

Greek Cypriots formed the island's largest ethnic community, 
nearly 80 percent of the island's population. They were the descen- 
dants of Achaean Greeks who settled on the island during the sec- 
ond half of the second millennium B.C. The island gradually 
became part of the Hellenic world as the settlers prospered over 
the next centuries (see The Ancient Period, ch. 1). Alexander the 
Great freed the island from the Persians and annexed it to his own 
empire in 333 B.C. Roman rule dating from 58 B.C. did not erase 
Greek ways and language, and after the division of the Roman 
Empire in A.D. 285 Cypriots enjoyed peace and national freedom 
for 300 years under the jurisdiction of the Eastern Empire of Byzan- 
tium (see Byzantium Rule, ch. 1). The most important event of 
the early Byzantine period was that the Greek Orthodox Church 
of Cyprus became independent in 43 1 . Beginning in the middle 
of the seventh century, Cyprus endured three centuries of Arab 
attacks and invasions. In 965, it became a province of Byzantium, 
and remained in that status for the next 200 years. 

The Byzantine era profoundly molded Cypriot culture. The Greek 
Orthodox Christian legacy bestowed on Greek Cypriots in this period 
would live on during the succeeding centuries of oppressive foreign 


The Society and Its Environment 

domination. English, Lusignan, and Venetian feudal lords ruled 
Cyprus with no lasting impact on its culture (see The Lusignan 
and Venetian Eras, ch. 1). Because Cyprus was never the final 
goal of any external ambition, but simply fell under the domina- 
tion of whichever power was dominant in the eastern Mediterra- 
nean, destroying its civilization was never a military objective or 

Nor did the long period of Ottoman rule (1570-1878) change 
Greek Cypriot culture (see Ottoman Rule, ch. 1). The Ottomans 
tended to administer their multicultural empire with the help of 
their subject millets, or religious communities. The tolerance of the 
millet system permitted the Greek Cypriot community to survive, 
administered for Constantinople by the Archbishop of the Church 
of Cyprus, who became the community's head, or ethnarch. 

However tolerant Ottoman rule may have been with regard to 
religion, it was otherwise generally harsh and rapacious, tempered 
mainly by inefficiency. Turkish settlers suffered alongside their 
Greek Cypriot neighbors, and the two groups endured together 
centuries of oppressive governance from Constantinople. 

In the light of intercommunal conflict since the mid-1950s, it 
is surprising that Cypriot Muslims and Christians generally lived 
harmoniously. Some Christian villages converted to Islam. In many 
places, Turks settled next to Greeks. The island evolved into a 
demographic mosaic of Greek and Turkish villages, interspersed 
with many mixed communities (see fig. 4). The extent of this sym- 
biosis could be seen in the two groups' participation in commer- 
cial and religious fairs, pilgrimages to each other's shrines, and 
the occurrence, albeit rare, of intermarriage despite Islamic and 
Greek laws to the contrary. There was also the extreme case of 
the linobambakoi (linen-cottons), villagers who practiced the rites of 
both religions and had a Christian as well as a Muslim name. In 
the minds of some, such religious syncretism indicates that religion 
was not a source of conflict in traditional Cypriot society. 

The rise of Greek nationalism in the 1820s and 1830s affected 
Greek Cypriots, but for the rest of the century these sentiments 
were limited to the educated. The concept of enosis — unification 
with the Greek motherland, by then an independent country, having 
freed itself from Ottoman rule — became important to literate Greek 
Cypriots. A movement for the realization of enosis gradually 
formed, in which the Church of Cyprus had a dominant role. 

During British rule (1878-1960), the desire for enosis intensified. 
The British brought an efficient and honest colonial administra- 
tion, but maintained the millet system. Government and education 
were administered along ethnic lines, accentuating differences. For 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Mediterranean Sea 



Famagusta (Gazimagusa) 





December 1960 
• Greek 
o Turkish 
^ Both Greek/ 
™ Turkish 
10 20 Kilom eters 
20 Miles 




Mediterranean Sea 


rv Kyrenia ^ ' 

\ ^ 

'. ' ill i ; 

■ X 




December 1964 

i i Area of Greek 

I ■ 

ill ■ ] 

® National capital 


■ m ^ "/ 

• . ■ 

^^Br y ■ 

n. Ttimassoi 

B Village w/ both 

Turks & Greeks 
• Populated place 

10 20 Kilometers 

I L -r J 1 

10 20 Miles 

Mediterranean Sea 






V Famagusta (Gazimagusa) 



December 1990 

i 1 Turkish Cypriot 


\ /Limassol 

® National capital 
• Populated place 
1 20 Kilometers 

I "-H 1 

10 20 Miles 

Figure 4. Ethnic Distribution of the Population, 1960, 1964, and 1990 


The Society and Its Environment 

example, the education system was organized with two Boards of 
Education, one Greek and one Turkish, controlled by Athens and 
Constantinople, respectively. The resulting education emphasized 
linguistic, religious, cultural, and ethnic differences and ignored 
traditional ties between the two Cypriot communities. The two 
groups were encouraged to view themselves as extensions of their 
respective motherlands, and the development of two distinct na- 
tionalities with antagonistic loyalties was ensured. 

By the 1950s, the growing attraction of enosis for ever larger 
segments of Greek Cypriot society caused a Turkish Cypriot reac- 
tion, a desire for taksim — partition of the island. The smaller eth- 
nic community had well-founded reasons for fearing rule from the 
Greek mainland. In the mid-1950s, Greek Cypriot agitation for 
enosis went beyond manifestos and demonstrations, and Turkish 
Cypriots responded in kind (see The Emergency, ch. 1). Within 
twenty years, the island was tragically divided. 

By the early 1990s, Greek Cypriot society enjoyed a high stan- 
dard of living, and, to a degree unknown in its past, was educated 
and open to influences from the outside world. Economic modern- 
ization created a more flexible and open society and caused Greek 
Cypriots to share the concerns and hopes of other secularized West 
European societies. The Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus was 
the ethnarch, or leader, of the Greek Cypriot community in name 
only because religion had lost much of its earlier power. Finally, 
the dream of enosis was irrevocably shattered by the events of 1974, 
and Greek Cypriots sought to deal with the consequences of the 
Turkish invasion. 

Other Ethnic Groups 

Cyprus had three other ethnic groups at the beginning of the 
1990s: Maronites, Armenians, and Latins. Together they numbered 
only about 6,000, less than 1 percent of the island's population, but 
they maintained social institutions of their own and were represented 
in organs of government. The Maronites and Armenians had come 
during the Byzantine period, and the Latins slightly later. The 
Maronites, Arabic- speaking peasants from around Syria and Leb- 
anon, were already an important ethnic group at the time of the 
Turkish conquest in 1571 . By the mid-twentieth century, they lived 
mainly in four villages in northwestern Cyprus. Armenian Cypri- 
ots were primarily urban and mercantile, most of whom had ar- 
rived after the collapse of the Armenian nationalist movement in 
the Caucasus at the end of World War I. Latins were concentrated 
among merchant families of the port towns on the southern coast 
and were descendants of the Lusignan and Venetian upper classes. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

The Ottomans had suppressed Roman Catholicism, and Latins 
were largely Greek Orthodox, but retained their French or Italian 
names. Some Latins reverted to the group's original religion. 


In 1960, the last year for which there was an official census for 
the entire population of Cyprus, the island was home to 573,566 
people. Official estimates held that there were 441 ,568 Greek Cypri- 
ots, 3,627 Armenians, 2,706 Maronites (in the future these two 
groups were to be counted as part of the Greek Cypriot communi- 
ty, according to the terms of the constitution of I960), 103,822 Turk- 
ish Cypriots, and 24,408 others (mostly foreigners) (see table 5, 
Appendix). According to government statistics, 81.14 percent of 
Cypriots in 1960 were Greek Cypriot (including Armenians and 
Maronites) and 18.86 percent were Turkish Cypriot. Republic of 
Cyprus statistics estimated the 1988 population of the whole island 
at 687,500, and that of the government-controlled area at 562,700 
(see table 6, Appendix). It was estimated that the island's popula- 
tion consisted of 550,400 (80.1 percent) Greek Cypriots (includ- 
ing 6,300 Armenians and Maronites), 128,200 (18.6 percent) 
Turkish Cypriots, and 8,900 (1.3 percent) who belonged to other 
groups (mainly British). Cypriot population estimates were often 
controversial because they could have significant bearing on polit- 
ical settlements. Thus, population figures from the "Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus" differed markedly from those of 
the Republic of Cyprus (see table 7, Appendix). 

Birth Rates 

At the end of the 1980s, the Republic of Cyprus had a fertility 
rate (births per woman) of 2.4, the highest in Western Europe. But 
this spurt in births was a new development, and it was uncertain 
how long it would continue. In the troubled 1970s, the reverse had 
been the case. Substantial migration and a decline in the fertility 
rate resulted in a negative growth rate of - 0.9 percent in the years 
1973-76 (see fig. 5). In the period 1976-82, while the economy was 
being restructured, population growth gradually reached an aver- 
age rate of 0.8 percent, and in 1984 peaked at 1.4 percent. In the 
second half of the 1980s, the growth rate remained above 1 percent. 

The long-term decline in the fertility rate was first noted after 
World War II, when the crude birth rate dropped from 32 per thou- 
sand in 1946 to an average of 25 per thousand during the 1950s. 
The main contributing factor in this remarkable fall in fertility was 
the rapid postwar economic development. This downward trend 
continued in the following decades, and a rate of 18 per thousand 


The Society and Its Environment 

was recorded in the first part of the 1970s. After a further decline 
to 16 per thousand in the years after the 1974 invasion, the Greek 
Cypriot birth rate increased to a rate of 20 to 21 per thousand during 
the period 1980-86, and then continued its decline, reaching 19.2 
per thousand in 1985-88. 

This change in the reproductive behavior of the Greek Cypriot 
population was generally attributed to improvement of the stan- 
dard of living, expansion of education to all sections of the popu- 
lation, and the consequent wider participation by women in the 
work force. In addition, there was the traditional Cypriot concern 
to provide a better future for offspring, which, in a modern social 
context, entailed increased expenditure for education and a striv- 
ing to amass a larger material inheritance. As a result, the aver- 
age family size has declined, from 3.97 persons in 1946 to 3.51 
in 1982. 

A final cause of declining birth rates is the disappearance in 
Cyprus of the rural-urban dichotomy, in which higher birth rates 
are registered in the countryside. The postwar period saw an in- 
creasing movement of people to the towns, on either a daily or a 
permanent basis. This fact, together with the compactness of the 
island, has resulted in "the near fusion of urban and rural life," 
in the words of L.W. St. John-Jones, a student of Cypriot demog- 
raphy. The rapid and effective dissemination of typical urban at- 
titudes contributed to a rural fertility rate not much higher than 
the urban one. Contraceptives were easily available at modest cost 
all over the island; abortions, widely carried out in private clinics, 
were seen not as matters of moral or religious controversy, but sim- 
ply as another means of family planning, albeit a drastic one. 


Emigration of Cypriots abroad has often been on a large enough 
scale to affect population growth. As a demographic phenomenon, 
it has been viewed as an extension of rural to urban movement. 
At times when a future in the towns was unpromising for those 
intent on escaping rural poverty, there was the additional safety 
valve of emigration. Cypriots frequently availed themselves of this 
opportunity instead of living in crowded slums in their country's 
towns, and their relatively small numbers meant that recipient coun- 
tries could easily absorb them. Although there was emigration as 
early as the 1930s, there is no available data before 1955. 

The periods of greatest emigration were 1955-59, the 1960s, and 
1974-79, times of political instability and socioeconomic insecurity 
when future prospects appeared bleak and unpromising. Between 
1955 and 1959, the period of anticolonial struggle, 29,000 Cypriots, 


Cyprus: A Country Study 


80 and over 














Wyyyy^ females 














f 1 — 

yyyvyprx , yy , > 



30 20 10 10 20 30 


Source: Based on information from Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Department 
of Statistics and Research, Demographic Report, 1988, Nicosia, 1989, 83. 

Figure 5. Republic of Cyprus: Population by Age and Sex, 1988 

5 percent of the population, left the island. In the 1960s, there were 
periods of economic recession and intercommunal strife, and net 
emigration has been estimated at about 50,000, or 8.5 percent of 
the island's 1970 population. Most of these emigrants were young 
males from rural areas and usually unemployed. Some 5 percent 
were factory workers, and only 5 percent were university gradu- 
ates. Britain headed the list of destinations, taking more than 75 
percent of the emigrants in 1953-73; another 8 to 10 percent went 
to Australia, and about 5 percent to North America. 

During the early 1970s, economic development, social progress, 
and relative political stability contributed to a slackening of emigra- 
tion. At the same time, there was immigration, so that the net im- 
migration was 3,200 in 1970-73. This trend ended with the 1974 
invasion. During the 1974-79 period, 51,500 persons left as 
emigrants, and another 15,000 became temporary workers abroad. 


The Society and Its Environment 

The new wave of emigrants had Australia as the most common 
destination (35 percent), followed by North America, Greece, and 
Britain. Many professionals and technical workers emigrated, and 
for the first time more women than men left. By the early 1980s, 
the government had rebuilt the economy, and the 30 percent un- 
employment rate of 1974 was replaced by a labor shortage. As a 
result, only about 2,000 Cypriots emigrated during the years 
1980-86, while 2,850 returned to the island. 

Although emigration slowed to a trickle during the 1980s, so 
many Cypriots had left the island in preceding decades that in the 
late 1980s an estimated 300,000 Cypriots (a number equivalent 
to 60 percent of the population of the Republic of Cyprus) resided 
in seven foreign countries. 

Internal Migration 

Major demographic changes could also be seen in the distribu- 
tion of the population between urban and rural areas in the past 
fifty years. From 1881 to 1911, there was almost no internal migra- 
tion, and the rural population constituted 81 percent of the total. 
The first change was noted in the 1931 census, when 22 percent 
of the population was classified as town dwellers. In the following 
decades, especially in the period 1946-60, the urban proportion 
grew increasingly rapidly; the urban population increased by 78 
percent in that period, whereas that of rural areas grew by only 
10 percent. Some 36 percent of the island's population was con- 
centrated in towns in 1960. The urban share increased to 42 per- 
cent by 1973. In this same period, the rural population actually 
declined by 0.7 percent. 

Following the displacement of one-third of the population in 1974, 
the urban population in the government-controlled area rose to 52 
percent in 1976 and 63.5 percent in 1983. Urbanization did not 
abate in the following years, for in 1986 fully 64 percent of the popu- 
lation living in government-controlled areas of Cyprus was urban- 
based. According to the republic's 1988 Demographic Report for 
those areas controlled by the government, 363,000 persons lived 
in urban areas and 199,300 in rural areas. Such a phenomenal 
change in the island's demographic composition could not fail to 
have significant repercussions in all areas of life. 

The Nicosia district, historically the largest of the island's six 
districts, continued to expand at a faster rate than the other dis- 
tricts. In 1881 its population constituted 30 percent of the total; 
in 1973, it constituted 37 percent, and in 1986, it was up to 42 
percent. In the late 1980s, the district's population was estimated 
at 234,000, despite the fact that a large part of it is in the occupied 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

north; Limassol, the second largest district, had 91,500; Paphos, 
49,500; and Famagusta, most of which is under Turkish occupa- 
tion, 29,100. 

Urbanization and Occupational Change 

Cyprus experienced a rapid and intense economic transforma- 
tion after World War II. The traditional economy of subsistence 
agriculture and animal husbandry was replaced by a commercial 
economy, centered in expanding urban areas. These economic 
changes resulted from extensive construction of housing and other 
facilities for British military personnel during World War II; ex- 
ports of minerals (60 percent of all exports), which became the is- 
land's most valuable export in the 1950s; and the fourteenfold 
increase in British military spending through the postwar period. 
(Cyprus became Britain's most important base in the eastern 
Mediterranean after the loss of bases in the Arab countries.) In- 
dependence brought such an acceleration of economic development, 
the so-called "economic explosion," that by the end of the 1960s 
the objectives of the government's economic planning were not only 
fulfilled, but overtaken. 

In this context of economic growth, agriculture modernized: farm 
machinery became common, irrigation increased, and the scien- 
tific use of pesticides and fertilizers became widespread. Farming, 
however, became less important in the economy as a whole. 
Although agricultural income tripled during the 1950s, and then 
doubled in the 1960s, earnings from industry, construction, trade, 
tourism, and telecommunications grew even more; and agricul- 
ture's share of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) 
declined. This decline brought with it changes in employment for 
many. The increasing fragmentation of farms through inheritance 
and a shortage of water caused Cypriots to leave farming for full- 
time or part-time jobs in other economic sectors. The proximity 
of employment opportunities in urban areas only made the transi- 
tion easier. 

The flight from agriculture, which became noticeable in the de- 
cade and a half after World War II, continued after independence 
and reached a peak in 1974, when the best and most productive 
agricultural land fell under Turkish occupation. In 1960 some 40.3 
percent of the economically active population were agricultural work- 
ers; in 1973, the figure was down to 33.6 percent employed in this 
sector. In 1988 government figures estimated only 13.9 percent of 
the work force earned a living from farming full time. Although 
changes in accounting principles explain some of the lower figures, 


Kakopetria, a village in the Troodos Mountains 
Courtesy Republic of Cyprus, Press and Information Office, Nicosia 

the decline of agricultural employment since the late 1940s was 

Urbanization in Cyprus did not result in the annihilation of tradi- 
tional values and practices, but in their preservation. Urbaniza- 
tion took place under conditions that generally spared the island 
the problems often connected with migration of large numbers of 
unemployed farm workers to urban centers. For one thing, urbani- 
zation occurred in a period of prosperity and increasing economic 
activity, and employment was available. In addition, farm work- 
ers generally left their villages only when they had found work in 
urban areas. Another happy circumstance was that the island's small 
size and its good road system linked most villages to the towns, 
so that many rural workers could commute daily to their new jobs. 
The capital and largest city was especially well connected to the 
countryside. Finally, rural migrants unable to afford housing in 
Nicosia and other towns were able to settle in nearby villages, a 
circumstance that reduced the likelihood of slums. 

Many migrants regarded access to secondary education as a prin- 
cipal reason for moving to the city. Traditional Cypriot agricul- 
tural society valued land above all else and considered education 
a wasteful luxury; a modern and diversified economy, however, 
made education a necessity. Migrants came to value education as 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

the principal means of improving their material and social posi- 
tions. Expansion of education contributed immensely to the dis- 
semination of urban values and organizations to rural Cyprus. 

Postwar population redistribution in Cyprus was so extensive 
that most urban dwellers were born in rural areas. These migrants 
maintained close ties with the countryside, and many owned plots 
of land in their places of origin. The satisfaction of owning land 
went beyond increasing property values, a fact that is easy to un- 
derstand in Cypriots, who were an agricultural people until just 
a generation ago. 

Class Structure 

Cypriot class structure traditionally has been free of vast dis- 
parities of wealth and status. During Ottoman rule, Venetian es- 
tates were broken up and given to Turkish settlers, who soon were 
indistinguishable from their Greek Cypriot neighbors, until one 
heard them speak. A small Ottoman bureaucracy governed the is- 
land, aided by the Greek Orthodox clergy, who, under the millet 
system, were the leaders of their people. Some Greek Cypriots en- 
gaged in commerce, but the island's population consisted mostly 
of small farmers. This pattern continued until the early decades 
of this century, when, under British rule, the economy became more 
diversified and living standards slowly began to rise. 

During this period, a small Greek commercial class formed, often 
drawing its money from working for the British. In addition to 
profiting from government service and increased commerce, some 
Cypriots acquired wealth as moneylenders. Taking advantage of 
frequent droughts and plagues, moneylenders could become 
dominant figures and landowners in the countryside. Their for- 
tunes were relatively small, however, for Cyprus was a poor coun- 
try, with most people living at subsistence levels. The founding 
of the cooperative movement in the early years of the twentieth 
century and British reforms in later decades broke the power of 
these small financiers and permitted farmers to repay their debts 
at reasonable rates. The cities had no wealthy class, but only more 
prosperous groups that earned their living in government service, 
the professions, and business. 

From the 1950s to the invasion of 1974, the Cypriot economy 
bloomed, and many prospered. The average living standard in- 
creased markedly in both the countryside and the city. Workers 
commuted to urban areas for employment, yet lived in their home 
villages; thus, no slums were created. Some businessmen in the 
cities earned substantial amounts of money through hotels, real 


The Society and Its Environment 

estate, and commerce. Although some of these businessmen be- 
came quite wealthy, their money was new. Fortunes in Cyprus rare- 
ly went back beyond a generation. 

The substantial economic growth of the Republic of Cyprus since 
the mid-1970s furthered these trends. All government-controlled 
areas benefited from the prosperous economy, and new modern 
houses were seen in every village. Land become very valuable, and 
fortunes could be earned from land earlier regarded as worthless. 
Many became rich from the explosive growth of the tourist indus- 
try. Fortunes were also earned from manufacturing, trade and ship- 
ping, and financial services, and at the beginning of the 1990s the 
republic had a highly visible class of the newly wealthy. 

The republic's prosperity was widely shared, however. The aver- 
age standard of living matched those of some other West Europe- 
an countries. At the beginning of the 1990s, even working-class 
Cypriots regarded vacations abroad as necessities. A welfare sys- 
tem along West European lines supported Cypriots in need. 

Education was a common means of rising in social status, and 
most Cypriots respected higher education and white-collar profes- 
sions. The expanding economy allowed many Cypriots to do more 
sophisticated work than had their parents. To move in one gener- 
ation from farmer to urban professional became, if not the rule, 
at least not extraordinary. Given the small size of the republic, and 
the still strong tradition of the extended family, virtually all Cypriots 
could number among their relatives farmers, teachers, government 
employees, small businessmen, and other professional workers. 

Family and Marriage 

The structure of the family was affected by the postwar changes. 
The family was traditionally the most important institution in Cypri- 
ot society. Especially in village life, people thought of themselves 
primarily as members of families, and rarely, according to sociol- 
ogist Peter Loizos, spoke of "themselves as individuals in the ex- 
istential sense." Others have noted that Greek Cypriots traditionally 
identified themselves first as members of families, then according 
to their places of origin, and lastly as citizens of a nation. 

The typical traditional Greek Cypriot households consisted of 
a father, a mother, and their unmarried children. At marriage, 
the parents gave their children a portion of land, if available, along 
with money and household items. Traditionally, the bridegroom 
provided the house and the bride's family the furniture and linens. 
These gifts were the dowry, the allocation of an equal portion of 
the parents' property to the children, male or female, at the time 
of marriage, rather than after the death of the parents. Until the 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

1950s, this transfer of property at marriage was agreed to orally 
by the parties involved; more recently the so-called dowry contract 
has been introduced. A formal agreement specifying the amount 
of property to be given to the couple, the dowry contract is signed 
by all parties and enforced by religious authorities. At the engage- 
ment, for example, a priest will ask if such a contract has been 

After World War II, it became the bride's obligation to provide 
the house. Ownership of a house, given the scarcity of land (espe- 
cially after the invasion of 1974) and the considerable expense of 
building, became a great advantage for a single woman seeking 
to marry. For this reason, a great part of the wages of a working 
woman went to the construction of a house, for a "good mar- 
riage" was as important at the beginning of the 1990s as it was 
in the past. 

Traditionally, all marriages were arranged, generally through 
the mediation of a matchmaker. The latter, although unrelated to 
either family, knew the families well enough to be confident that 
their children were well suited. Opportunities for the young them- 
selves to meet were rare and restricted. They met at church, in 
the presence of their parents; at the village fountain; and during 
"Sunday afternoon walks," where girls and boys strolled separately. 
Couples were matched with a few qualities in mind, and in larger 
settlements were often relative strangers. Love was not seen as a 
good reason for marriage, for romantic love was not highly esteemed 
in traditional Cypriot society. Divorce and separation were virtu- 
ally unknown. Through the system of marriage and dowry, kin- 
ship and economic ties were so rigidly defined that neither partner 
could opt out of a marriage without devastating social consequences. 

Urbanization and modernization have altered Greek Cypriot at- 
titudes toward marriage. The expansion of the school system has 
meant that boys and girls meet from an early age and are exposed 
to modern ideas about social and sexual relations. The great in- 
crease in the number of women in the work force also has liberat- 
ed them from strict parental control. 

Even at the beginning of the 1990s, however, economic consider- 
ations remained a decisive factor in matters of sexual morality and 
marriage settlements. In farming communities, for example, where 
daughters were financially dependent on parents, the latter could 
still regulate premarital behavior. Among the lower middle class 
of wage earners, where there was little property to divide among 
the children, parents still retained considerable authority over their 
daughters, for a "good name" was thought to increase the chances 
of a marriage bringing upward social mobility. Among affluent 


The Society and Its Environment 

urban classes, where girls associated with boys of similar econom- 
ic background, parents relaxed their vigilance considerably, and 
more typically modern Western attitudes toward sexual morality 

In traditional Cypriot society, full manhood was attained through 
marriage and becoming the main support for a family. Similarly, 
it was only through marriage that a woman could realize what was 
seen as her main purpose in life, becoming a mother and homemak- 
er. Remaining single reduced a woman to the marginal role of look- 
ing after aged parents and being on the periphery of her married 
siblings' lives. 

The great importance of a separate "dwelling unit" for the 
nuclear family has always been recognized as a prerequisite for the 
couple's economic independence. Accordingly, the head of the 
family has been seen as morally justified in pursuing the interest 
of his dependents in all circumstances. This principle of symferon, 
that is, self-interest, overrides every other consideration. Acting 
in accordance with the principle of symferon, Greek Cypriot par- 
ents do all in their power to equip their children for the future. 
In present-day Cyprus, this involves providing the best possible 
education for sons and securing a house as well as an acceptable 
education for daughters. 

In traditional Cypriot villages, houses were built close to one 
another, encouraging the close contact and cooperation that were 
necessary for survival in a context of general poverty. The closely 
knit community of families provided a sense of belonging and secu- 
rity, but also greatly restricted individuals within accepted norms 
and boundaries in all aspects of life. Urbanization had a liber- 
ating effect. As people became wage earners, the self-sufficiency 
of the nuclear family grew at the expense of community inter- 

Despite changes in its structure, however, the family remained 
strong in Greek Cypriot society. In the period 1985-89, the coun- 
try's marriage rate was 9.5 per thousand, the highest in Europe. 
The period saw a rising trend in the marriage age for men and 
women, about one year older for both than in earlier years. In 1988 
the mean age at marriage was 28.7 for grooms, and 25.2 for brides. 
Grooms and brides in rural areas still tended to marry younger 
than their urban counterparts. On the other hand, the divorce rate 
had almost doubled from 42 per thousand in 1980 to 68 per thou- 
sand in 1988. The number of extramarital births remained very 
low by European standards; in 1988 only seventy- two children were 
born out of wedlock, a mere 0.7 percent of the total number of 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Status of Women 

Postwar changes greatly affected Greek Cypriot women's place 
in society. Especially influential were changes that gave women 
expanded access to education and increased participation in the 
work force. At the beginning of the century, the proportion of girls 
to boys enrolled in primary education was one to three. By 1943 
some 80 percent of girls attended primary school. When, in 1960, 
elementary education was made compulsory, the two sexes were 
equally enrolled. By the 1980s, girls made up 45 percent of those 
receiving secondary education. Only after the mid-1960s did women 
commonly leave Cyprus to receive higher education. In the 1980s, 
women made up about 32 percent of those studying abroad. 

Cyprus had long had a high degree of female participation in 
the work force. In the period 1960-85, women's share of the work 
force rose only slighdy, from 40.8 percent to 42.2 percent. However, 
where women worked changed greatly. Women's share of the ur- 
ban work force rose from 22 percent to 41 percent, and their share 
of the rural work force fell from 51 percent to 44.4 percent. The 
decline in rural areas stemmed from the overall shift away from 
agricultural work, where women's contribution had always been 
vital, to employment in urban occupations. 

Cypriot women enjoyed the same rights to social welfare as men 
in such matters as social security payments, unemployment com- 
pensation, vacation time, and other common social provisions. In 
addition, after 1985 women benefited from special protective legis- 
lation that provided them with marriage grants and with materni- 
ty grants that paid them 75 percent of their insurable earnings. 
Still, a large number of women, the self-employed and unpaid fam- 
ily workers on farms, were not covered by the Social Insurance 
Scheme (see Health and Welfare, this ch.). These women constitut- 
ed 28 percent of the economically active female population. 

In 1985 the Republic of Cyprus ratified the United Nations Con- 
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women. Despite ratification of this agreement, as of late 1990 there 
was no legislation in the Republic of Cyprus that guaranteed the 
right to equal pay for work of equal value, nor the right of women 
to the same employment opportunities. 

The occupational segregation of the sexes was still persistent in 
Cyprus at the beginning of the 1990s. Even though the participa- 
tion of women in clerical jobs had more than doubled since the 
late 1970s, only one woman in fifteen was in an administrative or 
managerial position in 1985. Women's share of professional jobs 
increased to 39 percent by the mid-1980s, compared with 36 percent 


Breadbaking in a Cypriot village 
Courtesy Republic of Cyprus, Press and Information Office, Nicosia 

Traditional Cypriot wedding 
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

ten years earlier, but these jobs were concentrated in medicine and 
teaching, where women had traditionally found employment. In 
fields where men were dominant, women's share of professional 
positions amounted to only 1 1 percent, up from 8 percent in 1976. 
In the fields where women were dominant, men took just under 
half the professional positions. 

Although most Cypriot women worked outside the home, they 
were expected to fulfill the traditional domestic roles of housewife 
and mother. They could expect little help from their spouses, for 
most Cypriot men were not ready to accept any domestic duties, 
and most women did not expect them to behave otherwise. Nonethe- 
less, even women with full-time jobs were judged by the tradition- 
al standards of whether they kept a clean house and provided daily 
hot meals. 

Moreover, even at the beginning of the 1990s, Cypriot women 
were still burdened with the expectation of safeguarding the honor 
of the family. According to tradition, a woman's duty was to pro- 
tect herself against all criticism of sexual immodesty. A study car- 
ried out in a farming community in the mid-1970s found that 
women were still expected to avoid any social contact with men 
that could be construed to have a sexual content. An expressed 
desire for male society was seen to reflect poorly on a woman's 
honor, and virginity was seen by many villagers, both men and 
women, to be a precondition for marriage. The honor of a family, 
that is, the sense of dignity of its male members, depended on the 
sexual modesty and virtue of its women. These traditional attitudes 
have waned somewhat in recent decades, especially in urban areas, 
but were still prevalent in the early 1990s. Another indication of 
the conservative nature of Greek Cypriot society at the beginning 
of the 1990s was that the feminist movement in Cyprus was often 
the object of ridicule from both sexes. Nevertheless, women's in- 
creasing economic independence was a force for liberation in all 
sections of the population. 


The most important church in Cyprus, the Church of Cyprus, 
is an autocephalous church in the Orthodox tradition using the 
Greek liturgy. It recognizes the seniority and prestige of the ecu- 
menical patriarch in Constantinople, but retains complete adminis- 
trative autonomy under its own archbishop. The Great Schism, 
as the split between Catholic and Orthodox became known, had 
major consequences for the Church of Cyprus. Under Lusignan and 
Venetian rule, the Church of Cyprus was pressured to recognize 
the authority of the Roman pope. The imposed Roman hierarchy 


The Society and Its Environment 

attempted to remold the Church of Cyprus in the image of the 
Western church. Under the Muslim Ottomans, Cypriots were no 
longer considered schismatics, but merely unbelievers and follow- 
ers of an inferior religion. As such they were allowed considerable 
autonomy, and the archbishop was the officially recognized secu- 
lar as well as religious leader of his community. Under the Brit- 
ish, there was an attempt to secularize all public institutions, but 
this move was bitterly opposed by church authorities, who used 
the conflict with the state to gain leadership of the Greek nation- 
alist movement against colonial rule. At independence Archbishop 
Makarios III, a young, Western-educated former monk, was elected 
president of the republic, holding this position until his death in 
1977. His successor, Archbishop Chrysostomos, was still head of 
the Church of Cyprus at the beginning of the 1990s. He was a con- 
servative leader, both in religious and political matters, well-suited 
for a church that had never undergone reforms such as those in- 
stituted by the Second Vatican Council for the Roman Catholic 

The church had long been composed of four episcopal sees: the 
archbishopric of Nicosia, and the metropolitanates of Paphos, Ki- 
tion, and Kyrenia. New metropolitanates were created by Makarios 
in 1973 for Limassol and Morphou, with a suffragan, or assistant, 
bishop in Salamis under the archbishop. A bishop had to be a gradu- 
ate of the Orthodox theological seminary in Greece and be at least 
thirty years of age. Because Orthodox bishops were sworn to a vow 
of celibacy and parish clergy were usually married, bishops were 
recruits from monasteries rather than parish churches. Bishops were 
not appointed by the archbishop, but, like him, were elected through 
a system granting representation to laymen, other bishops, abbots, 
and regular clergy. 

Individual churches, monasteries, dioceses, and charitable educa- 
tional institutions organized by the Church of Cyprus were indepen- 
dent legal entities enjoying such rights and obligations as holding 
property. In exchange for the acquisition of many church lands, 
the government assumed responsibility for church salaries. Parish 
clergy, traditionally married men chosen by their fellow villagers, 
were sent for brief training before ordination. In the twentieth cen- 
tury, modernizers, most notably Archbishop Makarios, were in- 
strumental in strengthening the quality and training of priests at 
the Cypriot seminary in Nicosia. 

The monasteries of Cyprus had always been very important to 
the Church of Cyprus. By the twentieth century, many had long 
lain in ruins, but their properties were among the most important 
holdings of the church, the island's largest landowner. Although 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

the number of monks decreased in the postwar era, at the begin- 
ning of the 1990s there were at least ten active monasteries in the 
government-controlled areas. 

In the Orthodox church, ritual was to a great extent the center 
of the church's activity, for Orthodox doctrine emphasizes the mys- 
tery of God's grace rather than salvation through works and 
knowledge. Seven sacraments are recognized: baptism in infancy, 
confirmation with consecrated oil, penance, the Eucharist, matrimo- 
ny, ordination, and unction in times of sickness or when near death. 

Formal services are lengthy and colorful, with singing, incense, 
and elaborate vestments, according to the occasion, worn by the 
presiding priest. Statues are forbidden, but the veneration of icons, 
located on the church's walls and often covered with offerings of 
the faithful, is highly developed. Easter is the focus of the church 
year, closing the Lenten fasting with an Easter Eve vigil and 

Religious observance varied. In traditional rural villages, women 
attended services more frequently than men, and elderly family 
members were usually responsible for fulfilling religious duties on 
behalf of the whole family. Church attendance was less frequent 
in urban areas and among educated Cypriots. For much of the 
population, religion centered on rituals at home, veneration of icons, 
and observance of certain feast days of the Orthodox calendar. 


One of the most important institutional changes introduced dur- 
ing the period of British rule was the allocation of a small subsidy 
for the establishment of primary schools. A great increase in the 
number of primary schools throughout the island was made possi- 
ble by the Education Law of 1895, which permitted local authori- 
ties to raise taxes to finance schools. In 1897 there were only 76 
schools, run by voluntary and church donations; twenty years later, 
there were 179. Colonial officials also subsidized teacher training 
and agricultural courses, but did not interfere with local and church 
authorities in the area of secondary education. 

As a result of a campaign against illiteracy launched by British 
authorities, the percentage of illiterate adult Cypriots fell from 33 
percent in 1946 to 18 percent in 1960. After independence the il- 
literacy rate dropped still further, to 9.5 percent in 1976, the last 
year for which there are statistics. In that year, 15 percent of women 
were illiterate, as were 3.2 percent of men. This improvement 
reflected the growing school enrollment. In 1960 as much as 25 
percent of the population had never attended school, but by 1986-87 
this figure had dropped to 6 percent. Another indication of the 


The Society and Its Environment 

expansion of education was that in 1946 only 5 percent of adult 
women had attended secondary schools; forty years later, 30 per- 
cent had. 

During the colonial period, the main educational goal was the 
inculcation of national ideals and the strengthening of ethnic iden- 
tity. After independence, goals became more practical. A well- 
educated population was seen as the best way of guaranteeing a 
thriving economy, a rise in overall living standards, and a vigorous 
cultural life. The great importance attached to education could be 
seen in the significant rise in government spending on it during 
the period since independence. In 1960 education accounted for 
3.4 percent of the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary). 
By 1987 education accounted for 5.6 percent of GNP and 11.6 per- 
cent of the government's budget. 

At the beginning of the 1990s, qualified teachers and adminis- 
trative personnel for all levels and types of schools were in good 
supply. All teachers were accredited by a special committee of the 
Ministry of Education. All public schools had uniform curricula; 
the preparation of school textbooks was the responsibility of com- 
mittees of teachers and administrators, working in close coopera- 
tion with educational authorities in Greece. Some instructional 
material for both primary and secondary education was donated 
by the Greek government. Cypriot schools were also well provid- 
ed with modern teaching equipment. 

A principal challenge at the beginning of the 1990s was provid- 
ing education more responsive to the needs of the economy. The 
first vocational-technical schools were established after indepen- 
dence in an attempt to provide the rapidly expanding economy with 
technicians and skilled workers. However, Cypriots retained a ten- 
dency to choose academic rather than technical courses, for rea- 
sons of social prestige. Cyprus therefore faced a chronic shortage 
of skilled workers and a high rate of unemployment for university 
graduates. By the second half of the 1980s, this trend had ended. 
In the 1986-87 academic year, only 5.3 percent of students opted 
for the classical academic course of studies, compared with 46.2 
percent in the 1965-66 academic year. About half of all students 
chose to concentrate on economic and commercial courses; about 
one-fifth chose scientific courses; and one-fifth, vocational-technical 

The Greek Cypriot education system consisted of preprimary 
and primary schools, secondary general and secondary techni- 
cal/vocational schools, and special schools for the blind, deaf, and 
other teachable handicapped persons. In addition, there were in- 
stitutions for teacher training, specialized instruction, and informal 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

education. As of 1990, there was no university in the Republic of 
Cyprus, and until one opened in the early 1990s, further studies 
had to be pursued abroad. There were a small number of private 

The constitution of 1960 assigned responsibility for education 
to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communal chambers. 
After withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from all state institutions, 
the government proceeded with the establishment of the Ministry 
of Education in 1965. Under this ministry, the education system 
evolved its present structure: one to two and one-half years of 
preprimary schooling for children aged three to five and one-half 
years; six years of primary school for children aged five and one- 
half to eleven and one-half years; six years of secondary school- 
ing, followed by two to three years of higher education for those 
who did not go to study abroad. 

The development of preprimary education was a relatively re- 
cent phenomenon in Cyprus. In 1973 only 11 percent of children 
under five years of age attended public or private nurseries or kin- 
dergartens. Following the 1974 invasion, the state became much 
more involved with preprimary education through its establishment 
of nurseries and kindergartens for the thousands of refugees from 
northern areas. The 1980s saw a further expansion of public edu- 
cation of this kind (see table 8, Appendix). 

Primary education was always free in Cyprus and aimed at the 
all-around education of young children. After 1962 primary edu- 
cation was compulsory, and primary schools were found in all com- 
munities, even remote villages. In the 1986-87 academic year, there 
were 357 public primary schools, and 16 private ones (most of the 
latter for the children of foreign residents). 

Secondary education, which was also free, but not compulsory, 
was open without examination to all children who had completed 
primary schooling. It was divided into two stages, each consisting 
of three grades. During the first stage, the gymnasium, all students 
were taught the same general subjects, with a special emphasis on 
the humanities. The second stage consisted of either the lyceum, 
which offered five main fields of specialization (classical studies, 
science, economics, business, and languages), or a vocational- 
technical course. Schools of the second category aimed at provid- 
ing industry with technicians and craftsmen. Vocational schools 
trained many students for work in the country's important tourist 
industry; technical schools emphasized mathematics, science, and 
training in various technologies. 

After independence the number of students at the secondary level 
increased rapidly, rising from 26,000 in the 1960-61 academic year 


The Society and Its Environment 

to 42,000 ten years later. By the second half of the 1980s, 98 per- 
cent of those who completed primary school attended secondary 
schools, compared with about 75 percent twenty years earlier. 

Although Cyprus had no university of its own (the long-planned 
University of Cyprus was expected to begin enrolling students for 
some courses in 1991), many Cypriots were at foreign universi- 
ties. The percentage of students studying at the university level, 
29 percent, was among the highest in the world. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, an average of more than over 10,000 Cypriots studied 
abroad annually. During the 1970s, more than half of these stu- 
dents were in Greece, and about one-fifth were in Britain. In the 
1980s, the United States became an important destination for stu- 
dents going abroad, generally surpassing Britain. The number of 
women studying abroad increased markedly during the 1970s and 
1980s, going from 24 percent in 1970 to 40 percent in 1987. 

Cyprus did, however, provide some opportunities for third-level 
training, and in the late 1980s attracted some of those who earlier 
would have studied abroad. In 1987 there were seven public and 
ten private institutions of higher learning, which enrolled about 
one-fourth of the island's secondary- school graduates. The public 
institutions were the Pedagogical Academy of the Ministry of Edu- 
cation, which trained kindergarten and primary- school teachers; 
the Higher Technical Institute of the Ministry of Labor and So- 
cial Insurance, which trained mechanical, electrical, and civil en- 
gineers; the College of Forestry under the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Natural Resources; the School of Nursing, the School of Mid- 
wifery, and the Psychiatric School of Nursing under the Ministry 
of Health; and the Hotel and Catering Institute under the Minis- 
try of Labor and Social Insurance. Private institutions offered 
courses in business administration, secretarial studies, mechani- 
cal and civil engineering, banking and accounting, hotel and cater- 
ing, and communications. 

Health and Welfare 

A Cambridge professor, visiting Cyprus in 1801, wrote that 
"there is hardly upon earth a more wretched spot" than Cyprus, 
with its "pestiferous air" and contagion. A few years after the Brit- 
ish came into possession of the country, it was officially reported 
that the island was generally healthy; this assessment could be at- 
tributed to the disappearance of the plague around the middle of 
the nineteenth century. According to testimony of the chief medi- 
cal officer in the mid- 1880s, however, the island's situation was 
far from healthy. Because the towns and villages were often sur- 
rounded by marshes, drainage was often impossible and water 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

supplies were often contaminated. The draining of marshes, de- 
struction of the anopheles mosquito, securing of sanitary water, 
and introduction of elementary health measures freed Cyprus en- 
tirely of the plague, typhus, and other virulent diseases by the end 
of the century. Malaria remained a serious concern, whose effects 
were widely evident. The eradication of this disease after World 
War II contributed greatly to the well-being of the island, so much 
so that some observers have regarded it as the most important event 
in the modern history of Cyprus. 

Health Care 

Mortality rates and the health of Greek Cypriots improved stead- 
ily in the postwar era. The eradication of malaria was an impor- 
tant cause for this improvement, as were material prosperity and 
the diffusion of up-to-date health information. Since independence 
in 1960, the Ministry of Health has been responsible for improv- 
ing public health and providing public medical services, as well 
as overseeing the extensive private health-care sector. 

Government medical services were available to all at the begin- 
ning of the 1990s. The poor .were entitled to free services; middle- 
income families paid for care at reduced rates. These two groups 
accounted for well over half the population; upper- income persons 
paid for the full costs of medical services. In addition, employers 
and trade unions subsidized a number of health plans. Civil ser- 
vants and members of police and military units received free med- 
ical care. Cypriots needing care not available in the republic were 
sent abroad at government expense. 

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Republic of Cyprus had six 
general hospitals, all in the main towns. In addition, there were 
twenty-one rural health centers and a psychiatric hospital in Nico- 
sia. In 1987 there were 1,870 hospital beds, compared with 1,592 
in 1960. The private health sector was extensive, and more than 
three-quarters of all doctors and dentists had their own practices 
or practiced part time in private clinics. Taking both public and 
private care into account, in 1989 Cyprus had 1 hospital bed per 
166 inhabitants, 1 doctor per 482 inhabitants, and 1 dentist for 
every 1,356 inhabitants. 

The improvement in the island's health care during the post- 
war period was reflected by increased life expectancy. In the 
1983-87 period, Cypriot women could expect to live 77.8 years 
and men 73.9 years, compared with 69 and 64 years, respectively, 
for the period 1948-50. The improvement in the infant mortality 
rate was even more striking, with 11 deaths per 1,000 births in 
the mid-1980s, compared with 63 per 1,000 at mid-century. 


Refugee housing project in Strovolos, a suburb of Nicosia 
Courtesy Republic of Cyprus, Press and Information Office, Nicosia 

The main reasons for improved health conditions on the island 
were the Cypriots' constant pursuit of better living standards, their 
consuming concern with their family's welfare, the close urban- 
rural ties, and the rapid diffusion of and receptiveness to innova- 
tive ideas in health care. 

Social Insurance 

The five-year development plans adopted by the Republic of 
Cyprus increasingly stressed that a developing economy was the 
best means to improve the welfare and living standards of all sec- 
tors of the population. The plan covering the 1989-93 period had 
as its major objectives improving living standards, attaining higher 
levels of social welfare, and instituting a more equitable distribu- 
tion of national income and economic burdens. 

Beginning with independence, the state, trade unions, and the 
employers' associations had cooperated in establishing an exten- 
sive network of social security that included social insurance, death 
benefits, medical treatment and hospitalization, education, and 
housing. The crowning success of this effort was the national So- 
cial Insurance Scheme. As introduced by colonial authorities in 
1957, it was limited with regard to both the number of persons 
covered and the benefits it could provide. In 1964 the plan was 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

improved and expanded to cover every person gainfully employed 
on the island, including even the self-employed. The welfare pro- 
gram included maternity leave and assistance for sickness and work- 
related injuries. Legislation providing for annual paid vacations 
was introduced in 1967. By 1987 Cypriots working five days a week 
were entided to fifteen days of annual leave a year; those working 
six days a week had the right to eighteen days. Supporting this 
entidement was a central vacation fund to which all participating 
employers were required to contribute 6 percent of insurable 

A system of unemployment compensation was introduced in 
1968. Its main objectives were protecting employees against ar- 
bitrary dismissal, regulating how much advance notice was required 
before dismissal, and setting the amount of unemployment com- 

The Social Insurance Scheme was fundamentally improved in 
1973. For the first time, the plan included a disability pension, and 
coverage of the self-employed was extended. The social insurance 
program now included a whole range of benefits. Some benefits 
were short-range, such as unemployment, sickness, or injury 
benefits, marriage and maternity benefits, and disablement and 
funeral grants. Long-term benefits included pensions for the elderly, 
widows and invalids, and payments to orphans and survivors. 

In June 1974, social insurance payments were increased 25 per- 
cent to reach West European standards and meet relevant Inter- 
national Labor Organisation criteria. The economic crisis stemming 
from the Turkish invasion, with its 30 percent unemployment, com- 
pelled the government to reduce all pensions by 20 percent and 
suspend the payment of unemployment benefits, as well as mar- 
riage, birth, and funeral grants. By 1977 benefits were restored 
to their preinvasion levels, partly through the establishment of a 
separate fund for unemployment benefits. 

The Social Insurance Law of 1980 set contributions and benefits 
according to the incomes of the insured. The new program main- 
tained the previous flat-rate principle for basic benefits, but in- 
troduced supplementary benefits with contributions direcdy related 
to the incomes of insured persons. In addition to compulsory cover- 
age of all gainfully employed persons, the new program allowed 
those formerly employed to continue their social insurance on a 
voluntary basis. In the second half of the 1980s, participants had 
amounts equal to 15.5 percent of their insurable earnings paid into 
the central fund. For employees, the contributions came from three 
sources: 6 percent from employees themselves, 6 percent from 


The Society and Its Environment 

employers, and 3.5 percent from the government. For the self- 
employed, the government paid 3.5 percent, and the insured the 

Apart from the state Social Insurance Scheme, an increasing 
number of insurance or pension funds were being registered with 
the Income Tax Department of the Ministry of Finance. In 1987 
there were 1,065 such funds, with a total of C£25.1 million (for 
value of the Cyprus pound — see Glossary) in benefit payments. 
The number of insured contributors to all funds, public and pri- 
vate, amounted to 214,522 in 1987, compared with 183,000 in 1973. 
In this period, the government's annual contribution increased from 
C£21.7 million to C£223.7 million. In 1986 the government's pay- 
ments of social insurance benefits constituted 4.5 percent of GNP, 
compared with 1.6 percent in 1970. 

Social Welfare 

Social welfare policy was introduced for the first time in Cyprus 
in 1946, when legislation was enacted to regulate the supervision 
of juvenile offenders, the aftercare of reform-school boys, and the 
protection of deprived children. After independence social welfare 
became the responsibility of the Department of Social Welfare Ser- 
vices under the Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance. The gov- 
ernment committed itself to an active role in social policy when 
it stated in 1967 that "it recognizes that health, education and other 
social considerations affect and are interdependent with a vast com- 
plex of variables which determine both the social and economic 
welfare of the island." 

By the 1970s, social welfare had evolved into a body of activi- 
ties designed to enable individuals, family groups, and communi- 
ties to cope with social problems. In the late 1980s, the state provided 
five main categories of services: delinquency and social defense; 
child and family welfare; community work and youth services; so- 
cial services to other departments; and public assistance. 

Delinquency and social defense services were concerned with 
juvenile and adult offenders. They included pretrial reports on 
juveniles, supervision of persons placed on probation, follow-up 
care for those leaving detention centers (obligatory for juveniles, 
voluntary for adults), and supervision of juveniles involved in anti- 
social behavior when requested by parents or school authorities. 

The primary recipients of child and family welfare were chil- 
dren removed from families where conditions could no longer be 
remedied. Also served were children needing protection, but re- 
maining with their families, and children threatened by such 
problems as chronic illness, marriage breakdown, and homelessness. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

In these cases, the department could supervise fostering arrange- 
ments and adoptions. Service of this kind also involved inspecting 
and licensing homes for children, day nurseries, and childcare per- 
sonnel. In 1986 there were 207 day-care centers, 164 of them pri- 
vately run; state and local governments operated the rest. Children 
placed in the state's care lived in the department's four children's 
homes; delinquent youths (aged thirteen to eighteen) lived in four 
youth hostels. There was also a home for retarded children, one 
section of which was reserved for retarded adults. 

Community work and youth services involved the department 
in providing expert advice, and occasionally financial assistance, 
to voluntary community and youth organizations. Especially af- 
ter 1974, the department provided much support for youth centers, 
where recreational facilities were available for working young peo- 
ple. In the late 1980s, there were ninety-eight of these youth centers, 
eighty-three of which were run by local governments. 

Social services to other departments included long-term care for 
persons released from psychiatric institutions and, on occasion, for 
former medical patients; prison welfare measures; and assistance 
for students having difficulty adjusting to school. 

Public assistance was first instituted in 1952 to reduce poverty 
by offering economic assistance to very poor families, the aged, 
and the disabled. This service was greatiy expanded in 1973, when 
every Cypriot citizen was made eligible for financial assistance "for 
the maintenance of a minimum standard of living, and the satis- 
faction of his basic needs," and promised social services for solv- 
ing "his personal problems and the improvement of his living 
conditions." The ultimate objective of these services was to make 
their recipients socially and economically self-sufficient. By the time 
of the Turkish invasion in 1974, public assistance expenditures were 
minimal, given full employment and comparatively high living stan- 
dards. The years immediately after the invasion saw a swelling of 
public assistance services. By 1987, when the economy was fully 
restored, there were only 5,087 recipients of public assistance, half 
of whom were aged or disabled. 

Refugees and Social Reconstruction 

During and immediately after the 1974 invasion, the Depart- 
ment of Social Welfare Services undertook the housing, clothing, 
and feeding of the 180,000 refugees. The social needs stemming 
from the invasion were so great, however, that a new agency, the 
Special Service for the Care and Rehabilitation of Displaced Per- 
sons, was established in September 1974. Initially this agency con- 
centrated on emergency relief by distributing food and clothing and 


The Society and Its Environment 

providing medical assistance to the refugee camps. After a few 
months, it became clear that the thousands of displaced people 
would not return to their homes in the foreseeable future. As a 
result, the agency gradually expanded its scope, to aid the reinte- 
gration of the displaced into the new society forming in the gov- 
ernment-controlled area, once their immediate physical survival 
had been ensured. 

Housing for the wave of refugees was initially provided by the 
construction of twenty-three camps housing 20,000 displaced per- 
sons in tents. Thousands, however, remained outside the camps 
in shacks, makeshift barracks, public buildings, and half- finished 
houses. By the end of 1975, the service had replaced its tents with 
wooden barracks, built by the occupants themselves with materi- 
als or money provided by the service. 

Another initiative that contributed to solving the refugee problem 
was the Incentive Scheme for the Reactivation of Refugees. In- 
stituted in 1976, this program provided financial incentives to help 
refugees get back on their feet. Funds were available to all refu- 
gees, but special emphasis was placed on certain occupational groups 
that could soon become economically self-reliant, such as farmers 
in remote areas. By fostering economic recovery, the program suc- 
cessfully combated a culture of despair in the refugee community 
and spared the government a considerable drain on its public as- 
sistance funds. Despite the magnitude of the refugee problem, the 
government concluded that by 1977 its measures had succeeded 
in rehabilitating all groups affected by the invasion. 

The Special Service for the Care and Rehabilitation of Displaced 
Persons also undertook the construction of low-cost housing projects. 
In the 1975-86 period, 12,500 low-income families found housing 
in such projects, which also provided social services in the form 
of day-care centers, schools, and community and commercial 
centers. Other government programs that enabled thousands of 
refugees to live in acceptable housing involved "self-housing" on 
either private or state-owned land. In the period 1975-86, nearly 
10,500 houses were built on private properties, and 1 1 ,000 on state- 
owned sites, at a cost to the government of C£280 million. By 1987 
more than 43,000 families, about 80 percent of displaced persons, 
had been housed. 

Once the refugee housing problem had been resolved, the govern- 
ment extended its housing program to include low- and middle- 
income groups, who also faced serious housing problems because 
of a tremendous increase in the cost of land and construction. 
Through a combination of controls on the value of land and housing 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

loans, the government succeeded in significantly improving hous- 
ing conditions. 

Also introduced were a number of programs such as child care 
and youth recreation centers, hostels for the aged, assistance for 
invalids, and community welfare centers, all of which were incor- 
porated in the existing services of the Department of Social Wel- 
fare Services. In this way, the objectives of social policy were 
redefined as the "systematization, institutionalization, and legali- 
zation of public assistance, and the reconstruction of personal, 
family and social life in the island." 

"The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" 

Turkish Cypriot society, in the decades after World War II, ex- 
perienced a series of trials almost cataclysmic in scope and intensity. 
Earlier, the Turkish Cypriot minority had lived quiedy and securely 
under British rule. During the war, many Cypriots left the island 
for the first time to fight in His Majesty's forces. The burgeoning 
of Greek Cypriot nationalism in the 1950s at first only aroused mis- 
givings in Turkish Cypriots, but within a few years it drew them 
into what they saw as a struggle for their survival as an indepen- 
dent community. In the 1960s, Turkish Cypriots often feared for 
their physical survival, and fled into fortified enclaves around the 
island. The Turkish intervention of 1974 led to the de facto parti- 
tion of Cyprus, with Turkish Cypriots controlling 37 percent of 
its territory. 

The partition disrupted many lives, and more than half of the 
Turkish Cypriots had to abandon their homes and find new places 
of residence. Once in possession of their own territory, they set 
about constructing a new state and creating a functioning economy. 
Old habits and ways of life had to be discarded, for now all aspects 
of society became the responsibility of the Turkish Cypriots them- 
selves. Education expanded, a new professional class emerged, a 
growing economy created new kinds of occupations, women left 
their homes to work, life in formerly isolated villages was altered 
by the pull of the urban areas, and the Turkish Cypriot community 
entered a phase of its existence unimaginable a generation earlier. 


Except for a few Maronites in the Kormakiti (Korucam) area, 
at the western end of the Kyrenia range, and several hundred Greek 
Cypriots in the Karpas Peninsula, the people living in the 1 'Turk- 
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC") were Turkish 
Cypriots, descendants of Turks who settled in Cyprus following 
the Ottoman conquest in 1571 . As a result of the Ottoman conquest, 


The Society and Its Environment 

the ethnic and cultural composition of Cyprus changed drastically. 
Although the island had been ruled by Venetians, its population 
was mostly Greek. Turkish rule brought an influx of settlers speak- 
ing a different language and entertaining other cultural traditions 
and beliefs. In accordance with the decree of Sultan Selim II, some 
5,720 households left Turkey from the Karaman, I eel, Yozgat, 
Alanya, Antalya, and Aydin regions of Anatolia and migrated to 
Cyprus. The Turkish migrants were largely farmers, but some 
earned their livelihoods as shoemakers, tailors, weavers, cooks, ma- 
sons, tanners, jewelers, miners, and workers in other trades. In 
addition, some 12,000 soldiers, 4,000 cavalrymen, and 20,000 
former soldiers and their families stayed in Cyprus. 

The Ottoman Empire allowed its non-Muslim ethnic commu- 
nities (or millets, from the Arabic word for religion, millah) a degree 
of autonomy if they paid their taxes and were obedient subjects. 
The millet system permitted Greek Cypriots to remain in their vil- 
lages and maintain their traditional institutions. The Turkish im- 
migrants often lived by themselves in new settlements, but many 
lived in the same villages as Greek Cypriots. For the next four cen- 
turies, the two communities lived side by side throughout the is- 
land. Despite this physical proximity, each ethnic community had 
its own culture and there was litde intermingling. Both communi- 
ties, for example, considered interethnic marriage taboo, although 
it did sometimes occur. Also, in spite of relations that were often 
cordial, there was little possibility of serious intimacy between the 
two communities. In fact, according to the American psychologist, 
Vamik Volkan, the two groups seemed to have a psychological need 
to remain separate from each other. 

Until the island came under British administration in 1878, there 
were only rough estimates of Cyprus' s population and its ethnic 
breakdown. In more recent times, population figures became highly 
controversial after it was agreed that the government established 
in 1960 was to be staffed at a 70-to-30 ratio of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots, although the latter made up only 18 to 20 percent of the 
island's population. For this reason, the population figures were 
a vital issue in the island's government, likely to affect any far- 
reaching political settlements in the 1990s. 

About 40,000 to 60,000 Turks lived on Cyprus in the late six- 
teenth century, according to Ottoman migration figures. In the 
eighteenth century, the British consul in Syria, DeVezin, believed 
that the Turkish population on the island outnumbered the Greek 
population by a ratio of two to one. According to his estimates, 
the Greek Cypriots numbered between 20,000 to 30,000 and the 
Turkish population around 60,000. Not all historians accept his 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

estimate, however. If there was a Turkish majority, it did not last. 
By the time of the first British census of the island in 1881, Greek 
Cypriots numbered 140,000 and Turkish Cypriots 42,638. One 
reason suggested for the small number of Turkish Cypriots was 
that many of them sold their property and migrated to mainland 
Turkey when the island was placed under British administration 
according to the Cyprus Convention of 1878. 

There was a significant Turkish Cypriot exodus from the island 
between 1950 and 1974 when thousands left the island, mainly for 
Britain and Australia. The migration had two phases. The first 
lasted from 1950 to 1960, when Turkish Cypriots benefited from 
liberal British immigration policies as the island gained its indepen- 
dence and many Turkish Cypriots settled in London. Emigration 
would have been higher in this period had there not been pressure 
from the Turkish Cypriot leadership to remain in Cyprus and par- 
ticipate in building the new republic. 

The second and more intense phase of Turkish Cypriot emigra- 
tion began after intercommunal strife increased in late 1963. Liv- 
ing conditions for Turkish Cypriots worsened as about 25,000 of 
them, faced with Greek Cypriot violence, gathered in several en- 
claves around the island. In addition, all Turkish Cypriots work- 
ing for the government of the Republic of Cyprus lost their civil 
service positions. Aid from Turkey allowed those in the enclaves 
to survive, but life at a subsistence level and the constant threat 
of violence caused numerous Turkish Cypriots to leave for a bet- 
ter life abroad. As before, most emigrants left for Australia and 
Britain, but some settled in Turkey. By 1972 the Turkish Cypriot 
population had declined to around 78,000, and prospects for the 
community's survival on the island looked bleak. 

After the de facto partition of the island in 1974, Turkish Cypriots 
began to return to Cyprus, and the decline was reversed. In addi- 
tion, some 20,000 Turkish guest workers moved to the island to 
revive the Turkish Cypriot economy. Many of these workers even- 
tually decided to remain permanently and take "TRNC" citizen- 
ship. Some immigration from Turkey continued in subsequent 
years. Largely as a result of this dual immigration, the Turkish 
Cypriot population totaled 167,256 in 1988, according to the 
' ' TRNC ' ' State Planning Organisation . 

The average annual rate of population increase during the peri- 
od 1978-87 was 1.3 percent. In 1987 the rate was 1.5 percent. 
Despite the smallness of most age cohorts (that is, those born 
in a particular year) born in the 1970s (a probable reflection of 
the decade's turbulence), more than half the population was less 
than twenty-five years of age (see fig. 6). The age-sex distribution 


The Society and Its Environment 

matched standard patterns, with males in the majority in the first 
few decades, and women in the majority thereafter. 


Traditionally, both Cypriot communities were very conscious 
of their languages, cultures, and histories. Turkish Cypriots thought 
of themselves as Turks living on Cyprus and as members of the 
larger Turkish nation. Greek Cypriots believed that their language, 
history, culture and Orthodox religion made them part of the larger 
Greek nation. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that over 
the centuries, neither group accepted the equality of the other's 
language, culture, ethnicity, and religion. Despite the separate lives 
of the two communities, however, some degree of cross-cultural 
development did occur. Furthermore, both the Greek and Turk- 
ish Cypriots were strongly attached to their island, and they dis- 
tinguished themselves from foreigners, including mainland Greeks 
and Turks. 

One can observe a great irony in Cypriot self- identification. On 
the one hand, the two communities were proud to identify them- 
selves with their respective greater nations. On the other hand, both 
shared the belief that they were socially more progressive (better 
educated and less conservative) and therefore distinct from the main- 
landers. Thus, until the events of 1963, which led to a strict sepa- 
ration of the two communities, Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived 
side by side in a love-hate relationship. The two communities had 
borrowed some customs and ways of living from one another, and 
to some degree a recognizable ' 'Cypriot feeling" had developed 
over the centuries, distinguishing Cypriots from their cousins in 
Greece and Turkey. Generally, one did not know to which com- 
munity a Cypriot belonged until he or she spoke. Yet the two com- 
munities viewed each other with some suspicion and dislike. 
Tragically, however, a deepening of shared feelings was preclud- 
ed by the events of late 1963. After these events, Greek and Turk- 
ish Cypriots lived separately, and their offspring grew up with no 
intercommunal contact. 

Broadly, three main forces — education, British colonial practices, 
and secularization accompanying economic development — can be 
held responsible for transforming two ethnic communities into two 
national ones. Education was perhaps the most important, for it 
affected Cypriots during childhood and youth, the period of greatest 
susceptibility to outside influences. The two communities adopted 
the educational policies of Greece and Turkey, respectively, result- 
ing in the nationalist indoctrination of their youth. The schools polar- 
ized Cypriots in at least two ways. The segregated school systems 


Cyprus: A Country Study 


65 and over 









■ ^■■■^^■■B 







\ FI 




















y///// < y///)/y//A 





I I I I I I I I I 

10 8 64 2 02468 10 

Source: Based on information from "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," State Plan- 
ning Organisation, Statistics and Research Department, Statistical Yearbook, 1988, 
Nicosia, 1989, 12. 

Figure 6. "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ": Population by Age and 
Sex, 1989 

of the colonial and postindependence period socialized students into 
Greek and Turkish ethnicity, teaching mainland speech, culture, 
folklore, and nationalist myths. The texts used in these schools also 
included ethnic propaganda, often highly chauvinistic, with each 
community emphasizing its superiority over the other. 

British colonial policies also promoted ethnic polarization. The 
British applied the principle of "divide and rule," setting the two 
groups against each other to prevent combined action against colonial 
rule. For example, when Greek Cypriots rebelled in the 1950s, the 
colonial administration established an all-Turkish police force, 
known as the Auxiliary Police, to combat Greek Cypriots. This 
and similar practices contributed to intercommunal animosity. 


The Society and Its Environment 

Secularization also fostered ethnic nationalism. Although eco- 
nomic development and increased education reduced the explicit- 
ly religious characteristics of the two communities, the growth of 
nationalism on the two mainlands increased the significance of other 
differences. Turkish nationalism was at the core of the revolution- 
ary program promoted by the father of modern Turkey, Kemal 
Atatiirk (1881-1938), and affected Turkish Cypriots who followed 
his principles. President of the Republic of Turkey from 1923 to 
1938, Atatiirk attempted to build a new nation on the ruins of the 
Ottoman Empire and elaborated a program of six principles (the 
"Six Arrows") to do so. His principles of secularism (laicism) and 
nationalism reduced Islam's role in the everyday life of individu- 
als and emphasized Turkish identity as the main source of nation- 
alism. Traditional education with a religious foundation was 
discarded and replaced with one that followed secular principles 
and, shorn of Arab and Persian influences, was purely Turkish. 
Turkish Cypriots quickly adopted the secular program of Turkish 
nationalism. Under Ottoman rule, Turkish Cypriots had been clas- 
sified as Muslims, a distinction based on religion; Atatiirk' s pro- 
gram made their Turkishness paramount and further reinforced 
their division from their Greek Cypriot neighbors. 

Ethnic Values and Attitudes 

American sociologists Marvin Gerst and James H. Tenzel studied 
both ethnic communities in the early 1970s, after a decade of the 
postindependence struggle. Gerst and Tenzel focused mainly on 
the psychological grounds of ethnic conflict. One survey instru- 
ment used in their interviews with several hundred Cypriots mea- 
sured perceptions of one's own and the opposing ethnic group; the 
results were then standardized in reference to a third group, Ameri- 
can males. Although both Cypriot groups varied considerably from 
the American statistical norms, Greek and Turkish Cypriots had 
similar scores as regards their own behavior and perceptions of the 
other community as acting according to a shared list of generally 
negative behavior traits. 

The Turkish Cypriots scored as patient, obliging, stability seek- 
ing, thorough, self-effacing, dependent, mannerly, tactful, less self- 
aggrandizing, and more open to reasonable argument. Tenzel and 
Gerst described the Turkish Cypriots as hierarchical, patriarchal, 
and authoritarian — characteristics of a society in which roles are 
clearly defined. Turkish Cypriots regarded public service as a more 
prestigious though ill-paying occupation than a successful business 
career. As psychologist Vamik Volkan also argued, these roles were 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

instilled in childhood: Turkish Cypriot child care favored imita- 
tive, docile behavior and discouraged activity, curiosity, and talka- 

The psychological and behavioral differences between the two 
communities were perceived as extremely negative stereotypes by 
the other. Greek Cypriots, for example, scored as assertive in the 
survey done by Gerst and Tenzel. This quality appeared as impo- 
lite aggressiveness to Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots, on the other 
hand, viewed the Turkish Cypriot attention to manners and proce- 
dures as dullness and lack of ambition. In the context of inter- 
ethnic conflict, each group denied the goodness of the other and 
pointed to examples illustrating these differing norms to "prove" 
the identical charges of aggression, brutality, and stubbornness. 


The Turkish dialect spoken by Turkish Cypriots is closely related 
to other dialects of Anatolia, but distinct from the urban dialects 
of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Turkish Cypriots faced few difficul- 
ties communicating with mainland Turks. The differences that exist 
are much less significant than those found between Turkish and 
other Turkic languages of Central Asia. Atatiirk's language and 
educational reforms brought sweeping changes in standard Turk- 
ish. A Latin alphabet was introduced in place of the Arabic script, 
and the heavily Arabicized and Persianized court dialect was re- 
jected as the basis for standardization. The Turkish Cypriot com- 
munity was the only Turkish minority in former Ottoman territories 
outside mainland Turkey to quickly adopt Atatiirk's linguistic 
changes as well as the other revolutionary principles of his program. 

Social Structure 

The structure of Turkish Cypriot society changed dramatically 
during the twentieth century, especially after World War II. The 
main force for change was the growth of a modern and prosperous 
economy that required a variety of occupations, encouraged ur- 
banization, made education more accessible, and permitted more 
contact with the outside world. The de facto partition of the island 
in 1974 also strongly changed how Turkish Cypriots lived. The 
evolution of a Western- style family out of the traditional family 
structure was perhaps the most socially significant of these changes. 

Urban-Rural Composition 

When the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960, 60 percent 
of Turkish Cypriots lived in villages. The rest lived in the five ur- 
ban centers of Nicosia (Lefkosa), Famagusta (Gazimagusa), Larnaca, 


The Society and Its Environment 

Limassol, and Paphos. Few Turkish Cypriots lived in Kyrenia 
(Girne). During the period of intercommunal conflict, the urban- 
rural distribution of the Turkish Cypriot population was unclear 
because of the thousands of refugees living in tents and temporary 
shelters. After the de facto division of the island in 1974, however, 
there was a gradual change in the urban-rural ratio. By the late 
1980s, 51 percent of the Turkish Cypriot population lived in ur- 
ban areas. Given the small number of Turkish Cypriots, however, 
urban centers were not large. As of 1987, the Turkish Cypriot sec- 
tion of Nicosia had only about 38,000 inhabitants, Famagusta 
20,000, and Kyrenia 7,100. 

One reason for increased urbanization was the resettlement pro- 
gram after 1974, which placed refugees from territory controlled 
by the government of the Republic of Cyprus in houses previous- 
ly occupied by Greek Cypriots in the urban areas of Kyrenia, Mor- 
phou (Guzelyurt), and Famagusta. Immigrants from Turkey were 
largely settied in villages. 

Resettlement was an extensive process that directly involved 
about two-thirds of the Turkish Cypriot population. According to 
some estimates, about 60,000 Turkish Cypriots moved from their 
places of residence following the establishment of a cease-fire in 
1974. Most managed to move behind Turkish military lines on 
their own. Others, however, required international agreements or 
diplomatic initiatives in order to join their ethnic community. About 
9,400 Turkish Cypriots took refuge in the British base areas. 
Another 8, 100 came to territory controlled by Turkish forces after 
negotiations between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders 
under United Nations (UN) auspices resulted in an agreement to 
exchange populations. Although all Turkish Cypriots moved to 
areas controlled by their community, not all Greek Cypriots 
returned to areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus. Most of 
these Greek Cypriots lived in the Karpas Peninsula. 

The growth in the urban sector also reflected a changed Turk- 
ish Cypriot economy. In 1960 agriculture employed nearly half of 
all Turkish Cypriots. By 1990 this sector accounted for well under 
a third of the work force; about half of economically active Turk- 
ish Cypriots earned their livelihoods in the service sector and one- 
fifth in construction and industry. Except for agricultural work, 
most employment was in urban areas. 

Despite the marked decline in agricultural employment, at the 
end of the 1980s, 49 percent of Turkish Cypriots still lived in areas 
classified as rural. Urbanization was not as extensive as suggested 
by employment figures. The discrepancy resulted from the small 
size of the "TRNC." Many of those who worked in urban areas 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

were able to remain in their villages because the distance between 
most villages and urban centers was less than an hour's drive by 
car. Workers did not migrate to areas of employment, but instead 
commuted. As a result of such commuting, other urban develop- 
ments, such as changes in attitudes toward education and social 
values, were more easily diffused than otherwise would have been 
the case. 

Class Structure 

The Turkish Cypriot class structure changed markedly after 
1974. During the colonial and pre- 1963 independence years, most 
Turkish Cypriots lived in rural areas and engaged in farming. 
Others living in urban areas were mostly employed by the civil 
service. Very few Turkish Cypriots engaged in business. Under 
these conditions, one found the following social classes in the Turk- 
ish Cypriot community: large landowners (descendants of the Ot- 
toman administrators), bureaucrats, a small class of professionals, 
and peasants/farmers. 

Once Turkish Cypriots had created their own government and 
economy, they began to enter new occupations, altering the class 
structure of their community. At the beginning of the 1990s, there 
were many more Turkish Cypriot businessmen than there had been 
a generation earlier, and many others were highly trained profes- 
sionals because of the marked expansion of higher education. The 
old landed aristocracy no longer accounted for all wealthy Turk- 
ish Cypriots. This class was joined by the new rich, who had eco- 
nomic ties to the outside world. Although such developments should 
have contributed to the rise of middle-income groups among the 
Turkish Cypriots, the economic difficulties faced by the new state 
(most significandy high inflation) seriously eroded the real incomes 
of the middle class, most of whom were civil servants. 

At the beginning of the 1990s, most Turkish Cypriots were 
neither wealthy nor had professional occupations. The majority 
were wage earners, working in small production units or at rou- 
tine clerical and service jobs. About one-fourth of the work force 
was engaged in farming. 

Marriage and Family 

Turkish Cypriots were generally concerned with promoting the 
honor, prestige, and economic prosperity of their families. A major 
part of the thought, energy, and income of the family went to 
educating children, marrying them well, and helping them find 
good jobs. More than in most Western societies, Turkish Cypri- 
ots were conscious of their family as a whole and identified strongly 


The Society and Its Environment 

with how its individual members fared as part of this whole. 
However, socio-economic changes in recent decades have led to 
the existence of two types of families in Turkish Cypriot society: 
traditional and largely rural, and modern and urban. 

The traditional family maintained strong links between the 
nuclear or core family and the extended family. The extended fam- 
ily included the parents' siblings and their children, grandparents, 
and in many cases second and third cousins. Within this family 
network, financial and social support were key links among the 
members. When one of the extended family suffered economic hard- 
ship, that person could expect aid from able relatives. It was also 
common to help relatives in the field or on the farm. 

The nuclear or core traditional family might include not only 
the husband and wife and their unmarried children, but also a newly 
married son and his family, and sometimes the mother's parents. 
The presence of the mother's parents in the core family was an 
important variation from the traditional Turkish family structure, 
in which the husband's parents lived with the family. 

According to traditional Turkish family structure, the bride mar- 
ried into the groom's family and became virtually a servant to the 
household. The legitimation of the bride's lower status was found 
in the custom of baslik parasi (bonnet money) practiced in tradi- 
tional Turkish society and reintroduced into Cyprus by some Turk- 
ish settiers after 1974. According to this custom, money or valuable 
goods were paid to the bride's father by the bridegroom and his 
family. If the bridegroom was unable to meet the amount speci- 
fied by the bride's father, the marriage could not occur. In this 
practice, the money paid to the father did not go toward helping 
the newlyweds in any form. Rather, the money stayed with the 
girl's father. Widely practiced in rural Turkey, the custom frequent- 
ly results in the marriages of unwilling brides. The long absence 
of this custom among Turkish Cypriots was a sign of women's more 
secure and higher status on the island. 

Turkish Cypriots employed a different form of financial arrange- 
ment in marriages, drahoma, a dowry custom of Greek Cypriot ori- 
gin. It is probable that over the centuries the Turkish Cypriots 
recognized the advantages of this custom and adapted it to their 
own needs. Drahoma, as practiced by Greek Cypriots, required that 
the bride's family provide substantial assistance to the newlyweds. 
Turkish Cypriots modified it to include assistance from both fam- 
ilies. Traditionally, the bride's family provided a house, some fur- 
niture, and money as part of their daughter's dowry. The 
bridegroom's family met the young couple's remaining housing 
needs. If the bride's family was unable to provide such assistance, 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

the young couple lived with the bride's family until they saved 
enough money to set up their own separate household. Lastly, the 
bride brought to her new home the rest of her dowry, known as 
cehiz, making the new family financially more secure. The advan- 
tages of drahoma were so obvious to the Turkish Cypriot commu- 
nity that modern families also practiced it. 

In the traditional Turkish Cypriot family, the father had the last 
word in his children's choice of spouses. Customarily, the bride 
and groom did not have a chance for individual visits prior to their 
engagement. Usually, an elderly member of the suitor's family went 
to the young woman's parents and asked for her hand in mar- 
riage. If her father agreed, gifts were exchanged between the two 
families and the engagement took place. 

Originally, the wedding ceremonies for the bridegroom and bride 
occurred separately. Turkish Cypriots no longer practiced this cus- 
tom. Only the Turkish rural migrants to Cyprus continued the tra- 
dition of separate ceremonies. In rural Turkish Cypriot society, 
the bride and bridegroom attended the same ceremony and the fes- 
tivities lasted for several days. 

Women of traditional families generally did not work outside 
the home. It was their responsibility to tend to the traditional domes- 
tic tasks, while husbands and sons dealt with business and other 
concerns outside the home. 

In contrast to the traditional family, the modern family struc- 
ture revolved around the nuclear family and had a distinctly ur- 
ban character. Although maintaining close social ties with the 
extended family, members of the nuclear family remained econom- 
ically isolated from other relatives. There were joint economic re- 
lations among nuclear and extended family members, but they were 
far less common than with the traditional family. 

Another important difference between traditional and modern 
families was that marriage was not under the strict control of the 
father. Young couples often decided on marriage themselves. 
Although dating, as practiced in the United States, was not com- 
mon even at the beginning of the 1990s, couples met together in 
small groups of friends. Once a couple decided to marry, both sets 
of parents were consulted. The families then arranged the engage- 
ment and marriage. As noted, drahoma was also practiced by modern 
urban families. 

The modern family usually consisted of only the husband, wife, 
and unmarried children. Large multigenerational extended fami- 
lies were unusual. Although the husband continued even in the 
1980s to have a strong decision-making role, the wife became in- 
creasingly involved in the family's economic and social choices. 


The Society and Its Environment 

A major factor in the wife's changing family role was the fact that 
she also worked outside the home to support the family. 

Working wives and mothers were a relatively new phenomenon 
in Turkish Cypriot society. Until the post- 19 74 period, few women 
worked outside the home and even fewer had professional educa- 
tions. Men's earnings had to be sufficient to satisfy the needs of 
their families, and women typically remained home and focused 
their efforts on raising their children. 

After the 1974 war, this traditional arrangement lost its pre- 
dominance. Once Turkish Cypriots established a government of 
their own, they faced immense difficulties in managing its institu- 
tions and creating a functioning economy. Adding to the intrinsic 
difficulties of these tasks were the lack of international recognition 
of their state and the Greek Cypriot economic blockade. Under 
these circumstances, women's participation in the work force be- 
came essential to meet both their state's and their families' needs. 
Building a new state required officials to hire trained personnel 
of both sexes to fill positions in the bureaucracy. As a result, Turk- 
ish Cypriot women came to be employed outside the home to a 
much greater extent than previously. 

Women's absence from home worked a hardship on families with 
children. For the first time, child care became a serious issue in 
Turkish Cypriot society. Day-care centers were established in many 
cases, but when centers were unavailable, grandparents frequent- 
ly helped care for their children's offspring. The emergence of the 
child-care problem was an unfortunate result of women's employ- 
ment. It was an indication, however, that the structure of many 
Turkish Cypriot families in urban areas had become Westernized. 

Divorce was legal in the "TRNC. " During the first eight years 
of the 1980s, the number of divorces increased from 149 in 1980 
to 177 in 1987. The increase was slightly higher than the increase 
in marriages, which went from 1,058 in 1981, to 1,162 in 1987. 
Incompatibility was the cause given for about 90 percent of divorces. 
The highest frequency of divorce occurred in the first year of 


Nearly all Turkish Cypriots were followers of Islam, but, un- 
like most predominandy Muslim societies, the "TRNC" was a 
secular state, as specified in the first article of the 1985 constitu- 
tion. There was no state religion, and Turkish Cypriots were free 
to choose their own religion. Religious leaders had little influence 
in politics, and religious instruction, although available in schools, 
was not obligatory. The few Greek Cypriots who lived in the 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

"TRNC" were free to follow their Greek Orthodox faith. The tiny 
Maronite community had its Christian Maronite Church. In ad- 
dition, there were Anglican and Roman Catholic churches. 

The position of Islam and Islamic institutions in the Turkish 
Cypriot community differed from the position of Greek Orthodoxy 
among Greek Cypriots. In contrast to the Greek Cypriot millet's 
ethnarch, there was no Islamic religious figure with political pow- 
er. Whereas the Church of Cyprus was intimately identified with 
Greek nationalism and the campaign for enosis, Islam played vir- 
tually no role in Turkish Cypriot nationalism. The great figure 
of this latter movement was Atatiirk, a man famous for secularism, 
and in many respects the polar opposite of Archbishop Makarios 
III, who was both a religious and political leader. It was Atatiirk 
who established the secular Turkish state, which has generally ad- 
hered to his doctrines ever since. Although Atatiirk had no juris- 
diction over Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots adopted most of his program 
voluntarily and with little controversy. Turkish Cypriots were 
among the first to adopt Atatiirk' s prohibition of Arabic in reli- 
gious services and to use the Quran in Turkish translation. Since 
Atatiirk' s death, Turkish Cypriots have usually followed the reli- 
gious practices of Turkey. When in 1951, for example, Turkish 
authorities once again allowed the use of the Quran in Arabic and 
directed that the call to prayers also be in Arabic, Turkish Cypriots 
followed suit. Despite these lapses from Atatiirk' s policies, both 
Turkey and the "TRNC" remained fundamentally secular. 

The Islamic faith arose from the teachings of the Prophet Mu- 
hammad in Arabia in the seventh century. It is based on a 
monotheistic belief in God (Allah) as all-powerful in the universe 
and in human subservience to God's will. All devout persons should 
submit to the divinely willed plan; the word Muslim means one 
who has surrendered to God's will. This will has been made known 
through the prophets, including those of the Old Testament and 
Jesus, with Muhammad being the last of them. The Quran, held 
to have been revealed by God to Muhammad and dictated by him 
to scribes, is thus a guide to practical living and the basis for law 
covering all spheres of life. 

The principal religious observances, often known as the five pil- 
lars of Islam, are the profession of faith that "there is no God but 
God and Muhammad is his messenger' ' ; daily prayer; fasting dur- 
ing the month of Ramadan when the Quran was revealed; alms- 
giving; and once in one's lifetime, if feasible, the pilgrimage to 
Mecca, the birthplace of Muhammad and eventual home of his 
community of disciples. The daily prayers are called from the 
minaret of the mosque at dawn, noon, midafternoon, sunset, and 


The Society and Its Environment 

early evening. Devout Muslim males also attend community prayer 
services at the mosque on Friday, the weekly holy day. 

Turkish Cypriots, like most Turkish nationals, are followers of 
Sunni Islam. After the Prophet's death, his followers split over the 
question of the method of choosing his successors. The Sunnis (from 
sunnah, tradition) argued that Muhammad had prescribed no defini- 
tive procedure; the Shias (from Shiat Ali, party of Ali) insisted that 
his designation of his cousin and son-in-law Ali established a heredi- 
tary succession. Basic questions of theology and practice deepened 
the split. Sunnis consider the Quran and the hadith, a separate col- 
lection of the sayings and deeds of Muhmamad, to be a complete, 
comprehensive, and eternally correct source of religious guidance 
requiring only deductive elaboration by scholars. Shias accept an 
additional body of esoteric lore handed down by Muhammad to 
Ali, which may be revealed and expanded by divinely inspired 
Imams who were descendants of Ali. Within Sunni Islam, Tur- 
kish Cypriots have traditionally followed the Hanafi school of le- 
gal interpretation, a rather austere variety of Islam. 

Evkaf Idaresi (Turkish Religious Trust, usually known as Ev- 
kaf) was the prime institutional representative of the Turkish Cypri- 
ot community. Until 1915 it was governed by delegates chosen by 
the sultan and the British, with the Turkish delegate generally ex- 
ercising wide discretion; after formal annexation of the island, the 
British appointed both delegates. The Evkaf functioned during the 
colonial period as a government department. However, in the in- 
tensely nationalistic period before independence, control was given 
to a new elective council, and the constitution of 1960 assigned re- 
ligious matters as one of the major powers of the new Turkish Cypri- 
ot Communal Chamber. Since 1973, the Evkaf has been an 
independent foundation with its own budget, insulated to some ex- 
tent from the political leadership of the Turkish Cypriot commu- 
nity. Whereas the Evkaf operated Muslim schools in the past, in 
recent decades it has simply provided funds for the salary of the 
mufti, the highest religious figure, and for the construction, repair, 
and maintenance of the mosques. The Evkak's revenues were der- 
ived from its large landholdings and other property placed in trust 
for religious purposes. Before 1974 it was the second largest land- 
owner in Cyprus, surpassed only by the Church of Cyprus. Be- 
cause much of its property was located in territory occupied by the 
Republic of Cyprus, however, the de facto partition of the island 
cost the Evkaf half of its agricultural property and nearly all of its 
building sites. 

The mufti was the spiritual head of the Turkish Cypriot Islamic 
community. His office underwent dramatic changes after the Ottoman 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

period, when religion and administration were fused under the sul- 
tan as God's representative ruling over the Islamic community. 
The mufti's role was essentially that of supreme authority in reli- 
gious law rather than high priest or administrator. He was appointed 
by the sultan until Atatiirk abolished the caliphate. The British 
abolished the position in 1928 and transferred its duties to a new 
official in the Evkaf. The office was revived in 1956 as part of the 
reforms that gave Turkish Cypriots control over the Evkaf; the new 
mufti was elected by the island's Muslims and his retirement age 
set at seventy-five. Because of the secularization of the Turkish 
Cypriot society, however, the mufti lost his jurisdiction over such 
matters as law, marriage, and education. 

Turkish Cypriots were among the most secular of Islamic peo- 
ples. Wedding ceremonies were civil, rather than religious, for ex- 
ample. The eight decades of British rule contributed to this 
secularization. More significant was the Turkish Cypriots' close 
adherence to Atatiirk' s reforms in Turkey. Religion came to be 
a personal matter among Turkish Cypriots, and they did not at- 
tempt to impose their religious beliefs on others. Although there 
was some fasting during the month of Ramadan, moderate atten- 
dance at the Friday prayers, and widespread observation of the 
holy days, few Turkish Cypriots were orthodox Muslims. Most 
of those who fasted during Ramadan, for example, lived an unor- 
thodox life the rest of the year, and Turkish Cypriots generally did 
not abstain from alcohol as standard Muslim teaching requires, 
but followed traditional Mediterranean drinking customs. 

There were groups and organizations in the "TRNC" that op- 
posed traditional Turkish Cypriot secularism and religious toler- 
ance. Some Saudi Arabian and Libyan aid came from groups that 
wished to see an upsurge of Islamism (sometimes seen as fundamen- 
talism) on the island. Some of the aid funded new mosques and 
Quran schools around the island and the new Islamic university 
in Lefka (Lefke). 

The Cyprus Turkish Islam Society (CTIS) was one of the or- 
ganizations working for an expanded role for Islam in the 
"TRNC." The group's program, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
(Turk-Islam Sentezi), called for the union of Turkish nationalism 
and Islam, a coalition between government and military, and a 
society built on Islamic foundations and the rule of religious law, 
sharia (seriat in Turkish). The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis also identi- 
fied enemies to be controlled or eliminated, including atheists, com- 
munists, Western humanists, members of other religions, and those 
who blame Islam for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It main- 
tained close ties to Sheyh Nazim Adil Kibnsh, a Cypriot living 


The Society and Its Environment 

in London, who was a leading member of the Nak§ibendi order 
of Sunni Islam in Europe. The Nak§ibendi order also advocated 
a return to sharia and openly opposed Ataturk's reforms. 

Given the secular traditions of Turkish Cypriots, these and other 
like-minded groups have an uphill task to realize their aims. 
Nevertheless, some Turkish Cypriots would certainly find these 
aims attractive. This fact and the access of Islamic groups to the 
financial resources of oil-producing nations made it likely that their 
presence would continue to be felt in the "TRNC." 


Although the "TRNC" was by most standards still a so-called 
"developing society" at the beginning of the 1990s, with a per capita 
income and other social indicators similar to those of Greece, Tur- 
key, and Chile, the Turkish Cypriot educational level was that of 
more advanced countries. The Turkish Cypriot literacy rate stood 
at 97 percent, and there was a high number of university students. 
These educational attainments stemmed in part from relatively en- 
lightened British rule in the colonial period and the close adher- 
ence of Turkish Cypriots to Ataturk's educational reforms. These 
reforms entailed the adoption of the Latin alphabet and an em- 
phasis on secular values. Also contributing to the educational suc- 
cesses were the easily manageable size of Turkish Cypriot society 
and the fact that a well-trained work force was necessary if the 
"TRNC" were to prosper. 

Few Turkish Cypriots received a university education in the peri- 
od before the island became independent in 1960, and those who 
did frequently did not return to Cyprus upon completion of their 
studies. The fact that a high-school graduate in the 1940s and 1950s 
immediately attained a respectable position in the bureaucracy in- 
dicated the scarcity of university graduates. 

The small number of university-educated Turkish Cypriots creat- 
ed a serious problem when government agencies were staffed ac- 
cording to the 70 to 30 Greek Cypriot to Turkish Cypriot ratio 
agreed upon when the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960. 
To overcome this problem, Turkish Cypriots began a massive edu- 
cation training program that involved sending their high-school 
graduates to universities in Turkey. To facilitate this process, the 
Turkish authorities provided special quotas for Turkish Cypriot 
students. Thus, Cypriot Turks obtained easier access to university 
education in Turkey than did mainland Turks. This procedure end- 
ed in the late 1970s. Since then, Turkish Cypriots have participat- 
ed in the general university entrance examination set by the Turkish 
Ministry of Education. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Turkish Cypriots set up their own education system after the 
de facto partition of the island in 1974. By the beginning of the 
1990s, they had schools and universities that taught their youth 
from age four up to the graduate level. A preprimary school sys- 
tem was not yet run by the state, but private kindergartens were 
in operation in many areas. The public school system, under the 
direction of the Ministry of Education, Sports, and Youth, began 
with primary school, which was free and compulsory for all chil- 
dren between the ages of six and fifteen. Primary school was divided 
into two stages: the first for children aged six to twelve, and the 
second for children between thirteen and fifteen. Three years of 
secondary education for youth sixteen to eighteen took place at ly- 
cees (high schools) offering general academic courses and at tech- 
nical and vocational schools providing specialized training. 

The Turkish Cypriot education system expanded rapidly, with 
regard to both numbers and types of schools and students (see ta- 
ble 9, Appendix). The number of preprimary and elementary 
schools increased significantly. In these institutions, the student- 
teacher ratio also improved, from thirty in 1976-77 to twenty-seven 
in preprimary and twenty-three in elementary schools in 1988-89. 
At the junior high-school level, the student/teacher ratio improved 
from twenty in 1976-77 to twenty-two in 1988-89. The figures in 
1986-87 for the lycees and colleges were 20 and 15.6, respective- 
ly. In the vocational and technical schools, the 1988-89 figures in- 
dicated a student/teacher ratio of eight to one, a tremendous 
advantage for individual student training. In terms of literacy, state 
statistics show important improvements. The rate of those attend- 
ing school in 1987 was seven to twelve years of age, 98 percent; 
thirteen to fifteen, 66 percent; and fifteen to eighteen, 50 percent. 

Turkish Cypriot teachers often studied abroad, but they could 
also receive their training from a domestic teacher training college. 
The Higher Technical Institute and the Eastern Mediterranean 
University (EMU) at Famagusta provided education at the univer- 
sity level, as did the private University College of North Cyprus 
and the religious institution Lefke University. EMU, the largest 
of these schools, offered courses in engineering, business, and eco- 
nomics. The medium of teaching at this university was English, 
a considerable attraction, and most of its students were foreign- 
ers, mainly Turks. Enrollment grew rapidly. During the 1984-85 
academic year, EMU had 458 students. Enrollment nearly tripled 
the following year, and in the 1990-91 academic year amounted 
to 3,585. Two-thirds of the students were Turkish, 715 were Turk- 
ish Cypriots, and most of the remainder came from other Middle 
Eastern countries. In addition to those enrolled at the EMU, 


Dr. Burhan Nalbantoglu General Hospital in Nicosia 
Courtesy Office of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, " Washington 

1,875 Turkish Cypriots attended foreign universities in 1988, 1,580 
of them in Turkey. The United States and Britain each had more 
than 100 Turkish Cypriot university students. 

The growing emphasis on university education among Turkish 
Cypriots was not without its drawbacks. Because the available jobs 
for university graduates were limited in such a small state, many 
graduates chose to remain outside Cyprus. This fact was especial- 
ly true of those with advanced degrees. The resulting brain drain 
might be reduced by the continued expansion of faculty and staff 
at EMU. 

Lefke University was founded in 1990 by the Cyprus Science 
Wakf (a religious foundation) with US$2 million in funds from the 
Islamic Development Bank. The university had as its goal the com- 
bining of Islamic principles with advanced education for the benefit 
of students of the Middle East. It was thus a departure from the 
Turkish Cypriot tradition of secular education. At its founding, 
however, the new university had strong links not with Turkish 
Cypriots, but rather with Saudi Arabian groups and Turkish Is- 
lamists who wished to establish a university according to their ideals 
in Turkey. Strong opposition from Turkey's academic institutions 
forced them to settle on Lefka as a suitable site. The new universi- 
ty's closeness to Turkey and the fact that Turkish and Turkish 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Cypriot citizens enjoyed preferential treatment in each other's state 
meant that Turkish students of an Islamist bent would be able to 
study there. Some observers feared that Lefke University would 
have a negative effect on the Turkish Cypriot tradition of secularism. 
Others welcomed the establishment of a center of sharia in the 

Health and Welfare 

In the late 1980s, the Turkish Cypriot health care system con- 
sisted of two general hospitals, two district hospitals, one psychiatric 
hospital — all of which were operated by the state — and four pri- 
vate specialized hospitals. There were also ten public health centers 
that treated less serious medical problems. Between 1963 and 1989, 
the number of doctors serving in the public sector increased from 
76 to 116. This increase was seen in the numbers of both general 
practitioners and specialists. During the same period, the number 
of nurses increased from 225 to 315, and the number of public hospi- 
tal beds rose from 497 to 833. The number of hospital beds in pri- 
vate hospitals was 193 in 1989. With these improvements, the ratio 
of persons per physician declined from 1 ,908 in 1963 to 685 in 1989. 
The number of dentists also increased. In 1989 there were eigh- 
teen dentists in state hospitals and eighty-two in private practice. 

Health care services were administered by two directorates un- 
der the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Directorate of 
Medicine and Health and the State Laboratories Directorate, and 
by the Social Assistance Services Office. 

Health care was socialized in the "TRNC," although there re- 
mained a substantial private component. The main objective of 
the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare was to guarantee basic 
health care services for all citizens. In addition, the ministry as- 
sumed the responsibility of facilitating the satisfactory social use 
of these services. Such socialized health care required much 
capital — in short supply in the "TRNC." As a result of financial 
problems, the state faced great difficulties in providing major health 
care services quickly. In addition, the state sought to send patients 
to medical centers abroad, mostly to Turkey and Britain, when 
medical care for major health problems was not available domes- 
tically. All expenses including transportation were paid by the 

The regional welfare offices in larger population centers operat- 
ed under the Directorate of Social Welfare. The main duties of 
the directorate were child and family welfare, rehabilitation of 
juvenile delinquents, care of senior citizens, general community 
services, and provision of services for the families of the victims 


The Society and Its Environment 

of intercommunal strife and the disabled. The three main towns 
contained housing centers for rural and/or poor children attend- 
ing schools there. 

The government also provided generous welfare and retirement 
benefits. The foundations for this system were laid by the British 
colonial administration. At the beginning of the 1990s, Turkish 
Cypriot social welfare policies compared favorably with those of 
advanced West European countries. 

The Social Insurance Fund covered 75,000 citizens in 1989. In 
addition to paying for health care costs, the fund provided retire- 
ment benefits and financial aid to the needy, and assisted those 
disabled and survivors of those killed during intercommunal con- 
flict. In October 1989, about 9,000 persons received monthly pay- 
ments from the fund. 

* * * 

Statistical reports of the Republic of Cyprus are the most cur- 
rent source of information about Greek Cypriot society. Publica- 
tions of the Social Research Center in Nicosia also cover a range 
of social topics. The Cyprus Review, also published in Nicosia, fre- 
quently contains articles dealing with recent social developments 
in Cyprus. There are a number of excellent books about Greek 
Cypriot society, but they treat only developments of the 1960s and 
1970s. The Greek Gift and The Heart Grown Bitter, both by Peter Loi- 
zos, contain detailed treatments of the lives of the inhabitants of 
a village before and after the events of 1974. Kyriacos C. Mar- 
kides and others deal with a larger village in Lysi: Social Change in 
a Cypriot Village, and Michael A. Attalides examines the capital in 
Social Change and Urbanization in Cyprus. 

Readers wishing to learn more of Turkish Cypriot society will 
find their choice of sources restricted to a few books and publica- 
tions. The North Cyprus Almanack published in London by K. Riistem 
and Brother covers many social topics. Vamik Volkan has written 
numerous articles and books that treat, sometimes only in pass- 
ing, the psychology and way of life of Turkish Cypriots. The Cyprus 
Review is also informative about Turkish Cypriot society. The jour- 
nal attempts to bridge the gap between the island's two communi- 
ties and contains scholarly articles that deal with a great variety 
of subjects. Statistics published by the "TRNC" State Planning 
Organisation can help a researcher learn much about the struc- 
ture of Turkish Cypriot society. Finally, Lawrence Durrel's Bitter 
Lemons, written in the 1950s, provides glimpses of Cypriots of both 
communities before independence. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 


Chapter 3. The Economy 

Ruins of ancient aqueduct at Salamis near 
the contemporary village of Ayios Seryios 

provement in their living standards since World War II. Cyprus 
benefited from the war, and in succeeding decades its economy grew 
at rates that matched those of other countries that profited from 
the general West European boom that began in the 1950s and lasted 
up to the first oil price increase of 1973. Cypriot per capita income 
increased steadily through this period; the economy diversified and 
ceased to be that of a Third World colony. This success was achieved 
despite widespread turmoil stemming from shaking off British rule 
in the 1950s and intercommunal warfare during the 1960s. 

Cyprus was affected in 1973 and 1979 by the first and second 
oil price increases, for it was almost completely lacking in domes- 
tic sources of energy. However, energy-related economic disrup- 
tion was negligible compared with the effects of the Turkish invasion 
of 1974, which ended in the de facto partition of the Republic of 
Cyprus. The island's economy disintegrated as a third of its in- 
habitants fled their homes and livelihoods and many farming, 
manufacturing, and commercial relationships were shattered. 
Thereafter, the island's Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot com- 
munities lived separated from one another. Each sought to re- 
create a functioning economy. 

Greeks Cypriots were the more successful. Republic of Cyprus 
planners adopted an aggressive program of constructive deficit 
spending, economic incentives, and targeted investments that led 
the Greek Cypriot economy to reach pre- 1974 levels within a few 
years. This was an astonishing accomplishment in that the island's 
partition had cost the republic much of its agricultural and manufac- 
turing assets. 

The 1980s saw healthy growth and low unemployment. Tourism 
swelled, and by 1990 more than a million tourists, mostly from 
Western Europe, visited the republic each year. Housing them 
caused much construction and an explosion in the value of property 
along the coast. Manufacturing and trade were encouraged and 
grew. The destruction of Beirut permitted the republic to become 
a regional center for services and finance. As the 1990s began, Greek 
Cypriots were upgrading their tourist trade and aiming at a more 
diversified and sophisticated manufacturing sector. Leaders of the 
republic's economy hoped to take advantage of the republic's able 
and motivated work force and a strong and flexible commercial 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

The Turkish Cypriot economy also grew. Facing many obsta- 
cles and beginning at a lower point, however, its successes were 
smaller, and at the beginning of the 1990s Turkish Cypriots en- 
joyed a per capita income about one-third that of Greek Cypriots. 
Economic obstacles included the lack of a commercial tradition, 
a less well-trained work force, and rampant inflation largely im- 
ported from Turkey. However, perhaps the most serious econom- 
ic hurdle Turkish Cypriots had to surmount was their state's lack 
of international recognition. Its absence deprived them of some 
international aid and made foreign connections difficult. Despite 
these difficulties, however, Turkish Cypriots could look with some 
optimism toward the future. Tourism expanded rapidly in the late 
1980s and brought in vital foreign exchange. The overall economy 
had diversified to some extent. Agriculture was more efficient and 
employed a smaller share of the work force. The service sector had 
increased in importance. Analysts expected, however, that the Turk- 
ish Cypriot economy would likely continue to need Turkish as- 
sistance for the foreseeable future. 

Republic of Cyprus 

From independence in 1 960 until the Turkish occupation of the 
north in 1974, the economy of Cyprus performed well overall, and 
the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) increased at an 
average annual rate of about 7 percent in real terms. However, 
the Turkish Cypriot community did not share in this growth, liv- 
ing in its scattered agricultural enclaves under conditions like those 
of less developed countries (see The Republic of Cyprus, ch. 1). 

The Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern 37 per- 
cent of the island severely disrupted the economy of the Republic 
of Cyprus. Fragmentation of the market, a massive displacement 
of people (about a third of the island's population), and loss of im- 
portant natural resources had devastating effects. The government 
responded with the first and second emergency economic action 
plans, for 1975-76 and 1977-78. The pre-1974 policy of balanced 
budgets was replaced by expansionary fiscal and monetary poli- 
cies aimed at stimulating economic activity. Incentive plans to en- 
courage private economic activity were implemented, as were 
housing and employment programs for refugees who had fled areas 
seized by the Turks. 

These efforts proved phenomenally successful. The economy ex- 
panded at a 6 percent rate in real terms between 1974 and 1978, 
and by 1978 unemployment stood at about 2 percent, compared 
with 30 percent at the end of 1974. This growth continued through 
the 1980s. In 1988 the per capita gross national product (GNP — see 


The Economy 

Glossary) in current prices was about US$7,200 or C£3,597 (for 
value of the Cyprus pound — see Glossary), compared with C£537.9 
in 1973. 

The economy of the Republic of Cyprus changed as it grew in 
size and complexity. The primary sector lost ground, as it had in 
the decades before the Turkish invasion. Agriculture declined from 
more than 20 percent of GDP at the end of the 1960s to only about 
7 percent by the end of the 1980s, although it employed about 15 
percent of the labor force. Mining, vital in the 1950s as a source 
of exports, became insignificant. 

Manufacturing increased at double-digit rates during much of 
the 1980s. At the end of the decade, it accounted for 15.2 percent 
of GDP, the second largest share, after the service sector's, and 
was the second largest source of employment. Manufacturing de- 
pended on exports, most to the Middle East and the European Eco- 
nomic Community (EEC — see Glossary). However, rising labor 
costs and relatively low-quality products stood in the way of fu- 
ture industrial growth. Construction provided just under 10 per- 
cent of GDP in 1989 and was the fourth largest private employer. 
Construction had declined in importance since the second half of 
the 1970s, when much housing for refugees was built and work 
began on constructing the tourist facilities that were important to 
the south 's economy. 

The service, or tertiary, sector was the dominant sector in the 
Greek Cypriot economy after the late 1970s. In 1988 it accounted 
for 50.2 percent of GDP. The sector's most dynamic component 
was trade, restaurants, and hotels (or tourism), which supplied 20.8 
percent of the GDP and employed 22.3 percent of the labor force 
in 1988. The gigantic increase in the number of tourists — from 
165,000 in 1976 to 1,376,000 in 1989— was the main cause of this 
subsector's growth. Tourism was also an important source of for- 
eign exchange, exceeding the income from the export of domestic 
goods from 1985 through 1988. 

The other branches of the service sector — transportation, storage, 
telecommunications, finance, insurance, real estate, and business 
services — also experienced steady growth and improvement. 
Another dynamic component of the sector, important to Cyprus' s 
future economic growth, was offshore enterprises, which conduct- 
ed diverse businesses abroad from a base in southern Cyprus. At- 
tracted by generous tax concessions, the island's strategic location 
between Europe and the Middle East, and stable political condi- 
tions, many foreign businesses established themselves in the repub- 
lic. By 1990 more than 5,000 permits for offshore enterprises had 
been issued. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

The government played an active and successful role in plan- 
ning after 1974. This planning was indicative in nature. That is, 
the government set goals for the economy and limited its direct 
participation to improving the nation's infrastructure and support- 
ing and guiding the private sector. These activities were costly, 
however, and resulted in large and expanding budget deficits. By 
the end of 1987, the total deficit of the 1975-87 period amounted 
to C£640.6 million. 

Another problem was a consistently unfavorable trade balance. 
In most years, however, expanding surpluses in the invisibles ac- 
count, mainly from tourist receipts, nearly offset the trade deficits. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, it was not yet clear what effect the 
1988 Customs Union Agreement with the EEC would have on this 
deficit. Many Cypriots saw the agreement as an opportunity. Ac- 
cess to the community's market of 320 million people might prove 
beneficial, provided that the manufacturing sector, consisting of 
small, labor-intensive firms, was restructured and modernized. Un- 
doubtedly, the economy would face more intense competition in 
the 1990s, but its main asset, a versatile and educated human cap- 
ital, could make the difference again as it had often done in the past. 

Development of the Economy since Independence 

Cyprus faced a number of structural problems when it gained 
independence in 1960. Agriculture, the dominant sector, was subject 
to fluctuating weather conditions and characterized by low produc- 
tivity. The island's small manufacturing sector centered on small 
family firms specializing in handicrafts. Tourism was limited to 
a few hill resorts. The main exports were minerals. The country's 
infrastructure was that of a Third World country. 

These problems and the prevailing view that the market system 
alone would not be able to provide the basis for major structural 
changes and for intensive infrastructure building led to the con- 
clusion that economic planning was necessary. The government 
adopted a system of indicative planning, setting goals for the econ- 
omy and seeking to encourage and support the private sector's ef- 
forts to reach those goals through legislation and monetary and fiscal 
policies. In addition, the state spent substantial resources to im- 
prove the country's physical and institutional infrastructure. Plan- 
ners believed such measures would be sufficient for the island's 
dynamic private sector to function well and reach by itself the select- 
ed goals, with minimal government participation in the day-to-day 
operations of the economy. Indicative planning was managed by 
the Planning Bureau under the Ministry of Finance. The bureau, 
aided by expert advice from abroad, formulated three five-year 


The Economy 

development plans before the Turkish invasion in 1974, four emer- 
gency economic action plans after 1974, and a revised five-year 
plan for 1989 to 1993. 

The first five-year plan, for 1962 to 1966, aimed at achieving 
higher incomes, full employment, price stability, an improved 
balance of payments, and greater economic equality between rural 
and urban areas. The plan provided for a sizeable public invest- 
ment expenditure, C£62 million, on development projects for roads, 
ports, airport facilities, irrigation projects, and telecommunications 
and electricity systems. The Agricultural Research Institute was 
established in 1962 to improve the quality of agriculture, and the 
Central Bank of Cyprus was created in 1963 to ensure that an ap- 
propriate volume of credit was available to the private sector. This 
first plan achieved remarkable success, most obviously in agricul- 
tural production. 

The second five-year plan, for 1967 to 1971 , moved beyond the 
fundamental approach of the first plan, seeking to provide the so- 
cial and legal structures needed by a more advanced economy. It 
also gave the business community a more active role in planning. 
The third five-year plan, for 1972 to 1976, stressed regional plan- 
ning, to promote more even economic growth throughout the is- 
land. This plan also concerned itself with the social and cultural 
aspects of development. The Cyprus Development Bank was es- 
tablished to provide medium- and long-term loans for development 
projects, as well as technical and administrative assistance. The 
Higher Technical Institute and the Hotel and Catering Institute 
were established to provide specialized training. 

The success of these plans was shown by the great gains the Cypri- 
ot economy made in the first fourteen years of independence. 
Although agriculture had become much more productive, the second- 
ary and tertiary sectors had shown even greater productivity as 
Cyprus became a more developed nation. The primary sector's 
share of GDP declined from 26.3 percent in 1960 to 17 percent 
in 1973, while the secondary and tertiary sectors' shares expand- 
ed, respectively, from 19.5 to 25 percent and from 54.2 to 58 per- 
cent. In addition, the productivity of these two latter sectors was 
considerably higher than that of the primary sector. 

The economy was devastated by the 1974 Turkish invasion and 
the subsequent occupation of the northern 37 percent of the island. 
Serious problems included a large number of refugees (about a third 
of the populations of both communities), fragmentation of the is- 
land's market, and the loss by the government-controlled area of 
land containing raw materials, agricultural resources, and impor- 
tant infrastructure facilities such as the Nicosia International Airport 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

and Famagusta, the island's largest port. The need for reconstruc- 
tion and development was critical. To meet this challenge, a se- 
ries of emergency economic action plans for two-year periods was 

The first and second emergency economic action plans, cover- 
ing the period from 1975 to 1978, aimed mainly at aiding the refu- 
gees, then living in camps, by establishing a housing program for 
them. The plans also directed the government to stimulate the econ- 
omy by adopting expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. The 
results were positive. The economy expanded by about 6 percent 
per year, and the unemployment rate declined to about 2 percent 
in 1978. Increased domestic consumption and rising oil prices, 
however, produced some overheating of the economy; the infla- 
tion rate reached 7.4 percent in 1978. Despite this problem, the 
achievement of housing the refugees and getting the economy go- 
ing again with fewer resources in such a brief period of time was 
considered almost miraculous. 

The third Emergency Economic Action Plan, covering 1979 to 
1981 (the last of the two-year plans), aimed at countering the over- 
heating of the economy by adopting a restrictive monetary policy. 
The main goal of the fourth Emergency Economic Action Plan, 
covering 1982 to 1986, was to balance economic expansion with 
monetary stability. These goals were reached. Retail price infla- 
tion fell from 13.5 percent in 1980 and 10.8 percent in 1981 to 
5 or 6 percent in the next few years and 1.2 percent in 1986. High 
growth rates with low unemployment continued. 

Overall, the economy of Cyprus performed relatively well in the 
three areas of economic growth, full employment, and monetary 
stability between 1976 and the late 1980s. Between 1976 and 1986, 
GDP grew at an average annual rate of 8.4 percent in real terms. 
Per capita GNP in current prices increased from C £5 37. 9 in 1973 
to C£3,597 in 1988, or US$7,200, one of the highest in the Mediter- 
ranean area. Unemployment averaged 3.2 percent per year, and 
price increases 6.3 percent per year, during the 1976-88 period. 
The price increases of 1980 and 1981 pushed the average up, and 
the increases of the late 1980s were substantially lower (2.8 per- 
cent in 1987 and 3.8 percent in 1989). Government support of the 
private sector, through tax incentives, loan guarantees for export- 
oriented industries, grants and loans to agriculture and small in- 
dustries, training programs for the manufacturing sector, and the 
substantial improvement of the infrastructure, contributed great- 
ly to this success. 

Analysts believed that the 1990s would challenge the economy. 
The Customs Union Agreement with the EEC could be disastrous 


The Economy 

if manufacturing were not fundamentally restructured. The high 
tariffs that had protected manufacturing for decades would be dis- 
manded in the 1990s under the terms of the agreement. The repub- 
lic's seemingly permanent trade deficit would have to be substantially 
reduced if it were not to damage the economy in the long term. 
Agriculture would also be affected; some of its branches, mainly 
cereals and livestock, which enjoyed direct or indirect subsidies, 
might fall to foreign competition. The service sector would grow 
in importance. Tourism, which could not expect further growth 
in quantity, would have to bring in more receipts by improving 
the quality of its product. Financial services and offshore enter- 
prises would likely increase in importance. 

The Government Sector 

The government accounted for about 12 to 13 percent of GDP 
during the 1980s (see table 10, Appendix). The need to stimulate 
the economy after the division of the island in 1974 caused the 
government to abandon the old policy of balanced budgets and to 
adopt expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. The results were 
large and widening budget deficits paid for by borrowing at home 
and abroad. Domestic public debt rose from C£7.5 million in 1976 
to C£161.5 million in 1988. Public and publicly guaranteed for- 
eign debt increased from C£61.8 million in 1976 to C£602.5 mil- 
lion in 1988. The total public and publicly guaranteed domestic 
and foreign debt rose from C£760.8 million in 1987 to C£764 mil- 
lion (38.7 percent of GDP) in 1988. The foreign debt service ratio 
(total service payments as a percentage of exports of goods and ser- 
vices) was 11.8 in 1987 and 10.8 in 1988. Domestic borrowing only 
was used to cover the budget deficit in 1988. Thus, there was a 
decline in government foreign borrowing in 1988 to C£602.5 mil- 
lion, compared to C £6 17.5 million in 1987. Still, the burden of 
servicing the foreign debt continued to be significant. For instance, 
servicing the external debt was more than half the revenue from 
exports of domestically produced goods in 1987. 

Furthermore, it was anticipated that the tariff reductions that 
would result from the Customs Union Agreement with the EEC 
would produce revenue losses, raising the fiscal deficit to C£126 
million in 1992, compared with C£73.5 million in 1987. As a con- 
sequence, both public and foreign debts were expected to increase. 
The president of Cyprus, George Vassiliou, forecast a rise in the 
per capita public debt from C£2,107 in 1987 to C£3,563 in 1992 
and a rise in the total foreign debt to C£ 1,082 million in 1992. 

Given the government's ever-present fiscal deficit, there were 
concrete proposals at the beginning of the 1990s for the introduction 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

of a value-added tax (VAT — see Glossary) to improve the state's 
finances. The Republic of Cyprus lacked a broad-based consump- 
tion tax, and a VAT would generate much revenue. The income 
tax system was also to be overhauled, to reduce tax evasion. 

A specific look at government public finances shows that the 
Republic of Cyprus maintained three types of budgets: the Ordi- 
nary Budget, which included expenditures for government opera- 
tions and other current expenses; the Development Budget, which 
included development programs; and the Special Relief Fund, 
which covered state aid for the housing and care of refugees. 

The Ordinary Budget 

The major sources of revenue of the Ordinary Budget included 
direct taxes; indirect taxes; loan proceeds; sales of goods and ser- 
vices; interest, dividends, rents, and royalties; and foreign grants. 
Revenue in 1987 from direct taxes was C£107 million, or 27 per- 
cent of the total revenue for the Ordinary Budget; revenue from 
indirect taxes was C£151 .3 million, or 38.2 percent; and proceeds 
from loans were C£68 million, or 17.2 percent. These three main 
sources of revenue brought in 82.4 percent of the total revenue of 
the Ordinary Budget. 

The major expenditures of the Ordinary Budget were salaries, 
fees, and allowances; public debt charges; and subventions and con- 
tributions and subsidies. Salaries, fees, and allowances accounted 
for 33.9 percent of total expenditures in 1987; public debt charges, 
30.7 percent; subventions and contributions, 9.4 percent; and sub- 
sidies, 6.1 percent. The Ordinary Budget showed deficits of C£17.9 
million in 1985, C£12.5 million in 1986, C£32.1 million in 1987, 
and C£28.7 million in 1988. 

The Development Budget 

There was no revenue in the Development Budget during the 
period 1976-87. If there had been public savings (i.e., excesses of 
current revenues over current expenditures) in the Ordinary Bud- 
get, they could have provided the means to finance all or a part 
of the investment and other development expenditures. However, 
for most of the years of the 1976-87 period, there were no public 
savings. Thus, the Development Budget had to rely on domestic 
and foreign borrowing to cover its expenditures. The major ex- 
penditure items of the Development Budget were investment, capital 
transfers, and land acquisition. Another sizeable item was expen- 
ditures for wages and salaries. Investment expenditures amount- 
ed to C£46 million in 1988. Investment expenditures in the period 
1985-88 were mainly to finance the Southern Conveyor Project, 


The Economy 

the Khrysokhou Irrigation Project, the Nicosia- Limassol Highway, 
several other major roads, and Larnaca Airport. For this reason, 
construction activity absorbed most of the investment expenditures 
between 1985 and 1988. Investment's share of the total develop- 
ment expenditures was 60.22 percent in 1985, 76.19 percent in 
1986, 75.1 percent in 1987, and 67.74 in 1988. 

The Special Relief Fund 

The revenues of the Special Relief Fund were C£2 1 . 5 million 
in 1987. Expenditures were C£21.5 million. The fund showed a 
surplus in the period 1985-88. The main sources of revenue were 
direct taxes (a special contribution), indirect taxes (a temporary 
refugee levy on imports), and foreign grants. The main expendi- 
tures of the fund in 1988 included investment, C£10 million; cur- 
rent transfers, C£7.6 million; capital transfers, C£4.2 million; and 
wages and salaries, C£1.4 million. 

Employment and Labor Relations 

The south' s successful economy kept unemployment rates low. 
During the 1980s, unemployment rose above 3.3 percent only once, 
in 1987, when it reached 3.7 percent. In 1988 unemployment was 
2.8 percent. Unemployment rates were also low in the years just 
before the Turkish invasion of 1974, averaging about 1 percent. 
The invasion and division of the island disrupted the economy, 
and in the government- controlled area unemployment averaged 
16.2 percent in 1975 and 8.5 percent in 1976. During 1977 the 
rate fell to 3 percent, a rate typical for the south 's economy during 
the 1980s. 

The south' s economy frequently had to contend with a shortage 
of workers and in some years was forced to import workers from 
abroad to meet the needs of various sectors, especially the tourist 
industry. This shortfall reflected the changing employment patterns 
of the economy as a whole (see table 1 1 , Appendix). The only popu- 
lation group that consistently had difficulty finding employment 
was composed of university graduates. Their discontent sometimes 
resulted in demonstrations and demands that the civil service be 

In 1973 about 37.5 percent of those gainfully employed were 
members of labor unions. Union membership increased greatly be- 
tween 1974 and 1977, reaching 62 percent at the end of 1977. This 
trend continued, and in 1988 labor unions represented more than 
80 percent of the work force. 

The most prominent unions in the government-controlled area 
were the left-wing Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labor (Pankypria 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Ergatiki Omospondia — PEO) with about 70,000 members at the 
end of the 1980s, and the right-wing Cyprus Workers' Confeder- 
ation (Synomospondia Ergaton Kyprou — SEK) with about 50,000 
members. Third in importance was the civil servants' labor 
union, with a membership of about 13,000. Employers were or- 
ganized in various associations represented in the Cyprus Employ- 
ers' and Industrialists' Federation. 

Terms and conditions of employment were negotiated either 
directly between employee and employer or through collective bar- 
gaining between trade unions and employers' organizations. The 
government's policy was to remain largely uninvolved in these 
negotiations unless a deadlock had been reached or its participa- 
tion had been requested, when it acted through its Industrial Rela- 
tions Section, a part of the Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance. 
This section routinely acted to prevent labor-employer discord by 
providing both groups with guidance and information about good 
industrial relations. As a result, the number of working days lost 
to strikes was among the lowest in the Western world relative to 
the size of the work force. 

In the 1980s, wages rose faster than prices. A part of the wage 
increase was brought about through wage indexation, with auto- 
matic quarterly wage increases equal to about half the inflation rate. 
Even at this rate, however, wage increases could be troublesome 
for the economy. In 1988, for example, average wages and salar- 
ies increased 4.5 percent in real terms, but exceeded the produc- 
tivity gain of 3.5 percent. The relative scarcity of labor and rising 
labor costs affected the economy in the 1980s and were expected 
to continue to do in the 1990s. 

Primary Sector 

At the beginning of the 1990s, the primary sector was no longer 
as important as it had been. Agriculture's contribution to GDP 
had declined from about 20 percent at the end of the 1960s to about 
7 percent at the end of the 1980s. Mining's importance had fallen 
so much that it was no longer significant. Forestry and fishing were 
also of little importance. Nevertheless, agriculture would remain 
a stable element in the Republic of Cyprus for both economic and 
social reasons. Vast irrigation projects were underway for agricul- 
ture's benefit; government programs for a continuing reform of 
land tenure patterns were in place; and the cooperative movement 
was a significant force in the banking industry. 


When Cyprus achieved independence in 1960, the backbone of 


The Economy 

its economy was agriculture, mostly small farms, and sometimes 
even subsistence farms. During the 1960s, irrigation projects made 
possible vegetable and fruit exports; increasingly, commercialized 
farming was able to meet the demands for meat, dairy products, 
and wine from the British and United Nations troops stationed on 
the island and from the growing number of tourists. 

In the early 1970s, Cypriot farms, still overwhelmingly small, 
owner- run units, furnished about 70 percent of commodity exports 
and employed about 95,000 people, or one- third of the island's eco- 
nomically active population. Given the expansion of the manufac- 
turing and service sectors, however, agriculture's importance was 
declining, and in the first half of the 1970s its share of GDP amount- 
ed to 18 percent. 

The de facto division of the island in 1974 left the Turkish Cypriot 
community in the north in possession of agricultural resources that 
produced about four-fifths of the citrus and cereal crops, two-thirds 
of the green fodder, and all of the tobacco (see fig. 7). The south 
retained nearly all of the island's grape-growing areas and decidu- 
ous fruit orchards. The south also possessed lands producing roughly 
three-fourths of the valuable potato crop and other vegetables (ex- 
cluding carrots), half the island's olive trees, and two- thirds of its 
carob trees. In addition, the south retained two-thirds of the 
livestock population. 

The Turkish occupation caused a large-scale uncoordinated ex- 
change of the agricultural work force between the northern and 
southern zones. The resulting substantial agricultural unemploy- 
ment was countered by government actions that included finan- 
cial assistance on easy terms to farmers. By 1978 the number of 
persons working in agriculture in the government-controlled area 
amounted to about 47,000, or 23 percent of the working popula- 
tion. Thereafter, however, agriculture's portion of the work force 
declined to 20.7 percent in 1979 and 15.8 percent in 1987. Its con- 
tribution to the economy also declined; from 17.3 percent of GDP 
in 1976 to 10.7 percent in 1979 and 7.7 percent in 1988. This share 
was important to the south 's economy, however, and in 1988 value 
added in agriculture, at constant 1985 prices, was C£112.7 million. 

Agriculture's share of the national economy could be expected 
to decline still further in the 1990s, as the Greek Cypriot economy 
became even more dominated by the service sector. The island's 
favorable climate and its location near its leading market, Western 
Europe, however, meant that farming would remain an important 
and stable part of the overall economy. Government irrigation 
projects, subsidies, and tax policies encouraged farming's existence, 


Cyprus: A Country Study 


The Economy 

as did research in new crops and new varieties of ones already in 

The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources oversaw ef- 
forts to improve agriculture, fishing, and forestry. Subordinate to 
this ministry and assisting it were, among others, the Agricultural 
Research Institute, the Veterinary Service, the Meteorological Ser- 
vice, the Department of Water Development, the Department of 
Forests, and the Department of Geological Survey. 

In addition to macroeconomic considerations, the government 
encouraged agriculture because it provided rural employment, 
which maintained village life and relieved urban crowding. Small- 
scale agricultural activity prevented some regions from losing much 
of their population. Part-time agricultural work also permitted ur- 
ban residents to keep in contact with their villages and gave them 
supplemental income. 

Water Resources 

Cyprus' s water supply was both inadequate and irregular. The 
average rainfall of 500 millimeters, mostly in the winter, left the 
island quite dry much of the rest of the time because no rivers flowed 
year round. During the colonial period, a dam and reservoir con- 
struction program was begun, and by independence Cyprus had 
sixteen dams with a storage capacity of 6 million cubic meters, or 
1 percent of the island's estimated 600 million cubic meters of us- 
able runoff from annual rainfall. 

After independence a number of large projects were mounted 
to increase reservoir storage capacity, which reached 300 million 
cubic meters by 1990. The most important of these projects, and 
the largest development project in Cyprus since independence, was 
the Southern Conveyor Project, which collected surplus water from 
the southwestern part of the island and conveyed it by a 
1 10-kilometer-long water carrier to the central and eastern areas. 
When the project reached completion in 1993, it, and a number 
of other large projects, would guarantee farmers and the inhabi- 
tants of Nicosia and other towns adequate amounts of water into 
the next century. 

Land Use and Tenure 

Three categories of landownership existed in Cyprus during the 
Ottoman period: private, state, and communal. This division con- 
tinued to characterize landholding in the Greek Cypriot area in 1990. 
Most land was privately owned. The largest private landowner was 
the Church of Cyprus, whose holdings before the Turkish invasion 
included an estimated 5.8 percent of the island's arable land. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Unrestricted legal ownership of private land dated only from 
1946, when the British administration enacted a new land law that 
superseded the land code in effect under the Ottomans, in which 
all agricultural land belonged to the state. Those who worked the 
land were in effect hereditary tenants, whose right to the land was 
usufructuary. Land could be transmitted from father to son, but 
could not be disposed of otherwise without official permission. 

The Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration, and Valuation) 
Law of 1946 established the present-day legal basis for landhold- 
ing. All former state lands that had been properly acquired by in- 
dividuals were declared to be private property; private property 
as defined in the former Ottoman land code also continued to be 
private property. Communal land remained the property of vil- 
lages or towns, and all unoccupied and vacant land not lawfully 
held (most forest land, for example) became state land. 

Both Greek and Turkish inheritance practices required the di- 
vision of an estate among the surviving heirs. At the time of the 
1946 law, fragmentation of land was already great, many hold- 
ings did not have access roads, and owners frequently possessed 
varying numbers of plots that might be separated by distances of 
several kilometers. 

Despite the 1946 law, however, fragmentation of plots continued. 
The 1946 census showed 60,179 holdings averaging 7.2 hectares. 
By 1960 the number of holdings had risen to 69,445, an increase 
of 15.4 percent, and the average holding had decreased to 6.2 hect- 
ares. By 1974 the average holding was an estimated 5 hectares. 
Holdings were seldom a single piece of land; most consisted of small 
plots, an average of ten per holding in 1960. In some villages, the 
average number of plots was 40, and extremes of 100 plots held 
by a single farmer were reported. 

The government enacted the Land Consolidation Law of 1969 
to resolve the problem of land tenure. The law established the Cen- 
tral Land Consolidation Authority, with the power to buy and also 
acquire compulsorily land and other property, which it could sell 
or use for land consolidation. The authority's board included mem- 
bers of several ministries and departments and also representatives 
of the farmers. At the village level, committees of government 
representatives and local farmers coordinated and supervised the 
local program. 

Land consolidation consisted of merging fragmented holdings. 
Dual and multiple holdings were to be eliminated, and plots smaller 
than the minimums listed in the 1946 land law were to be expropri- 
ated. Government-owned land could be used to enlarge holdings; 
recipients could purchase the land at current market prices, paying 


Grape harvest 

Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

in installments at low interest rates. A farmer-owner who lost land 
in the redistribution process was to receive land having the same 
value as his former holding. The land consolidation program also 
involved the construction of a service road network to connect all 
plots to larger roads. 

By the end of 1988, twenty-eight land consolidation projects had 
been completed, and thirty-one projects were underway. Where 
projects had been completed, minute plots were almost completely 
eliminated, the average size of plots increased by 100 percent, and 
the number of plots declined by about 70 percent. 

Agricultural Cooperatives 

The agricultural cooperative movement in Cyprus was founded 
in 1909 by a village society of farmers who had returned from an 
inspection tour of Britain and Germany. The cooperative move- 
ment's development was slow, largely because few villagers were 
qualified to manage cooperatives. The Agricultural Bank, estab- 
lished in 1925 to furnish medium- and long-term loans to farm- 
ers, functioned through the cooperative societies. In 1937 a new 
impetus was given to the movement by the establishment of the 
Cooperative Central Bank (CCB), with membership limited to the 
cooperative societies. 

The bank's initial function was to furnish the societies with funds 
for short-term loans to members. This function was expanded in 
1960 (when the CCB absorbed the Agricultural Bank) to include 
medium- and long-term loans. By the late 1980s, the CCB was 
the third largest bank in the government-controlled area in terms 
of deposits. The cooperative movement's banking activity was es- 
pecially strong in the countryside, but also competed with conven- 
tional banks in urban areas and had about a 30 percent share of 
the banking business as a whole. 

In addition to banking and credit activities, the cooperative move- 
ment maintained retail stores. Cooperatives also marketed agricul- 
tural products and exported large amounts of citrus fruits, other 
fruits, table grapes, and vegetables. The largest winery on the is- 
land was the Cooperative Winery SODAP Ltd. 


Crop production was by far the most important component of 
agriculture. In 1988 it contributed 71 percent of total value added 
in agriculture, compared with 19 percent for livestock. Ancillary 
production contributed 6 percent; the shares of fishing and fore- 
stry were 3 and 1 percent, respectively. 


The Economy 

A wide range of crops were grown on Cyprus. Cereals (wheat 
and barley), legumes, vegetables (carrots, potatoes, and tomatoes), 
and fruit and other tree crops (almonds, apples, bananas, carobs, 
grapes, grapefruit, lemons, melons, olives, oranges, and peaches) 
(see table 12, Appendix). 

Crops were rainfed or irrigated. Wheat and barley were rainfed 
or dryland crops, as were carobs, olives, fodder, and wine grapes. 
Crops that required irrigation included vegetables, citrus fruits, 
deciduous fruits, bananas, and table grapes. These irrigated crops 
accounted for half of agricultural production. 

Cereals, mainly wheat and barley, grew mostly on the Mesaor- 
ia, the island's central plain. Production fluctuated widely, depend- 
ing on rainfall. Wheat's importance relative to barley declined 
steadily during the 1980s, the result of greater subsidies paid for 
the raising of barley. Despite the subsidies and a doubling of barley 
production, only part of the domestic need for cereals was met, 
and substantial imports were necessary. 

Market vegetables grew in many areas around the island. The 
potato was the most important of these crops, far outstripping toma- 
toes, carrots, watermelons and sweet melons, cucumbers, and others 
in both weight and value. In fact, the potato was the most impor- 
tant agricultural product in the late 1980s, during which more than 
80 percent of its production was exported (see table 13, Appen- 
dix). In 1987 the potato earned 10 percent of the total value of 
domestic exports, more than any other item except clothing. Be- 
cause the Cypriot potato was harvested twice, in winter and in early 
spring, it had a competitive advantage in the European market. 
Britain was the largest consumer. A shortage of suitable land and 
a need for irrigation meant that the potato's importance for Cypriot 
agriculture would likely decline in the 1990s, but it would remain 
one of the sector's main supports. 

Citrus production was another irrigated crop that was impor- 
tant for exports; about 75 percent of production was consumed 
abroad. Groves of oranges, lemons, grapefruit, and tangerines were 
located along the coasts. Unlike potato production, that of citrus 
fruits was expected to expand greatly in the 1990s, and one esti- 
mate foresaw a yield of 350,000 tons by the turn of the century, 
compared with 169,000 tons in 1989. 

Viniculture and the production of wine have been major eco- 
nomic activities for centuries in Cyprus. Most vineyards are lo- 
cated in the southwestern part of the island on the slopes of the 
Troodos Mountains in the Paphos district and in hilly areas in the 
Limassol district. Some grapes were grown for table consumption, 
but about four-fifths of the harvest was used for wine, two-thirds 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

of it exported. In 1989 the grape harvest amounted to 212,000 tons, 
and wine production was 34. 1 million liters. The most commonly 
grown grapes were the xymisteria and mavro varieties. Systematic 
efforts were undertaken by the government to improve the quality 
of Cypriot grapes, and different kinds of wine were manufactured 
to increase exports, mainly to Europe. 

Deciduous tree crops common to temperate climates, including 
olives, apples, pears, peaches, carobs, and cherries, were also grown. 
These crops required some cool weather during the year, and the 
orchards were almost entirely in mountainous areas. Almond trees, 
which do not need cool weather, were widespread on the plains. 
Olives were easily the most important export item of these tree crops. 

Livestock and Poultry 

Livestock products, including poultry and milk, made up a sig- 
nificant part of the gross output by value of the agricultural sec- 
tor. In 1989 there were 49,000 catde, 325,000 sheep, 208,000 goats, 
281,000 pigs, and 2,475,000 chickens in the government-controlled 
area. During the 1980s, livestock production roughly doubled, as 
a result of subsidies, strict import regulations, and government- 
sponsored research that improved both the quality of livestock and 
its management. Although Greek Cypriots had become self- 
sufficient with regard to pork and poultry, it was necessary to im- 
port beef, veal, and mutton to meet domestic needs. Specialists 
believed that the gradual lifting of import restrictions, as required 
by the EEC Customs Union Agreement, would put many ineffi- 
cient breeders of livestock out of business. 

Fishing and Forestry 

Fishing has been of small importance to Cyprus throughout his- 
tory. The intermittent nature of the rivers inhibits natural propa- 
gation of freshwater fish, and the surrounding waters are generally 
deficient in the nutrients and associated plankton essential to the 
growth of a large marine fish population. 

The Turkish invasion resulted in the loss of some of the better 
fishing areas. By the second half of the 1980s, loans and subsidies 
from the Department of Fisheries had secured the existence of a 
fishing fleet of several hundred small vessels, and annual catches 
exceeded those preceding 1974. In 1989 the catch totaled 2,600 
tons at live weight. 

The 1980s also saw saltwater and freshwater fish farms come into 
operation. Much of their production was exported. An experimen- 
tal fish farm was scheduled to open in the 1990s at Meneou, near 


The Economy 

Forestry played a very small role in the Greek Cypriot econo- 
my. In the period 1986-1988, its value added was 0.01 percent of 
the agricultural total in all three years. 

Nearly all of the south 's forests were owned by the state, which 
had long managed an active and sophisticated program for their 
care and improvement. The Turkish invasion of 1974 damaged 
the island's forests extensively, but by the 1980s reforestation 
projects had repaired much of the harm. The College of Forestry, 
established by the British in the colonial period, enjoyed an inter- 
national reputation for excellence. 

Mining and Quarrying 

For several millennia, Cyprus was an important source of cop- 
per ores (mainly cuprous pyrite) and other ores and minerals, in- 
cluding chromite, iron pyrite (mined for its sulphur content), 
asbestos, gypsum, and umber (see fig. 8). In addition to these 
minerals, exploited mainly for export, limestone, sand, and ag- 
gregates were quarried in substantial quantities for the domestic 
cement and construction industries. In the 1950s, minerals account- 
ed for three-fifths of exports and employed 6,700 persons. By 1963 
minerals' share of exports had fallen to 34 percent, owing to both 
a changing world market and the growth of other sectors of the 
Cypriot economy. The Turkish invasion of 1974 disrupted or ended 
much mining activity. Many deposits in the government-controlled 
territory were nearing exhaustion. In 1981 minerals supplied only 
4.5 percent of exports, and by the end of the 1980s less than 1 per- 
cent. Mining and quarrying also employed fewer persons: 1,800 
in 1979 and half that in 1987. The subsector's contribution to GDP 
had also become quite small: 0.5 percent to GDP in 1985 and in 
1986 and 0.4 percent in 1987 and 1988. With the closure of the 
asbestos mine in 1988, the industry's contribution to GDP declined 
still further. In 1989 the principal minerals mined were flotation 
pyrites (57,455 tons), copper concentrates (1,752 tons), and cop- 
per precipitates (1,080 tons). The quarrying of sand, gravel, and 
road aggregate depended on construction demands. In the late 
1980s, demand was generally good. In 1982 a port was construct- 
ed at Vasilikos on the south central coast to handle the mining and 
cement production of the Hellenic Mining Company. 

Secondary Sector 

Manufacturing, the largest component of the secondary sector, 
consisted mainly of light manufacturing. Government policies, es- 
pecially since the events of 1974, had long aimed at strengthening 
light manufacturing and increasing its export production. The trade 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

The Economy 

agreement with the EEC that went into effect in 1988 could have 
momentous effects on this subsector, most obviously in removing 
the tariffs that had protected Cypriot manufacturing from foreign 
competition. Energy production and construction were also sig- 
nificant components of this sector. 


At independence the manufacturing sector consisted almost en- 
tirely of small, family-owned enterprises, most with fewer than five 
workers. Production consisted mainly of consumer goods and items 
for the construction industry, all for the local market. Obstacles 
to the development of larger establishments were the limited domes- 
tic market, a generally low level of income, a lack of available cap- 
ital, and a shortage of skilled labor. 

During the period of the second five-year plan (1967-71), steps 
were taken by the government to encourage industrial development. 
Import duties on raw materials were reduced or abolished, and 
tariffs were imposed to protect domestic industry. Generous depreci- 
ation allowances and tax remissions were granted. In addition, 
training centers were set up for management, technical personnel, 
and workers. Industrial parks were established in Nicosia, Limas- 
sol, and Larnaca. Government policy generally left manufactur- 
ing to private enterprise, but in some cases, such as the petroleum 
refinery at Larnaca, the government made direct investments. 

During the plan period, some seventy larger manufacturing 
plants were constructed. These plants included a petroleum refinery, 
biscuit and margarine factories, fruit- and meat-canning plants, 
a brewery, an edible oil plant, paper products factories, textile and 
hosiery mills, pharmaceutical plants, and metal fabricating plants. 
A 1972 census of industrial production, covering Greek Cypriot 
establishments plus estimates for the Turkish Cypriot communi- 
ty, showed that more than four- fifths of the 7,612 plants in manufac- 
turing (excluding cottage industries) still had 1 to 4 employees; only 
about thirty establishments had more than 100. These larger es- 
tablishments, however, accounted for 81 .4 percent of the value add- 
ed by manufacturing. Despite this change, manufacturing as a 
whole remained largely geared to the local market, the principal 
exception being canned goods, most of which were exported. 

The Turkish occupation resulted in a major division of the is- 
land's manufacturing sector, because one-third of the larger en- 
terprises were located in the north. Another immediate effect was 
disruption of the domestic market. The division also cut off the 
sources of some raw materials and intermediate goods. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

The sharp general drop in incomes in the south after mid- 1974 
forced the manufacturing industry to reorient production toward 
exports. A principal objective of the first Emergency Economic Ac- 
tion Plan (1975-76) was the reactivation of manufacturing with 
emphasis on the development of such labor-intensive industries as 
clothing and footwear aimed at the export market. This effort also 
included measures to reestablish in the Greek Cypriot area the oper- 
ations of entrepreneurs who had fled the Turkish Cypriot zone. 
During this plan period, 200 new or reopened plants went into 
production, and at the end of the period more than 130 additional 
ones were under construction. 

The Greek Cypriot government took other steps to create an ex- 
port climate attractive to industrial entrepreneurs. Raw material 
and machinery imports were duty-free, a guarantee scheme was 
established for bank credits for exports, and a tax allowance was 
granted on foreign exchange earnings from exports. Trade centers 
were also set up abroad, and there was participation in foreign trade 
exhibitions. Some indication of the success of the overall effort was 
seen in the tripling of exports of manufactured goods from C£22.5 
million in 1975 to C£66.5 million in 1978. By the late 1970s, 
manufacturing was very close to wholesale and retail trade in its 
contribution to GDP, and there Were some 1,320 manufacturing 
enterprises covering a broad range of industrial activity. 

During the decade of 1979-88, the contribution of manufactur- 
ing to GDP at current prices nearly tripled (see table 14, Appen- 
dix). Manufacturing's share of GDP, however, declined slightly 
during this period, beginning in 1984. The decline moved manufac- 
turing into second place, after the category of wholesale and retail 
trade, restaurants, and hotels. 

The principal industrial products were food, beverages, and 
tobacco; textiles, wearing apparel, and leather; wood and wood 
products; paper and paper products; printing and publishing; chem- 
icals and toiletries, petroleum, rubber, and plastic products; non- 
metallic mineral products, such as cement; and metal products, 
machinery, and equipment. 

The three subsectors of food, beverages, and tobacco; textiles, 
wearing apparel, and leather; and chemicals and toiletries, pe- 
troleum, rubber, and plastic products represented 65.4 percent of 
the total gross industrial output in 1979, and in 1987 they represent- 
ed 64.7 percent. In 1987 the relative share in industrial output of 
food, beverages, and tobacco was 27.4 percent; of textiles, wear- 
ing apparel, and leather, 23.2 percent; and of chemicals and 
toiletries, petroleum, rubber, and plastic products, 14 percent. 
During the period 1979-87, the two most important subsectors for 


The Economy 

exports were food, beverages, and tobacco and textiles, wearing 
apparel, and leather. In 1987 they accounted for 21.6 and 54.2 
percent of total industrial exports, respectively. 

Industrial output came to depend on exports. The Arab Middle 
East was a key market for industrial production, but the EEC pur- 
chased 39.3 percent of exported manufactures in 1987. These two 
markets and the protected domestic market absorbed about 90 per- 
cent of manufactured products. 

The traditional markets for Cypriot manufactured goods could 
not be regarded as secure at the beginning of the 1990s. The Arab 
Middle East markets were often highly volatile, for both political 
and economic reasons, and the European market had also become 
increasingly competitive. A main threat to Cypriot exports in these 
areas were Asian manufacturers with lower labor costs and higher- 
quality goods. The domestic market was also increasingly threat- 
ened because the terms of the Customs Union Agreement with 
the EEC required the country to gradually dismande its highly pro- 
tective tariff system. (In the late 1980s, for example, Cypriot tariffs 
on clothing imports from the EEC were over 80 percent.) 

In meeting these mounting challenges, Cypriot manufacturers 
were striving to raise the quality of their production, improve mar- 
keting, and contain labor costs through productivity gains as tariffs 
came down. The government continued its longstanding policy of 
encouraging manufacturing by improving the infrastructure and 
creating industrial parks and free industrial zones. It also identi- 
fied new industries and products suitable for future development. 
Because of the number of small, labor-intensive plants with well- 
qualified workers adept at learning new technologies, the govern- 
ment recommended that these plants adopt the principle of "flexible 
specialization," with modern design techniques, quick turn-around 
times, and computer-controlled machinery, to meet the rigors of 
the global market of the 1990s. 

Energy Resources 

Cyprus had an unfortunate energy situation. The island had no 
known deposits of mineral fuels, and the lack of rivers that flowed 
year-round made significant generation of hydroelectric power im- 
possible. The island did have a great amount of sunlight, however, 
and in the government-controlled sector about 35 percent of houses 
were fitted with rooftop solar panels for heating water. By 1990 
Cyprus was one of the world's foremost users of solar energy. The 
only other domestic source of energy was firewood. 

Petroleum, all of it imported, supplied about 95 percent of the 
island's energy. Oil imports consumed about 50 percent of foreign 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

exchange earnings in some years. Imported crude was processed 
by the Larnaca refinery of the Cyprus Petroleum Refinery Ltd. 
In 1989 this refinery had a capacity of 17,000 barrels a day, or 
800,000 tons a year. Major users imported their own heavy fuel 
oil directly via oil terminals at Larnaca, Dhekelia, to the east of 
Larnaca, and Moni, near Limassol. 

The largest single user of petroleum, consuming about 35 per- 
cent of the total, was the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC), 
a public corporation founded in 1952. The EAC was responsible 
for nearly all of the island's generation, transmission, and distri- 
bution of electric power. The "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus" ("TRNC") had no significant power plants and received 
its electricity from the EAC. As of 1990, it had not paid for any 
of this power. 

In 1989 the EAC produced 1.84 gigawatt-hours from three oil- 
fired thermal stations, two at Dhekelia (one old plant with a ca- 
pacity of 42 megawatts, used only in emergencies, and a new plant 
with a capacity of 240 megawatts), and one at Moni, near Limas- 
sol, with a capacity of 180 megawatts. The EAC also had a few 
small standby diesel plants. A number of industrial operations had 
their own generating facilities. At the beginning of the 1990s, there 
were plans to construct a coal-fired power plant at Vasilikos to 
reduce petroleum dependency, but environmental concerns may 
prevent its being built. 


Increased economic activity from the late 1960s, stimulated in 
part by the second five-year plan, resulted in a rapid growth of 
construction, including new urban and rural housing, commer- 
cial establishments, industrial facilities, tourist accommodations, 
and government infrastructure projects. The sector's growth rate 
averaged 17.5 percent per year in current terms between 1968 and 
1972 and rose to 24.8 percent in 1973. Construction workers num- 
bered 25,000 to 28,600 in the 1968-73 period and constituted about 
one-tenth of the island's gainfully employed work force. 

The construction industry was hard hit by the Turkish invasion 
and occupation; construction by the private sector ceased almost 
completely. In 1975 the construction work force numbered only 
about 8,900, or 6.2 percent of persons gainfully employed in the 

Commercial construction revived in 1976, when the industry, 
in response to government policy decisions and actions, began to 
build housing for nearly 200,000 refugees, many of whom were 
living in tents and makeshift shacks. This construction boom lasted 


Clothing plant, an example of Cypriot light industry 
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 

until 1981 . The boom was further energized by events in the Mid- 
dle East, which caused many businesses to move their headquar- 
ters or offices from Lebanon to Cyprus. Rapidly expanding tourism 
also stimulated construction of new facilities, as did industrial plant 
construction. After the refugees were housed, the government be- 
gan its program of building housing for low-income groups as part 
of a new, wider concept of government social responsibility. An 
especially strong year in the boom period was 1979, when the con- 
struction industry expanded 36.3 percent and made up 13.4 per- 
cent of the GDP in 1979. 

The construction industry experienced much lower growth rates 
in the 1980s. In the 1985-87 period, it actually shrank in real terms, 
and some Cypriot contractors were obliged to go abroad to find 
work. The industry remained an important part of the economy, 
however, with regard to both its contribution to the GDP and the 
employment it provided. In 1987, a representative year, dwellings 
absorbed about half of total construction investment, nonresiden- 
tial buildings about a quarter, and infrastructure (such as roads, 
bridges, dams, irrigation works, and telecommunication and elec- 
trical transmissions lines) the rest. 

Important spurs to the construction industry were the Housing 
Finance Corporation and the Land Development Corporation, 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

government entities created to enable middle- and low-income peo- 
ple to acquire their own houses. During the late 1980s, these or- 
ganizations provided low-cost loans and managed the construction 
of several hundred houses a year (in 1989 eighty-two housing units 
in Nicosia alone). The goal for 1990 was to construct 575 units 
in the whole of the Republic of Cyprus. 

Tertiary Sector 

By the beginning of the 1990s, the service, or tertiary, sector 
had become the most important part of the economy of the Republic 
of Cyprus and accounted for more than half the country's GDP. 
It was also the economy's fastest growing component and through 
this growth was gradually transforming the economy into a postin- 
dustrial and information one. Tourism had long been the most im- 
portant subsector, but in the future financial and transport services 
and offshore enterprises were thought likely to take the leading role, 
favored by the island's fortunate location between Europe and the 
Middle East and its stable social and economic conditions. 

Trade, Restaurants, and Hotels 

Since the late 1970s, the largest and most dynamic component 
of the service sector has been that of wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants, and hotels (tourism). It grew at double-digit rates be- 
tween 1979 and 1988, except for 1986 (see table 15, Appendix). 
Its contribution to the GDP in current terms quadrupled between 
1979 and 1988. By the late 1980s, with about 50,000 workers, it 
had also become the largest source of employment. 

Tourism gained importance in this subsector during the 1980s, 
but had not overtaken trade. Trade (wholesale and retail) contribut- 
ed C£76.7 million, in current terms, to GDP in 1979 (79.56 per- 
cent of the sector) and C£217.3 million (55.4 percent) in 1988. 
Restaurants and hotels (tourism) contributed C£19.7 million in 1979 
(20.43 percent of the total sector) and C£174.6 million (44.55 per- 
cent) in 1988. The value added to GDP by trade nearly tripled 
in current prices between 1979 and 1988, and that of restaurants 
and hotels (tourism) increased about nine times. 

Tourism was seriously disrupted by the Turkish invasion of 1974. 
Only 47,000 tourists came to the island in 1975, down from 264,000 
in 1973. However, under the influence of the emergency eco- 
nomic action plans of 1976-78, 1979-81, and 1982-86, earnings 
from tourism increased at least 20 percent for eleven straight years, 
and the number of tourists who visited the Republic of Cyprus went 
from 165,000 in 1976 to 1,376,000 in 1989. Foreign currency earn- 
ings from tourism amounted to almost C£500 million in 1989. 


Dhekelia Power Plant 
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 

Earnings were so significant that tourism was a greater source of 
foreign exchange than the export of domestic goods from 1986 
through 1989. 

Most of the tourists who came to the government-controlled areas 
were middle-income Europeans. For many years, British visitors 
were the most numerous and made up about one-third of the total. 
Swedes were the second largest group in the late 1980s, closely fol- 
lowed by Germans. Most tourists came for stays of about ten days 
and arrived during the warm months, despite efforts by the Cyprus 
Tourism Organisation (CTO) to achieve a more even seasonal dis- 
tribution of visits. In the late 1980s, the CTO began to be success- 
ful in increasing conference tourism as a step toward this goal. 

By the late 1980s, efforts were underway to raise the quality rather 
than quantity of tourism because the south' s ability to receive more 
tourists had reached a saturation point. A one-year ban on licenses 
for new hotels in coastal areas was announced in March 1989 to 
check unplanned development. The volume of demand had sur- 
passed the available infrastructure to support it, with resulting 
problems of traffic congestion, water shortages, and inadequate 
sewerage capacity. 

Future growth was to depend on attracting wealthier tourists, 
who would spend more money during their stays. This aim was 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

to be accomplished by turning away from simple sun- and- sea 
tourism and developing higher-quality hotels with facilities such 
as golf courses, marinas for yachting, and casinos. Emphasis was 
also to be placed on building mountain resorts and developing the 
island's archaeological sites for sightseeing. 

Transportation, Storage, and Telecommunications 

Transportation, storage, and telecommunications contributed 
in current prices 8.1 percent of GDP in 1979 and 9.4 percent in 
1988. The subsector accounted for 5.5 percent of the gainfully em- 
ployed in 1979 and 6 percent in 1987. The value contributed by 
the subsector to GDP was C£48.7 million in 1979 and C£178 mil- 
lion in 1988. Transportation and storage alone represented 74.7 
percent of the subsector' s value in 1979 and 72 percent in 1988. 
The subsector could be considered to some extent trade because 
of large components in transshipment trade, warehousing services, 
and air passenger services connected with tourism. 


The transportation system in the government-controlled area was 
well developed (see fig. 9). The road network was satisfactory for 
passenger and freight traffic. In 1989 the government-controlled 
area had 9,824 kilometers of roads, of which 5,240 kilometers were 
asphalted or tarred and 4,584 kilometers were dirt or gravel. An 
expressway linked the major port town of Limassol with the capi- 
tal, and in 1990 work was underway on a highway to Paphos and 
Larnaca from this road. There were no railroads in Cyprus. 

At the time of the Turkish invasion, the country's main airport 
was the Nicosia International Airport. It was closed after the Turk- 
ish invasion of 1974, however, because it was located on the At- 
tila Line that divided the island. It was replaced by international 
airports at Larnaca and Paphos. Passenger arrivals at these two 
airports totaled 2,900,000 in 1989. In 1990 about thirty airlines 
offered more than 100 scheduled flights per week from Larnaca 
to Western and Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the 
Persian Gulf. A number of charter passenger and freight flights 
were also available. Cyprus Airways, the country's national airline, 
was both publicly and privately owned. It operated about a dozen 
large aircraft at the beginning of the 1990s. 

The de facto division of Cyprus closed Famagusta, then the is- 
land's main port. Larnaca and Limassol took its place. Both ports 
were modernized and fitted with late-design container and break- 
bulk facilities that permitted them to warehouse goods and func- 
tion as major container transshipment centers in the eastern 


The Economy 

Mediterranean. Transit cargoes enjoyed special treatment, includ- 
ing minimal customs formalities, free trade facilities, and special 
rates for long-term storage. In addition to these two ports, the is- 
land had the smaller ports of Paphos and Vasilikos and three oil 
terminals for importing petroleum. About 100 shipping lines in- 
cluded Cyprus in their regular schedules. In 1989, 5,678 ships, total- 
ing 14.8 million net registered tons, called at Cypriot ports. During 
the 1980s, Cyprus became a major shipping nation, moving from 
twenty-ninth place in the early 1980s, in terms of registered ton- 
nage, to seventh place, with close to 2,000 ships totaling 18.5 mil- 
lion gross tons. Most were foreign-owned. 


Telecommunications in the Republic of Cyprus were excellent. 
In 1990 the island had 210,000 telephones, or 30 per 100 popula- 
tion. All telephones were connected to automatic exchanges, and 
international direct dialing was available throughout the island. 
International facsimile (fax), data transmission, and telex services 
were also available. The domestic transmission system consisted 
of a mix of coaxial cables and analog radio links, along with the 
latest technologies of digital radio-relay and fiber optics cables. 
There were 234,000 television sets (color and black and white) in 
the nation at the beginning of the 1990s. The state Cyprus Broad- 
casting Corporation had two radio stations and one television sta- 
tion. There was also a private radio station, and, in addition, the 
British forces had both radio and television broadcasting facilities. 
International communications were via three submarine cables, two 
to Europe and one to Lebanon; tropospheric- scatter radio links to 
Greece and Turkey; and three satellite ground stations, two working 
with the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(Intelsat) Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean satellites and the third 
linked to the European Telecommunications Satellite Organisa- 
tion (Eutelsat) system. 

Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Business Services 

Economic activity by this subsector expanded substantially af- 
ter 1976. Some of the forces contributing to this expansion were 
the housing boom, which stemmed from the need to accommo- 
date refugees from the Turkish-occupied north; the offshore busi- 
ness and banking activities, which began in the late 1970s; and 
other business services, such as accounting, computer program- 
ming, and consultancy services. Many of these services proved to 
be a dynamic component of the economy. This subsector was not 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

The Economy 

a large employer, but many of those it employed were among the 
best trained in the country. 

Banking services in Cyprus were relatively well developed. In 1989 
Cyprus had a central bank, eight commercial banks, nineteen offshore 
banks, and four specialized financial institutions. About 320 bran- 
ches of the commercial banks were located throughout the republic. 

The Central Bank of Cyprus had the exclusive right to issue notes 
and coins, regulate the supply of money and credit, and act as 
banker, financial agent, and economic adviser to the government. 
It supervised all banks and designated financial institutions, 
managed the international reserves of the country, administered 
the exchange control legislation, and determined the exchange rate 
of the Cyprus pound. 

Commercial banks were the main source of funds for working 
capital and capital investment. They provided about 80 percent of 
the loan funds flowing into the private sector, and also provided 
housing, professional, and personal loans. In addition to providing 
these conventional banking services, the banks had entered the fields 
of installment-plan financing, general insurance, data processing, 
and trustee services. Commercial banks had strong networks of 
correspondent relationships with many foreign banks, and some 
Cypriot banks were connected to the Society of Worldwide Inter- 
bank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), an international 
system of telecommunications for the computerized transmission of 
commercial and financial messages among 1 ,500 banks worldwide. 

Offshore banks had become an important subsector since the first 
offshore banking license was granted in 1982. The guidelines gov- 
erning the establishment and operation of these units were clearly 
laid out by the Central Bank of Cyprus. Offshore banks could only 
transact business abroad and with nonresidents of Cyprus. 

In addition to offshore banks, offshore businesses as a whole were 
a dynamic element in Cyprus's growth. Between 1975 and the end 
of the 1980s, more than 5,000 permits were issued by the Central 
Bank of Cyprus for the establishment of these enterprises. The is- 
land's central geographic location, English legal system, low cost 
of living, and generous tax incentives made it a major center for 
offshore businesses. Many kinds of activities were conducted, in- 
cluding marketing of consumer goods, transit and storage trade, 
holding of property and securities, business consulting and services, 
distribution and repair of equipment, architecture and town plan- 
ning, road and airport construction, maintenance of computer hard- 
ware, ship management, and insurance. 

Foreign exchange earnings from offshore enterprises were 
C£44.5 million in 1988. In that year, 555 new permits were issued. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

At the end of the 1980s, about 700 offshore enterprises maintained 
fully staffed administrative offices in the Republic of Cyprus, em- 
ploying about 3,000 persons, 1,800 of them foreigners. 

More than fifty insurance companies operated in Cyprus. Many 
were incorporated abroad and represented well-known multina- 
tional insurance companies. The industry was regulated by the 
government to safeguard the interests of the insured and to pre- 
vent the uncontrolled flow of capital from the island. 

Community, Social, and Personal Services 

The principal activities of this subsector were personal and house- 
hold services, social and related community services, and recrea- 
tional and cultural services rendered by the private sector. As the 
Republic of Cyprus became a wealthier and more diverse society, 
this branch's share of GDP grew, from 3.4 percent in 1979 to 5.5 
percent in 1988 (increasing fivefold in current prices). Its share 
of the work force grew even more, from 4.7 percent of the gainful- 
ly employed in 1979 to 7.2 percent in 1987. 

Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments 

Cyprus' s trade balance has been consistently unfavorable since 
before independence. Given its large and expanding trade deficit, 
the Republic of Cyprus was fortunate to have a large and growing 
surplus in its invisibles account, enough even to offset the trade 
deficit in 1987 and 1988 (see table 16, Appendix). The major fac- 
tors contributing to this surplus were tourist receipts, receipts from 
transfers, and income from other goods and services (such as for- 
eign military expenditures in Cyprus, embassy expenditures, and 
foreign exchange from offshore enterprises). Tourist receipts ex- 
panded from C£232 million in 1985 to C£386 million in 1988. In- 
come from other goods and services increased from C£ 173.3 million 
in 1985 to C£208.2 million in 1988. 

Cyprus experienced its first overall balance-of-payments deficit 
after independence in 1973. During the 1980s, the influx of capi- 
tal in the form of loans and investments was sufficient to give the 
country a positive balance of payments in all years except 1985 
and 1988, despite the usually negative current account balance. 

The foreign exchange reserves of the Republic of Cyprus at the 
end of 1988 reached C£571.8 million, an improvement over the 
reserves of C£501 .2 million at the end of 1987. These reserves were 
estimated to be sufficient to cover about nine months of imports. 

Even though the trade balance was chronically unfavorable, ex- 
ports had greatly increased since the Turkish occupation in 1974. 
Exports of goods and services rose by an average of 20.7 percent 


Limassol, an important port and tourist center 
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

annually (in current prices) during the 1975-86 period; they in- 
creased 16.5 percent in 1987 and 10.5 percent in 1988. 

The main domestic exports had been agricultural exports, es- 
pecially citrus fruits and potatoes, and manufactured products, most 
importandy clothing, footwear, chemicals, and machinery. Agricul- 
tural exports amounted to 24.7 percent of total domestic exports 
in 1985 but declined to 20.5 percent in 1988; manufactured ex- 
ports were 71.7 percent of the total in 1985 and rose to 77.4 per- 
cent in 1988. 

The European Economic Community (EEC) continued to be 
the main market for the republic's exports, absorbing 42.7 per- 
cent of total domestic exports in 1986, some 45 percent in 1987, 
and 47 percent in 1988. Among the EEC countries, the top cus- 
tomer continued to be Britain, with a share of 50.4 percent in 1988, 
followed by Greece with a share of 19.5 percent. The other major 
block of countries to which the republic's exports continued to do 
well were the Arab countries. In 1986 this group took 42.2 per- 
cent of total domestic exports, in 1987 38.6 percent, and in 1988 
36.7 percent. 

The Republic of Cyprus was dependent on imports for many 
raw materials, consumer goods, transportation equipment, capi- 
tal goods, and fuels. Total imports increased from C£ 177.8 mil- 
lion in 1976 to C£l . 130 billion in 1989. The seemingly permanent 
trade deficits amounted to C£365.8 million in 1987, C£476.6 mil- 
lion in 1988, and C£668.6 million in 1989. In 1989 consumer goods 
were 18.8 percent of total imports; intermediate goods (raw materi- 
als), 41.6 percent; capital goods, 9.5 percent; transport equipment, 
20.4 percent; and fuels, 9.6 percent. 

Most of the republic's imports came from the EEC: 60.7 per- 
cent in 1986 and 54.5 percent in 1988. Britain was the largest source 
of imports among the EEC countries, accounting for 22. 1 percent 
of imports from the group in 1986 and 25.5 percent in 1988. Italy, 
the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Greece 
had the next three largest shares. Other major trading areas that 
provided imports to the republic were Eastern Europe (5.2 per- 
cent of total imports in 1986 and 7.1 percent in 1988) and the Arab 
countries (7.2 percent in 1986 and 4.8 percent in 1988). The rest 
of the world provided 26.8 percent of imports in 1986 and 33.5 
percent in 1988; Japan accounted for 34.7 percent of this group's 
exports in 1988, and the United States, 13.6 percent. 

The balance of payments record of the Republic of Cyprus in- 
dicated the economy's vulnerability in the early 1990s. Imports 
continued to outpace exports, resulting in ever-expanding trade 
deficits. This situation would have been worse if it were not for the 


The Economy 

high protection afforded the domestic market. Although the Cus- 
toms Union Agreement with the EEC , which became effective in 
January 1988, abolished all import duties on Cypriot industrial 
exports to the EEC countries, the real test for Cypriot manufac- 
turing was expected in the second half of the 1990s, when all tariffs 
on EEC industrial and agricultural exports to Cyprus were to be 
phased out. EEC duties on Cyprus 's agricultural exports to the 
EEC will also be phased out by then. Although some exceptions 
were allowed, the agreement would require free trade with the main 
Cypriot export market. 

The Customs Union Agreement was the outcome of long negoti- 
ations. After Britain's entry into the EEC, Cyprus signed an as- 
sociation agreement, to become effective in June 1973 and to cover 
a ten-year period. According to the terms of the agreement, Cyprus 
received preferential access to the British market in return for a 
35 percent reduction of tariffs on EEC goods, phased in over five 
years. A follow-up phase of the agreement, covering 1978 to 1983, 
would have led to a full customs union. The Turkish occupation 
interrupted the natural progress of this agreement. Cyprus was still 
allowed to export most of its industrial goods to the EEC without 
tariffs, but rules of origin restrictions applied, as did some restric- 
tions on agricultural exports. 

The Customs Union Agreement posed a major challenge to the 
highly protected manufacturing sector of Cyprus, revealing its com- 
petitive weaknesses. Only a restructuring of the sector by increas- 
ing the size of its units, reducing its labor-unit costs, improving 
its productivity, and strengthening the marketing of products to 
new markets would allow it to prosper. At the beginning of the 
1990s, the sector's restructuring was under way, and the govern- 
ment had established the Council for the Promotion of Exports to 
make Cypriot products better known abroad. 

'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" 

Between 1963 and 1974, the economy of the Turkish Cypriot 
community was that of an underdeveloped society. Much of this 
backwardness resulted from the economic blockade imposed by 
Greek Cypriots on the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, which largely cut 
them off from the outside world. The geographical separation of 
the enclaves from one another only worsened their plight. In ad- 
dition to external obstacles, Turkish Cypriots were not a notably 
commercial people or much involved in the island's limited 
manufacturing sector. Most Turkish Cypriots earned their liveli- 
hood from farming or government employment. By the early 1970s, 
Turkish Cypriots accounted for only 6 percent of the island's gross 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

domestic product (GDP — see Glossary), although they constitut- 
ed about 20 percent of its population. 

The harsh economic conditions began to change after the Turk- 
ish intervention of 1974 and the subsequent de facto partition of 
Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots formed their own "state" in 1975, 
and in 1983 declared the area they occupied in northern Cyprus 
to be the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"). 
Once they had their own contiguous territory and government, Turk- 
ish Cypriots began to work toward economic development. Their 
efforts were aided by significant financial and technical assistance 
from Turkey and an influx of workers from that country. Some of 
these workers came as settlers. Others were Turkish Cypriots who 
had left the island during the violent and uncertain 1963-74 period. 

The Turkish Cypriots had some success in fashioning a work- 
ing economy. The GDP of the "TRNC" nearly doubled in real 
terms between 1977 and 1990 (see table 17, Appendix). Accord- 
ing to Turkish Cypriot statistics, the GDP of the "TRNC" grew 
at an average annual rate of 6.4 percent between 1977 and 1988. 
The rate of growth was 7.5 percent in 1988 and 7.1 percent in 1989, 
and similar growth was expected in 1990. 

In addition to healthy growth rates, the economy was becoming 
more modern in structure. In 1989 industry's share of GDP was 
14 percent and surpassed for the first time agriculture's share of 
10.9 percent (see table 18, Appendix). Services represented near- 
ly half of GDP, although an unhealthy proportion of this share 
stemmed from government services and employment. 

Turkish Cypriots still lagged far behind Greek Cypriots econom- 
ically. For example, per capita income increased from US$586 in 
1974 to US$2,245 in 1989, but was only a third of the level achieved 
in the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots often contended that 
many of their economic difficulties stemmed from the Greek Cypriot 
effort to impose an economic blockade, cutting them off from the 
rest of the world except Turkey. There was another cause of difficul- 
ties: because the "TRNC" was recognized only by Turkey, most 
international economic assistance to Cyprus from international or- 
ganizations such as the World Bank (see Glossary) and the Euro- 
pean Community (EC — see Glossary) went to the Republic of 
Cyprus. In short, although the Turkish Cypriots had achieved a 
measure of political independence and economic success, by late 
1990 the "TRNC" still lacked the external recognition necessary 
for greater economic development. 

The State and Economic Development 

In the first years after the de facto partition of the island, the 


The Economy 

Turkish Cypriot community had sought by any means possible to 
establish a viable economy. Faced with the problem of creating an 
economy from a very small base, the government became the em- 
ployer of first resort. Numerous semipublic economic enterprises 
were set up with Turkish aid, and a functioning economy was put 
in place. The Cyprus Turkish Industrial Enterprises Holding Com- 
pany, the Cyprus Turkish Tourism Management Company, and 
the Cyprus Turkish Maritime Company were examples of these 
state- sponsored entities. They were nonprofit and service-oriented 
and staffed by state-appointed managers. State planners created 
them to meet economic needs the private sector was unable to 

The State Planning Organisation (SPO) was the agency respon- 
sible for planning. The SPO was subordinate to the prime minister, 
but its daily activities were conducted in cooperation with the Minis- 
try of Economy and Finance. The SPO helped establish long-term 
economic goals and coordinated the planning activities of minis- 
tries. The two main components of the SPO were the State Plan- 
ning Section and the Coordination, Executive, and Technical 
Assistance Section. 

The State Planning Section was responsible for preparing eco- 
nomic and social development plans. Such plans required research, 
analysis, and project evaluation. The section also monitored the 
implementation of plans and cooperated in preparing the govern- 
ment 's Annual Development Budget. 

The Coordination, Executive, and Technical Assistance Section 
prepared the Annual Development Budget and supervised its im- 
plementation. It also implemented development plans, provided 
technical data for the working committees of the National Assem- 
bly, and prepared requests for technical and economic assistance. 
In addition, the section published statistical reports on all sectors 
of the economy. 

The Turkish Cypriot economy was mixed, neither wholly state- 
managed, nor privately owned. Although the state economic en- 
terprises were significant actors, and the state set the overall direc- 
tion of the economy, the state did not generally interfere in the 
private sector beyond legislation that set wage rates and taxation. 
The state supported and encouraged the private sector through in- 
vestments in the national infrastructure and other measures. For 
example, it set up ' ' free economic zones" to attract foreign invest- 
ment. By the late 1980s, about fifty foreign investors had taken 
advantage of these zones' generous tax provisions. 

In the second half of the 1980s, however, the government changed 
its policy in response to persistent economic dependence on Turkey. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

In late 1986, the "TRNC" signed an economic agreement with 
Turkey, and in 1987 a development plan was formulated. Both 
the agreement and the plan aimed at transforming the Turkish 
Cypriot economy into one based on liberal economic doctrines. 
The long-term result, it was hoped, would be a stronger economy 
less dependent on Turkish aid and one that in time would become 

The movement toward a liberal, market-oriented economy was 
to be realized by making tourism the driving force. Tourism would 
pull the rest of the economy into growth and reduce the impor- 
tance of state-owned and state-managed enterprises. Turkey in- 
creased its aid, much of which went toward improving the 
infrastructure, and promised to guarantee all foreign investments 
in the "TRNC." The government offered tax concessions, long- 
term, low-cost leases, and reduced controls on transfers of foreign 
exchange. These and other measures were successful. Tourism's 
earnings tripled between 1986 and 1989. Manufacturing also in- 
creased its share of GDP, as did nongovernment services, and the 
size of the state sector and agriculture began to fall. The ratio of 
the public sector to the private sector in fixed capital investments 
gradually changed from two to one to the reverse. 

A key aim of the new liberal policies was to reduce the burden 
of a swollen government sector. Although some reduction was 
achieved, serious problems in this area remained at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Expenditures for wages and pensions, for example, 
made up two- thirds of the government's budget. Reforms of very 
generous pension plans for civil servants were needed, as was a 
streamlining of the government's cumbersome bureaucratic 

Chronic inflation was another problem that needed to be ad- 
dressed. Inflation rates ranged from lows of 33 percent in 1982 and 
1983, to a high of over 100 percent in 1979. The year 1988 saw 
a rate of 62 percent. The most serious cause of inflation was the 
use of the Turkish lira (TL; for value of the lira — see Glossary) 
as legal tender. This currency's persistently high inflation rate was 
imported into the "TRNC." There were from time to time dis- 
cussions of the desirability and practicality of the Turkish Cypri- 
ots' having their own currency, but as of 1990 no steps in this 
direction had been taken. Some inflation, however, was domestic 
in origin, stemming from excessive state spending. 

Although the government's share of GDP declined somewhat 
as the economy grew and modernized, at the beginning of the 1990s 
the "TRNC" still relied on Turkish aid. Turkey's aid to Turkish 
Cypriots in 1990, in both loans and grants, was expected to amount 


The Economy 

to TL140 billion (US$60.5 million), a sizeable increase over the 
TL88 billion provided in 1989. An indication of the increasing 
health of the Turkish Cypriot economy, however, was that in 1988, 
for the first time, local government revenues substantially exceed- 
ed Turkish aid. The figures for 1989 also reflected this change. 

A potentially serious problem for the Turkish Cypriot economy 
at the end of 1990 was the apparent collapse of the economic em- 
pire of Asil Nadir, the only major foreign investor in the ' 'TRNC . ' ' 
Nadir was a native-born Turkish Cypriot long resident in Lon- 
don. As chairman of a large multinational company, Polly Peck 
International, Nadir had taken advantage of the government's "free 
economic zone" policy and invested heavily in industry, citrus 
production, and tourism. He was surpassed only by the state as 
an employer in the "TRNC," with as many as 8,000 people, by 
some estimates, earning their livings from his varied enterprises. 
Late in 1990, however, Nadir's international empire suffered 
reverses and faced possible bankruptcy and liquidation. The long- 
term effects of Nadir's legal and financial difficulties on his invest- 
ments in the "TRNC" were not known, but the short-term ef- 
fects were painful. 

The Work Force and Labor Unions 

Nearly 70,000 Turkish Cypriots were economically active in 
1989. Unemployment was measured at about 1 percent. A short- 
age of skilled workers in some areas required the immigration of 
some foreign labor. According to government statistics, agricul- 
ture accounted for the largest share of employment, followed by 
government (see table 19, Appendix). These two branches of the 
economy accounted for just under half the work force. Some Turk- 
ish Cypriot economists have noted that both these sectors were rela- 
tively inefficient and contained some hidden unemployment. 
Agriculture's share of the work force had slowly declined during 
the 1980s, and government's share declined by a fraction. The 
shares of other sectors rose slowly as the economy modernized. 

Turkish Cypriots enjoyed a higher standard of living than citizens 
of Turkey. The minimum wage, for example, was higher than on 
the mainland. In addition, wages rose steadily. The chronic high 
inflation led the government to use a cost of living adjustment 
(COLA) mechanism that increased all wages every three months 
in step with inflation. This policy limited or prevented real reduc- 
tions in wages. In addition, annual merit raises were typical. 

As of 1986, the last year for which figures were available, one- 
third of the work force was unionized, a large proportion for a de- 
veloping country with a large agricultural sector. The establishment 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

of labor unions was free from government interference. Accord- 
ing to Articles 70 and 7 1 of the constitution and the Trade Unions 
Law, no prior permission from the state was necessary for the for- 
mation of trade unions. The only legal requirement was that a mini- 
mum of twenty persons should come together to establish a union. 
However, in cases in which the total number of persons active in 
a field was less than twenty, but more than three, a trade union 
could also be formed. 

In the second half of the 1980s, there were two main trade un- 
ion federations in the "TRNC." In addition, seventeen indepen- 
dent unions represented about one- third of the unionized workers. 
The oldest federation, the Turkish Cypriot Trade Union Federa- 
tion (Kibns Turk I§ci Sendikalan Federasyonu — TURK-SEN) was 
founded in 1954 and by the mid-1980s had about 9,300 members 
belonging to fifteen unions. This federation emphasized practical 
issues as opposed to ideology and was a member of the Interna- 
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Eu- 
ropean Trade Union Confederation. It also maintained close ties 
with the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Or- 
ganizations (AFL-CIO). TURK-SEN was closely affiliated with 
the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, from which it received 
financial and technical assistance to promote job unionism in the 
' 'TRNC." The other major labor organization was the Revolu- 
tionary Trade Unions' Federation (Devrimci I§ci Sendikalan 
Federasyonu— DEV-i§). Founded in 1976, DEV-i§ had about 
4,500 members in two unions in 1986. It was a member of the 
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and maintained close 
relations with similar foreign trade unions. A strong rival to TURK- 
SEN, DEV-I§ emphasized " ideological unionism" and propagated 
leftist political ideas. DEV-i§ operated freely in the "TRNC," 
although its sister union in Turkey was declared illegal after the 
1980 military coup (and as of 1990, despite the return to civilian 
rule in 1983 in Turkey, was still banned). To some observers, the 
freedom of DEV-I§ was a clear indication that politics in the 
"TRNC" was not controlled by Turkish authorities, despite the 
obvious economic and military dependence of Turkish Cypriots 
on the Turkish state. 

Primary Sector 

The primary sector of the Turkish Cypriot economy accounted 
for about one-tenth of the total GDP at the beginning of the 1990s, 
but its share was in decline, indicating that the economy was moder- 
nizing. Agriculture made up virtually all of the primary sector; 


The Economy 

fishing and forestry together accounted for less than 1 percent of 
Turkish Cypriot GDP in 1990. 


Although there was a sharp rise in the urban population in the 
1980s, the "TRNC" still had a significant rural element. Close 
to three-fourths of its land was used for farming or forestry, and 
almost a third of its work force was employed in this sector. Even 
in the second half of the 1980s, agricultural products made up well 
over half of all exports. The economy of the ' ' TRNC" was be- 
coming more developed, however, and by 1990 agriculture's share 
of GDP was only about 9 percent, half of its share in 1980. 

Turkish Cypriot farming became increasingly mechanized dur- 
ing the 1980s. At the end of the decade there were 4,500 tractors 
in the "TRNC," compared with 975 in 1975, and 220 combines. 
Modernization also brought extensive use of fertilizers, insecticides, 
and feeds. In some areas, however, where modern methods were 
not practical, traditional farming methods were still to be seen. 

The government attempted to ensure a steady rise in agricul- 
tural production by participating directly in this sector. It estab- 
lished the necessary infrastructure by carrying out irrigation 
projects, promoting land consolidation, and constructing farm 
roads. The state also oversaw broad research and education pro- 
grams to inform farmers of the latest agricultural methods. A quasi- 
governmental agency, Tanm Sigortasi, provided insurance against 
crop failures. In addition, the government helped farmers to or- 
ganize the marketing of their produce. Finally, the state provided 
agricultural credits and subsidies to farmers to help them improve 
their production and increase their incomes. 

Water Resources 

Despite government support of agriculture, the future of Turk- 
ish Cypriot farming was threatened by an insufficient supply of 
water. Rainfall, long inadequate, in the 1980s was more meager 
than usual. In addition to the problem of scarcity was the difficulty 
of providing an adequate supply of water throughout the year be- 
cause of the high costs of containment and distribution. Extreme- 
ly irregular river flow necessitated large storage capacities, the 
terrain required unusually high dams, and high erosion rates in 
the watersheds required extra storage space to allow for siltation 
of reservoirs. Cost factors deterred significant construction by the 
British administration until the 1950s, when a modest program was 
initiated. After independence was gained in 1960, construction of 
dams and supply systems accelerated. In the 1980s, the Republic 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

of Cyprus undertook extensive water development projects. These 
Greek Cypriot projects sometimes had unfavorable effects on Turk- 
ish Cypriots, because many of the projects trapped water in the 
Troodos Mountains, where most of the island's rainfall and snow 
fell, and prevented the flow of water downstream into the "TRNC." 

Turkish Cypriots sought to alleviate their water shortage by build- 
ing dams and a series of irrigation networks. In 1989 a dam was 
completed at Gecitkoy, at the western end of the Kyrenia Range, 
and seven more dams were under construction, with another dozen 
or so in the planning stage. As of the late 1980s, however, only 
about 5 percent of agricultural land was irrigable throughout the 
growing season. In 1976 Turkish Cypriots initiated a massive 
reforestation project in the Kyrenia Range in the hope of attract- 
ing more rainfall into this region. The success of all of these projects 
depended ultimately, however, on the level of rainfall, which 
declined during much of the 1980s. 

Land Use and Tenure 

At the end of the 1980s, the total area of the "TRNC" was mea- 
sured at 2,496,370 hectares. Of this area, 56.7 percent was agricul- 
tural land, 19.5 percent forest, 4.96 percent uncultivated, 10.68 
percent occupied by towns, villages, and roads, and 8.16 percent 
unusable. In 1975, of the agricultural land, 50 percent was culti- 
vated; by 1987, some 68.7 percent was cultivated. 

The ' ' TRNC" recognized three categories of land ownership: 
private, state, and communal. The greatest amount of land was 
privately owned. Unrestricted legal ownership of private land in 
Cyprus dated only from 1946, when the British administration 
enacted a new land law, the Immovable Property (Tenure, Regis- 
tration, and Valuation) Law, which superseded the land code in 
effect under the Ottomans. Under the Ottoman code, all land be- 
longed to the state, and those who worked the land were in effect 
hereditary tenants whose right to the land was usufructuary. Land 
could be transmitted from father to son, but could not otherwise 
be disposed of without official permission. The 1946 British law 
ended this tradition, stipulating that all state land properly acquired 
by individuals became their private property. Communal land re- 
mained as before, but all unoccupied and vacant land not lawfully 
held became the property of the state. As a result, virtually all forests 
become state property. 

The Muslim religious foundation Evkaf Idaresi (Turkish Reli- 
gious Trust, usually known as Evkaf) was the largest private own- 
er of property in the ' 'TRNC." Before the events of 1974, Evkaf 


The Economy 

owned 1 to 2 percent of the island's total farmland. These hold- 
ings dated back to Ottoman times and were mainly donations in 
perpetuity from members of the Turkish Cypriot community. Much 
of Evkafs land was located in parts of the island that remained 
under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. 

Agricultural Cooperatives 

The cooperative movement was established in Cyprus during 
the period of British rule to better the economic conditions of farmers 
and villagers. As of 1987, there were 257 active cooperative socie- 
ties in the "TRNC." Most villages and towns had cooperative 
credit unions that provided savings and loan services for members. 
Loans were made both in cash and in kind (items needed for farm- 
ing) to assist cooperative society members. One of the banks oper- 
ating in the "TRNC" was the cooperative societies' own bank, 
the Turkish Cypriot Cooperative Central Bank. The government 
oversaw the activities of the societies through the Office of the Regis- 
trar of Cooperative Societies. 


Crops made up about 70 percent of the primary sector's contri- 
bution to the GDP of the "TRNC." Animal husbandry supplied 
nearly all the rest, with fishing and forestry accounting for a very 
small share (less than 1 percent between them). As in the Repub- 
lic of Cyprus, agriculture in the "TRNC" was rainfed or irrigat- 
ed. Rainfed, or dryland, agriculture produced cereals, fodder, 
tobacco, olives, carobs, almonds, and wine grapes. Irrigated agricul- 
ture yielded citrus fruits, deciduous fruits, potatoes, vegetables, 
table grapes, and bananas. 

Cereal cultivation in the "TRNC" occupied one-third of all cul- 
tivated land. Barley production exceeded domestic consumption 
requirements, and the surplus was exported. Wheat production met 
two-thirds of domestic demand. Mechanized farming had signifi- 
cantly improved cereal production. In 1975 total cereal produc- 
tion stood at 59,913 tons. By 1987 production had nearly doubled, 
to 111,867 tons. 

Citrus fruits (oranges, lemons, and grapefruit) were by far the 
most valuable agricultural products. These fruits usually account- 
ed for at least two-thirds of the total agricultural exports of the 
"TRNC," and until the very end of the 1980s they were a more 
important export than manufactured goods. Citrus fruits were 
grown on irrigated land in areas with mild winter weather near 
Famagusta (Gazimagusa), Morphou (Giizelyurt), Lefka (Lefke), 
and Lapithos (Lapta). 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Other important tree crops were carobs and olives, frequently 
grown intermixed on hillsides and mountain slopes. Only a few 
of the 1.5 million olive trees in the "TRNC" were grown in groves. 
The carob tree, a member of the pulse family, is a native of the 
eastern Mediterranean whose seeds are used mainly for cattle fod- 
der. Most exports went to Britain. Deciduous tree crops common 
to temperate climates, including apples, pears, plums, apricots, 
pomegranates, and figs, were also grown in the "TRNC," but 
to a much lesser extent than in the Republic of Cyprus. 

Industrial crops included fibers (cotton, flax, and hemp), spices 
(cumin and aniseed), and tobacco. Tobacco grew in the northeast 
corner of the island. At the end of the 1980s, tobacco was not an 
important crop, but it did yield some exports. 

The diverse topography and climate of Cyprus permit the culti- 
vation of a great variety of other crops. An important crop was 
the potato. Two potato crops a year permitted substantial exports, 
mainly to Britain. In the second half of the 1980s, potatoes account- 
ed for about 5 percent of Turkish Cypriot exports. Potato farming 
developed during the post- 1974 years as a result of an improved 
irrigation system. Other vegetables and fruits grown included cab- 
bage, cauliflower, carrots, cucumbers, onions, squash, strawber- 
ries, tomatoes, artichokes, avocados, bananas, leeks, and okra. Most 
were grown not only for domestic consumption but also for ex- 
port. Vines occupied the largest area in the Karpas Peninsula, and 
some groves were also found in the Kyrenia (Girne) region. Some 
fresh grapes were exported. Because of water shortages, however, 
grape production fell to only about 100 tons a year in the late 1980s. 

Livestock and Poultry 

Livestock was an important part of Turkish Cypriot agriculture. 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the number of animals raised increased 
significandy. The number of catde increased 40 percent, from 8,600 
in 1975 to 12,038 in 1987, and the number of sheep rose from 
147,609 in 1975 to 185,238 in 1987. The goat population was 
reduced by 3.3 percent in this period because of the damage goats 
did to vegetation. During this same period, milk production in- 
creased by 50 percent, from 20,000 to 29,937 tons a year; meat 
production increased by 166 percent, from 1,891 to 5,320 tons; 
and poultry production increased by 265 percent, from 800 to 2,920 
tons. In 1985, 1986, and 1987, live animal exports to Arab coun- 
tries were an important Turkish Cypriot export. For example, 
government statistics indicated that 20,596 sheep and 11,104 goats, 
worth TL1 .6 billion, were exported to Arab countries in 1987. Live 



Cyprus: A Country Study 

animal exports fell in the next two years; it was not certain what 
future trends would be. 

A large and modern meat and poultry factory, financed by Tur- 
key, was built in the second half of the 1980s to meet long-term 
consumer needs for these products. Completed in 1989, with an 
annual processing capacity of 6,000 tons of sheep meat, 2,600 tons 
of cattle meat, 1 ,000 tons of goat meat, and 3,000 tons of poultry, 
the plant could also use bones, leather, and other substances for 
food and other purposes. Despite its sanitary advantages and highly 
economic production costs, the plant's opening was prevented by 
local agricultural interests. 

Forestry and Fishing 

The main forests of the "TRNC" were in the areas of Lapithos, 
Bellapais, Buffavento, Kantara, and Kartal — all located along the 
Kyrenia (Girne) Range. Forests located on the northern slopes of 
the Kyrenia Range were a mixture of pine and Mediterranean 
cypress. Forests on the southern slopes of the Kyrenia Range and 
in the Karpas Peninsula were mostly olive brush and tamarisk. Ce- 
dar and golden oak (both endemic to Cyprus), plane, and alder 
were also found in the ''TRNC," as were species of eucalyptus 
and acacia. The Muslim religious foundation Evkaf had some forest 
holdings, but most forests were state owned and managed by the 
Department of Forestry, under the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Natural Resources. One of the department's aims was reforesta- 
tion of the barren slopes of Pentadaktylos Mountain (Be§parmak 
Mountain) in the Kyrenia Range and other forest areas burned 
during fighting in 1974, estimated at forty-eight square kilome- 
ters of "TRNC" territory. Forestry provided some employment 
but was of almost no significance to the economy as a whole, ac- 
counting for only 0.1 percent of GDP in the late 1980s. 

The fishing industry met about 60 percent of domestic demand 
and was a significant source of employment in Boghaz (Bogaz) on 
the southern coast of the Karpas Peninsula and Kyrenia. Deep- 
sea fishing was done by trawlers. Most Turkish Cypriot fishermen, 
however, used small boats with fishing nets. Foreign vessels were 
not permitted to fish within the six-mile territorial limit of the 
"TRNC." In the late 1980s, fishing accounted for only about 0.6 
percent of GDP. 

Secondary Sector 

The secondary sector of the Turkish Cypriot economy, consist- 
ing of manufacturing, energy, mining, and construction, had shown 
strong growth since 1977. In 1977 the secondary sector made up 


The Economy 

13.8 percent of the "TRNC's" GDP, and by 1990, it had grown 
to 21 percent. In 1990 manufacturing was the sector's most im- 
portant branch, accounting for 12.3 percent of GDP; construction's 
share was 7.3 percent; mining's share was a negligible 0.3 percent; 
and energy-related activities accounted for 1.7 percent. 


Manufacturing showed steady progress after the late 1970s, and 
by 1990 was an important component of the Turkish Cypriot econ- 
omy. In 1989 it surpassed for the first time agriculture's contribu- 
tion to GDP. Only government services and trade were more 
important. Manufactured products were important exports. Their 
share of exports expanded rapidly in the 1980s, from 19 percent 
in 1981 to 45 percent in 1989. Manufacturing's share of employ- 
ment increased only slightly, however. 

Except for a cement factory at Boghaz, manufacturing in the 
"TRNC" consisted entirely of light industry. About 600 firms, 
mostly small and family-owned, were active at the end of the 1980s. 
Clothing and textiles were the most important products, and cloth- 
ing came to account for about 30 percent of exports in the late 1980s, 
exceeded only by citrus exports. A number of foreign companies 
were active in the clothing industry. Other manufactured products 
included footwear, leather goods, furniture, chemicals, paper, and 
some metal items. 

Energy Resources and Mining 

Turkish Cypriot manufacturing faced frequent power shortages 
because virtually all electricity consumed in the "TRNC" came 
from power plants in the Republic of Cyprus. Until the second 
half of the 1980s, the "TRNC" received electricity in exchange 
for water it supplied to the republic. By the late 1980s, however, 
the republic had made extensive investments in water management 
facilities and no longer needed water from the ' 'TRNC . " A result 
of this independence, Turkish Cypriots contended, was that the 
provision of electricity to them was frequently, even daily, inter- 
rupted for short periods beginning in the late 1980s. To counter 
the uncertain supply of electric power, Turkish Cypriots began con- 
structing an oil-fired power plant near Kyrenia. Financed by Tur- 
key, the plant was scheduled to go into production by 1993 with 
a capacity of 120 megawatts and an annual production of 750 mil- 
lion kilowatt-hours. Greek Cypriot opinion about the power plant 
was mixed. Its construction would mean that the Republic of 
Cyprus would no longer need to supply the "TRNC" with elec- 
tricity. The resulting energy independence of Turkish Cypriots 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

would, however, make them less susceptible to Greek Cypriot 

Like Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots were entirely dependent 
on imports for petroleum. All petroleum imports were in the form 
of finished products because the "TRNC" had no refineries. 

Mining was once quite important for the Cypriot economy, but 
by the late 1980s it represented only 0.3 percent of the GDP of 
the "TRNC." There was some mining in the area around Lefka, 
but about 90 percent of mineral deposits of value were in the Repub- 
lic of Cyprus. Minerals in the "TRNC" that could be exported 
included cuprous and iron pyrites, chrome iron ore, manganese 
ore, gypsum, earth colors, and lime. 


The construction industry was an important segment of the Turk- 
ish Cypriot economy and provided about 10 percent of employ- 
ment and about 7 percent of GDP in the late 1980s. Demand for 
housing, especially for the refugees displaced by the events of 1974, 
extensive work on the infrastructure, and a rapidly expanding 
tourist industry accounted for much of this activity. Government- 
financed housing programs for civil servants also helped maintain 
the construction industry. The cost of government- financed hous- 
ing of this kind was cheaper than in the private sector and permit- 
ted ordinary wage-earners to become homeowners. 

Tertiary Sector 

The tertiary, or service, sector of the Turkish Cypriot economy 
grew in importance during the 1980s as part of the economy's 
modernization. The greatest expansion was in trade and tourism; 
earnings from tourism tripled between 1986 and 1989. Financial, 
business, and personal services also grew more important to the 
economy in the 1980s. Government still accounted for too large 
a share of the Turkish Cypriot economy at the end of the 1980s, 
but its share was declining. A new development in the late 1980s 
was the founding of Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagus- 
ta. With an enrollment of 3,500 students (2,800 of whom were for- 
eign), it was a valuable new source of employment and foreign 
exchange, and an example of how the Turkish Cypriot service sector 
might grow in the future. 


The Central Bank of North Cyprus, the central bank of the 
"TRNC," was established by law in 1983 and began operation 
the next year. It performed the usual functions of a central bank, 


Famagusta (Gazimagusa) port 
Courtesy Office of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, " Washington 

but did not issue a national currency. The Turkish lira was used 
instead. Establishment of a separate "TRNC" currency was oc- 
casionally discussed, but concrete action for this purpose had not 
been undertaken as of 1990. Foreign exchange was traded freely 
in the "TRNC," with no restrictions on transactions. A free cur- 
rency exchange market was seen as part of a liberal economy. The 
government set interest rates as high as 40 percent for one-year 
deposits and 48 percent for some other deposits to prevent capital 
flight and shield deposits against the effects of chronic high inflation. 

The central bank monitored the activities of about a dozen Turk- 
ish Cypriot banks and the branches of several Turkish banks active 
in the "TRNC." By the late 1980s, the largest commercial bank 
was the Turk Bankasi, followed by the Cyprus Credit Bank and 
the Cyprus Commercial Bank. The cooperative movement's bank, 
the Turkish Cypriot Cooperative Central Bank, was important to 
cooperative members throughout the "TRNC." The Muslim re- 
ligious foundation Evkaf had its own bank, Kibns Vakiflar Bankasi, 
which managed the foundation's financial assets and the revenue 
accruing to it from its widespread and varied real estate holdings. 


According to government statistics, the Turkish Cypriot road 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

network in the mid-1980s consisted of 5,280 kilometers of paved 
and 800 kilometers of unpaved roads. In an effort to support farm- 
ing, the government constructed many service roads. The Depart- 
ment of Public Works was responsible for about 2,720 kilometers 
of paved roads, and the rest came under the jurisdiction of municipal 
administrations. After 1974, major highways were built between 
Nicosia and Morphou, Nicosia and Kyrenia, and Nicosia and Er- 
can Airport. Another highway to Gecitkale Airport was under con- 
sideration in the late 1980s. 

The two major international airports in the "TRNC," Ercan 
and Gecitkale, were both administered by the Department of Civil 
Aviation. Ercan Airport was equipped with navigational aids and 
equipment and was capable of handling all types of aircraft (in- 
cluding the DC- 10 and Airbus 300). About 120,000 passengers 
traveled through Ercan Airport each year. The national airline of 
the "TRNC," Turkish Cypriot Airlines, operated a small fleet of 
large, modern aircraft. 

The major ports of the "TRNC" were Famagusta, Kyrenia, 
and Kalecik, located on the southwestern coast of the Karpas Penin- 
sula. Famagusta was the main multipurpose port, capable of receiv- 
ing in its inner harbor vessels up to 131 meters in length and with 
a draft of up to 6.7 meters. Part of Famagusta's outer harbor was 
a free port. Famagusta's port was equipped with tugboats, mobile 
and floating cranes, forklifts, warehouses, and a quay-connected 
modern silo with a storage capacity of 20,000 tons. In 1975, 608 
ships sailed into the port. In 1987 this number increased to 1,042. 
The number of passengers increased from 65,403 to 91,986, and 
the total tonnage of goods entering the port from 72,755 to 290,736 

The port of Kalecik consisted of two privately owned sections. 
One was equipped with a conveyor belt for bulk and/or bagged 
cargo and a pier 42 meters in length. The other section was a tanker 
terminal with submerged pipelines. 

Kyrenia' s small port had a maximum depth of 3.2 meters and 
was used mainly as a yacht harbor. Newer facilities to the east of 
the old port served as loading docks for ferries between the island 
and Turkey. The new port's total quay length in the mid-1980s 
was 409 meters; the main quay was 150 meters long, with an aver- 
age depth of 8 meters. In 1987 more than 400 ships visited the port, 
bringing 37,000 passengers and 1,500 vehicles. 


Telephone, telex, fax, and telegraph communications between 
the "TRNC" and the outside world were carried out via fully 


The Economy 

automatic exchange services. All villages and towns were connect- 
ed to this system, and 40,000 households had telephones. Substantial 
assistance from Turkey financed the modernization of the telecom- 
munications system. A further modernization of this system, 
planned in the late 1980s, included the installation of a fully com- 
puterized digital exchange system with fiber optic lines. By early 
1990, some fiber optics were already in use. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, there were 75,000 television sets (color and black and 
white) in the "TRNC." The state Bayrak Radio and Television 
Corporation had eight radio and three television stations. 


Tourism was the most important source of foreign currency in 
the late 1980s, earning US$1 18 million in 1988 and US$126.8 mil- 
lion in 1989. The "TRNC" had direct air and sea links only to 
Turkey because this country alone recognized it as an indepen- 
dent nation. Despite this handicap, the number of foreign tourists 
from countries other than Turkey increased substantially in the 
late 1980s, as did the foreign exchange they brought with them. 

The number of tourists coming to the "TRNC" tripled during 
the 1980s, from 87,000 in 1981 to 310,000 in 1990. About 20 per- 
cent of the tourists were from countries other than Turkey. The 
number of tourist beds approximately doubled during the 1980s, 
to more than 7,000 by 1990. Tourism became a year-round busi- 
ness, with a professional staff trained at the Hotel and Catering 
Training Center at Kyrenia. This facility was under the Ministry 
of Tourism and Culture. A range of accommodations was availa- 
ble, from campsites to luxury hotels. Tourism was expected to con- 
tinue to grow in the 1990s. 

The expansion of tourism was especially noticeable in the late 
1980s. Earnings more than tripled between 1986 and 1989. This 
increase was a result of the government's decision in late 1986 to 
make tourism the locomotive that would pull the entire economy. 
To promote the tourism industry and attract foreign investment 
in it, the government introduced a number of incentives, includ- 
ing long-term, low-cost leases on government-owned land and build- 
ings, exemption of many goods serving tourism from import duties, 
and exemption or moderation of some taxes. 

Foreign Trade 

At the beginning of the 1990s, the "TRNC" traded with more 
than sixty countries around the world. Among these trading part- 
ners were members of the EC, countries of the Middle East, the 
United States, Japan, and numerous other countries in Africa and 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Asia. Lack of recognition of the "TRNC" and the economic and 
political blockade imposed by the Republic of Cyprus made it 
difficult for the "TRNC" to establish direct and regular sea and 
air links with countries other than Turkey. The blockade could be 
circumvented, however, by trading through international com- 

The Turkish Cypriot economy suffered from a chronic trade 
deficit. During the 1980s, imports often exceeded imports by mar- 
gins of three and four to one, and in some years, 1989 for exam- 
ple, the ratio was even worse (see table 20, Appendix). More than 
half the imports were of manufactured goods; the Turkish Cypri- 
ot economy had a small manufacturing sector. Foods, fuels, and 
chemicals accounted for most of the remaining imports. 

Turkey was by far the main source of imports (see table 2 1 , Ap- 
pendix). In the late 1980s, Turkey supplied roughly two-fifths of 
total imports. Countries of the EC supplied one- third, half of which 
came from Britain. The Far East was the source of most of the 

The most important customer for Turkish Cypriot goods in the 
late 1980s was Britain, which took about two-thirds notably citrus 
fruits and vegetables. The other EC countries bought a much 
smaller share, and Turkey accounted for 12 to 17 percent between 
1986 and 1989. The Middle East fluctuated widely in its share of 
Turkish Cypriot exports, buying 10.2 percent in 1986 and 3.6 per- 
cent in 1988. The Far East purchased virtually no Turkish Cypri- 
ot goods. 

The government attempted to stimulate trade by various 
means, including liberal tax concessions and the free exchange of 
foreign currency. The establishment of a free port and zone at 
Famagusta in late 1977 was another government initiative to boost 
foreign trade. To make business in the free port attractive to in- 
vestors, the government exempted income from activities there from 
corporate and income taxes. Imports into the free port and zone 
were also exempt from duties and tolls. Import duties elsewhere 
in the "TRNC" could be onerous. Furthermore, profits and cap- 
ital from the free port and zone could be repatriated without limit. 
In addition to these highly competitive concessions, the area's in- 
frastructure was suitable for all kinds of manufacturing, process- 
ing, and construction activities. 

* * * 

The Republic of Cyprus and its ministries, departments, and 
banks publish a variety of statistical reports that provide useful 


The Economy 

economic information, usually with a one- to two-year time lag. 
Particularly relevant are the Annual Reports of the Central Bank of 
Cyprus, the Economic Reports of the Department of Statistics and 
Research, Ministry of Finance; the Annual Reports of the Cyprus 
Telecommunications Authority and of the Cyprus Electricity 
Authority; and the special reports of the Cyprus Development Bank 
on issues such as "Consumption Expenditures in Cyprus" and 
"The Cyprus Economy." 

Other noteworthy reports and studies include reports from the 
International Trade Administration of the United States Depart- 
ment of Commerce (prepared by the American Embassy in Nico- 
sia), which summarize major economic trends, especially those 
pertinent to the United States economy. The Economist Intelli- 
gence Unit's Country Report: Lebanon, Cyprus and Country Profile: Leb- 
anon, Cyprus offer quarterly and annual analyses, respectively, of 
economic and political trends in Cyprus. A monograph by John 
Hudson and Marina Dymiotou-Jensen, Modelling a Developing Coun- 
try, gives, among other things, a brief and expert account of the 
government's planning process. 

The sources most readily available for those wishing to know 
more of the economy of the "TRNC" are published by Europa 
Publications Ltd. The Europe World Year Book and The Middle East 
and North Africa, for example, will provide much basic information. 
North Cyprus Almanack, published by K. Riistem and Brother in Lon- 
don, treats a number of aspects of the Turkish Cypriot economy. 
The State Planning Organisation of the "TRNC" publishes an- 
nual comprehensive economic statistics. These are available at 
"TRNC" offices around the world. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 


Artist's rendition of early map of Cyprus 

government have been sources of bitter controversy since indepen- 
dence in 1960, and have become the "national" question for both 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Politics in both communi- 
ties, governed separately since 1964 and physically separated since 
1974, have been dominated by the lack of consensus, both between 
and within the two communities, over the very identity of the state 
and the structure of its government and political institutions. 

The original political arrangements outlined in the 1960 consti- 
tution were in effect for only three years. By 1963, after proposals 
by President Archbishop Makarios III (1960-77) to amend the con- 
stitution in ways widely viewed as favoring the majority Greek 
Cypriot population, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from many na- 
tional institutions and began self-government in the Turkish quar- 
ters of the island's towns and cities and in Turkish Cypriot villages. 

A more significant change occurred after the 1974 Turkish in- 
tervention. Following the dislocation and resettlement of large seg- 
ments of both communities, the current situation emerged: two 
separate governments — only one of which enjoys international 
recognition as the legitimate government — functioning in two dis- 
crete geographic zones. In February 1975, the provisional Turk- 
ish Cypriot administration declared itself the "Turkish Federated 
State of Cyprus" ("TFSC"), although it stated its intention to move 
toward a federal solution with the Greek Cypriots and pledged not 
to seek recognition as an independent state. In October 1983, af- 
ter continued stalemate of United Nations (UN) efforts toward a 
settlement, Turkish Cypriots renamed their "state" the "Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"). While restating their 
commitment to working toward a federal solution, Turkish Cypriot 
authorities launched an international campaign for recognition of 
their state, arguing that recognition would facilitate a solution by 
according the island's two political entities equal status. As of the 
early 1990s, however, only Turkey had recognized the "TRNC." 

Greek Cypriots maintained that the Republic of Cyprus estab- 
lished in 1960 continued to exist, with functioning institutions, ab- 
sent Turkish Cypriot participation. The status of the 1959 treaties 
that established the republic in 1960 remained in dispute, posing 
a challenge to the Greek Cypriot claim of legal authority and 
sovereignty over the whole island (except for the 256 square kilo- 
meters that are sovereign British base areas). The Greek Cypriot 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

position on the legal status of the 1959 agreements is not completely 
clear. The late president Makarios attempted to invalidate the 
Treaty of Guarantee, and later Greek Cypriot leaders claimed it 
violated their sovereignty, but on occasion they have tried to in- 
voke it. For example, after the 1983 Turkish Cypriot declaration 
of statehood, the republic's president tried to persuade the British 
government to intervene under the terms of that treaty's Article IV. 

Since the 1974 crisis and the emergence of the Cyprus question 
as an international political problem, the Republic of Cyprus has 
had three presidents. Makarios, the dominant political and reli- 
gious figure for Greek Cypriots, died of a heart attack in the sum- 
mer of 1977 at age sixty-three. He was succeeded by Spyros 
Kyprianou, leader of the ruling Democratic Front, and Makari- 
os' s ecclesiastical responsibilities were assumed by Bishop Chry- 
sostomos of Paphos. Kyprianou was reelected unopposed in 
January 1978 and was reelected in contested elections in 1983. In 
February 1988, Kyprianou was ousted in an upset by newcomer 
George Vassiliou, a successful businessman with no party affilia- 
tion, who campaigned on a promise to bring fresh ideas and ener- 
gy to the settlement process. 

Leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community has remained since 
1974 in the hands of Rauf Denkta§, elected president of the "Turk- 
ish Federated State of Cyprus" ("TFSC") in July 1975 and re- 
elected in 1981. In 1985, under a new constitution in the newly 
formed "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"), 
Denkta§ again won at the polls, by a vote of 70.4 percent, and in 
April 1990 received 67.1 percent of the vote, defeating two op- 

The search for a settlement through creation of a new federal 
republic continued in the late 1980s and in 1990. Talks intensified 
after Vassiliou 's election, and the UN-sponsored negotiations be- 
tween Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1988-90 aimed at outlining 
a framework for establishing a federal republic that would be bi- 
communal with respect to constitutional issues and bizonal with 
respect to territorial concerns. Early optimism that Vassiliou would 
be the catalytic force to bring the talks to a successful conclusion 
was dampened when talks broke down in early 1990. Despite ten- 
tative progress on closing the gap between Greek Cypriot demands 
for freedom of movement, property, and settlement and the Turk- 
ish Cypriot demand for strict bizonality with considerable authority 
to the two provinces or states, the process was encumbered by deep 
mistrust between the two sides and a growing conviction that the 
Turkish Cypriot side was more inclined to work for its separate 
status than for power sharing in a unitary state with Greek Cypriots. 


Government and Politics 


The Republic of Cyprus was created in 1960 through interna- 
tional agreements reached in Zurich and London in February 1959, 
with a constitution that went into effect in August 1960. The con- 
stitution recognized the strong bicommunal character of the new 
state, with elaborate safeguards for the minority Turkish Cypriot 
community. In the preindependence debate over the governmen- 
tal structure of the new state, neither Britain nor the Turkish Cypri- 
ot community accepted the concept of " minority rights" as an 
organizing principle. Rather, the Turkish Cypriots were recognized 
as one of two "communities" with certain rights; the legitimacy 
of the state would derive from the partnership between the two com- 
munities. The Cypriot consociational experiment had some unique 
features designed to achieve a delicate balance between the prevail- 
ing Greek Cypriot preference for a unitary state and the Turkish 
Cypriot desire for as much recognition as a separate political enti- 
ty as possible. The tension between these two communal priorities 
proved insurmountable. 

Since 1964, the constitution of 1960 has not been the legal docu- 
ment governing relations between the two communities, although 
it remains the basis of government and law for the 80 percent of 
the population that are Greek Cypriot and residing in the two- thirds 
of the island controlled by the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus. 
The "TRNC" approved a new constitution in 1985, which estab- 
lished a parliamentary system in the north. 

1960 Constitution 

At independence, Cyprus' s constitution called for a government 
divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches, headed 
by a president, with strong guarantees for the Turkish Cypriot com- 
munity. The constitution arranged for a Greek Cypriot president 
and Turkish Cypriot vice president, elected by their respective com- 
munities for five-year terms of office. Members of the island's other 
minorities — Armenians, Maronites, and Roman Catholics — were 
given the option of joining one of the communities for voting pur- 
poses. All chose to be identified as Greek, although some have con- 
tinued to live in the Turkish zone since the 1974 division of the 
island. Greek and Turkish were designated as official languages, 
and the two communities were given the right to celebrate, respec- 
tively, Greek and Turkish national holidays. 

The constitution further provided that executive power in all but 
communal matters be vested in the president and vice president. 
The two executives had the right of veto, separately or jointiy, over 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

certain laws or decisions of both the Council of Ministers and the 
House of Representatives, the legislative body. The constitution 
spelled out in detail their powers and duties. 

The Council of Ministers was to be composed of seven Greek 
Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots, with the former appointed 
by the president and the latter by the vice president. Decisions of 
the council were to be taken by absolute majority. Of three key 
portfolios — defense, finance, and foreign affairs — one was to be 
held by a Turkish Cypriot. 

The unicameral House of Representatives was designed to legis- 
late for the republic in all matters except those expressly reserved 
to separate communal chambers. The constitution provided that 
thirty-five of its members be Greek Cypriots and fifteen Turkish 
Cypriots. (Representation in proportion to communal strength 
would have resulted in a forty-to-ten ratio.) Members, elected from 
separate communal rolls, were to serve for terms of five years. The 
president of the House of Representatives was to be a Greek Cypriot 
and its vice president, a Turkish Cypriot. 

Voting in the House of Representatives was to be by majority, 
except that separate majorities in the two communities were re- 
quired for imposition of taxes or duties, modification of the elec- 
toral law, or laws relating to the separate municipalities in the five 
main towns. The establishment of these municipalities became one 
of the most controversial intercommunal issues. Although the con- 
stitution called for their establishment, implementing legislation 
was never passed because the Greeks were convinced that such laws 
could lead to partition. Turkish Cypriots have long cited this issue 
as evidence of the Greek Cypriots' intention to undermine the Turk- 
ish Cypriots' separate communal identity. 

The constitution also called for the creation of two communal 
chambers, composed of representatives elected by each communi- 
ty. These chambers were empowered to deal with religious, educa- 
tional, and cultural matters, questions of personal status, and the 
supervision of cooperatives and credit societies. To supplement an 
annual provision to the chambers from the government budget, 
the constitution enabled the communal chambers to impose taxes 
and fees of their own to support their activities. 

The judicial system broadly outlined in the Zurich-London ac- 
cords and stipulated in detail in the constitution included the 
Supreme Constitutional Court, the High Court of Justice, district 
and assize courts, and communal courts. At the summit was the 
Supreme Constitutional Court, composed of three judges: a Greek 
Cypriot, a Turkish Cypriot, and a contracted judge from a neutral 
country who would serve as president of the court. The president, 


Government and Politics 

who was entitled to two votes, would serve for six years, while the 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges would serve until age 
sixty-eight. The court was to have final jurisdiction on matters of 
constitutional interpretation and adjudication of disputes center- 
ing on alleged discrimination in law against either of the two com- 

This bicommunal structure was duplicated in the High Court 
of Justice, which exercised appellate jurisdiction over lower courts 
in civil and criminal matters. The lower courts were assize courts, 
with criminal jurisdiction, and district courts, with civil jurisdic- 
tion except in questions of personal status and religious matters. 
Disputes between plaintiffs and the defendants belonging to the 
same community were to be tried by tribunals composed of judges 
belonging to the appropriate community. Disputes between members 
of different communities were to be tried by mixed tribunals whose 
compositions were to be determined by the High Court of Justice. 

Civil disputes relating to questions of personal status and reli- 
gious matters were to be tried in communal courts. These courts 
were rigidly limited in jurisdiction and could not impose restraint, 
detention, or imprisonment. 

The constitution set forth other safeguards for the Turkish Cypri- 
ot minority in sections dealing with the civil service and the armed 
forces of the republic. According to the 1960 census, Greek Cypriots 
composed 77 percent of the population, Turkish Cypriots 18.3 per- 
cent, and other minorities the remainder. The constitution required 
that the two groups be represented in the civil service at a ratio 
of 70 to 30 percent. In addition, the republic was to have an army 
of 2,000 members, 60 percent Greek Cypriot and 40 percent Turk- 
ish Cypriot. After an initial period, a 2,000-member security force 
consisting of police and gendarmerie was to be 70 percent Greek 
Cypriot and 30 percent Turkish Cypriot. 

The organizational structure and qualifications of the civil ser- 
vice were laid down on the model of the British civil service, with 
provisions for tenure, career status, and promotion through a grade- 
level system. The ten-member Public Service Commission de- 
termined the rules of conduct and qualifications for the various 

1963 Constitutional Breakdown 

The 1960 constitution did not succeed in providing the frame- 
work for a lasting compromise between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
Rather, its bicommunal features impeded administration and gave 
rise to continuing dissension, which culminated finally in armed 
violence between members of the two communities. Beginning in 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

late 1963, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government, and 
by 1965 the Greek Cypriots were in full charge. 

The constitution failed to allay the suspicion and distrust that 
had increasingly divided the two communities, especially since the 
eruption of intercommunal violence in 1958. Many Greek Cypriots 
viewed the Zurich- London agreements as imposed on Cyprus from 
outside and therefore illegitimate, Their main objection to the agree- 
ments, however, was that they barred the unification, or enosis, 
of Cyprus with Greece. Greek Cypriots also viewed the constitu- 
tional provisions drafted to safeguard minority rights as granting 
the Turkish Cypriots disproportionate privileges that the Turkish 
Cypriots abused. Therefore, some politically active elements of the 
Greek Cypriot community were motivated to undermine the con- 
stitution, or at least press for modifications. 

Turkish Cypriots, some of whom also would have preferred 
different arrangements than those contained in the independence 
documents, such as taksim, or partition, of the island and union 
of its two parts with the respective motherlands (so-called double 
enosis), nonetheless maintained that the separative provisions of 
the constitution were essential to their security and identity as a 
separate national community. 

A number of quarrels broke out over the balance of representa- 
tion of the two communities in the government and over foreign 
policy, taxation by communal chambers, and other matters. The 
disputes brought the government to a virtual standstill. The lead- 
ing cause of disagreements was the ratio of Greek Cypriots to Turk- 
ish Cypriots in the civil service. Turkish Cypriots complained that 
the seventy-to-thirty ratio was not enforced. Greek Cypriots felt 
that the provisions discriminated against them because they con- 
stituted almost 80 percent of the population. Another major point 
of contention concerned the composition of units under the sixty- 
to-forty ratio decreed for the Cypriot army. President Makarios 
favored complete integration; Vice President Fazil Kiiguk accepted 
a mixed force at the battalion level but insisted on segregated com- 
panies. On October 20, 1961, Kuciik used his constitutional veto 
power for the first and only time to halt the development of a fully 
integrated force. Makarios then stated that the country could not 
afford an army anyway. Planning and development of the nation- 
al army ceased, and paramilitary forces arose in each community. 

From the start, Greek Cypriots had been uneasy about the idea 
of separate municipalities, which Turkish Cypriots were determined 
to preserve. The Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber also failed 
to set up a communal court system, whereas Turkish Cypriot com- 
munal courts were established. 


Government and Politics 

Still another issue that provoked strong Greek Cypriot criticism 
was the right of the veto held by the Turkish Cypriot vice presi- 
dent and what amounted to final veto power held by the Turkish 
Cypriot representatives in the House of Representatives with respect 
to laws and decisions affecting the entire population. Turkish Cypriot 
representatives had exercised this veto power with respect to in- 
come tax legislation, seriously limiting government revenues. 

In late 1963, after three years' experience of unsteady self- 
government, Makarios declared that certain constitutional provi- 
sions ' 'threatened to paralyze the State machinery.'' Revisions were 
necessary, he said, to remove obstacles that prevented Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots from * ' cooperating in the spirit of understand- 
ing and friendship." On November 30, 1963, Makarios proposed 
thirteen amendments to be considered immediately by the leaders 
of the Turkish Cypriot community. 

These proposals, outlined in a presidential memorandum enti- 
tled ''Suggested Measures for Facilitating the Smooth Functioning 
of the State and for the Removal of Certain Causes of Intercom- 
munal Friction," reflected all the constitutional problems that had 
arisen. The president's action had far-reaching implications. Most 
important, it deeply eroded Turkish Cypriot confidence in the 
fragile power- sharing arrangement. The proposals also automati- 
cally involved Greece, Turkey, and Britain, which as signatories 
to the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance had pledged to guaran- 
tee the status quo under the constitution. 

The proposed amendments would have eliminated most of the 
special rights of Turkish Cypriots. For instance, they would have 
abolished many of the provisions for separate communal institu- 
tions, substituting an integrated state with limited guarantees for 
the minority community. The administration of justice was to be 
unified. Instead of having separate municipalities in the five larg- 
est towns, a provision originally called for in the constitution, munic- 
ipalities were to be unified. The veto powers of the president and 
vice president were to be abandoned, as were the provisions for 
separate parliamentary majorities in certain areas of legislation. 
Turkish Cypriot representation in the civil service was to be propor- 
tionate to the size of the community. By way of compensation, the 
Turkish Cypriot vice president was to be given the right to depu- 
tize for the Greek Cypriot president in case of his absence, and 
the vice president of the House of Representatives was to be act- 
ing president of the body during the temporary absence or inca- 
pacity of the president. 

Kuciik reportedly had agreed to consider these proposals. The 
Turkish government, however, rejected the entire list. In any case, 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

intercommunal fighting erupted in December 1963, and in March 
1964 the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of an 
international peace-keeping force to control the violence and act 
as a buffer between the two communities. 

1964-74 Situation: Separate Communal Life 

By the spring of 1964, the legislature was effectively a Greek 
Cypriot body. Turkish Cypriot representatives, like their counter- 
parts in the civil service, feared for their safety in the Greek- 
dominated parts of Nicosia and did not participate. 

Turkish Cypriots have argued that what they considered their 
involuntary nonparticipation rendered any acts of that parliament 
unconstitutional. Greek Cypriots have maintained that the insti- 
tutions continued to function under the constitution, despite Turk- 
ish Cypriot absence. 

In 1964 the Greek Cypriot-controlled House of Representatives 
passed a number of important pieces of legislation, including laws 
providing for the establishment of an armed force, the National 
Guard, and for the restoration to the government of its rights to 
impose an income tax. Other laws altered the government struc- 
ture and some of the bicommunal arrangements, including abolish- 
ing separate electoral rolls for Greek and Turkish Cypriots, 
abolishing the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber, and amal- 
gamating the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court 
of Justice into the Supreme Court. 

Reaction of the Turkish Cypriot judiciary to this judicial change 
was apparendy not unfavorable, since a Turkish Cypriot was named 
president of the Supreme Court. He assumed his post, and other 
Turkish Cypriot judges returned to the bench. For about two years, 
Turkish Cypriot judges participated in the revised court system, 
dealing with both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In June 1966, 
however, the Turkish Cypriot judges withdrew from the system, 
claiming harassment. The Turkish Cypriot leadership directed its 
community not to use the courts of the republic, to which, however, 
they continued to be legally entided, according to the Greek Cypri- 
ots. In turn, the Greek Cypriot government considered the judicial 
processes set up in the Turkish Cypriot community to be without 
legal foundation. 

The establishment of a separate Turkish Cypriot administration 
evolved in late 1967, in the wake of renewed intercommunal hostil- 
ities (see Intercommunal Violence, ch. 1). Turkish Cypriot leaders, 
on December 29, 1967, announced the formation of a "transitional 
administration" to oversee the affairs of the Turkish Cypriot com- 
munity "until such time as provisions of the 1960 constitution have 


Government and Politics 

been fully implemented." The administration was to be headed 
by Kiiciik as president and Rauf Denkta§ (the former president 
of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, who had been liv- 
ing in exile in Turkey) as vice president. 

The fifteen Turkish Cypriot former members of the republic's 
House of Representatives joined the members of the Turkish Cypri- 
ot Communal Chamber to constitute a Turkish Cypriot legisla- 
tive assembly. Nine of the members were to function as an executive 
council to carry out ministerial duties. President Makarios declared 
the administration illegal and its actions devoid of any legal effect. 

On February 25, 1968, Greek Cypriots reelected Makarios to 
office, in the first presidential election since 1960, by an overwhelm- 
ing majority. Running against a single opponent campaigning for 
enosis, Makarios won about 96 percent of the votes cast. 

Intercommunal talks for a solution to the constitutional crisis 
began on June 24, 1968, and reached a deadlock on September 
20, 1971. Talks resumed in July 1972, in the presence of UN Secre- 
tary General Kurt Waldheim and one constitutional adviser each 
from Greece and Turkey. Both sides realized that the basic arti- 
cles of the constitution, intended to balance the rights and interests 
of both communities, had become moot and that new constitutional 
arrangements had to be found. 

At the same time, extralegal political activities were proliferat- 
ing, some based on preindependence clandestine movements. The 
emergence of these groups, namely, the National Organization of 
Cypriot Fighters B (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston B — 
EOKA B) and its Turkish Cypriot response, the Turkish Resistance 
Organization (Turk Mukavemet Tesjrilati — TMT), was eroding 
the authority of conventional politicians. There were mounting calls 
for enosis from forces no longer supportive of Makarios, notably 
the National Guard, and there was a radical Turkish Cypriot reac- 
tion (see Conflict Within the Greek Cypriot Community, 1967-74, 
ch. 5). 

The 1974 Crisis and Division of the Island 

Pressures mounting within the Cypriot communities and within 
the military junta ruling Greece converged in the summer of 1974. 
Greek military officials, angered by Makarios' s independence from 
Greece and his policy of nonalignment, backed a coup d'etat by 
Greek Cypriot National Guard officers intent on enosis. The coup 
imposed Nicos Sampson as provisional president. 

The Turkish response was swift. On July 20, Turkish troops 
reached the island and established a beachhead in the north. A 
ceasefire was reached two days later, with the North Atiantic Treaty 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Organization (NATO) allies of Greece and Turkey working ur- 
gently to avoid an intra- alliance confrontation. Peace talks were 
hastily convened in Geneva, but those talks did not satisfy Turk- 
ish concerns. On August 14, the Turks began a second offensive 
that resulted in their control of over 36 percent of the island. The 
ceasefire lines achieved after the extension of Turkish control formed 
the basis for the buffer zone manned by the United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which has been in place 
since 1964 (see United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, 
ch. 5). 

The events of 1974 dramatically altered the internal balance of 
power between the two Cypriot communities and coupled their 
prevailing political and institutional separation with stark physi- 
cal and geographical separation. In a grim historical echo of the 
widely praised 1930 Greek-Turkish exchange-of-population agree- 
ments, roughly a third of each community, displaced by the war, 
was transferred to the side of the island that its community con- 
trolled. As a consequence, in 1990 nearly a third of the people of 
Cyprus lived outside their birthplaces or places of residence in 1974. 

Institutionally, Turkish Cypriots simply consolidated what had 
been a separate administration run out of Turkish Cypriot enclaves 
across the island into the northern third, made secure by Turkish 
troops. That presence altered the political life of the Turkish Cypri- 
ots, however. Many decisions affecting the life of the community 
had a security dimension, and the economy of the small entity has 
been dependent on Turkish subsidies and trade. Thus, the extent 
of the real autonomy of Turkish Cypriot authorities from their 
mainland protectors and benefactors was the subject of continued 
speculation and uncertainty. 

Search for a New Political Formula 

Clearly, the debate over government and politics on the island 
of Cyprus is more fundamental than in many other countries. The 
lack of consensus between the two major communities over how 
to govern and administer the island shapes daily life in each com- 
munity and dominates the island's relations with the outside world. 
At issue is whether the island should have one government or two, 
whether the two communities in fact constitute two distinct politi- 
cal entities and ' 'nations, ' ' and whether some form of cooperation 
and power sharing between the two communities is possible. 

After 1974, the debate over these issues resumed, mainly in a 
formal process under the auspices of the UN secretary general. Po- 
litical leaders in each community asserted that there was general 
agreement on how to proceed with the settlement negotiations, and 


The Archbishopric in Nicosia as it appeared 
after the violent summer of 1974 
The Archbishopric after its restoration, with a statue of Archbishop 
Markarios III, president of the Republic of Cyprus, 1960-77 
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

that both sides had minimum requirements that had to be recog- 
nized. These mainstream positions fell along a continuum from 
a concept of federalism, in which major powers and functions would 
be retained at the federal level and residual powers at the level of 
the province or state, to something more like confederalism, with 
emphasis placed on maximum authority in the constituent states 
and more symbolic power for the overarching apparatus. 

The interests of the two communities diverged over this range, 
with Greek Cypriots seeking to maximize prospects for functional 
reunification of the island and internal mobility of people and goods, 
and Turkish Cypriots arguing that separation of the communities 
and their authority best served their security interests. As a conse- 
quence, the two sides did not share the same sense of urgency about 
settlement. Greek Cypriots believed that time was not on their side, 
and that continued division of the island favored the separation 
preferred by Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots thus felt a greater 
sense of urgency than Turkish Cypriots, who were more satisfied 
with the status quo. 

At the same time, dissident voices, with litde political significance, 
argued for options other than the federal solution, including return- 
ing to preindependence proposals such as enosis, possibly with cer- 
tain rights provided to Turkey, or double enosis, in which the two 
parts of the divided island would become states or provinces of their 
respective motherlands. 

As of 1990, the governments of the Greek Cypriots and Turk- 
ish Cypriots and the world community had embraced the idea that 
settlement of the Cyprus question was possible through negotia- 
tions aiming to reestablish a single government, bizonal with respect 
to territory and bicommunal with respect to constitutional aspects. 
This process continued to dominate national life and political de- 
bate in both communities. 

Milestones in the United Nations Settlement Process 

In the immediate aftermath of the 1974 crisis, acting Greek 
Cypriot president Glafkos Clerides met with Rauf Denkta§ in Sep- 
tember. These intercommunal talks were initially limited to hu- 
manitarian issues, such as the exchange of population between the 
two sides of the island. Later, at the urging of the United States, 
the two men, with Clerides the intercommunal negotiator in a re- 
stored Makarios government, resumed a substantive agenda and 
met in Vienna in January 1975. They both declared their support 
for the principle of an independent, nonaligned, and demilitarized 
Cyprus. Beyond these broad concepts, however, there were seri- 
ous differences over the form of government, the size of the area 


Government and Politics 

to be retained by Turkish Cypriots, the return of refugees and com- 
pensation for property losses, and the timing of the withdrawal of 
Turkish troops. 

By February 1976, the two sides, according to statements, had 
discussed territorial and constitutional issues and had agreed to ex- 
change written proposals before May. Before the May meeting, 
however, difficulties arose within the Greek Cypriot camp, der- 
ides resigned as negotiator because of differences of view with 
Makarios and allegations that he was willing to accept a bizonal 
federation, an idea that Makarios opposed at the time. 

Makarios appointed Tassos Papadopoulos, deputy president of 
the House of Representatives, to replace Clerides. Denkta§, who 
declined to deal face to face with Papadopoulos because he had been 
an active member of the EOKA, appointed Umit Suleyman Onan 
to serve as negotiator. 

1977 Makarios -Denktas Accords 

After intensive efforts by Waldheim, Makarios and Denkta§ met 
on January 27, 1977, the first meeting between the two men since 
the Turkish Cypriots had withdrawn from the government of the 
republic in 1964. By then Makarios was leaning toward negotia- 
tion on the basis of a bizonal federation, provided that there be 
some Turkish Cypriot territorial concessions. He continued to in- 
sist on a strong central government and freedom of movement for 
all Cypriots. He demanded 80 percent of the territory, proportionate 
to the size of the Greek Cypriot population, but indicated that he 
might accept 75 percent if it included Varosha, the formerly prosper- 
ous tourist area of Famagusta to which 35,000 Greek Cypriots want- 
ed to return. Denktas. apparently indicated readiness to consider 
about 68 percent. 

On February 12, 1977, the two men met and agreed on four 
guidelines. The first was that Cyprus would be an independent, 
nonaligned, bicommunal federal republic. Second, the territory un- 
der the administration of each community was to be discussed in 
light of economic viability, productivity, and property rights. Third, 
questions of principle such as freedom of movement and setdement, 
rights of ownership, and certain special matters were to be open 
for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental decision 
for a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties. 
Finally, the powers and functions of a central government would 
be such as to safeguard the unity of the country. 

This achievement raised hopes among Cyprus 's foreign friends 
that a setdement could be reached. These hopes were dashed 
when President Makarios, the central figure in the Greek Cypriot 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

community, died of a heart attack in August 1977. Spyros Kypri- 
anou, his successor, pledged to adhere to positions he believed 
Makarios would have taken. 

Over time, it became clear that Kyprianou enjoyed less politi- 
cal room to maneuver than his predecessor, partly because of the 
growing political strength of the refugees and displaced persons. 
Kyprianou found in this group a ready-made constituency, and 
he embraced their advocacy of their right to return to homes and 
property and their call for a permeable border and unimpeded free 
movement and unrestricted settlement. This position sharpened 
differences with the Turkish Cypriot advocacy of a tightly controlled 
border and guarantees that the ethnic balance established by the 
de facto partition would remain undisturbed. 

In April 1978, a new set of Turkish Cypriot proposals was made 
public, but was quickly rejected by the Greek Cypriot negotiator, 
Papadopoulos, who objected to both the constitutional and the ter- 
ritorial aspects of the proposals. Kyprianou dismissed Papadopoulos 
in June over disagreements. 

Later in 1978, external powers tried their hand at a Cyprus 
proposal. President Jimmy Carter had convinced a slim majority 
in the United States Congress to lift the arms embargo imposed 
against Turkey because of its intervention on Cyprus; Carter 
pledged to renew diplomatic efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. 
The United States then worked with Britain and Canada to launch 
a new settlement plan. The twelve-point plan (often called the ABC 
plan because of its American, British, and Canadian sponsorship) 
proposed a biregional, independent federal republic. The state's 
constitutional structure would conform to the Makarios-Denkta§ 
guidelines of February 1977, as well as to pertinent clauses of the 
1960 constitution. There would be two constituent regions. The 
federal government would be responsible for foreign affairs, defense, 
currency and central banking, trade, communications, federal 
finance, customs, immigration and emigration, and civil aviation. 
Residual functions would rest with the two regions. A bicameral 
legislature would be established, with the upper chamber evenly 
divided between the two communities and the lower one divided 
on a population-ratio basis. The Council of Ministers would be 
jointly selected by the president and vice president, one of whom 
would be a Greek Cypriot and the other a Turkish Cypriot. On 
territorial issues, the plan envisioned significant Turkish Cypriot 
geographic concessions, although the size and locale of the two 
regions would take into account factors such as economic viability, 
security, population distribution, and history. The plan addressed 
the refugee issue and called for essentially a demilitarized republic 


Government and Politics 

and withdrawal of all foreign forces except for an agreed-upon con- 

The Republic of Cyprus government objected to many points in 
the plan, largely because it preempted various positions of the two 
sides. The Greek Cypriot foreign minister said he would have 
preferred an agenda that did not go into so much detail. Other 
Greek Cypriot forces, including the church and some political par- 
ties, also opposed the plan. In the Greek community, only Glafkos 
Clerides urged its acceptance as a basis for talks. Turkish Cypri- 
ots also formally rejected the plan as an overall settlement package. 

However, the ABC plan stimulated further efforts toward a set- 
tlement. The UN Security Council acted quickly to resume inter- 
communal talks, on the basis of an agenda that combined the 
Makarios-Denkta§ guidelines with some aspects of the allied plan. 

Two other effects of the American initiative should be noted. 
The plan was the last American-drafted proposal for Cyprus and 
convinced some in the Western policy community that even a fair- 
minded effort had little chance of winning Cypriot acceptance. Sec- 
ond, it reinforced Cypriot anxiety about having solutions imposed 
from outside. By the early 1990s, many features of the initiative 
remained part of the UN-brokered negotiating effort, but Cypriots 
remained committed to writing their own plan. 

1979 Kyprianou-Denkta§ Communique 

In early 1979, President Kyprianou was persuaded by his polit- 
ical advisers to resume talks with Denkta§, and Javier Perez de Cue- 
llar, then undersecretary general of the UN, called the two to a 
meeting in Nicosia in June. The two intercommunal negotiators, 
Minister to the President George Ioannides for the Greek Cypri- 
ots and Umit Suleyman Onan for the Turkish Cypriots, pursued 
talks aiming at a communique stating the broad agenda for fur- 
ther talks. This process stalled temporarily when Greek Cypriots 
sought to give the Varosha issue priority above all other issues. 
On May 18 and 19, the two leaders held a second summit that 
led to the successful conclusion of a ten-point agreement that called 
for a resumption of talks on all territorial and constitutional issues; 
placed priority on reaching agreement on the resettlement of 
Varosha; stated the commitment of the parties to abstain from ac- 
tions that could jeopardize the talks; and envisaged the demilitari- 
zation of Cyprus. The agreement also repeated past statements 
about guarantees against union with any other country, partition, 
or secession. The ten points were largely a tactical means to se- 
cure further negotiations and did not resolve any substantive issues. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

One more meeting was held in June 1979, but the talks were then 
suspended until August 1980. 

The UN-established common ground on which the talks resumed 
was a four-part agenda addressing, on a rotating basis, the reset- 
tlement of Varosha under UN auspices, initial practical measures 
to promote good will, constitutional issues, and territorial issues. 
The talks, conducted in Cyprus under the chairmanship of the UN 
secretary general's Special Representative on Cyprus, Ambassador 
Hugo Gobbi, continued without a major breakthrough and were 
temporarily suspended for the spring 1981 parliamentary elections 
on both sides of the island. In August and October 1981, the two 
sides made substantive presentations, which were welcomed as signs 
of commitment to compromise, but which also revealed the seri- 
ous gap in the two sides' concepts of a solution. 

The Turkish Cypriot proposal, submitted in August 1981 , named 
four fundamental principles: a bicommunal and bizonal federal 
republic shall be established, but the two federated states will not 
form a unitary state; the Turkish Cypriot community will be regard- 
ed as an equal cofounder with the Greek Cypriot community, and 
all government institutions will be staffed on a fifty-fifty ratio; the 
federal or central government will not be so strong as to imperil 
the independence of its component states; and the three freedoms 
of movement, property, and settlement will be restricted as set out 
by the 1977 guidelines. The proposal identified as ' 'federal mat- 
ters" six functions, including foreign affairs; foreign financial af- 
fairs; tourism and information; posts and telecommunications; 
federal health and veterinarian services; and standards of weights 
and measures, patents, copyrights, and trademarks. The Turkish 
Cypriots also submitted two maps, one defining a proposed bound- 
ary line between the two federated states and one focused on 
Varosha in particular. The Turkish Cypriot proposal treated the 
federal concept narrowly, limiting federal authority. 

The Greek Cypriots submitted their proposal on October 1 , 1981 . 
It contrasted sharply with the Turkish Cypriot proposal, with a 
heavy emphasis on the unity of the island and the powers of the 
federal republic. The plan's six principles included the indivisibil- 
ity of the territory of the federal republic; the federal republic as 
sole subject of international law, to the exclusion of the provinces; 
and the use of the federal legislative and executive powers to en- 
sure Cyprus 's economic reintegration. The Turkish Cypriots con- 
sidered this proposal merely an elaboration of a 1977 Greek Cypriot 

Despite the failure to make headway on the core political issues, 
this phase had one notable achievement: the agreement on terms 


Government and Politics 

of reference for a Committee on Missing Persons, consisting of 
representatives of the two communities and an international par- 
ticipant designated by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross. The committee's first meeting was held on July 14, 1981. 
The committee met sporadically throughout the 1980s, and new 
proposals to invigorate its work were discussed in early 1990. The 
work of the committee was hampered by sensitivity about exchanges 
of dossiers and information. Sensitive areas included security mat- 
ters and religious questions, such as whether graves should be dis- 

By late 1981 , UN officials and other supporters of the setdement 
process had concluded that the talks needed new stimulus. Secre- 
tary General Waldheim issued an evaluation of the negotiations 
in November, in what he called a "determined effort to lend struc- 
ture and substance" to the negotiating process. The evaluation iden- 
tified major points of "coincidence and equidistance" in the 
positions held by the two sides and proposed that the contemplat- 
ed republic's executive authority be exercised by a federal council 
having six ministerial functions, corresponding roughly to the nar- 
row Turkish Cypriot concept. Waldheim also suggested a bicameral 
legislature, provincial chambers, and a territorial compromise in 
which the Greek Cypriot side would administer at least 70 percent 
of the island. 

The setdement process in the early 1980s was affected by the 
need for President Kyprianou to establish his credibility and demon- 
strate his loyalty to the national cause after the death of the charis- 
matic Makarios. To many observers, it appeared that Kyprianou 
had less room for maneuver and was less inclined, by political 
preference or capability, to put forth new strategic positions. The 
election of a socialist government in Athens in October 1981 may 
also have affected the attitudes of the parties; Greek Cypriots wel- 
comed Greek prime minister Andreas Papandreou's desire to "in- 
ternationalize" the Cyprus problem, which effectively gave Greek 
Cypriots some breathing room in the intercommunal process. 
Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot leaders were developing new for- 
mulas and concepts of their own and generally disapproved of ef- 
forts to internationalize the issue. 

On November 15, 1983, after months of speculation, Rauf Denk- 
ta§ declared Turkish Cypriot statehood, on the basis of the universal 
right to self-determination. His proclamation, which cited the Unit- 
ed States Declaration of Independence, declared the establishment 
of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"). The 
move was not intended to block progress toward creating a federal 
republic, Denkta§ said. Rather, the assertion of the political identity 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

and equality of the Turkish Cypriots would, in his view, enhance 
prospects for a new relationship between the two sides of the is- 
land. He also pledged that the new state would not join any other 
state, meaning Turkey. 

The move was widely condemned by Western powers and the 
UN. The secretary general considered the declaration contrary to 
past Security Council resolutions and at odds with the high-level 
agreements of 1977 and 1979. The United States urged nonrecog- 
nition of the entity and voted for a nearly unanimous Security Coun- 
cil resolution (541) that called for reversal of the declaration. (Jordan 
voted no; Pakistan abstained.) 

1984 Proximity Talks 

The statehood declaration did not end the negotiation process. 
In August 1984, the two sides met UN Secretary General Perez 
de Cuellar in Vienna. They agreed to proximity talks, that is, talks 
in which the parties do not meet direcdy, but communicate through 
an intermediary. These talks began in New York in September. 
After three months, Perez de Cuellar determined that the differ- 
ences between the two sides had narrowed enough to allow for a 
direct summit between the two leaders. That meeting took place 
in New York on January 17, 1985. 

The 1985 summit was in some ways a watershed in Cypriot set- 
dement efforts because it altered, at least temporarily, external ob- 
servers' perceptions of the sources of the stalemate, and because 
it represented the beginning of a phase of settlement efforts. But 
that phase would come to an end in early 1990. 

1985-86 Draft Framework Exercise 

At the January 1985 summit, UN officials presented a draft frame- 
work agreement for the establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal fed- 
eral republic. The parties, according to many accounts, had been 
briefed on its contents but not directly involved in its drafting. Denk- 
ta§ indicated his willingness to sign the draft, on the understand- 
ing that details would be worked out in separate talks. However, 
Kyprianou declined to sign, saying he considered the draft a basis 
for negotiations but that such a commitment was premature. 

The collapse of the summit redounded to Turkish Cypriot favor, 
in the reactions of the news media and Cyprus' s Western friends. 
By 1990, however, Turkish Cypriots referred to the 1985 summit 
as a regrettable Turkish Cypriot acquiescence to external pressure, 
from Turkey and the United States in particular. 

The UN worked intensively with the two parties after the sum- 
mit, on the assumption that a tactical misstep need not undermine 


Government and Politics 

the considerable achievement of drafting an oudine reflecting broad 
areas of agreement. Yet UN efforts in the months that followed 
showed the near- impossibility of bridging the gaps; drafts proved 
acceptable to one side or the other, but never both. In April 1985, 
a draft framework agreement won acceptance by Greek Cypriots 
and was rejected by the Turkish Gypriot side. After extensive con- 
sultations, a new draft was promulgated; it was embraced by the 
Turkish Cypriots and rejected by the Greek Cypriots. 

1988-90 Vassiliou-Denktas Meetings 

The politics of the settlement process appeared to change sig- 
nificantly when Greek Cypriots elected George Vassiliou president 
in February 1988. Vassiliou was a successful businessman with no 
important political party base (although his parents were found- 
ing members of the island's communist party, the Progressive Party 
of the Working People (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou 
Laou — AKEL). He campaigned on a pledge to solve the Cyprus 
problem with new vigor and creativity. His upset victory over 
Spyros Kyprianou seemed to indicate popular support for a new 
approach and for more rapid progress on a settlement. The UN 
and Cyprus 's Western partners welcomed Vassiliou 's election and 
his statements about the settlement process. 

The UN arranged for informal meetings between Vassiliou and 
Denkta§ at the Nicosia home of the UN special representative, Oscar 
Camillion. The first round of these meetings took place between 
August and November 1988. A second round occurred between 
December 1988 and April 1989, but the talks faltered when the 
two sides began submitting papers and drafts that began to dominate 
the discussions. These two rounds raised new concerns that the 
UN had lost control of the process, and that reaching agreement 
on a fixed agenda or schedule might prove difficult. 

In May 1989, a more formal process began, after Secretary 
General Perez de Cuellar assigned his two aides, Camillion and 
Gustave Feissel, to meet separately and jointly with the parties to 
draft an outline, which could be based on an "ideas paper" that 
the UN had circulated on a noncommittal basis to the parties. This 
third round was stalled for the second half of 1989, over procedural 
and substantive difficulties, with the Turkish Cypriots' objecting 
to the "ideas paper. ' ' The parties met in New York with the secre- 
tary general to report on their progress in February and March 

The secretary general reported that the gap between the two sides 
remained wide and that he was not convinced there was an agreed- 
upon basis on which to proceed. He turned to the Security Council 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

for clarification of his "good offices" mission; clarification was given 
in Resolution 649, which was passed unanimously on March 13. 

The two sides separately indicated satisfaction with the UN reso- 
lution. Greek Cypriots emphasized the active role proposed for the 
UN, including the right to make suggestions, and Turkish Cypriots 
were pleased with the resolution's references to the separate status 
of the two communities and to bizonality as an enshrined princi- 
ple in a prospective settlement. 

This eighteen-month round of setdement efforts had begun hope- 
fully. A period of creative tension and groping to create new un- 
derstandings occurred in mid- 1989, when Vassiliou and his advisers 
privately and informally offered important concessions to the Turk- 
ish Cypriot side. That is, none of the Greek Cypriot proposals or 
suggestions were binding or formally entrenched in official docu- 
ments, but were offered discreedy as the basis for discussion. These 
concessions included a willingness to phase in the three freedoms, 
beginning with freedom of movement and holding freedom of set- 
tlement and property in abeyance. New thinking and flexibility 
on the territorial issue were displayed, with a range of options 
presented to the Turkish Cypriot side. The options included a 
smaller but nearly exclusively Turkish Cypriot zone as a substi- 
tute for various larger but more demographically mixed zones. 
Greek Cypriots tried to link the size of the territorial swap with 
the degree of communal purity. They were more flexible than in 
the past on the issue of the presidency, offering alternatives such 
as rotating the position between the two communities or having 
joint elections, with Turkish Cypriot votes weighted. Turkish Cypri- 
ots found themselves challenged by a more flexible interlocutor and 
reacted with caution, expressing new legal reservations about the 
proposals. At that point, between October 1989 and February 1990, 
the Greek Cypriot side seemed to withdraw some of its new ideas, 
and the president found his freedom of maneuver limited by new 
domestic resistance to further concessions. 

When the talks collapsed in early 1990, both sides appeared to 
be turning away from the UN process. The two governments 
seemed able to withstand domestic criticism of the talks; opposi- 
tion complaints on both sides appeared to focus on tactics and did 
not challenge the fundamental government positions. Both lead- 
ers appeared to be preparing to defend their positions to outside 
patrons and partners. Greek Cypriots mounted a renewed effort 
to win international support for their position and stressed the need 
for international pressure on Turkey if they were to win conces- 
sions from the Turkish Cypriots. For Turkish Cypriots, the end 
of the talks heralded a period of active domestic politics. A push 


Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas (left) and Republic of Cyprus 
President George Vassiliou (right) meeting at the intercommunal 
talks sponsored by the United Nations 
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

for new diplomatic recognition of the "TRNC" was under con- 
sideration (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). 

Prospects for Creation of a Federal Republic of Cyprus 

The second half of 1990 saw little action in Cyprus settlement 
efforts, in large measure because of the Iraq- Kuwait crisis and the 
demands it placed on the UN and on much of the world commu- 
nity. Some in Cyprus found parallels between the Gulf situation 
and Cyprus and hoped that the resolution of the Gulf crisis would 
renew international interest in a Cyprus setdement. Greek Cypri- 
ots saw in the world condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 
possible new interest in pressing for removal of Turkish troops from 
Cyprus and in using UN resolutions more effectively to resolve 
outstanding disputes. Greek Cypriots also saw the continued with- 
drawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe as further impetus 
to bring Cyprus into conformity with these regional and world 
trends. At the same time, Turkey's pivotal role in the Gulf crisis, 
including its decision to close Iraq's oil pipeline and its importance as 
a staging area for Kurdish refugee relief, appeared to deepen some 
Western countries' support for Turkey, and the prospect for 
new pressures on Turkey were uncertain. Turkish President Turgut 
Ozal did cite willingness to work on Cyprus among the features of 
a dynamic Turkish foreign policy he envisioned in the post-Gulf 
crisis period. 

At the end of 1990, the two sides had not disavowed their interest 
in UN efforts and were aware of Perez de Cuellar's strong personal 
interest in seeing progress on Cyprus before his retirement as secre- 
tary general in late 1991 . Although no formal meetings between the 
two Cypriot leaders occurred, there was a slight increase in ministerial 
and nongovernment contacts between the two communities, which 
many considered helpful to confidence building. Continued work 
by the United States Special Cyprus Coordinator, Nelson Ledsky, 
and by UN officials kept the two communities engaged in thinking 
about setdement prospects, with the expectation that 1991 would 
be a more active year. 

Politics in the Republic of Cyprus 

Political Institutions 

In 1990 the Republic of Cyprus operated under the terms of the 
1960 constitution as amended in 1964. It consisted of three indepen- 
dent branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The republic's 
president, George Vassiliou, was head of state and presided over 
a council of eleven ministers. 


Government and Politics 

Presidential authority remained as outlined in the constitution. 
Cabinet portfolios included agriculture and natural resources, com- 
merce and industry, communications and works, defense, educa- 
tion, finance, foreign affairs, health, interior, justice, and labor 
and social insurance. Policy making was in the hands of adminis- 
trative directors who were appointed civil servants with lifelong 
tenure. In an effort to make government more of a meritocracy, 
Vassiliou reassigned a number of ministerial directors to other po- 
sitions but encountered resistance from the parties when he tried 
to replace some of these directors. 

The legislative body, the House of Representatives, consisted 
of fifty- six Greek Cypriot members, with twenty-four seats held 
for Turkish Cypriots, who had not recognized or participated in 
the republic's legislative life since the constitutional amendments 
of 1964. Originally a chamber of fifty, with thirty-five Greek Cypri- 
ots and fifteen Turkish Cypriots, the House of Representatives was 
enlarged in 1985. 

The republic's judicial branch largely followed the original struc- 
ture outlined at independence. The 1964 amalgamation of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice into 
the Supreme Court, combining the functions of the two former 
courts and eliminating the neutral judge, also led to the establish- 
ment of the Supreme Council of Judicature. Assigned the judica- 
tory functions of the former high court, it was composed of the 
attorney general of the republic, the president and two judges of 
the Supreme Court, the senior president of a district court, a senior 
district judge, and a practicing advocate elected every six months 
by a general meeting of the Cyprus Bar Association. 

As a result of the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriot public servants 
from the government, the Public Service Commission could not 
function as provided for in the constitution. Therefore, the Public 
Service Law of 1967 established a new commission to exercise the 
same functions. Its five members were appointed by the president. 
President Vassiliou 's effort to replace the incumbents with mem- 
bers of his choice was thwarted when the parliament would not 
provide funding to complete the contracts of the replaced members. 

At the district level, a district officer coordinated village and 
government activities and had the right to inspect local village coun- 
cils. The mayors and councils for municipalities were appointed. 

At the village level, there had been since Ottoman times coun- 
cils, each composed of a village head (mukhtar) and elders (aza\ pi. , 
azades). Large villages that prior to 1974 had had sizable mixed 
populations had separate councils, one for each community. Un- 
der the Ottoman Empire, the village head and elders were elected 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

by the villagers. In the British period and after independence, the 
village heads were appointed by the government and then chose 
the elders. New legislation in 1979 provided that village and town 
government officials should be elected rather than appointed, and 
beginning in 1979 elections for village councils and their presidents 
have occurred every five years. The cycle for municipal elections 
was different: elections were held every five years, most recently 
in 1986. These election results generally followed the national pat- 
tern in terms of the relative shares won by each of the parties. In 
some cases, however, parties were able to cooperate at the village 
level although competing nationally. 

Political Parties 

In the early postindependence period, Greek Cypriot political 
party life centered around a loose coalition of Makarios support- 
ers called the Patriotic Front, plus the communist party, AKEL. 
The front dissolved in the late 1960s; its major factions broke into 
discrete parties. The House of Representatives afterwards main- 
tained a fairly stable balance among four parties that ranged from 
a communist party to one that was right of center. Each of these 
parties generally received at least 9 percent of the vote, more than 
the 5 percent being the minimum required to win seats in the legis- 
lature (see table 3, Appendix). 

Three of the four parties so divided the vote that none ever won 
a clear majority. The Republic of Cyprus has a modified propor- 
tional representation system. There were occasional proposals for 
a simple proportional system, and the electoral law has been modi- 
fied five times in the 1980s. 

As of 1990, the Democratic Rally (Dimokratikos Synagermos — 
DISY) was the largest parliamentary party. Created in 1976 and 
led by Glafkos Clerides, it evolved from the Unified Democratic 
Party (Eniaion), which was one of the factions that emerged from 
the Democratic Front in the 1970 parliamentary elections. DISY's 
platform focused on free-enterprise economic policies and a prac- 
tical solution to the intercommunal problem. It was the most ex- 
plicitly pro- Western and pro-NATO of Cyprus 's parties and drew 
its support from middle-class professionals, businessmen, and white- 
collar employees. Its shares of parliamentary election votes were 
24.1 percent in 1976 (but no seats because of the electoral law), 
31.9 percent in 1981 (twelve seats), and 33.6 percent in 1985 
(nineteen seats). 

The Democratic Party (Dimokratiko Komma — DIKO), formed 
in 1976, was seen as the closest to President Makarios and was 
headed by his successor, Spyros Kyprianou. The party platform 


Government and Politics 

in its first electoral campaign emphasized a nonaligned foreign poli- 
cy and a long-term struggle over Turkish occupation in the north. 
Over the years, this party formed uneasy alliances with the two 
more leftist parties, the communists and socialists. The Democratic 
Party won twenty-one seats in 1976, eight seats in 1981 (19.5 per- 
cent), and sixteen seats in 1985 (27.7 percent). In June 1990, Kypri- 
anou was reelected party leader. 

The socialist party, the United Democratic Union of Cyprus 
(Eniea Dimokratiki Enosis Kyprou — EDEK), often called the So- 
cialist Party EDEK (Socialistiko Komma EDEK), was formed in 
1969 by Makarios's personal physician, Vassos Lyssarides. The 
party advocated socialized medicine and nationalization of banks 
and foreign-owned mines. It was anti-NATO and pro- Arab and 
favored a nonaligned foreign policy, although those positions seemed 
to have softened in the late 1980s. The party supported enosis with 
a democratic Greece, opposed continued British sovereignty rights 
on the island, but differed from the communists in keeping its dis- 
tance from the Soviet Union. Its appeal was strongest among non- 
communist leftists, intellectuals, and white-collar workers. Its 
electoral strength was the weakest of the four parties. In 1976 EDEK 
won four seats, three in 1981 (8.2 percent), and six in 1985 (11.1 

The communist movement has been a major force on the island 
since the 1920s, often vying with the Church of Cyprus for the role 
of dominant political player. The first communist party was formed 
in 1924 in Limassol, was banned in 1931 , and reappeared in 1941 
with the creation of the Progressive Party of the Working People 
(Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou — AKEL). Banned in 
the preindependence emergency from 1955 to 1959, AKEL has 
been in every parliament since 1960. AKEL won nine seats in 1976, 
twelve in 1981 (32.8 percent), and fifteen in the enlarged chamber 
in 1985. The latter number represented a drop to 27.4 percent. 

In response to the serious crisis in the communist movement af- 
ter the collapse of East European regimes in late 1989, AKEL held 
internal conferences in early 1990, but resisted reform proposals. 
As a consequence, AKEL dissidents formed a new leftist group- 
ing called the Democratic Socialist Renewal Movement (Ananeotiko 
Dimokratiko Sosialistiko Kinima— ADISOK) in May 1990. The 
reformers included five members of parliament elected in 1985 as 
AKEL leaders. ADISOK selected House Deputy Pavlos Dhinglis 
as chairman and criticized AKEL for undemocratic behavior and 
an anachronistic mentality. It petitioned President Vassiliou for 
representation on the National Council, a forum in which all po- 
litical groups met to discuss political issues. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

The parties had held fairly constant positions on key policy is- 
sues since the second half of the 1970s. AKEL and DISY, although 
at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, were regarded as most 
flexible and forthcoming on settlement matters. EDEK and DIKO 
took a harder line, pushing for a more punitive approach to Tur- 
key. On social and economic policy, the parties' ideological predilec- 
tions prevailed: EDEK and AKEL advocated greater government 
support for workers and free public health services; DISY favored 
free enterprise. Some Cypriot analysts believe that DISY and DIKO 
have an overlapping constituency and could merge into a single 
centrist party if DIKO were to drop its far-right support, estimat- 
ed at 5 percent of its strength. 


The press was another major player in Greek Cypriot politics. 
There were ten Greek-language and one English-language daily 
papers for a population of 500,000 (see table 22, Appendix). Tele- 
vision broadcasting was government-controlled. In 1989 President 
Vassiliou proposed a press law, aimed at setting guidelines and 
a professional code of ethics and at stimulating greater competi- 
tion by allowing private radio stations (thus ending the monopoly 
of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation). An early version of a 
comprehensive press bill passed in parliament and in 1990 was un- 
der review for further revisions, to address criticisms that in its origi- 
nal form it set too many regulations. In mid- 1990, parliament 
approved and the president signed legislation to make municipali- 
ties, companies, and individuals eligible to establish private radio 
stations. A new relationship with the Greek media, allowing Cypriot 
television to broadcast Greek programs, was established in 1990, 
although it was seen as threatening to the financially weak Cyprus 
Broadcasting Corporation. 

Political Dynamics 

The politics of Cyprus have gradually evolved from the shadow 
of the dominant figure of Makarios, who embodied the struggle 
for independence from Britain and enosis with Greece. After in- 
dependence was achieved without enosis, Makarios 's own think- 
ing changed, and Cypriot politics struggled with its internal 
ghost — enosis. Makarios became persuaded that true national in- 
dependence for Cyprus had advantages, and Greek political trends 
by the mid-1960s convinced him that Cyprus had a destiny dis- 
tinct from that of Greece. The Greek Cypriot population did not 
let go of the dream of enosis as quickly, and pro-enosis forces 


Government and Politics 

eventually turned on Makarios, leading to the 1974 coup (see Con- 
flict Withiri the Greek Cypriot Community, 1967-74, ch. 5). 

Although the drive for enosis subsided as a mobilizing force, the 
difficulties of creating a nation out of a bifurcated society took center 
stage. Makarios failed to draw the Greek and Turkish Cypriot com- 
munities together, but, helped by his unusual position and special 
gifts, he created a consensus among Greek Cypriots. Although the 
authority of the Church of Cyprus diminished with the rise of new 
secular institutions, Makarios, as its head, nonetheless embodied 
the traditional authority of Cypriot Hellenism and, as elected presi- 
dent, had legitimate political authority. In addition, he possessed 
an extraordinary charisma and a mastery of diplomacy that his ad- 
versaries saw as deviousness and duplicity. By the time of the 1974 
coup, however, it was clear that Makarios 's total domination of 
Cypriot politics was coming to an end. From July to December 
1974, Makarios was out of the country, and the government of 
the truncated republic was run competently by Glafkos Clerides. 
Makarios and Clerides then competed as heads of rival political 
groups, with the differences between them focused on the inter- 
communal process. Makarios reportedly welcomed this competi- 
tion as a sign of growing Cypriot political maturity. 

After Makarios' s death in 1977, Kyprianou succeeded to the 
presidency, and Clerides continued as the principal opposition lead- 
er. The two men differed, among other things, over how to deal 
with the intercommunal talks. 

Sharing the stage with Kyprianou were several other major 
figures, including Archbishop Chrysostomos, who had succeeded 
Makarios as head of the Church of Cyprus. Although the arch- 
bishop traveled the world meeting with overseas Greeks, Chry- 
sostomos' s personal political impact was judged by many to be far 
less significant than that of Makarios or that of the church as a 

Kyprianou was in many ways typical of the centrist, noncon- 
troversial political figures who often follow charismatic leaders. He 
sought to preserve the Makarios legacy and pursue policies that 
would further Makarios 's goals. But Kyraianou did not have the 
tactical dexterity or diplomatic skill of Makarios, and he became 
associated with an approach to the settlement process that preserved 
the status quo, rather than displaying the openness and initiative 
that characterized Makarios at the end of his life. By the late 1980s, 
the Kyprianou presidency was considered weak and passive, unable 
to break the stalemate in the settlement process and losing respect 
at home. At the same time, Kyprianou 's less authoritative style 
did allow more competition in Greek Cypriot politics, permitting 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

independents and other party leaders to contest presidential elec- 
tions with greater prospects for success. 

Political Culture in the Vassiliou Era 

The election of George Vassiliou in February 1988 was unex- 
pected. Although many Cypriots were increasingly disaffected be- 
cause of the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks and the 
incumbent's reputation for passivity and ineffectiveness, the results 
were an upset. The first round, held on February 14, gave a plural- 
ity and 33.3 percent to Glafkos Clerides of DISY. Vassiliou, an 
independent, came in second, with 30.1 percent, and the incum- 
bent, Spyros Kyprianou of DIKO, came in third with 27.3 per- 
cent. Kyprianou was defeated, according to Cypriot press opinion, 
because of inflexibility in the settlement talks and because of party 
maneuvering, including an unpopular tactical alliance with the com- 
munist party, AKEL. 

The runoff between Clerides and Vassiliou was held on Febru- 
ary 21 , and Vassiliou won by a little over 10,000 votes. He polled 
51.6 percent; Clerides, a veteran of Cypriot politics and acting presi- 
dent in 1974, polled 48.4 percent. Ironically, in the final contest 
the two men were in substantial agreement over the settlement is- 
sue; both expressed eagerness to engage in talks with Denkta§, and 
neither made withdrawal of Turkish troops a precondition for talks. 
Some observers believe that Clerides narrowly missed victory be- 
cause of his past associations with right-wing political groups. 

Born in Famagusta in 1931, Vassiliou completed secondary 
school in Cyprus and spent more than a decade studying and work- 
ing in Europe. He received a doctorate in economics in Hungary. 
Upon his return to Cyprus in 1962, he founded and became presi- 
dent of the Middle East Marketing Research Bureau, the largest 
consultancy in the region, with offices in eleven countries. 

Vassiliou 's campaign emphasized his wish to invigorate the set- 
tlement process. He offered to meet directly with both then-Prime 
Minister Turgut Ozal of Turkey and his Turkish Cypriot coun- 
terpart, Denktag. Without a strong party base, Vassiliou also decid- 
ed to resurrect the National Council, first created by Makarios, 
with the hope that the political parties meeting together could forge 
a collective and consensus-based policy toward the settlement 
process. Vassiliou proceeded to work out new rules with the party 
leaders, including guidelines on which issues required their unani- 
mous consent. He pledged to put any settlement plan to the peo- 
ple in a referendum. But his seemingly liberal views on a setdement 
were tempered by his policy commitment to reorganize and rein- 
force civil defense and increase defense spending. 


Government and Politics 

A number of factors brought Vassiliou to power. The electorate 
was frustrated by the impasse in the settlement process and wel- 
comed someone who spoke of new ideas and energy. More broadly, 
the vote may have signaled the end of the Makarios era and the 
desire for new leaders, rather than Makarios' s heir apparent. 

Vassiliou brought to the presidential palace skills learned in the 
private sector, such as prompt decision making, cost-benefit anal- 
ysis, marketing, and open competition, that promised livelier and 
more effective policy making. Some Cypriots welcomed his attempt 
to bring corporate boardroom concepts into politics. Others resented 
it. In his first two years in office, Vassiliou was constrained by the 
island's experienced politicians, who had different agendas, and 
by Turkish Cypriot strategies that did not embrace the spirit of 
Vassiliou 's settlement message. 

The new president tried to introduce fresh faces into the execu- 
tive branch. His first cabinet had only two ministers who had previ- 
ously held office: George Iacovou continued to serve as foreign 
minister, ensuring continuity in external relations, and Christodou- 
los Veniamin took the post of interior minister, which he had held, 
along with other cabinet posts, between 1975 and 1985. In May 
1990, President Vassiliou replaced four of his cabinet ministers and 
appointed several who had not served in previous cabinets. For 
the most part, the outside appointees were people who had the ap- 
proval of one or more of the major parties. 

Vassiliou had promised to achieve progress in talks with Turk- 
ish Cypriots through intercommunal talks and negotiations with 
Turkey. However, in his first two years he made no breakthrough 
toward a settlement. 

He achieved more in other areas. In the 1988 election campaign, 
Vassiliou spoke of his desire to make changes in the civil service, 
to end the spoils system that had created a large and inefficient 
public sector. He pledged moves toward a meritocracy and promised 
to bring into government energetic, talented people from the pri- 
vate sector. During his first two years in office, he was unable to 
replace the incumbent appointees to the Public Service Commis- 
sion with his own candidates because the parliament did not ap- 
prove funds for it. Nor did another campaign promise, to create 
a government ombudsman as a clearinghouse for complaints, make 
headway in the first two years of his presidency. He was also un- 
able to wrest from the political parties appointments to quasi- 
governmental posts such as utilities boards. He failed to pursue 
vigorously a campaign pledge to investigate charges of corruption 
in the police force. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Vassiliou's modest gains in these efforts were constrained by the 
parties' resistance to the businessman-president's ideas. The parlia- 
ment failed to approve many of his requests for new positions, such 
as political appointments for ministerial special assistants and even 
experts to assist the president. 

Vassiliou did manage to dilute the parties' power to some extent. 
Political patronage jobs, formerly the perquisites of the largest party, 
were shared among the major parties, reflecting Vassiliou's desire 
for a consensus-based political system. Vassiliou often chose for 
appointed positions associates whose skills he respected but who 
were also acceptable to one or more of the major parties. This power 
sharing with the parties, however, kept the new president from keep- 
ing his promise to reduce the size of the public sector. 

Yet Vassiliou's intelligence, energy, and worldliness were valued 
by Cyprus' s friends overseas. Vassiliou visited all major Europe- 
an capitals, traveled in the United States, and attended multilateral 
conferences to explain the Cyprus situation and enlist support for 
new settlement efforts. He was troubled that the dramatic and tri- 
umphant world events of 1989 and 1990 distracted world atten- 
tion from the Cyprus problem, and he was concerned about the 
prospects for its neglect. His presidency, nevertheless, although it 
did not produce dramatic results, won respect and attention from 
a number of friendly governments. 

Politics in the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" 

The Turkish Cypriot government gradually evolved after 1963. 
In 1975 and again in 1983, major changes were made to develop 
a national identity and the institutions of statehood, despite the 
government's dependence on Turkey and lack of recognition by 
the world community. 

The political evolution of the Turkish Cypriot government com- 
plicated the search for a settlement. Greek Cypriots held that the 
institutional changes since 1974 were illegitimate and artificial and 
could be reversed for the sake of a settlement. Although Turkish 
Cypriots maintained that these changes need not impede creation 
of a federal republic and that some of them could be nullified if 
replaced by acceptable alternatives, it was increasingly clear that 
the new institutions were becoming rooted in Turkish Cypriot so- 
ciety. In addition, the de facto autonomy that Turkish Cypriots 
had become accustomed to would be difficult to dismantle. 

Thus, the situation on the ground in the north shaped and nar- 
rowed the possible outcomes in the talks. Although Turkish Cypriot 
politics were the politics of a small and fragile entity dependent 
on an outside patron, the prospects for fundamental change in the 


"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" Office of the Prime Minister, Nicosia 
Courtesy Office of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, " Washington 

government of Cyprus may depend more on the community in the 
north than on the better known and more politically stable Greek 
Cypriot society. 

Major Political Institutions in the "TRNC" 

The institutional framework for the "TRNC" was set out in 
the 1985 constitution, drafted by the Constitutional Commission 
and approved by the Constituent Assembly in March 1985 and 
by a national referendum in May 1985. The constitution was ap- 
proved by 70.2 percent of the votes cast; opposition to it centered 
on its retention of capital punishment and certain other provisions 
deemed too politically restrictive. 

Although based on the 1975 document that established the "Turk- 
ish Federated State of Cyprus," the new constitution provided for 
an unfettered independent republic. It made no reference to a fed- 
eral republic, but Turkish Cypriot authorities consistently point- 
ed to a March 1985 Constituent Assembly vote declaring that the 
new constitution would not hinder establishment of a federal 

The constitution establishes a secular republic based on princi- 
ples of democracy, social justice, and the supremacy of law. The 
balance of powers among the governmental branches is flexible, 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

not fixed; the president and the Legislative Assembly both partici- 
pate in the Council of Judicature, which names, promotes, and 
oversees the judicial branch. The president and the legislature also 
share the power to declare war and commit armed forces overseas. 

The president, elected for five years, is required to be of Cypri- 
ot parentage and to have resided in Cyprus for five years. He is 
the head of state and commander in chief, although the security 
forces are the responsibility of the prime minister. The president 
may preside over meetings of the cabinet, the Council of Ministers, 
but does not have a vote. He also names the prime minister from 
those elected to parliament and appoints, in consultation with the 
prime minister, other ministers, who need not be elected mem- 
bers. The number of ministries is limited by the constitution to 
ten. In the event of a vacancy in the office of the president, the pres- 
ident of the Legislative Assembly would become acting president. 

The Legislative Assembly is a unicameral body of fifty mem- 
bers elected for five-year terms. It enacts laws, exercises control 
over the Council of Ministers, approves the budget, has authority 
to give general and special amnesties, decides whether to carry out 
death penalties imposed by the courts, and ratifies international 
agreements. Upon an absolute majority vote, the Legislative As- 
sembly may dissolve itself and call for new elections. Under cer- 
tain circumstances, the president may also dissolve the body. 

The judicial system established by the 1985 constitution rough- 
ly corresponds in several features to the provisions of the 1 960 con- 
stitution of the Republic of Cyprus. The Supreme Court consists 
of a president and seven judges, and has jurisdiction to sit as the 
Supreme Constitutional Court, the Court of Appeal, and the High 
Administrative Court. As the Constitutional Court, it is composed 
of five justices and as a Court of Appeal, three. The "TRNC," 
drawing on the 1960 constitution and on the Turkish and United 
States systems, provides for challenges to the constitutionality of 
legislation. The Supreme Court, in its role as High Administra- 
tive Court, fulfills the same functions as described in article 146 
of the 1960 constitution. The Supreme Council of Judicature, con- 
sisting of the Supreme Court, the attorney general, and several 
other officials, is the exclusive authority for appointments, promo- 
tions, disciplinary control, and all other matters relating to the 
judges of the courts. 

There are three categories of lower courts. Assize courts, in the 
capitals of the three districts of the "TRNC," sit three times a 
year to try persons convicted of indictable offenses. These courts 
have unlimited jurisdiction in criminal matters. District courts, also 
located in the district capitals, have jurisdiction in civil and criminal 


Government and Politics 

matters. Family courts, each composed of a single judge, hear and 
determine actions relating to personal status and religious matters. 

For administrative purposes, the "TRNC" is divided into three 
districts, Nicosia (Lefko§a), Famagusta (Gazimagusa), and Kyre- 
nia (Girne), each headed by a district officer (kaymakam), the 
representative of the central government and subordinate to the 
minister of interior. There are twenty-six municipalities, consist- 
ing of towns and large villages, each governed by a municipal coun- 
cil and its head, the mayor. Council members and the mayor win 
their posts in municipal elections, usually held every four years. 
Candidates in these elections may run as independents or be af- 
filiated with a party. Villages, of which there are about 150, are 
each governed by a village commission consisting of a mayor 
(muhtar) and assistants {aza\ pi., azalar), also elected for four-year 
terms. Municipalities usually dealt with the relevant ministry when 
approaching the national government. Villages usually contacted 
the district kaymakam when they wished the services of the central 

Political Parties 

The Turkish Cypriot community had three major political par- 
ties. A few smaller parties emerged in the 1980s, and a 1990 alli- 
ance among three opposition parties was short-lived. 

The ruling party, the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik 
Partisi— UBP), was founded by Denktas. in 1975. Its head in 1990 
was Dervi§ Eroglu, the prime minister. The UBP was reported to 
draw on former members of the Turkish Resistance Organization 
(Turk Mukavemet Teskilati — TMT) and other conservative na- 
tionalist forces. The party was also a rallying point for forces that 
sought close ties to Turkey and identified themselves as Turks more 
than Cypriots. In the 1980s, the party governed alone or in coali- 
tion, but was riven with internal personality conflicts and charges 
of corruption. Its electoral performance was uneven, but the party 
implemented electoral law changes that favored its plurality. Its 
strength was augmented, it was commonly accepted, by support 
from settlers from the Turkish mainland. In the 1976 elections, 
the UBP won thirty of the forty parliamentary seats; it dropped 
to eighteen seats in 1981 but won twenty-four seats in the enlarged 
parliament of 1985 and thirty-four in the 1990 elections. After 
March 1990, changes in the electoral law that favored the strong- 
est party, the UBP won nearly 70 percent of the seats with 55 per- 
cent of the vote. 

As it had in the municipal elections of 1976, 1980, and 1986, 
the UBP won a majority of the mayoral posts in the elections of 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

June 1990. The party's victory was not as impressive as in the past, 
for the other parties boycotted the elections and the UBP had only 
independent candidates for opponents. Despite the absence of or- 
ganized opposition, the UBP won only fourteen of the twenty- six 
mayoral contests, although it was victorious in the three larg- 
est municipalities: the capital, Nicosia, and the two ports, Fama- 
gusta and Kyrenia. 

The second major party in the "TRNC" was the Communal 
Liberation Party (Toplumcu Kurtulu§ Partisi — TKP), founded in 
1976 by Alpay Durduran. The party has supported a federal solu- 
tion but has criticized the government for the pace of negotiations, 
the failure to encourage more contact between the two communi- 
ties, and the policy of encouraging settlers from Turkey. The party's 
head, Mustafa Akinci, served three terms as mayor of Nicosia and 
became known for his bridge-building efforts with his Greek Cypriot 
counterpart, Lellos Demetriades. In one of the few examples of 
bicommunal cooperation, the two mayors worked with the UN and 
other international organizations on joint projects such as restora- 
tion of the medieval walls of the capital city and a common sewage 
system. The TKP was strengthened temporarily in 1990 when 
Ismet Kotak, former UBP deputy and newspaper publisher, left 
the small defunct Progressive People's Party and joined the TKP. 
The TKP backed Ismail Bozkurt, an independent presidential can- 
didate, in the 1990 parliamentary elections. The TKP won six seats 
in the 1976 elections, thirteen in 1981, ten in the fifty- seat cham- 
ber in 1985, and five in the 1990 elections as part of an electoral 
alliance, the Democratic Struggle Party (Demokratik Miicadele 
Partisi — DMP). In mid- 1990, the strength of the party was 
weakened when the DMP failed to oust the UBP. The TKP with- 
drew from the alliance, and most of its members boycotted the 
parliament to protest what it considered electoral improprieties by 
the ruling party and by Turkey. 

The third of the main parties and the oldest party in the 
"TRNC," the Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetci Turk 
Partisi — CTP), was founded in 1970. Its leader, Ozker Ozgiir, dis- 
avowed alleged communist leanings and described his party's ideol- 
ogy as progressive socialist. Much of the CTP's support derived 
from the small labor movement on the island. The party won two 
seats in the 1976 elections, six in 1981, twelve in 1985, and seven 
in 1990, when it joined the TKP and the New Dawn Party (Yeni 
Dogus. Partisi — YDP) in the DMP electoral alliance. After the elec- 
tions and the collapse of the alliance, the CTP deputies joined their 
TKP colleagues in boycotting the parliament. 


Government and Politics 

The YDP emerged with minor electoral strength in the 1985 elec- 
tions. Founded in 1984 with considerable support from the Turk- 
ish Embassy, the YDP consolidated several smaller parties that at- 
tracted support from Turkish setders on the island. Many settlers, 
however, continued to vote for the UBP. The party's leader for 
several years was retired Turkish colonel Aytac Be§e§ler, who ar- 
rived on Cyprus in 1979. In the 1985 elections, the YDP won four 
seats in the Legislative Assembly. In 1988 Be§e§ler was replaced 
as party head by Orhan Ucok, reportedly a supporter of Turkish 
opposition leader Siileyman Demirel and less inclined to provide 
automatic support for the ruling party and the president. The YDP 
briefly joined the electoral opposition alliance DMP that stood in 
the May 1990 elections, presumably because its membership felt 
the government was not moving quickly enough on some issues 
of concern to them, one of which was providing legal title to their 
property. When the DMP failed to defeat the UBP and disbanded, 
the two YDP candidates took their seats in the Assembly. 


The press was an active participant in political life in the "TRNC," 
and the role of the progovernment press in influencing election 
outcomes sparked increasing controversy. There was no law regulat- 
ing media behavior or ethics. The state-controlled radio and tele- 
vision was 80 percent fed from Turkish national television. There 
were ten daily papers in the north in 1990, three owned by pro- 
Denktas. business magnate Asil Nadir, three affiliated with parties, 
and four independents, including one that focused on financial matters. 

Rauf Denkta§ and Turkish Cypriot Politics 

As Makarios was the dominant figure in Greek Cypriot politics 
for nearly two decades after independence, so Rauf Denkta§ over- 
shadowed all other political forces in Turkish Cypriot politics. Born 
in Paphos in 1924, Denkta§ was trained as a lawyer. He was from 
a prominent family that lived in close proimity to Greek Cypri- 
ots, and his biographers have chronicled many grievances and 
humiliations that he suffered as a youth from intolerant Greek 
Cypriots. He was politically active from a young age and was ex- 
iled to Turkey during the preindependence period. His activity in 
Turkish Cypriot politics has been continuous; he emerged as a pro- 
tege of Vice President Kiiciik, became intercommunal negotiator 
in 1968, and was vice president of the republic at the time of the 
1974 crisis. He was elected president of the "TSFC" in 1975, was 
reelected in 1981, became president of the "TRNC" in 1985, and 
successfully stood for election in that year and again in 1990. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Under Denkta§, constitutional changes have occurred that made 
the parliament stronger and the president weaker, theoretically, 
than their counterparts in the republic in the south. Yet Denkta§ 
remained a more powerful figure on the Turkish Cypriot scene than 
his legal role would suggest. He retained considerable influence 
over the governing political party by playing personalities against 
one another and preventing independent leadership of the party, 
despite his formal claims to being above politics. He used the force 
of his personal appeals to national security and national interest 
whenever opposition parties appeared to be gaining in electoral 

From one perspective, Denkta§ presided over an entity in which 
the consensus over the core issue — the settlement with Greek 
Cypriots — remained remarkably strong, and his powerful presence 
successfully reflected and symbolized national unity. But from 
another perspective, Turkish Cypriot political culture, with its 
proclivity toward factiousness and frequent questioning of the rules 
of the game, seemed to push for more rational and competitive 
democracy. There also were signs of continued resentment and 
resistance, in certain quarters, to a domineering father figure. 

The three elections of 1990 — presidential in April, parliamen- 
tary in May, and municipal in June — suggested some new politi- 
cal dynamics in the "TRNC." Denkta§ was challenged by two 
veteran politicians, Alpay Durduran and Ismail Bozkurt. The op- 
position parties, after considerable debate over strategy, backed 
Bozkurt 's candidacy. Denkta§'s two- thirds approval rating thus 
worked to the disfavor of the opposition parties facing parliamen- 
tary elections. In what many considered an alliance of convenience, 
the TKP and CTP joined with the setder party— the YDP— to form 
the electoral alliance DMP. The alliance was formed mainly in op- 
position to UBP domination of the parliament and political 
patronage. To a lesser degree, its members were united in the view 
that Denkta§'s control of the political system had inhibited 
democratic competition. The main goal of the alliance was to reduce 
UBP control of political power; its candidates pledged, if elected, 
to revise the electoral law and go to new elections within a few 
months. The alliance did not differ with the ruling establishment 
on the setdement question and emphasized domestic issues, such 
as the alleged corruption of the UBP and what it viewed as ineffec- 
tive economic policies. The parties had worked out a power-sharing 
arrangement among themselves should they win, including a pledge 
by the leftist CTP to decline a major post, such as the premiership 
or speaker of the parliament. 


Government and Politics 

The outcome of the presidential elections hampered the DMP's 
strategy, and there were reports that many settlers abandoned the 
YDP, casting their parliamentary votes for Denkta§'s party. The 
alliance's failure at the polls (it won sixteen out of fifty seats) caused 
considerable internal strain, and the alliance collapsed. The two 
major opposition parties, the TKP and the CTP, continued to work 
together after the May vote; they challenged the outcome of the 
elections and charged Turkish mainland interference and other im- 
proprieties. They also continued to complain that the electoral law 
greatly favored the ruling party. Four of the DMP's fourteen 
deputies broke from the alliance and joined the parliament; two 
were from the YDP and two, including Ismet Kotak, had run on 
the TKP ticket. 

Foreign Policy 

From the time of independence, Cypriots saw their problem on 
several levels. First, it was an intercommunal problem that required 
local, domestic political solutions. Next, and very close to this level, 
was the relationship of the island to its motherlands, Greece and 
Turkey; the two Cypriot communities struggled with the question 
of how much their foreign policies should be determined by the 
foreign policy interests and resources of the motherlands. At another 
level, many Cypriots considered their island a pawn in the super- 
power struggle, often exaggerating its strategic significance. Be- 
cause the two motherlands, Greece and Turkey, were North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, Cyprus was by 
definition a problem within the Western camp, a circumstance the 
Soviet Union and its allies, during the Cold War, occasionally 
sought to exploit. As a response to these constricting relationships, 
Cypriot foreign policy was nonaligned, and both communities found 
support among Third World countries for whom the Cyprus 
problem resonated with their own problems, be it the matter of 
a larger nearby state occupying territory of a smaller one, or the 
matter of a religious minority suffering discrimination at the hands 
of the majority. 

Cyprus' s relations with the outside world were shaped profoundly 
by the chronic dilemma of the island's political identity. The two 
communities conducted narrow foreign policies focused on this sin- 
gle issue. Yet the Republic of Cyprus conducted active and effec- 
tive diplomatic efforts in many countries to win support for its 
position in UN settlement talks and in support of sympathetic reso- 
lutions in multilateral forums of which Cyprus was a member. The 
"TRNC" by the mid-1980s tried to break out of its isolation and 
began to conduct its own foreign policy, in some ways mirroring 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

the efforts of its Greek Cypriot neighbors. Recognition as a state 
was the primary foreign policy objective of the regime in the north. 
Foreign policy in general was considerably more important for the 
republic; the "TRNC" was persuaded that its cause would benefit 
from "benign neglect" by the world community, allowing the two 
communities to develop normal relations without external pressure. 

The Republic of Cyprus 

The founding documents of Cyprus 's independence set some re- 
quirements for its foreign policy and linked the republic to three 
NATO members — Turkey, Greece, and Britain — through a Treaty 
of Alliance and a Treaty of Guarantee. These treaties, calling for 
the motherlands to garrison troops on the island and for the three 
NATO countries to guarantee and protect the independence of the 
republic, seemed to constrain or contradict the commitment to 
nonalignment enshrined in the constitution. Cypriots complained 
about these implied limits on their sovereignty, but in time devel- 
oped foreign policies that were independent of the motherlands. 

The Foreign Policy of Internationalization 

Greek Cypriots have focused most of their foreign policy ener- 
gies since 1974 on winning broader international support for a 
Cyprus settlement providing for a withdrawal of Turkish troops 
and, to the extent possible, a restoration of the status quo ante of 
a single government on the island and the free flow of people and 
goods throughout its territory. The republic continued to enjoy in- 
ternational recognition as the legal government of Cyprus; and 
membership in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the Confer- 
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the United 
Nations, and the Commonwealth provided opportunities to pro- 
mote these aims. Resolutions passed by these organizations called 
for the withdrawal of foreign troops, condemned Turkey's settler 
policy, urged the immediate implementation of UN resolutions, 
and called for sanctions against Turkey. 

Cyprus placed considerable importance on its membership in 
the NAM. It hosted a number of NAM meetings and headed an 
effort in 1989 and 1990 to redefine the NAM's objectives in light 
of the dramatic changes in East-West relations and the virtual end 
of superpower rivalry and competition. Support from the non- 
aligned states was particularly important during UN debates. 
Greek Cypriots were aware that UN resolutions lacked direct ef- 
fect on Turkey unless accompanied by substantive sanctions, but 
they hoped that collective international pressure might yield some 
results. On occasion, the republic was persuaded by its Western 


Government and Politics 

allies to forego the annual UN General Assembly resolution de- 
bate, avoiding repetitious and largely ineffective rituals and allow- 
ing the UN-sponsored talks to proceed without undue pressure. 
President Vassiliou adapted the traditional Greek Cypriot strat- 
egy to his new thinking by occasionally modifying his language, 
avoiding punitive measures, and emphasizing positive incentives 
to engage Turkish Cypriots in negotiations. After the collapse of 
the 1990 UN talks, however, Greek Cypriot positions in inter- 
national organizations returned to earlier phases, seeking direct 
condemnation of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot policies and 

The strategy of internationalization became more Europe- 
oriented in 1990. After the fall of the Berlin wall and the com- 
mitment to unification of the two Germanies, the Greek Cypriot 
republic perceived its situation as increasingly anomalous and un- 
acceptable. It argued that, after Soviet troops completed withdraw- 
ing from Eastern Europe, Cyprus would be the only country in 
Europe with foreign occupying troops. The unification of Germa- 
ny also underscored the deep Greek Cypriot yearning for reunifi- 
cation, and Greek Cypriots held candlelight processions around 
the old walls of the capital, Nicosia, calling for an end to the divi- 
sion of the island. 

The decline of the relative importance of NATO among Euro- 
pean institutions had both advantages and disadvantages for Greek 
Cypriot foreign policy. On the one hand, it appeared to reduce 
Turkey's leverage over its Western allies and opened the way for 
broader pressures on Turkey. On the other hand, the potential 
loosening of Turkey's ties with Western partners could also weaken 
those countries' influence on Turkey's policies. In addition, the 
preoccupation with Germany and the emergence of new violent 
conflicts in the Balkans made it harder to keep the attention of Eu- 
ropean powers on Cyprus. 

The proposals in mid- 1990 to expand the mission and scope of 
the CSCE appealed to Greek Cypriots. They had found participa- 
tion in the CSCE, along with six other neutral and nonaligned Eu- 
ropean states, less satisfactory when the organization's main 
function was as a forum for East- West confidence-building mea- 
sures. In a future united Europe, however, Cypriots could envi- 
sion a greater role for the small states in the CSCE, and some be- 
lieved that the CSCE's expanded conflict-mediation role might have 
benefits for Cyprus. The Italian proposal for a southern variant 
of the CSCE, the CSC -Mediterranean, found tentative support 
from both Cypriot communities. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Relations with Greece 

After the troubles of 1963-64 and the effective separation of the 
two communities, the Greek Cypriots controlling the republic's in- 
stitutions did not, ironically, orient their foreign policy more toward 
Greece. Instead, the growing authority and confidence of Presi- 
dent Makarios and divergent trends in Greek and Greek Cypriot 
politics led to the republic's foreign policy becoming more indepen- 
dent. Greek Cypriots were disappointed that Greece had placed 
the interests of the Western alliance above those of the island in 
the preindependence London and Zurich talks. Greek Cypriots also 
viewed as inadequate the Greek response to the 1963-64 troubles, 
with Greece again deferring to NATO interests. 

Relations deteriorated further when the military seized power 
in Athens in 1967. Makarios was anathema to the staunchly anti- 
communist regime in Greece. His flirtation with Eastern Europe 
and Third World nations, his refusal to stem criticism of the dic- 
tatorship, and his charismatic appeal to Greeks everywhere were 
major concerns of the new Greek leadership. The infiltration of 
Greek soldiers from the mainland, in excess of levels approved in 
the Treaty of Alliance, became a threat almost equal to that from 
the Turkish mainland. By the early 1970s, the rift between the 
Athens junta and the Makarios government had become open. 
Athens allegedly financed operations of anti-Makarios organiza- 
tions and newspapers and was widely thought responsible for at- 
tempts on Makarios's life. Pressures mounted, and in July 1974, 
after Makarios openly challenged the junta's interference, the Cypri- 
ot National Guard, led by Greek officers, staged a coup that ulti- 
mately resulted in Turkish intervention and the junta's demise. 

With the 1974 restoration of civilian government in Athens and 
the environment of crisis in the Greek- controlled part of the island 
after the Turkish intervention, relations between the republic and 
the government in Greece were restored to normal. Closer coordi- 
nation of foreign policy began, particularly focused on winning sup- 
port for resolutions in international organizations and from Greeks 
abroad. Greece gave full public support to policies adopted by the 
republic and pledged not to interfere in domestic Cypriot politics. 
The two governments agreed that Greek Cypriot participation in 
settlement efforts was essential and tried to uncouple the Cyprus 
issue from other Greek-Turkish disputes, such as those about ter- 
ritorial rights in the Aegean Sea. 

Differences remained over the two governments' priorities. Greek 
prime minister Constantinos Karamanlis was said to favor a more 


Government and Politics 

moderate and conciliatory stand on Cyprus than either Makarios 
or Kyprianou, both of whom advocated a "long struggle" in the 
face of what they perceived as Turkish intransigence. The Greek 
government was also eager to return to NATO, which it did in 
1981, and to reduce tensions with Turkey. In addition, the tripar- 
tite American-British-Canadian plan (the ABC plan) of 1978 won 
Greece's approval, although it was rejected by Greek Cypriots as 
a framework for negotiations. 

When Greeks elected the socialist government of Andreas Papan- 
dreou to office in 1981, the foreign policy of Greece shifted. Less 
inclined to demonstrate Greece's loyalty to NATO and other 
Western institutions, Papandreou sought to "internationalize" the 
Cyprus settlement effort and took a more confrontational approach 
to bilateral differences with Turkey. This approach led to a new, 
and sometimes uneasy, division of labor between Greece and the 
republic, with the latter engaged in intercommunal talks and the 
former raising the Turkish troop issue in NATO and other inter- 
national forums. Cyprus was relinked to bilateral Greek-Turkish 
problems, insofar as Papandreou insisted that relations between 
the two NATO allies could not improve until the Cyprus problem 
was solved and Turkish troops withdrawn. This policy was tem- 
porarily suspended in early 1988, when Papandreou and Turkish 
prime minister Ozal conducted talks known as the Davos process, 
aimed at improving ties through Aegean confidence-building mea- 
sures. The process was stalled in late 1988 by political and health 
problems of the Greek premier. For most of 1989 and early 1990, 
Greece was ruled by interim governments that took no new for- 
eign policy initiatives, although the 1988 election of the activist 
George Vassiliou in Cyprus gave some new vigor and interest to 
the frequent consultations in Athens between the two governments. 

In April 1990, Greeks returned to power the centrist New 
Democracy Party, and the new prime minister, veteran politician 
Constantinos Mitsotakis, pledged to renew Greece's efforts to solve 
the Cyprus problem. The two governments formed a joint com- 
mittee, administered by their foreign ministries, to share informa- 
tion and coordinate policies and thus avoid the strains that had 
arisen from divergent approaches to the Cyprus problem. 

Relations with the United States and the Soviet Union 

Cyprus had ambivalent relations with the superpowers during 
the Cold War. Despite its nonalignment, the cultural, political, 
and economic orientation of Cyprus was to the West, and NATO 
allies played crucial roles in the achievement of Cyprus' s inde- 
pendence, the treaties guaranteeing that independence, and the 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

composition of the UN peace-keeping force that was on the island 
continuously after 1964. 

Relations with the United States after the 1974 crisis were shaped 
by Cypriot convictions that the United States had been too close 
to the Greek junta, could have prevented its coup against Makarios, 
supported or acquiesced in the Turkish intervention, and gave in- 
sufficient attention to solving the Cyprus problem. Relations be- 
tween Cyprus and the United States were also haunted by the 1974 
assassination of United States Ambassador Roger Davies in Nico- 
sia. Yet, pressed by the United States Congress and the aroused 
Greek- American community, the Nixon and Ford administrations 
became involved in refugee resettlement and peace talks during 
the 1974 crisis and its aftermath. 

As the Turkish intervention was consolidated, leading to a long- 
term division of the island, Greek Cypriots continued to have 
misgivings about the strategic intentions of United States policy. 
Cypriots occasionally pressed for new American initiatives, although 
none was offered after the 1978 ABC plan. A more activist Ameri- 
can policy was institutionalized through the establishment in 1981 
of a Special Cyprus Coordinator in the Department of State. The 
position was held by Reginald Bartholemew (1981-82), Christian 
Chapman (1982-83), Richard Haass (1983-85), James Wilken- 
son (1985-89), and Nelson Ledsky after 1989. Yet efforts by these 
diplomats to stimulate discussion about confidence-building mea- 
sures, intercommunal projects and cooperation, and new directions 
in the US$15 million annual aid program to Cyprus met resistance 
from the republic's government. The republic looked to the Unit- 
ed States Congress and the Greek-American community to cor- 
rect what they considered a pro-Turkish bias in United States policy. 

Relations with the Soviet Union were more distant and reflect- 
ed ups and downs in superpower influence in the Mediterranean 
and in United States-Turkish relations. The Soviets had support- 
ed the Greek Cypriot position after 1974 and generally pursued 
policies that fostered strains in intra- NATO relations. They worked 
with the island's communist party, but equally well with the cen- 
trist governments. In the late 1970s, the Soviets were cooler toward 
the Greek Cypriot view because of improved relations with Tur- 
key. The Soviets under Mikhail Gorbachev became more interested 
in Cyprus settlement efforts. In 1986 the Soviets outiined their policy 
for a Cyprus settlement, calling for a withdrawal of all foreign troops 
and bases (presumably including the British sovereign base areas), 
a demilitarization of the island, and a new federal government. 
Greek Cypriots welcomed the proposal, although in subsequent 


President Vassiliou with President George Bush 
at the White House, 1991 
Courtesy The White House (Susan Biddle) 

months it was interpreted by many as part of a broad Third World- 
Soviet public relations exercise more than a serious diplomatic in- 
itiative to which resources would be devoted. 

Relations with the European Community 

As Europe moved to create a single market by the end of 1992, 
the European Community (EC — see Glossary) became an increas- 
ingly important focus of Cypriot foreign policy. Cyprus became 
an associate member of the EC in June 1973, motivated largely 
by a desire to maintain its major trading partnership with Britain. 
But relations with Brussels were troubled by the uncertainty of the 
political situation on the island and the EC's preference for avoid- 
ing entanglement in political disputes. EC policy throughout the 
years of the division of the island was to deal with the republic 
government as the legal authority but at the same time to state that 
the benefits of association must extend to the entire island and its 
population. Cypriot efforts to link EC aid to Turkey to progress 
on a Cyprus settlement were unsuccessful, although the European 
Parliament passed several supportive but largely symbolic resolu- 
tions on Cyprus in the 1980s. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

After the 1988 election of George Vassiliou, in an era of revital- 
ized European consciousness, Cyprus' s attention to the EC in- 
creased dramatically, and its foreign policy became more 
EC -oriented and focused less on the Third World and the NAM. 
On July 4, 1990, the republic formally applied for full EC mem- 
bership. In a public statement, President Vassiliou said that Cyprus 
had " declared its European orientation and its desire to partici- 
pate as actively as possible and on an equal footing with the other 
EC member states in the historic process of European integration 
and the building of a Common European House of peace, cooper- 
ation and prosperity." 

It was clear that the membership bid, which was not expected 
to culminate in actual accession until the next century, was strongly 
driven by the settlement process. The application could be seen 
as a tactical move intended to give new momentum and new in- 
centives to the Turkish side to achieve progress in talks. For Vas- 
siliou, the EC application and its expected decade-long waiting 
period were an opportunity. He hoped that the EC accession time- 
table would parallel a negotiation timetable, so that a new federal 
government and full membership in the EC could be achieved at 
the same time. He argued that the benefits of EC membership 
would be conferred on "all Cypriots without exception." Should 
settlement talks fail, the EC application would serve a second pur- 
pose, giving Cyprus a framework for discussing the lack of progress 
with its EC trading partners. 

It was estimated that by the beginning of the 1990s 85 percent 
of Greek Cypriots favored full EC membership, with AKEL the 
notable exception. The Greek Cypriot parliament pressured Vas- 
siliou in the spring of 1990 to move more quickly on the EC issue. 
Some Cypriots, including DISY leader Clerides and some Vas- 
siliou supporters, floated the proposal to have Turkish Cypriots 
participate in future negotiations with Brussels, although such 
proposals, without more formal recognition of Turkish Cypriot 
separate political rights, appeared doomed to failure. 

Other Foreign Policy Concerns 

The Republic of Cyprus also participated in foreign policy de- 
bates on issues of broader interest to Cyprus as a small, nonaligned 
country. When approached by its Western friends, including the 
United States, Cyprus proved a reliable and effective partner in 
issues of common concern, such as antiterrorism measures and con- 
trol of illegal narcotics, and it became increasingly interested in 
environmental causes, particularly in the Mediterranean region. 


Government and Politics 

Cyprus was also compelled because of geographic proximity to 
address the Arab-Israeli issue and the Lebanon crisis that plagued 
the Middle East throughout the 1980s. The island was occasion- 
ally touched by the violence of these disputes when Israeli and 
Palestinian commandos carried out missions against each other in 
Cypriot coastal towns, and even in Nicosia. For the most part, 
Cyprus remained neutral, allowing the island to be the meeting 
place for informal diplomatic encounters between Arabs and Is- 
raelis. Cyprus had active trade and cultural relations with Israel, 
and a fully accredited Israeli Embassy functioned in Nicosia. At 
the same time, Cyprus supported moderate Palestinian positions 
in international forums and sought more active Arab support of 
its position, appealing to Arab sentiment over what it saw as analo- 
gous situations in the respective Israeli and Turkish occupations 
of their territories. 

The "TRNC" 

Turkish Cypriots began developing a rudimentary foreign poli- 
cy after 1963, focused mainly on public relations efforts to explain 
the communal perspective on the island's political difficulties. Two 
factors constrained the development of a Turkish Cypriot foreign 
policy. First, Turkish Cypriots lacked the personnel and resources 
to project themselves on the world scene. Second, Turkish Cypri- 
ot administrations, in their various forms since 1963, lacked in- 
ternational recognition and were dependent on Turkey's acting as 
an intermediary to international opinion. The situation changed 
gradually after 1985, although Turkish Cypriot activism in for- 
eign policy focused on expanding trade and political contact, rather 
than on the settlement process. The view of the Turkish Cypriot 
government was that less, not more, international attention would 
help a Cyprus settlement. 

Relations with Turkey 

As was the case with Greek Cypriots and their mainland, re- 
lations between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey could be char- 
acterized as close and cooperative, although many observers 
detected strains barely beneath the surface. Turkey usually sup- 
ported Turkish Cypriot policies in their broadest sense, although 
tactical differences often occurred. On several key occasions in the 
UN setdement process, Ankara pressed the Turkish Cypriot govern- 
ment to be more forthcoming. From 1975 until the declaration of 
the "TRNC" in 1983, for example, it was reported on numerous 
occasions that Turkey had persuaded Denkta§ to delay his unilateral 
declaration of independence. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

The main institutional vehicle for Turkish-Turkish Cypriot 
cooperation was the Coordination Committee (Koordinasyon 
Komitesi) formed in the 1 960s to administer the extensive economic 
relationship between the two. The participants in these coordina- 
tion activities, which became more ad hoc as Turkish Cypriot 
bureaucratic competence grew, were representatives of the prime 
minister's office in Turkey and a collection of key decision makers 
from the Turkish Cypriot executive branch. From 1974 to 1983, 
coordination was close, including Turkish participation in Turkish 
Cypriot cabinet meetings. After the establishment of the "TRNC," 
such contact was replaced with more formal state-to-state relations. 
Turkey demonstrated in various ways its recognition of the separate- 
ness of the Turkish Cypriot political entity, although opposition 
parties and many observers believed that the Turkish Embassy in 
the north was engaged in activities beyond the normal purview of 
a foreign mission. 

The economic dimension of bilateral relations also showed its 
strains. After 1974, the Turkish contribution to the Turkish Cypriot 
budget was estimated at 80 percent, but by 1990 that subsidy was 
reported to be in the 30 to 40 percent range. The opposition press 
in Turkey occasionally complained that aid and assistance to north- 
ern Cyprus were an economic burden on Turkey, whose econom- 
ic performance was uneven in the 1980s. For their part, Turkish 
Cypriots complained of inadequate aid, the failure as of late 1990 
to establish a customs union, and the importation of Turkey's eco- 
nomic problems, most notably rampant inflation in the late 1970s 
and again in the late 1980s. Relations were also strained by social 
differences between mainland settlers and the higher levels of edu- 
cation and more urban and secular lifestyles of most Turkish 

The Quest for Recognition 

Most Turkish Cypriot foreign policy efforts focused on achiev- 
ing recognition of the "TRNC" and explaining the Turkish Cypriot 
position on the settlement process. The "TRNC" had one em- 
bassy, in Ankara, two consulates, in Istanbul and Mersin, and five 
representation missions, in London, Washington, New York, Brus- 
sels, and Islamabad. These missions did not have diplomatic sta- 
tus. In 1990 there were reports that additional missions might be 
opened in Abu Dhabi, Canada, Australia, Italy, and Germany. 

The Islamic nations were the key target of Turkish Cypriot recog- 
nition efforts. In wooing Islamic support, Turkish Cypriot officials 
emphasized the religious aspect of the Cyprus conflict and stressed 
the importance of Muslim solidarity. Meetings of the Organization 


Government and Politics 

of the Islamic Conference (OIC), in which Turkey played an in- 
creasingly active role in the 1980s, were an important focus for 
the "TRNC." The OIC passed several resolutions urging economic 
support and cultural contact with the Turkish Cypriots but stopped 
short of embracing the recognition issue. Many Arab Islamic coun- 
tries had ambivalent relations with Turkey because of the legacy 
of the Ottoman Empire, and also because they wished to maintain 
good relations with the Republic of Cyprus, which served as a finan- 
cial center and entrepot for Middle Eastern business activity. These 
reservations hindered the "TRNC" in its attempt to achieve its 
goals in the Islamic world. Among these countries, Pakistan, Jor- 
dan, and Bangladesh were considered the strongest supporters of 
the Turkish Cypriot cause. 

* * * 

The literature on Cyprus in the decade of the 1 980s concentrat- 
ed heavily on the intercommunal talks and UN efforts to settle the 
island's political dispute. There was little scholarly or journalistic 
coverage of the politics of the two communities separate from the 
politics of the settlement question. Nonetheless, elections in the 
Republic of Cyprus and in the "TRNC" provided opportunities 
to examine more closely the players and the political dynamics in 
each community. One particularly useful journalistic account is 
the 1990 New Yorker article by Mary Anne Weaver, reviewing the 
evolution of views in both communities and describing vividly the 
political and diplomatic atmosphere on the island. Also of note is 
Robert McDonald's International Institute for Strategic Studies 
monograph, The Problem of Cyprus, published in 1989. Other major 
sources of information on settlement positions are official newslet- 
ters and fact sheets. The Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in 
Washington publishes a monthly bulletin that carefully tracks 
government positions and occasionally features information on 
domestic politics. The Washington office of the "TRNC" represen- 
tative also distributes occasional fact sheets and position papers. 
Hearings and reports of the United States Congress are informa- 
tive on the debate between Congress and the executive over Unit- 
ed States policy on Cyprus and on United States perceptions of 
the status of settlement efforts. Such documents can be purchased 
from the United States Government Printing Office. 

Several books, including edited volumes of articles on Cyprus, 
were published in the 1980s, providing different perspectives on 
the situation and on prospects for a settlement. Cyprus in Transi- 
tion, 1960-1985, edited by John T.A. Koumoulides, contains several 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

retrospective articles, mostly from the perspectives of outside players 
in Cypriot affairs: the United Kingdom, the United States, the 
United Nations, and others. The Canadian Institute for Interna- 
tional Peace and Security published in 1991 a volume of articles 
from a workshop series on conflict resolution on Cyprus. The 
volume reviews the positions of external players as well as Cypri- 
ots and contains several useful chapters by Cypriots discussing 
confidence-building measures and cultural and sociological factors 
in settlement efforts. Tozun Bahcheli's Greek-Turkish Relations since 
1955 also contains useful coverage of the Cyprus issue in its for- 
eign policy dimensions. 

Because of the importance of legal and constitutional aspects in 
a settlement, lawyers and legal officials from both communities have 
published books on these issues. Polyvios G. Polyviou's Cyprus: In 
Search of a Constitution examines the legal and political aspects of 
the constitution that Greek Cypriots still support. Zaim M. 
Necatigil, the attorney general of the "TRNC," has published two 
books that provide the Turkish Cypriot perspective on these mat- 
ters: The Cyprus Conflict: A Lawyer's View (1981), and The Cyprus 
Question and the Turkish Position in International Law (1989). (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 


Chapter 5. National Security 

Paphos Castle, partially rebuilt by the Turks in the late 
sixteenth century after destruction by the Venetians of the 
original fourteenth- century fortification 

THE MANY ANCIENT AND MODERN walled fortresses that 
dot the landscape of Cyprus attest to the island's long history of 
armed conflict. Valuable minerals and forest products and the is- 
land's strategic location along trade routes between Europe and 
the Middle East have made Cyprus the object of repeated occupa- 
tions by the region's dominant military powers since the second 
millennium B.C. (see The Ancient Period, ch. 1). 

The competing interests of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus — freed 
from British rule in 1960 — have deeply affected the country's na- 
tional security in the modern period. Competition between the two 
outside powers fueled intercommunal strife between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots and subversive acts against President Archbishop 
Makarios III. Greek military personnel attached to the Cypriot Na- 
tional Guard supported the campaign against Makarios, which cul- 
minated in the coup d'etat of July 1974 and the subsequent Turkish 
military intervention and occupation of 37 percent of the island. 
The events of July- August 1974 further strained relations between 
the two nations that form the southeastern flank of the North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO), endangering Western secu- 
rity in the region. 

The Zurich- London agreements, signed in London on Febru- 
ary 19, 1959, provided legitimacy to actions taken jointly or in- 
dividually by Greece and Turkey, as well as by Britain, to uphold 
the constitution of the new island nation. In the ensuing years, 
however, the rights spelled out in the constitution were often abused 
or misapplied. For example, the bicommunal Cyprus Army provid- 
ed for in the agreements never materialized; rather, each ethnic 
community created its own military force, trained, armed, and par- 
tially staffed by personnel from the mainland. Both Greece and 
Turkey intervened in Cypriot affairs in a manner that went well 
beyond their legitimate security roles, and Britain for the most part 
simply stood aside. 

The events of 1974 have resulted in a de facto partition of the 
island into segregated Greek and Turkish communities with siz- 
able opposing forces in close proximity. More than two Turkish 
Army divisions in the north alleviated fears of the Turkish Cypri- 
ot minority that its physical safety was threatened by intercom- 
munal violence. Although the strong Turkish military presence was 
a source of insecurity for the Greek Cypriot community, as of 1990 
the Turkish forces had shown no further territorial ambitions since 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

the 1974 cease-fire. During the late 1980s, the Greek Cypriot Na- 
tional Guard began to strengthen and modernize its armored units 
and air defenses to reduce the margin of Turkish superiority. 
Demonstrations by Greek Cypriot women sometimes crossed into 
the buffer zone, leading to confrontations with Turkish troops and 
introducing an element of potential instability. 

Greek Cypriots saw the large Turkish Army contingent on Cyprus 
as an alien force distorting the community's balance. On the other 
hand, the growing strength of the National Guard was regarded 
by Turkish Cypriots as a threat justifying the retention of Turkish 
forces. Nevertheless, as of 1990 the military position seemed a stale- 
mate, furthered by the continued presence (since early 1964) of 
United Nations (UN) peace-keeping troops. Numerous rounds of 
bilateral and UN-sponsored talks had failed to reduce the military 
confrontation, an essential step in any political settlement. 

The Cyprus Conflict 

The Struggle for Independence 

The roots of the Cyprus conflict lie in the striving of the Greek 
Cypriot majority for unification, or enosis, with Greece, an idea 
that emerged during the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s 
and developed under British colonial rule (see British Rule, ch. 
1). Popular sentiment for enosis, joined with resentment of Brit- 
ish tax policies, ignited in 1931 in a brief but widespread uprising. 
During the uprising, the British Government House in Nicosia was 
burned, 6 Cypriots were killed, and 2,000 were arrested by Brit- 
ish authorities. From then on, enosis became more popular in the 
Greek Cypriot community; however, a clampdown on Cypriot po- 
litical activity and the exigencies of World War II precluded any 
violent manifestation for twenty-four years. 

The barely suppressed desire for enosis erupted on April 1 , 1955, 
when bombs destroyed the transmitter of the Cyprus broadcast- 
ing station and exploded at British Army and police installations 
in Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, and Larnaca. The explosions 
signaled the beginning of a guerrilla war against the British colonial 
administration that was to continue for four years and claim some 
600 lives. The Greek Cypriots fought under the banner of the Na- 
tional Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion 
Agoniston — EOKA), led by Colonel (later General) George Gri- 
vas. Although EOKA included only a few hundred active guerril- 
las, it enjoyed wide support in the Greek Cypriot community and 
was able to keep about 10,000 British soldiers occupied. 


National Security 

However, when EOKA called a cease-fire in March 1959, after 
the signing in February of the agreements that led to Cypriot in- 
dependence, it could claim only partial success. The Cypriot tie 
to Britain was broken sooner than it would have been without the 
guerrilla struggle, but EOKA's goal of enosis remained unmet. 

For members of the Turkish Cypriot minority, who regarded 
Turkey as their motherland, enosis would have meant becoming 
a much smaller minority within the Greek nation. In the mid-1950s, 
Turkish Cypriots responded to the growth of EOKA with the for- 
mation of their own paramilitary organization, Volkan (volcano), 
which later became the Turkish Resistance Organization (Turk 
Mukavemet Te§kilati — TMT). British authorities also armed a 
paramilitary police force composed entirely of Turkish Cypriots, 
the Mobile Reserve, to help combat terrorism. The intense inter- 
communal violence of 1958 implanted a bitterness in both ethnic 
communities and foreshadowed postindependence strife that would 
tear the young nation apart. 

Three interrelated treaties in February 1959, and the subsequent 
adoption of a constitution, resulted in Cyprus 's gaining its indepen- 
dence on August 19, 1960. Under the Treaty of Establishment, 
Britain retained sovereign rights over two areas to be used as mili- 
tary bases. The Treaty of Alliance stipulated that contingents of 
950 Greek troops and 650 Turkish troops were to provide for the 
defense of the island and train a new Cypriot army. Under the 
Treaty of Guarantee, in the event of a threat to the established 
political arrangements of Cyprus, the treaty's signatories, Greece, 
Turkey, and Britain, were to consult on appropriate measures to 
safeguard or restore them; the signatories were granted the right 
to intervene together or, if concerted action proved impossible, to 
act unilaterally to uphold the settlement. These elaborate arrange- 
ments came to provide the pretexts for repeated foreign interven- 
tion that severely undermined Cypriot security and for Turkey's 
unilateral military action in 1974, which led to the de facto parti- 
tion of the island. 

Intercommunal Violence, 1963-67 

Three years of peace followed Cypriot independence in 1960. 
Beneath the peace, however, lay the resentment of some Greek 
Cypriots at the prevention of enosis and a growing conflict between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots over the bicommunal provisions of 
the constitution. The Cyprus Army, which was to consist of 1,200 
Greek Cypriots and 800 Turkish Cypriots, never materialized be- 
cause of differences over the six-to-four formula for integrating the 
force. EOKA had officially disbanded and surrendered its weapons 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

in 1959, and Grivas had returned to Greece. In fact, however, many 
former EOKA members had retained their weapons, and some 
joined groups of armed irregulars. The Turkish Cypriot commu- 
nity responded to the growth of these groups by reviving the TMT 
in early 1962. These forces received arms and assistance from the 
Greek and Turkish contingents assigned to the island. 

In late November 1963, the president, Archbishop Makarios, 
introduced a thirteen-point proposal to amend the constitution in 
a way that would ensure the dominance of Greek Cypriots (see 
Republic of Cyprus, ch. 1). In the tense atmosphere that ensued, 
a street brawl broke out on December 2 1 in Nicosia between Turk- 
ish Cypriots and Greek Cypriot police. This fight was followed by 
major attacks by Greek Cypriot irregulars in Nicosia and Larna- 
ca. Looting and destruction of Turkish villages forced many Turk- 
ish Cypriots to withdraw into defensible enclaves guarded by the 
TMT paramilitary. Fearful that Turkey might carry out its threat 
to invade, Makarios agreed to British intervention from its bases 
on the island. On December 27, British troops assumed positions 
between opposing irregular units, and the fighting, which had 
claimed 100 lives on each side during the previous week, subsided 
temporarily. The cease-fire held in Nicosia, but by mid- February 
1964 Greek Cypriot attacks at Limassol brought a renewed threat 
of Turkish landings. Britain appealed to the UN Security Coun- 
cil, and on March 4, 1964, the UN approved a resolution to es- 
tablish an international peace-keeping force for duty in Cyprus. 
Contingents from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and 
Sweden joined the British soldiers already in place; together they 
made up the 6,500-member United Nations Peace-keeping Force 
in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The force was still present on the island, 
though at much reduced strength, a quarter of a century later (see 
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, this ch.). 

In June 1964, the National Guard was formed by the Greek 
Cypriot government, which also instituted male conscription. The 
National Guard absorbed the various private armies into a single 
national military force loyal to the government and served as a de- 
terrent to a Turkish invasion. Greek Army soldiers were clandes- 
tinely transferred to the guard on a large scale; by mid- summer 
the National Guard consisted of an estimated 24,000 officers and 
men, about half from the Greek Army. Grivas, thought to be the 
only man who could enforce discipline over the disparate armed 
Greek Cypriot factions, returned from Athens to command the Na- 
tional Guard. 

Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot community, in its newly created 
enclaves, organized militarily under the TMT, supported by 


National Security 

conscription of Turkish Cypriot youths. Turkish Army troops 
trained the Turkish Cypriot forces, totaling an estimated 10,000 
fighters, and directed the defense of the enclaves. Outbreaks of fight- 
ing continued, although the presence of UNFICYP prevented them 
from erupting into major hostilities. In August 1964, the National 
Guard carried out a coordinated sea and land assault against Kok- 
kina on the northwest coast in an effort to cut off the major Turk- 
ish Cypriot supply line to the mainland. Heavy attacks by Turkish 
jet fighter-bombers, operating beyond the range of the Greek Air 
Force, halted the Greek Cypriot offensive. Several years of peace 
followed, while the two communities improved their military 

In November 1967, units of the National Guard, at the instiga- 
tion of Grivas, launched a massive artillery assault on two Turk- 
ish Cypriot villages following a dispute over police patrols. The 
crisis was defused when United States mediation brought an agree- 
ment that endured for the next seven years: all foreign troops in 
excess of those permitted by the Treaty of Alliance were to be re- 
moved from Cyprus, and the National Guard was to be disman- 
tled in exchange for an immediate Turkish demobilization. Grivas 
was recalled to Athens, along with about 10,000 of the Greek troops 
assigned to the National Guard. The National Guard, however, 
was not dissolved. 

Conflict Within the Greek Cypriot Community, 1967-74 

During the next seven years, events in Cyprus were shaped by 
the differences over enosis that arose between Makarios and the 
military government that was installed in Greece after a coup d'etat 
in 1967. Convinced of Turkey's willingness to use its superior force 
to prevent enosis, Makarios began to seek support among Greek 
Cypriots — especially those in the communist party — who rejected 
enosis, at least for the near future, in favor of an independent, 
nonaligned Cyprus (see Political Dynamics, ch. 4). Because 
Makarios had decided enosis was no longer possible in the short 
term, more adamant pro-enosis Cypriot groups and anticommunist 
Greek officers, both of which infiltrated the National Guard dur- 
ing the late 1960s and early 1970s, would subvert his government 
increasingly after 1967 and finally overthrow him in 1974. 

Makarios failed in his efforts to limit the autonomy of the Na- 
tional Guard, which, under the influence of right-wing Greek 
officers, remained attached to enosis and bitterly opposed to Makari- 
os 's political association with the communist party. Compulsory 
military service for all Greek Cypriot males — for a period that in- 
creased from six months to two years during the 1960s — allowed 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

the arming and training of a great number of men, many of whom 
subsequently took up arms against the government. Between 1969 
and 1971, several groups embarked on a renewed terrorist cam- 
paign for enosis. Grivas returned clandestinely to Cyprus some- 
time in the late summer or early fall of 1971 and set up a new 
guerrilla organization, the National Organization of Cypriot Fight- 
ers B (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston B — EOKA B). Most 
members of the terrorist movement held regular jobs in the Greek 
Cypriot community; half were police officials and members of the 
National Guard. 

There was also considerable evidence of support of EOKA B ac- 
tivities by the Greek junta, whose hostility to Makarios became 
increasingly apparent during the early 1970s. The junta was be- 
lieved to be involved in several attempts on the life of President 
Makarios. In March 1970, Makarios narrowly escaped death when 
his helicopter was shot down. Makarios walked away from the crash, 
but his pilot was killed. Former minister of interior Polykarpos 
Georkajis, in contact with local right-wing groups and the junta 
in Athens, was thought to be implicated, and was assassinated short- 
ly afterward. A paramilitary presidential guard loyal to Makarios, 
called the Tactical Police Reserve, was organized in 1972. Con- 
sisting of fewer than 1,000 men, the Tactical Police Reserve suc- 
ceeded in arresting large numbers of EOKA B guerrillas. In a 
further attempt to bring subversive forces under control, Makarios 
dismissed many National Guard and police officers suspected of 
EOKA B activity. 

With the death of Grivas from a heart attack in January 1974, 
EOKA B came more direcdy under the control of the military junta 
in Athens, which, after a change of leadership, was even more 
hostile to Makarios. The archbishop, however, saw the Greek- 
officered National Guard as a more serious threat to his govern- 
ment than EOKA B. In a letter to the Greek president in early 
July, he accused the junta of attempting to subvert the government 
of Cyprus through the Greek officers of the National Guard, who 
in turn supported the terrorist activities of EOKA B. Makarios 
demanded immediate removal of the 650 Greek officers staffing 
the National Guard and their replacement by 100 instructors who 
would help reorganize the Greek Cypriot force. 

The reply to the Makarios challenge came on July 1 5 in the form 
of a coup d'etat led by Greek officers in the National Guard, under 
orders from Athens. The fierce fighting that broke out resulted in 
casualties estimated at over 500, but the lightly armed Tactical 
Police Reserve and irregular pro-Makarios units were no match 
for the heavily armed National Guardsmen and the EOKA B 


National Security 

irregulars. Narrowly escaping capture when the presidential palace 
was bombarded, Makarios was flown to London from the Sover- 
eign Base Area at Akrotiri. Former EOKA gunman and convict- 
ed murderer Nicos Sampson, notorious for his brutality in the 1950s 
and 1960s, was proclaimed president. As Makarios had foreseen, 
but the Greek military leaders had not, Turkey reacted forcibly 
to the coup by landing a large number of troops on the northern 
coast of Cyprus. As a result, both the insurrectionary government 
in Cyprus and the military dictatorship in Greece fell from power. 

The Turkish Military Intervention, July-August 1974 

Citing the Treaty of Guarantee as the basis for its action, Tur- 
key launched its seaborne assault west of Kyrenia on July 20, 1974. 
About 6,000 men participated in the landing force, which was fol- 
lowed shortly afterward by about 1 ,000 paratroopers dropped north 
of Nicosia. Turkish Cypriot irregulars joined the Turkish regu- 
lars in both areas, but they faced fierce opposition from the Na- 
tional Guard. Kyrenia did not come under Turkish control until 
heavy sea and air bombardment drove out Greek Cypriot troops 
on the third day of fighting. Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriot enclaves 
throughout the southern part of the island fell to Greek Cypriot 
forces. Only in Nicosia was the Turkish Cypriot enclave success- 
fully defended by TMT irregulars, with the aid of the Turkish Air 

When a UN-imposed cease-fire took effect on July 22, Turkish 
troops held a triangular area in northern Cyprus, with Kyrenia 
in the center of its base along the coast and northern Nicosia at 
its apex. Clear Turkish superiority in personnel and equipment 
deterred Greek leaders from intervening. Nearly half the Turkish 
Cypriot population lay outside the occupied area, in enclaves now 
controlled by the National Guard. During the next three weeks, 
while foreign ministers from Britain, Greece, and Turkey met in 
Geneva, Turkish troops continued to seize control of areas out- 
side the cease-fire lines, broadening the triangle under their occu- 
pation. Their troop strength was augmented through the Kyrenia 
bridgehead to some 40,000 soldiers and 200 tanks. 

On August 14, immediately upon the breakup of the second 
round of Geneva talks, two divisions of the Turkish Army advanced 
beyond their cease-fire positions. During the three-day offensive, 
Greek Cypriot resistance crumpled under heavy air, armor, and 
artillery bombardment. Civilians, alarmed by reports of atrocities 
during the first Turkish campaign, fled ahead of the advancing 
troops, who proceeded unimpeded through much of northern 
Cyprus. By August 16, the Turkish advance had reached the 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Figure 10. Nicosia and the Green Line 

predetermined "Attila Line," behind which troops occupied 37 
percent of Cypriot territory, and Turkey ordered a cease-fire (see 
fig. 1). Although authoritative figures on casualties were not pub- 
lished, it was estimated that Greek Cypriot forces suffered 6,000 
casualties, and Turkish-led forces lost 1,500 dead and 2,000 

De Facto Partition, 1974- 

About 180,000 people, an estimated one-third of the population 
of Cyprus, became refugees during the fighting. The buffer zone 
between the two cease-fire lines occupied by UNFICYP marked 
the almost total segregation of the Greek and Turkish ethnic com- 
munities. At first, tensions were high along the buffer zone, which 


National Security 

extended for 180 kilometers across the island and was in most places 
3-7 kilometers wide (although as narrow as 20 meters in the center 
of Nicosia) (see fig. 10). Sporadic exchanges of gunfire across the 
lines and infiltrations by Turkish patrols gradually subsided. By 
the close of 1978, the UN reported that the cease-fire lines were 
almost completely stabilized. During most of the 1980s, cease-fire 
violations were confined mostly to occasional incidents of misbe- 
havior by individual soldiers. 

All but a few hundred Greek Cypriots fled from the Turkish- 
occupied area in the north or were induced to leave in the period 
following the 1974 fighting. As of late 1989, only 611 Greek Cypriots 
lived under Turkish occupation, almost all of them in the Karpas 
Peninsula. A further 276 Maronites were in the north. Only about 
100 Turkish Cypriots remained in the south. Turkish soldiers who 
had fought on Cyprus were allowed to settie with their families and 
given homes. In addition, a significant number of immigrants from 
Turkey had been allowed to settle in the north. Both the Turkish 
Cypriot refugees from the south and the settlers from Turkey were 
granted homes and property abandoned by Greek Cypriots. The 
presence of Turkish immigrants, the appropriation of property, 
and the fate of more than 1,600 Greek Cypriots missing since the 
1974 fighting complicated the prospects of a settlement to end the 
division of the island. Beginning in 1976, a succession of low- and 
high-level meetings, intercommunal talks, and talks initiated by 
the UN secretary general led to progress on some issues but, as 
of late 1990, had failed to achieve a political solution (see Search 
for a New Political Formula, ch. 4). 

Problems of Internal Security 

There has been little political violence in Cyprus since the Turk- 
ish invasion of 1974. Violence on behalf of enosis, which had been 
prevalent from 1955 until the invasion, was rejected by the vast 
majority of Greek Cypriots after 1974, although union with Greece 
continued to command strong emotional appeal in the right wing. 
Moreover, Turkish troops acted as a deterrent against terrorist oper- 
ations aimed against the Turkish presence or threatening change 
in the status quo. Turkish sources have claimed that the Republic 
of Cyprus supplied arms and possibly even guerrilla- warfare train- 
ing to Kurdish and Armenian opponents of the Turkish govern- 
ment at secret camps in the Troodos Mountains. Such allegations 
have been rejected by the Greek Cypriot authorities, however, and 
most observers thought it unlikely that such activities could be car- 
ried out clandestinely. Nonetheless, leaders of the Kurdish rebels 
had been received officially by members of the Cyprus House of 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Representatives, and a former head of the National Guard had 
reportedly visited training camps for Kurdish guerrillas in Syria. 

EOKA B became a factor of diminishing importance after its 
role in the coup of July 1974, although it continued to be involved 
in some violence against the Makarios government. Fears that the 
organization might conduct a terrorist campaign against Turkish 
occupation in the north never materialized. Many former EOKA 
B activists accepted an offer of amnesty from Makarios. However, 
several dozen of the most extreme leaders, including Nicos Samp- 
son, were arrested and imprisoned. A law enacted in 1977 provid- 
ed the basis for purging EOKA B members from the public service, 
the police, and the National Guard. In early 1978, the group an- 
nounced its formal dissolution. During the 1980s, there was no fur- 
ther EOKA B activity, although veterans of the group came together 
periodically on patriotic occasions, as did other disbanded paramili- 
tary groups. Sampson returned to Cyprus from exile in June 1990, 
but was immediately arrested by the Greek Cypriot police. 

The danger of intercommunal violence was greatly reduced by 
the buffer provided by UNFICYP. It was feared initially that refu- 
gees from the north after the Turkish intervention in 1974 might 
resort to arms in an effort to regain lost houses and property. The 
rapid recovery of the economy in southern Cyprus, coupled with 
large amounts of international aid, enabled the refugees to be ac- 
commodated and absorbed by the community. Although perma- 
nent housing had by 1990 been provided for all of the refugees, 
many still wished to return to their homes; this desire was a source 
of emotion and tension, but not of significant violence. 

Beginning in 1987, a series of demonstrations known as the 
Women's Walk Home were carried out by Greek Cypriot women 
trying to force their way into Turkish-controlled territory. For the 
most part, the women were turned back without casualties by 
UNFICYP and Turkish security personnel after entering the buffer 
zone and sometimes advancing a few meters into the Turkish- 
occupied north. The most serious incident occurred in July 1989, 
when about 1,000 women and religious leaders, some displaying 
Greek flags and spearheaded by a group of men who pushed aside 
barriers, crossed the buffer zone without interference from the Greek 
Cypriot police. More than 100 were arrested by Turkish Cypriot 
forces, and some women were injured in scuffling. The arrested 
women were released within a few days, but ten men, including 
two priests, were detained for ten days. In March 1990, five youths 
were sentenced to jail terms of up to three months for infiltrating 
Turkish Cypriot territory and attempting to pull down a Turkish 
flag. The Women's Walk Home was mainly an effort to bring 


Relatives demonstrating for information about the fate of the 
1,600 Greek Cypriots missing in action since the summer of 1974 
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 

pressure on the Greek Cypriot government to stand firm on issues 
of freedom of movement and settlement and compensation for 
property in the negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. Neverthe- 
less, it had the potential to provoke a confrontation of forces in 
the buffer area. 

The spillover of terrorism from the Middle East injected addi- 
tional tensions and violence unconnected to the conflict between 
the Greek- and Turkish-speaking communities. With its strategic 
location, Cyprus had increasingly been used as a transit point for 
the movement of individuals and arms as well as terrorist actions 
arising out of the fighting in Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
The presence of missions of Syria, Libya, and Israel and a liaison 
office of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) all within 
close proximity in Nicosia complicated the efforts of the Greek 
Cypriot authorities to counter the security threat. With the cur- 
tailment of direct air service to Beirut, a relatively safe way of travel 
to war-torn Lebanon was by flying to Cyprus and then continuing 
by ferry. Helicopter flights also connected Cyprus with the beseiged 
Christian enclaves in Beirut, permitting the movement of person- 
nel and arms. Palestinian terrorist groups regularly transited the is- 
land to other destinations, particularly to Eastern Europe. A weekly 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

flight of the Iranian airline linking Tehran with Cyprus also facili- 
tated the movement of terrorists. 

A number of international incidents involving Palestinians or 
Lebanese refugees occurred in the late 1980s. In 1985 three Israe- 
lis were murdered aboard their private yacht in Larnaca harbor 
by gunmen linked to the PLO. This action provoked a damaging 
raid six days later by the Israeli air force against the PLO head- 
quarters in Tunisia. In 1988 seven PLO officials were killed in two 
car bombings in Cyprus, and a ship slated to carry Palestinian 
deportees to Israel was bombed at its dock in Limassol. The Abu 
Nidal terrorist organization, headquartered in Libya, was suspected 
in an attempt to bomb the Israeli Embassy; the bomb exploded 
some distance from the embassy, killing one of the terrorists and 
two Cypriots. In October 1989, six Lebanese were found guilty 
of possessing Soviet SAM- 7 antiaircraft missiles with the intent 
of shooting down an airplane carrying the Lebanese dissident Chris- 
tian leader, General Michel Aoun. 

Other violence was linked to protests over the continued exis- 
tence of British bases on the island and their use by the United 
States. In 1986 British service personnel and their dependents were 
targets of attacks by groups believed to be linked with Libya. The 
attacks were believed to be in retaliation against Britain for mak- 
ing its bases in England available for United States raids against 

The Greek Cypriot communist party, known as the Progressive 
Party of the Working People (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou 
Laou — AKEL), has campaigned vigorously against the bases and 
the use of them for United States intelligence- gathering. AKEL 
also proclaimed its opposition to what it regarded as the linkage 
of Cyprus to NATO through the bases, the presence of the Unit- 
ed States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and United States 
' 'provocation" against Libya, all of which were perceived as 
threatening the peace and security of the region. Despite its adamant 
foreign policy, AKEL has never pursued a violent course in press- 
ing its political demands nor has it been regarded as a security 

Armed Forces 

By virtue of its strategic situation, Cyprus has been invaded, 
conquered, and colonized by foreign military powers that succes- 
sively dominated the region. Since the second millennium B.C., 
the island has been occupied by the Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyp- 
tians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, crusaders, Genoese, Venetians, 
and Ottoman Turks. It was employed by the Arabs as a base to 


National Security 

launch warfare against Byzantium, and by the crusaders in their 
efforts to wrest the Holy Land from Muslims. The Turkish Cypriot 
community on Cyprus originated in the some 50,000 Turkish oc- 
cupation forces and discharged soldiers who remained on the is- 
land after the defeat of the Venetians in 1571 . Britain used Cyprus 
as a base in both world wars and as a staging ground for the attack 
on Suez in 1956. 

Incapable of repelling the many foreign powers that have over- 
run the island, the Cypriot people have inherited little military tra- 
dition of their own. In the twentieth century, some 1 1 ,000 Cypriots 
fought as auxiliaries with the British Army during World War I, 
and about 30,000 Cypriots served in the Cyprus Regiment and 
other British units during World War II. But Cyprus itself was 
not the scene of fighting in either war, and Cypriot recruits were 
demobilized at the close of hostilities. After independence in 1960, 
Cyprus remained a neutral country and became a member of the 
Nonaligned Movement (NAM). It did not join any military al- 

The intractability of the Cyprus problem nevertheless imposed 
on the island the presence of six separate military forces. As of the 
early 1990s, these forces included Turkish troops in the north, the 
Greek Army contingent in the south, the British in the two Sover- 
eign Base Areas on the southern coast, and UNFICYP manning 
the buffer zone separating the two Cyprus communities. The in- 
digenous Cypriot armed forces on the island consisted of the Greek 
Cypriot National Guard in the south and the Turkish Cypriot Secu- 
rity Force (Kibns Turk Emniyet Kuvvetleri) in the north. 

In reunification negotiations, the Greek Cypriot government pro- 
posed demilitarization as the way to remove both external and in- 
ternal security threats. Specificially, the government foresaw the 
withdrawal of all non-Cypriot military forces, the disbanding of 
Cypriot military forces under a timetable to be drawn up in ad- 
vance of establishing a new federal government, and a UN- 
controlled force to assist in internal security. 

Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, called for a "balance" be- 
tween non-Cypriot and Cypriot forces on both sides of the island. 
Once a federal government was in place, non-Cypriot forces on 
both sides would be brought to the level needed for ensuring the 
fulfillment of guarantees. 

Forces in the Government-Controlled Area 

Under the provisions of the constitution of 1960, a 2,000-member 
bicommunal force, the Cyprus Army, composed of 60 percent 
Greek Cypriots and 40 percent Turkish Cypriots, was to be the 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

primary security arm of the Republic of Cyprus. This force was 
never brought into being because of disagreement about its organi- 
zation, and since 1964 the National Guard — composed mainly of 
Greek Cypriot draftees — had served as the main armed body in 
the southern part of the island. In addition, a Greek Army regi- 
ment of 950 men was present on the island in accordance with the 
terms of the Treaty of Alliance. 

During the decade after its formation by Archbishop Makarios, 
the National Guard became increasingly oriented toward a pro- 
Greek junta, anticommunist, and, ironically, ultimately anti- 
Makarios position that culminated in the 1974 coup. The fall of 
the military from power in Greece led to the recall of the most avid 
right-wing Greek officers and their replacement by officers of more 
moderate views. By the late 1970s, the National Guard was no 
longer identified with any political faction and exercised no politi- 
cal influence. Although it had not been regarded by Western 
analysts as a very effective professional military force because of 
its earlier intense politicization, the National Guard performed 
credibly in 1974 in resisting the initial landing of overwhelmingly 
superior Turkish forces. 

Although it had undertaken a major strengthening and modern- 
ization program in the late 1980s, the National Guard had only 
a limited ability to deter a major Turkish offensive or to mount 
counterattacks. According to a statement by Minister of Defense 
Andreas Aloneftis in 1990, the National Guard buildup was strictly 
defensive in purpose. Aloneftis acknowledged that the Greek Cypri- 
ots would like to ''liberate" the land in the north but said this was 
impossible in light of existing realities. He said that he was seek- 
ing to build a reliable deterrent force against a Turkish effort to 
occupy the whole island. The objective, he asserted, was to be able 
to delay the Turkish advance for two to three weeks until the UN 
Security Council could intervene. 

Personnel and Recruitment 

According to The Military Balance, 1989-90, published by the In- 
ternational Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the National 
Guard had a complement of some 13,000 men on active duty in 
1989. Scaled back from a peak of 35,000 in 1967, its size had re- 
mained fairly constant since the Turkish invasion in 1974. The bulk 
of its personnel were Greek Cypriot conscripts fulfilling twenty- 
six months of mandatory service. 

The National Guard's officer corps had always consisted main- 
ly of officers detailed to it from the Greek Army. In early 1990, 
an estimated 1,800 officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) 


Soldiers of the National Guard 
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington 

from the Greek Army were serving in the National Guard, com- 
pared with approximately 800 Greek Cypriot officers and NCOs. 
Greek officers dominated in senior positions; as of 1990, the Na- 
tional Guard's commander, deputy commander, and chief of staff 
were all Greek nationals. The senior Greek Cypriot officer was a 
divisional commander with the rank of brigadier general. Efforts 
were under way to increase the number of Greek Cypriots in the 
force. In early 1990, parliament approved the appointment of Greek 
Cypriots to an additional sixty-five officer and fifty NCO positions. 

Young Cypriots wishing to make a career of military service at- 
tended the Greek military academy. National Guard officers also 
obtained their advanced training at Greek military institutions, 
where a designated number of places were set aside for them. In 
addition, training was provided in France in the use of the new 
French equipment being introduced into the National Guard. Some 
conscripts could become reserve officers after successfully completing 
a six-month course, then serving as second lieutenants for ten 
months of active duty. Greek officers assumed the primary respon- 
sibility for National Guard training at all levels. 

Soldiers completing their active duty continued to serve in the 
reserves until age fifty, and officers served until age sixty-five. As 
of 1990, it was estimated that the National Guard could call upon 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

66,000 first-line reserves and more than 30,000 older second-line 
reserves (over age fifty). Selected reserve units were called up peri- 
odically without advance notice to test the mobilization system. 
A certain percentage of the reserves were mobilized annually to 
participate in a week of National Guard field exercises. 

Uniforms, symbols of rank, and insignia of the National Guard 
were similar to those of the Greek Army. The color and cut of the 
uniforms was the same, although the design of the buttons, the 
device on caps, and the shield on epaulets incorporated an olive 
branch device corresponding to that found on the Cypriot flag and 
coat of arms. Fatigue uniforms were of camouflage cloth. 

Few exemptions were granted from compulsory service. Exit per- 
mits from the island and the opportunity for higher education were 
not available until the service obligation was fulfilled. The annual 
call-up was in June, and discharges were granted in August to con- 
form to the academic year. In spite of incentives, it proved difficult 
to induce qualified individuals to remain in military service, es- 
pecially at the NCO level. Young men with skilled or semiskilled 
occupations could easily obtain well-paying jobs in the thriving 
civilian economy. 

Under the influence of an energetic commanding officer, the 
training regime was intensified in the late 1980s. The morale of 
the National Guard was considered high, as a result of the more 
rigorous training program and the introduction of modern weapons 
systems. Draftee wages were low — about US$15 a month in the 
late 1980s — and were generally supplemented by help from fami- 
lies to meet personal expenses. Conscripts were often able to ar- 
range postings near their homes. Career personnel were paid on 
a scale of remuneration that appeared adequate, especially at the 
officer level. 

As of 1990, the first women had been recruited as volunteers 
into the National Guard, following a decision to accept female ap- 
plicants for noncombatant positions. The minister of defense said 
in 1989 that conscription of women was being studied and might 
be introduced selectively. 

In March 1989, Minister of Defense Aloneftis announced that 
a home guard to provide local defense and protect rear areas would 
be formed of men from the second-line reserves and other men who 
had been exempted from military service because of dependents. 
By late 1990, it was not clear what progress had been made in or- 
ganizing the home guard, although about 3,000 men, including re- 
servists, living in villages adjacent to the UN buffer zone had been 
recruited and trained to impede a Turkish attack. They were 
equipped with small arms and light antitank weapons. 


National Security 

Organization and Equipment 

In 1990 the National Guard was commanded by Greek Lieu- 
tenant General Panayotis Markopoulos. He was responsible to the 
minister of defense and ultimately to President George Vassiliou. 
The National Guard was organized into an army headquarters, 
two divisional headquarters, and two brigade headquarters that 
would be filled out with combat units upon mobilization. Its larg- 
est active units consisted of two mechanized battalions, one armored 
battalion, an artillery battalion, and a commando battalion. Re- 
serves were organized into six infantry brigades, each with three 
infantry battalions, one light artillery battalion, and one armored 
reconnaissance squadron. These units were maintained only at 
cadre strength. Greek Army forces were organized into one infan- 
try battalion, one commando battalion, and a support element. 

Foreign military observers considered the Greek Cypriot and 
Greek forces on the southern part of the island to be seriously defi- 
cient relative to the Turkish Army contingent in the north, nota- 
bly with respect to armored strength. They also had litde protection 
against aircraft based on the nearby Turkish mainland. During 
the 1974 fighting, the 200 Turkish tanks ferried to the island had 
proven the determining factor in the collapse of the Greek Cypriot 
defenses. The acquisition of armored equipment, antitank weapons, 
and antiaircraft systems by the National Guard in the late 1980s 
addressed the most conspicuous weaknesses in the National Guard's 
defensive armaments, but they still fell short of matching the Turk- 
ish forces in the north. 

The National Guard's armor, which had previously consisted 
of a few Soviet T-34 tanks of World War II vintage and a small 
number of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and obsolete armored 
cars, was significantly augmented beginning in 1987, with the deliv- 
ery of French AMX-30 B-2 tanks mounted with 105mm guns. 
The total order of fifty-four tanks was due to be in service by the 
early 1990s. A total of 127 French wheeled APCs had also been 
acquired; 27 were fitted with 20mm cannons and the rest with 
turret-mounted machineguns. Also on order were 120 EE-9 Cas- 
cavel six- wheeled armored vehicles from Brazil, equipped with 
90mm guns, of which 40 had been delivered as of 1989. The EE-1 1 
Urutu, a Brazilian APC, had been purchased and twenty-eight ar- 
mored reconnaissance vehicles, the EE-3 Jararaca, also manufac- 
tured in Brazil, were on order. It was also reported that 500 vehicles, 
presumably unarmored, would be supplied by Greece as aid in 
1990, as part of a longer-term plan to modernize 2,000 vehicles 
in the National Guard inventory (see table 23, Appendix). 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

The National Guard's artillery units were equipped with 75mm 
to 105mm guns and howitzers and truck-mounted 128mm multi- 
ple rocket launchers of Yugoslav manufacture. Antitank defenses 
had been stiffened by the purchase of Milan and HOT (high- 
subsonic, optically tracked) wire- guided missile systems from 
France. Some of the HOT missiles were fitted to armored vehicles 
and to six Gazelle helicopters acquired from France in 1988. 

The air defense capability was strengthened in the late 1980s 
by the acquisition of triple 20mm cannons from Yugoslavia and 
twin 35mm towed antiaircraft guns from Switzerland, which were 
to be used in conjunction with the Contraves Skyguard fire-control 
radar system. The older 40mm and 94mm antiaircraft guns still 
in the inventory were considered virtually useless against modern 
fighter aircraft. The National Guard had also acquired from Syria 
a small number of Soviet SA-7 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. 

The National Guard air element as of 1989 included Gazelle 
helicopters and one Pilatus Maritime Defender suitable for coastal 
patrol and light transport duties. In mid- 1989, the first of two Swiss 
Pilatus PC -9 turboprop aircraft was delivered. These planes were 
intended for advanced training but could be modified for combat 
missions. The National Guard Naval Command, with 330 per- 
sonnel in 1989, had one coastal patrol craft of 95 tons mounting 
a 40mm gun. 

According to press reports in spring 1990, the Greek Cypriot 
government had placed orders for additional Gazelle helicopters 
mounted with HOT missiles, more antiaircraft guns, medium-range 
antiaircraft missiles, and Leonidas armored vehicles from Greece. 

Defense Spending 

Defense costs were divided into two categories, budgetary spend- 
ing and off-budget expenditures. The former were believed to in- 
clude mainly the ongoing personnel and training expenditures of 
the National Guard, and the latter included capital expenditures, 
notably arms purchases. Off-budget expenditures were disbursed 
from a defense fund, the size of which was not disclosed. The defense 
fund was financed by a special defense levy on interest, dividends, 
rents, and company profits. This levy was raised from 2 to 3 per- 
cent effective July 1990, and was to be extended for three years un- 
til mid- 1993. In addition, receipts from increased taxes on gasoline 
and cigarettes were to be deposited in the defense fund. Private com- 
panies and the Church of Cyprus, considered to be the wealthiest 
institution on the island, also contributed directly to the fund. 

According to data published by the United States Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency (AC DA), which included only 


National Security 

regularly budgeted defense items, military spending had gradual- 
ly tapered off, from US$42 million in 1981 to US$35 million in 
1987. With inflation taken into account, the reduction was even 
more marked, from US$52 million in 1981 to US$35 million in 
1987, in constant 1987 dollars. Budgeted defense spending con- 
stituted only 0.9 percent of the gross national product (GNP— see 
Glossary) in 1987 (down from 2.0 percent in 1981) and 2.9 per- 
cent of total central government expenditures (down from 7.0 per- 
cent in 1981). Budgeted military expenditures amounted to US$51 
per capita annually. 

Although total defense outlays were considered classified infor- 
mation, Aloneftis said in a 1990 interview that they would total 
US$325 million in 1990 and that similar amounts would be spent 
annually for the following three to five years. This amount was 
triple 1986 defense spending. According to Aloneftis, the arms build- 
up was being financed through supplier credits and loans from 
France, Greece, Italy, Singapore, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland. 
During the five-year period of 1983-87, total arms imports had 
been US$320 million, and most of these shipments had occurred 
in 1987, according to ACDA. France had been the dominant sup- 
plier (US$290 million), and most of the rest had come from Brazil. 

Forces in the Turkish-Administered Area 

In 1990 the dominant military force in the Turkish-administered 
northern sector of the island remained, as it had been since the 
Turkish invasion of 1974, the 28th and 39th infantry divisions of 
the Turkish Army, backed by an independent armored brigade 
and some artillery support. The 28th division was headquartered 
at Asha (Pasakoy) to the northeast of Nicosia, and the 39th divi- 
sion near Morphou (Giizelyurt). The corps reserve was at Kythrea 
(Degirmenlik) to the northeast of Nicosia. The Turkish contingent 
was referred to officially as the Cyprus Turkish Peace Force. The 
original force of 40,000 troops was reduced shortly after the 1974 
invasion. In early 1990, Turkish defense authorities claimed that 
the Cyprus contingent amounted to only 17,500, whereas Greek 
Cypriot authorities placed its strength at 35,000. Independent 
sources believed that the force numbered about 30,000. 

The Turkish detachments on Cyprus were part of the Turkish 
Aegean Army command structure, with headquarters at Izmir on 
the Turkish mainland. However, the commander of the Turkish 
troops reported directly to the Turkish General Staff in the capi- 
tal, Ankara. The commander on Cyprus as of late 1989 was Lieu- 
tenant General Sabahattin Akinci. Although responsible for all 
security questions, Akinci was not directly involved in political 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

matters of northern Cyprus. The principal missions of the Turkish 
Army contingent were to maintain the security of the Turkish 
Cypriot community, defend the borders established in 1974, pro- 
tect against any Greek Cypriot guerrilla attacks or other cross-border 
actions, and assist in the training of members of the Turkish Cypriot 
armed force. 

Details on the arms and equipment of the Turkish Army forces 
were not available, although they were known to include M-47 
and M-48 tanks and M-l 13 APCs of United States origin, as well 
as 105mm, 155mm, and 203mm guns and howitzers. The forces 
were supplied with 40mm antiaircraft guns and, according to Greek 
sources, the Milan antitank missile. Turkey had supplemented its 
armored inventory in the late 1980s with M-48A5 tanks that had 
been upgraded and mounted with 105mm guns as part of a major 
modernization program throughout the Turkish Army. As of 1990, 
the Turkish forces on Cyprus were believed to have more than 200 
converted M-48s and 100 of the original M-48s and M-47s. The 
Turkish forces were also equipped with light aircraft and Bell 
UH-1D helicopters, operating from a newly constructed airfield 
at Lefkoniko (Gecitkale). Small groups of combat jet aircraft of 
the Turkish Air Force occasionally appeared at the new field, but 
none were based there. 

Even before independence, the Turkish Cypriot community had 
maintained its own paramilitary force (the TMT), trained and 
equipped by the Turkish Army contingent on the island. In 1967 
this force were named the Mucahit (fighter), and in 1975 the Miica- 
hit was renamed the Turkish Cypriot Security Force. As of 1989, 
the strength of this force was believed to be about 4,000. It was 
organized into seven infantry battalions armed with light weapons 
plus some artillery units equipped with mortars. 

The Turkish Cypriot Security Force was commanded in 1989 
by an officer of the Turkish Army, Brigadier General Bilgi Buyu- 
kunal, who had both operational and administrative responsibili- 
ties, as well as control over the police force. The commander was 
responsible to the prime minister of the self-proclaimed "Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC") through the minister 
of foreign affairs and defense, Kenan Atakol. A unified military- 
civilian defense staff of the ministry was responsible for defense 
policy and strategy. Although legally separate from the Turkish 
Army on the island, the Turkish Cypriot Security Force was be- 
lieved to remain under the de facto operational control of the Turk- 
ish forces. It also depended on Turkey for training and equipment. 
Most of its officers were regular Turkish Army officers on second- 
ment. Its announced budget for 1990 was US$3.9 million, an 


National Security 

unusually small amount, representing only 1.5 percent of the to- 
tal government budget. Observers believed that many of its ex- 
penses were absorbed by the Turkish Army. 

Turkish Cypriot males were liable to conscription at age eigh- 
teen for a twenty-four-month period of service. Discharged soldiers 
served in the reserves until the age of fifty. The number of first- 
line and second-line reserves was estimated at 5,000 and 10,000, 
respectively, as of 1989. 

British Forces on Cyprus 

Under the provisions of the Treaty of Establishment, Britain re- 
tained perpetual sovereignty over two areas on the southern coast 
of Cyprus, totaling 256 square kilometers. A further fifteen reserved 
areas, including water sources and off-base radar sites, remained 
under British jurisdiction. Since 1960 the British Army and Royal 
Air Force (RAF) have garrisoned up to 10,000 troops in the Sover- 
eign Base Areas at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Formerly, two squadrons 
of bombers and their fighter escorts were based on Cyprus, but 
since the late 1970s the RAF has no longer stationed combat air- 
craft on the island. 

With the decline of the British military presence in the Middle 
East, the bases have been used as training sites for RAF and ground 
force units and staging areas between Britain and southern Asia 
and the Far East. With permission from the Cyprus government, 
British troops also carried on extensive training outside the base 
area in the Troodos Mountains. The bases provided support for 
UN troops on Cyprus and workshops for maintenance of UN equip- 
ment. The most important role of the bases was electronic intelli- 
gence gathering and communications relay. Intercepts were made 
of aircraft, ship, and satellite communications from the eastern 
Mediterranean through the Middle East to Iran. Information so 
acquired was shared with the United States. Although the bases 
had no formal link to NATO, their presence in the primary area 
of operation of the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean 
was of material value to the alliance. 

The bases provided logistic support for peace-keeping missions 
by United States forces in the Middle East, including the Multina- 
tional Force sent to Lebanon in 1982. U-2 reconnaissance planes 
were based at Akrotiri beginning in the 1970s, to monitor the cease- 
fire in the Sinai. The United States also maintained Blackhawk 
helicopters there, which had flown support missions on behalf of 
the American Embassy in Beirut prior to its closure. 

As of 1990, the British personnel strength of the Sovereign Base 
Areas was about 4,000, plus approximately the same number of 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

dependents. The army units consisted of one infantry battalion plus 
two infantry companies and one armored reconnaissance squadron. 
The only permanent RAF unit was a squadron of five Wessex 
helicopters. The army had six Gazelle helicopters, which also served 
to support UNFICYP activities. 

The British bases were a long-standing source of contention, 
although most Greek Cypriots as of 1990 accepted the presence 
of British forces. Military relations were very good, and British 
and Greek Cypriot authorities cooperated closely in antiterrorism 
matters. Almost all Greek Cypriot political parties agreed that Brit- 
ain should eventually give up its rights on the island. The com- 
munist party, AKEL, was the most vocal in attacking the use of 
the bases for intelligence purposes and in calling for the British to 
relinquish the territory. 

United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus 

United Nations (UN) troops were present on Cyprus beginning 
with the breakdown of the constitutional arrangements in 1964. 
The original three-month UNFICYP mandate was extended, ini- 
tially at three-month intervals and, after 1974, at six-month inter- 
vals. Any of the permanent members of the UN Security Council 
could veto its continuation, but none has ever done so. The Secu- 
rity Council repeatedly affirmed the original mandate and adopt- 
ed a number of resolutions that required the force to perform 
additional or modified functions. The basic mandate called on 
UNFICYP to operate "in the interest of preserving international 
peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence 
of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and 
restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." 

The UNFICYP force level was maintained at about 4,500 from 
1965 to 1968, and 3,500 from 1969 to 1972. Except for a temporary 
increase to 4,440 for a period after the 1974 fighting, its size gradu- 
ally declined, reaching about 2,000 as of 1990. 

Before 1974 UNFICYP troops were deployed throughout the 
island between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot defense posi- 
tions. Frequently UN soldiers acted as mediators to prevent minor 
squabbles from leading to armed conflict. Only rarely was force, 
or even the threat of force, necessary in these efforts. In 1974, 
however, UNFICYP was unable to prevent either the attack against 
Makarios or the Turkish intervention (operations that, in any case, 
exceeded both its mandate and its military preparedness.) During 
the fighting, however, UN troops took up positions at Nicosia In- 
ternational Airport, preventing either side from capturing this stra- 
tegic location. UNFICYP also played an essential role in the 


United Nations troops manning an observation post 
looking across the Mesaoria 
Courtesy United Nations 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

exchange of prisoners. After the hostilities, all UN personnel moved 
back into the buffer zone between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot 
cease-fire lines. 

Through a system of 146 observation posts, 54 of them perma- 
nently manned, and mobile and standing patrols, the buffer zone 
was kept under constant surveillance. A patrol and communica- 
tions track running the entire length of the buffer zone was used 
for reconnaissance, monitoring of agricultural activities in the zone, 
resupply of observation posts, and rapid reaction to any incidents. 
Regular patrols were generally conducted in Land Rovers or similar 
vehicles. Armored scout cars formed a reserve, and British helicop- 
ters were also available if needed. In 1989 both sides accepted a 
UNFICYP proposal to dismantle their forward military positions 
in Nicosia and cease patrolling in three sensitive areas of the city 
to reduce the risk of incidents. 

In April 1989, command of UNFICYP was assumed by Major 
General Clive Milner of Canada. The head of each national con- 
tingent in the UN force was directly responsible to the UNFICYP 
commander, as was the chief of staff, who oversaw the headquar- 
ters staff and the various support units. Each national contingent 
operated as a unit in prescribed areas in the buffer zone; only at 
headquarters did personnel from different nations work together 
on a daily basis. As of 1990, Britain provided 742 soldiers, Cana- 
da 575, Austria 410, and Denmark 342. The Irish, Finnish, and 
Swedish contingents had been reduced to token numbers in 1973, 
1977, and 1988, respectively. The main British, Canadian, Aus- 
trian, and Danish units were organized as infantry battalions. All 
seven participating countries supplied military police and headquar- 
ters personnel. In addition, Britain furnished a nineteen-member 
scout car squadron and most of the UNFICYP support units. Aus- 
tria and Sweden supplied the thirty-five-member civilian police con- 
tingent under UNFICYP control. 

Each contingent wore the standard uniform of its home coun- 
try, although UNFICYP personnel wore distinctive blue headgear, 
blue UN sleeve emblems, and a variety of UN-issued accessories. 
Each contingent rotated its troops every six months, although a 
small number of staff personnel undertook longer tours of duty. 
Salaries were based on those in each contingent's home country 
and were paid by the home countries. The cost of maintaining 
UNFICYP came to about US$26 million in 1989, including oper- 
ational expenses, transport, pay, and allowances above what would 
have been incurred if contingents were serving at home, and sal- 
aries and travel of nonmilitary personnel. Funds for these expen- 
ses depended entirely on voluntary contributions by UN member 


National Security 

states. These contributions, however, had never been sufficient. 
Reimbursement claims of troop-contributing countries had been 
met only to June 1980. The accumulated deficit was nearly US$175 
million by the close of 1989. 

UNFICYP personnel functioned in several capacities in addi- 
tion to monitoring the cease-fire lines. They provided security for 
farmers from both Cypriot communities who lived and worked 
within the buffer zone. They visited Turkish Cypriots in the south 
and Greek Cypriots in the north to ensure their safety and welfare, 
and arranged temporary visits and reunions of relatives. UNFICYP 
commanders held meetings with commanders of the National Guard 
and of the Turkish forces as required, and meetings were held with 
both sides at the chief-of- staff level at regular intervals. The civilian 
police contingent of UNFICYP functioned as a liaison between the 
two communities' police forces and maintained law and order in 
the buffer zone. 


The police system, like the armed forces, was split along com- 
munal lines. The 1960 constitution called for two police organiza- 
tions: an urban police force, to be commanded by a Greek Cypriot, 
and a rural police force, or gendarmerie, to be commanded by a 
Turkish Cypriot. The constitutional system broke down after the 
Christmas crisis of 1963, and each community subsequendy provid- 
ed its own police. The Turkish Cypriot police was originally an 
arm of the paramilitary TMT; after 1974 it operated under the 
Turkish Cypriot Security Force, within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Defense and the Ministry of Interior of the Turkish 
Cypriot administration in the north. New legislation in 1984 rede- 
fined its structure, but it continued to be accountable to the com- 
mander of the Turkish Cypriot Security Force. 

The Cyprus Police Force, in contrast, was a force organization- 
ally and operationally separate from the National Guard, within 
the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Cyprus. After 1963 the 
police of the government of Cyprus assumed no responsibility for 
the Turkish Cypriot community (in 1973 the force of over 3,000 
contained only one Turkish Cypriot), so that the de facto parti- 
tion of the island after 1974 meant only a reduction in the amount 
of territory for which the police were responsible. The Greek Cypriot 
police force rose in strength from 2,550 in 1969 to 3,500 in 1978, 
and to 3,700 in 1989. 

Organization of the Greek Cypriot Police 

The chief of the Cyprus Police Force was responsible to the 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

minister of interior. He was aided by a deputy chief and, below 
him, two assistant chiefs, who supervised activities at police head- 
quarters. Headquarters consisted of four departments: adminis- 
tration; traffic; criminal investigation; and planning, training, and 
public relations. Beneath headquarters in the chain of command 
stood seven division chiefs, each of whom supervised a police dis- 
trict; beneath them were station chiefs. Directly under the nation- 
al headquarters were five special units: the Police Training School, 
the Aliens and Immigration Service, the Fire Service, the Cyprus 
Information Service, and the Mobile Immediate Action Units. The 
latter two services, although administratively responsible to the chief 
of police, were operationally controlled elsewhere. The Cyprus In- 
formation Service, a small intelligence unit concerned with both 
security matters and common crime, received its directions from 
the president of the republic. The Mobile Immediate Action Units, 
a reincarnation of the Tactical Police Reserve of the early 1970s, 
were elite forces trained to protect high-ranking officials and for- 
eign embassies and to provide special weapons assault teams in the 
event of terrorist attacks. The units' training and operational con- 
trol were in the hands of the National Guard, and their commander 
was an officer of the National Guard. 

Personnel needs of the police were met through recruitment of 
career officers from the Greek Cypriot population. Unlike the Na- 
tional Guard, the police force contained no mainland Greeks. New 
recruits attended a twenty-one-week course at the Police Training 
School in Athalassa, southeast of Nicosia. A few high-ranking 
officers received training in Britain, Greece, and other countries. 

The police force was armed beyond the requirements of ordi- 
nary police work; its arsenal included armored cars and light ar- 
tillery acquired in the 1960s, when the police played a central role 
in the intercommunal struggle. In 1989 orders were placed for the 
purchase of a helicopter with sophisticated surveillance equipment 
and two coastal patrol boats, as part of stepped-up antinarcotics 

Turkish Cypriot Police Organization 

Regulations published in 1986 under Law Number 51 of 1984 
on Police Organization (Establishment, Functions, and Authori- 
ties) of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus defined the area 
of jurisdiction of the police force of northern Cyprus. The Police 
Organization was divided into two major components, the central 
and provincial organizations. The director general of police, the 
most senior officer of the Police Organization, was responsible to 
the commander of the Turkish Cypriot Security Force with regard 


Portion of the Green Line, 
the line dividing Nicosia 
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, 

to planning, coordination, and supervision of police services. Un- 
der the immediate control of the director general's deputy were 
nine central police directorates: administrative; judicial police; po- 
litical police; air, sea, and ports police; traffic; the fire service; police 
school; immigration; and indigenous affairs. Two special units, the 
Mobile Unit for Immediate Action and the narcotics squad, were 
directly accountable to the director general. 

The Judicial Police Directorate assisted provincial police organi- 
zations in criminal investigations and carried out its own judicial 
investigations in matters of special interest to the director general. 
Its branches included photographic identification and fingerprint- 
ing; criminal records; firearms registration; ballistics laboratories; 
and a bomb squad. The Political Police Directorate included depart- 
ments of domestic and foreign intelligence. The directorate tried 
to gain advance knowledge of actions or plans that could affect in- 
ternal security and carried out measures for dealing with them. 
Provincial political police departments were directly subordinate 
to the central directorate, gathering information on threatened 
offenses or incidents against the security of the state and other duties 
as assigned by the director of political police. The combined staff- 
ing of the central political police organization and the five provin- 
cial organizations was set at 107 individuals. 

Separate provincial police directorates were established at Nicosia, 
Famagusta (Gazimagusa), Kyrenia (Girne), Morphou, and the 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Karpas Peninsula. Under the supervision of each provincial direc- 
torate were three or four regional directorates and six to twelve 
police stations. The provincial police directorates also had six service 
units: administration, judicial police, traffic, immigration, fire, and 
administrative and indigenous affairs. 

Crime and Punishment 
Incidence of Crime 

Somewhat paradoxically, in light of the violence of the nation's 
past, statistics of the Republic of Cyprus pointed to a crime rate 
that was lower (6.44 crimes per 1,000 inhabitants) than the rate 
for most West European countries. The low incidence of crime 
among Cypriot nationals was accounted for by the closeness of fam- 
ily ties, the emphasis on upholding the family's honor and reputa- 
tion, and the social pressures for education and achievement. 
According to statistics submitted to the International Criminal 
Police Organization (INTERPOL) for the year 1988, various forms 
of theft constituted by far the largest number of serious offenses 
(2,592). Only fourteen murders, eighteen sex offenses, and seventy- 
seven serious assaults were recorded. There were 528 cases of fraud 
and 48 drug offenses. Juveniles accounted for 13.6 percent of thefts 
and women for 6.7 percent. Corresponding data on crime in the 
Turkish Cypriot-administered north were not available. 

The domestic use of illegal drugs was low compared with the 
situation elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean and Europe, 
although the minister of interior testified in parliament in October 
1989 that the problem was growing. Cyprus was not a source of 
narcotics but was an important brokering center for narcotics 
traffickers, especially those from Lebanon and Turkey. Traffick- 
ers met in Cyprus, forwarded shipments of heroin and cannabis 
through the island's container transshipment facilities, and used 
Cypriot air links to transship currency and bullion to and from 
Europe. Narcotics laws were rigidly enforced, and draft legisla- 
tion to provide stricter penalties for possession and trafficking in 
illegal drugs was under discussion in early 1990. Cypriot police 
cooperated closely with law enforcement authorities in neighbor- 
ing countries, resulting in significant seizures and arrests. There 
were, however, no direct working relations with Turkish Cypriot 
enforcement authorities or with Turkey. According to Turkish 
sources, northern Cyprus had also become a transit point for drugs, 
and there were indications of major drug-processing activities. 

In 1 989 a total of 1 34 arrests were recorded by the Republic of 
Cyprus for drug offenses; 72 were of Cypriot nationals and 62 of 


National Security 

foreigners. The number of arrests had mounted steadily since 1986, 
when 26 Cypriots and 29 foreigners were arrested. 

The Criminal justice System 

The courts exercising criminal jurisdiction in the Republic of 
Cyprus were district courts, assize courts, and the Supreme Court 
in its appellate functions. District courts served as the courts of 
first instance for all but the most serious crimes; their jurisdiction 
was over any crime with a penalty of up to three years' imprison- 
ment, a fine of up to C£500 (Cyprus pound — for value, see Glos- 
sary), or both. Assize courts had unlimited jurisdiction in the first 
instance but in practice heard only a small percentage of the cases 
coming before the district courts. The Supreme Court heard all 
criminal appeals but had no original jurisdiction in criminal mat- 
ters. There were no special courts to deal with security or political 
offenses, and civilians were not subject to trial by military courts. 

The court system in the Turkish-administered area was similar 
to that of the Republic of Cyprus. In district courts, a judge sit- 
ting alone had jurisdiction to try summarily all offenses punish- 
able by imprisonment not exceeding three years. Assize courts, 
composed of three judges, had jurisdiction to try offenses punish- 
able with more than three years imprisonment. The Supreme Court 
dealt with criminal appeals from assize courts and district courts, 
but did not exercise initial jurisdiction in criminal matters except 
when, sitting as the Supreme Council of Judicature, it might try 
the president for treason or the prime minister and other ministers 
for charges preferred by the Legislative Assembly. 

District courts of the Republic of Cyprus sat permanently, con- 
sisted of one judge each, and conducted exclusively summary tri- 
als held immediately after preliminary inquiries. Assize courts met 
three times a year in each judicial district and were each composed 
of three judges chosen from the district court. Assize courts heard 
preliminary inquiries, or trials of information, after which the ac- 
cused could be discharged or bound over for trial. Trial procedure 
was based on English common law and was identical in both courts: 
the charge was read, the accused entered a plea, the prosecution 
presented witnesses and evidence, the defense presented its case, 
closing statements were made, and the verdict and sentence were 
handed down. Cases were generally tried before judges, although 
a request for a jury trial was usually granted. 

Within ten days of the pronouncement of sentence, the accused 
could appeal any case involving a sentence of imprisonment or a 
fine over C£20. The accused could appeal either a conviction or 
a sentence; the prosecutor could also appeal a sentence or, from 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

a district court, a judgment. All appeals went to the Supreme Court 
and had to be heard by at least three of its seven members. The 
Supreme Court had wide latitude in its appeal findings: it could 
increase, decrease, or modify a sentence; it could acquit or con- 
vict in overruling a lower court; or it could remand a case to the 
lower court for retrial. 

Defendants had the right to be present at their trials, to be 
represented by counsel, to be provided with a public defender if 
unable to afford a lawyer, to confront witnesses, and to present 
evidence in their own defense. According to the Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices published annually by the United States 
Department of State, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention 
was provided by law and respected in practice by both the Govern- 
ment of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Preventive 
detention was not legally authorized and was not reported in prac- 
tice. Under the Greek Cypriot system, no one could be held for 
more than one day for investigation of a crime without referral of 
the case to the courts for extension. Most periods of investigative 
detention did not exceed eight or ten days before formal charges 
were filed. Attorneys had free access to detainees. 

Punishments allowed by law included death by hanging, im- 
prisonment up to life, whipping, and fines. Criminal punishments 
as actually implemented were light. The death penalty, which could 
be handed down for premeditated murder, high treason, piracy, 
and certain capital offenses under military law, was in practice com- 
muted by the president of the republic. The punishment of whip- 
ping was not imposed in practice. The few long prison sentences 
handed down by Greek Cypriot courts were usually shortened by 
pardons or parole actions. The vast majority of punishments for 
criminal convictions were in the form of fines. 

Prisoners in the Republic of Cyprus were housed in the Nicosia 
Central Prison. The prison population was very low. In 1990, of 
260 inmates, 65 were aliens. Thus, although foreigners constitut- 
ed only 1 percent of the population, they accounted for 25 percent 
of the prisoners. Most of these were Middle Easterners convicted 
of drug trafficking. 

Both the Cyprus constitution and the basic document govern- 
ing the Turkish Cypriot community specifically prohibited torture. 
In both communities, freedom from cruel, unhuman, or degrad- 
ing treatment was provided by law and respected in practice. Ade- 
quate health care was provided in detention facilities, and diets were 
considered normal. Family members were permitted monthly visits 
after conviction, and attorneys could visit at any time. 


National Security 

* * * 

The Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities 
release few details on the size, equipment, organization, and deploy- 
ment of troops at their disposal. Their public statements tend to 
minimize the strength of their own forces and to exaggerate the 
strength of the other side. Estimates in the foregoing section rely 
primarily on data found in The Military Balance, 1989-1990 pub- 
lished by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, sup- 
plemented by reports in Jane's Defence Weekly. The article on Cyprus 
by Gwynne Dyer in World Armies (1983 edition) provides additional 
particulars on the National Guard and other military contingents, 
although its information on Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces 
is limited. An interview with Defense Minister Aloneftis, reported 
by Mary Anne Weaver in the New Yorker, reveals numerous de- 
tails on the defense preparations of the Greek Cypriot forces as of 
1990. A study by Keith Kyle on Cyprus, published by the Minority 
Rights Group in London, is a concise but balanced review of 
politico-military events through 1984. The international strategic 
dimensions of the Cyprus dispute are analyzed by Robert 
McDonald in The Problem of Cyprus in the Adelphi Papers series. 
The role of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) during its quarter century of peace-keeping is treat- 
ed by Alan James in "The UN Force in Cyprus" in the journal 
International Affairs. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 




1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Selected Turkish Cypriot Places-Names 

3 Republic of Cyprus: Parliamentary Election Results, 1976-85 

4 "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": Parliamentary 

Election Results, 1976-90 

5 Population of Cyprus, Selected Years, 1491-1973 

6 Population of Cyprus, Selected Years, 1975-88 

7 Turkish Cypriot Population, Selected Dates, Sixteenth Cen- 

tury to 1988 

8 Republic of Cyprus: Schools, Teachers, and Enrollments, 

Selected School Years, 1975-76 to 1988-89 

9 "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": Schools, Teachers, 

and Enrollments, 1976-77 and 1988-89 

10 Republic of Cyprus: Distribution of Gross Domestic Product 

(GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1979-88 

1 1 Republic of Cyprus: Gainfully Employed Population by Sector, 

Selected Years, 1976-87 

12 Republic of Cyprus: Production and Value of Principal 

Agricultural Products, Selected Years, 1979-87 

13 Republic of Cyprus: Exports, 1985-88 

14 Republic of Cyprus: Value of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 

by Sector, Selected Years, 1979-88 

15 Republic of Cyprus: Annual Increase of Gross Domestic 

Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected years, 1979-88 

16 Republic of Cyprus: Balance of Payments, 1985-88 

1 7 ' 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" : Value of Gross Do- 

mestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1977-90 

18 "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": Distribution of 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 

19 "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' ' : Gainfully Employed 

Population by Sector, 1986-89 

20 "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": Balance of Pay- 

ments, 1987-90 

21 "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": Major Trading 

Partners, Selected Years, 1982-90 

22 Selected Newspapers, 1990 

23 Republic of Cyprus: Major National Guard Equipment, 1990 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

When you know 

Multiply by 

To find 










Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 




square miles 


cubic feet 






long tons 


short tons 




degrees Fahrenheit 


divide by 5 

and add 32 

Table 2. Selected Turkish Cypriot Place-Names 

Turkish Form International Standard Form 













Gecitkale . 

Giizelyurt . 
Korucam . 


Lefko§a . . 
Pa§ak6y . . 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Table 3. Republic of Cyprus: Parliamentary Election 
Results, 1976-85 

1976 1981 1985 

Seats Percentages Seats Percentages Seats Percentages 

Party of Votes of Votes of Votes 

AKEL 1 9 69.5 2 12 32.8 15 27.4 

DIKO 3 21 — 2 8 19.5 16 27.7 

DISY 4 24.1 12 31.9 19 33.6 

EDEK 5 4 — 2 3 8.2 6 11.1 

Other 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 

n.a. — not available 

1 Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Progressive Party of the Working People). 

2 AKEL, DIKO, and EDEK formed an electoral coalition in 1976 against DISY. 

3 Dimokratiko Komma (Democratic Party). 

4 Dimokratikos Synagermos (Democratic Rally). 

5 Eniea Dimokratiki Enosis Kyprou (United Democratic Union of Cyprus). 

Table 4. "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": 
Parliamentary Election Results, 1976-90 














of Votes 

of Votes 

of Votes 

of Votes 

CTP 1 . . . 








44 2 

TKP 3 . . . 









UBP 4 . . . 









YDP 5 . . . 









Other . . . 
















1 Cumhuriyetci Turk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party). 

2 CTP, TKP, and YDP formed an electoral alliance in 1990 against UBP. 

3 Toplumcu Kurtulus. Partisi (Communal Liberation Party). 

4 Ulusal Birlik Partisi (National Unity Party). 

5 Yeni Dogus, Partisi (New Dawn Party). 

6 YDP was not established until 1984. 

7 Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 



Table 5. Population of Cyprus, Selected Years, 1491-1973 

Year Population 

1491 168,000 

1575 180,000 

1881 186,200 

1891 209,300 

1901 237,000 

1911 274,100 

1921 310,700 

1931 348,000 

1946 450,100 

1960 573,600 

1973 * 631,800 

• De Jure census. 

Source: Based on information from L.W. St. John-Jones, The Population of Cyprus, Houns- 
low, Middlesex, United Kingdom, 1983, 33; and Republic of Cyprus, Ministry 
of Finance, Department of Statistics and Research, Statistical Abstract, 1987 and 1988, 
Nos. 33-34, Nicosia, 1989, 33. 

Table 6. Population of Cyprus, Selected Years, 1975-88 

Area Controlled by 

Year Entire Island Republic of Cyprus 

1975 618,000 498,300 

1978 616,000 501,300 

1980 627,000 513,300 

1982 640,000 524,600 

1984 657,000 538,400 

1986 673,000 550,900 

1988 688,000 562,700 

Source: Based on information from Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Department 
of Statistics and Research, Statistical Abstract, 1987 and 1988, Nos. 33-34, Nicosia, 
1989, 41, 45. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Table 7. Turkish Cypriot Population, Selected Dates, 
Sixteenth Century to 1988 

Date Population * 

Sixteenth century 40,000 to 60,000 

Eighteenth century 60,000 

1881 45,458 

1911 56,428 

1921 61,339 

1931 64,245 

1946 80,548 

1960 104,333 

1963 120,000 

1972 78,000 

1978 146,740 

1982 152,239 

1986 162,676 

1988 167,256 

* Figures through 1960 are based on Ottoman and British estimates and censuses. Figures thereafter 
are provided by Turkish Cypriot authorities. 

Table 8. Republic of Cyprus: Schools, Teachers, and 
Enrollments, Selected School Years, 1975-76 to 1988-89 





Preprimary schools 













Primary schools 
















Secondary schools 














Vocational and technical schools 













Source: Based on information from Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Department 
of Statistics and Research, Statistical Abstract, 1987 and 1988, Nos. 33-34, Nicosia, 
1989, 87. 



Table 9. "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'': Schools, 
Teachers, and Enrollments, 1976-77 and 1988-89 



Preprimary schools 







Elementary schools 







Junior high schools 







Senior high schools 







Vocational and technical schools 







Higher education 






n.a. — not available. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Table 10. Republic of Cyprus: Distribution of Gross Domestic 
Product by Sector (GDP), Selected Years, 1979-88 
(in percentages at current market prices) 







1988 * 

Agriculture, forestry, and 






















Electricity, gas, and water . . . 














Wholesale and retail trade, 

restaurants and hotels .... 








Transportation, storage, 

and telecommunications . . . 








Finance, insurance, real estate, 

and business services 







Community, social, and 

personal services 








Public administration and 





























* Provisional. 

Source: Based on information from Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, 
1987, Nicosia, May 1989, 60. 



Table 11. Republic of Cyprus: Gainfully Employed Population by 
Sector, Selected Years, 1976-87 
(in percentages) 

Sector 1976 1979 1982 1985 1986 1987 

Agriculture, forestry, and 

9S 9 

90 7 

18 4 

Ifi 7 

ifi 1 

1 8 

1 J.O 

\^iT11Tlcr Qn/i cii i r\ t*t*\71 n or 







"N/fpirnifaPtiirincy ^innlnHincr 

iViculUlaLlUl Hit I 111V.1UU111C 

cottage industries) 







Electricity, gas, and water . . . 














Wholesale and retail trade, 

restaurants, and hotels .... 







Transportation, storage, and 







Finance, insurance, real estate, 







Community, social, and 







Public administration and 



























Source: Based on information from Republic 

of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, 

1987, Nicosia, May 1989, 126. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 


























































































































CC l 


















































































,— • 











,— 1 






































































a l 




























































































































^3 2 

3 ^ 

U > 

C «3 

2^ o 

S | I S 8,^1 § SL^c ■: 

fa J 






CT> CO — ' 
* N O 

co m 


<-i in n 


m in m 
e<-i cm 

ID (£) if! 

o o m 








<£> CO CT) 

oi -< n 

Ov •* 
m" co" 




o M ~ 


CO V) 

!3 «j 











Cyprus: A Country Study 

Table 13. Republic of Cyprus: Exports, 1985-88 
(in millions of Cyprus pounds) 1 

X lUUUtl 






Agricultural products 

Jo. J 

1 A. 1 

1 J . J 

1 1 Q 

1 1 

1 . D 

1 .9 





A 1 

4-. 3 

1 A 

5 . 4 

1 c 

5 . o 

1 o 
5 . 1 

1 Q 

d .y 

D . 

a n 

i . y 

Q 1 

y . l 


"7 K 





Manufactured products 

Wine and alcoholic beverages 













1 0. / 

1 A A 

10. U 

\ C A 


1 . 3 

3 . 5 











Machinery and transportation equipment . . . 




































. 199.3 




n.a. — not available. 

1 For value of the Cyprus pound — see Glossary. 

2 Includes quarrying materials. 

Source: Based on information from Republic of Cyprus, Central Bank of Cyprus, Annual 
Report, 1988, Nicosia, May 1989, 39. 



Table 14. Republic of Cyprus: Value of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1979-88 
(in millions of Cyprus pounds at current market prices) 1 







1988 2 

Agriculture, forestry, and 








Mining and quarrying . . . 














Electricity, gas, and 













Wholesale and retail 

trade, restaurants, and 







Transportation, storage, 

and telecommuni- 







Finance, insurance, real 

estate, and business 







Community, social, and 







Public administration and 







Public services 





















1 For value of the Cyprus pound — see Glossary. 

2 Provisional. 

Source: Based on information from Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, 
1987, Nicosia, May 1989, 57. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Table 15. Republic of Cyprus: Annual Increase of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1979-88 
(in percentages) 







1988 * 

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing . 

. 16.6 






, 9.2 













Electricity, gas, and water 













Wholesale and retail trade, 

restaurants, and hotels 

. 29.7 






Transportation, storage, and 








Finance, insurance, real estate, 

. 23.5 






Community, social, and 

personal services 







Public administration and defense 

. 27.8 






. 26.6 







. 26.3 







, 24.0 






* Provisional. 

Source: Based on information from Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, 
1987, Nicosia, May 1989, 59. 

Table 16. Republic of Cyprus: Balance of Payments, 1985-88 
(in millions of Cyprus pounds) 1 




1988 2 

. , . . 255.4 




687.2 4 

-591.5 5 

-638.3 6 






, , 583.8 




. , -249.2 




, , 334.6 




Current account balance 





Short-term capital 








-5.6 7 

Other private long-term capital . . . 





Capital account balance 





. ... 17.5 








1 For value of the Cyprus pound — see Glossary. 

2 Provisional. 

3 f.o.b. — free on board. 

4 Includes aircraft valued at C£228.6 million. 

5 Includes pipes for Southern Conveyor Project valued at C£218.8 million. 

6 Includes pipes for Southern Conveyor Project valued at C£21.8 million. 

' Includes loan prepayments by government amounting to C£244.0 million. 

Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Cyprus, Annual Report, 1988, Nicosia, 
May 1989, 46. 



Table 17. "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": Value of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1977-90 
(in millions of Turkish lira at 1977 value) * 








i r 
Agriculture, forestry, 

and fishing 







\yf aniifartnrincr m inincr 

1V£CL11U1CIV~IU1 lllg , lllllllllg, 

electricity, and 














Wholesale and retail 

trade, restaurants, 







Transportation and 

telecommunications . 







Financial institutions . 







Ownership of 








Business and personal 







Government services . 







Import duties 














* For value of the Turkish lira — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," State Plan- 
ning Organisation. 

Table 18. "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": Distribution of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1977-90 
(in percentages) 

Sector 1977 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 

Agriculture, forestry, and 

, 16.4 






Manufacturing, mining, 













Wholesale and retail trade, 

restaurants, and hotels 







Transportation and 








. 3.1 












Business and personal services . 


























* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," State Plan- 
ning Organisation. 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Table 19. "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": 
Gainfully Employed Population by Sector, 1986-89 
(in percentages) 





1989 * 





Manufacturing, mining, electricity, and water 









Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, and hotels . 

















Government services (including state economic 










* Provisional. 

Source: Based on information from Center for Business and Economic Research of the 
Eastern Mediterranean University and Cyprus Turkish-German Cultural Associ- 
ation, Structural Changes in the Economy of North Cyprus, Famagusta, Cyprus, 1990. 

Table 20. "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": Balance of 
Payments, 1987-90 
(in millons of United States dollars) 









. . 221.0 




. . -165.9 




. . 103.5 




Other invisibles (net) 





Invisibles balance 





. . -20.7 








Other foreign aid 





Financing of imports by waiver as against 

















Source: Based on information from "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," State Plan- 
ning Organisation. 



© o <£> o 
r^i tJh' ! T-l in 

(N M O * * 

cr! m in eo cm 

Ot N (O (N 
ID >t' CO N 

en cn cm oo 

cm CTi m en 
ui « n T)i ri 

CO 0"> lO '<4 H Tt 1 

r>! m' ©' in o 

3 "E 




Cyprus: A Country Study 

Table 22. Selected Newspapers, 1990 

Newspaper Political Stance Circulation 

Greek Cypriot 

Agon center-right 9,000 

Apogevmatini centrist 10,000 

Cyprus Mail center-right 4,000 

Eleftheria Tis Gnomis -do- 2,000 

Eleftherotypia DIKO party organ 1 6,500 

Haravghi AKEL party organ 2 13,000 

Philelefiheros centrist 20,000 

ProinaNea EDEK party organ 3 1,200 

Simerini supports DISY 4 13,000 

Turkish Cypriot 

Birlik UBP party organ 5 4,500 

Cyprus Times centrist n.a. 

Halkin Sesi -do- 6,000 

Kibris center-right 4,000 

Kibns Postasi center-left 4,500 

Ortam TKP party organ 6 1,250 

Yeniduzen CTP party organ 7 1,000 

n.a. — not available. 

1 DIKO — Dimokratiko Komma (Democratic Party). 

2 AKEL — Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Progressive Party of the Working People). 

3 EDEK — Eniea Dimokratiki Enosis Kyprou (United Democratic Union of Cyprus). 

4 DISY — Dimokratikos Synagermos (Democratic Rally). 

5 UBP— Ulusal Birlik Partisi (National Unity Party). 

6 TKP — Toplumcu Kurtulus. Partisi (Communal Liberation Party). 

7 CTP — Cumhuriyetci Turk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party). 

Source: Based on information from Europa World Year Book, 1991, 1, London, 1991, 848-49; 
and Political Handbook of the World, 1991, Binghamton, New York, 1991, 169, 171. 



Table 23. Republic of Cyprus: Major National Guard Equipment, 1990 

Type and Description 

Country of 



AMX-30 B-2 France 30 of 54 ordered 

Armored reconnaissance vehicles 

EE-9 Cascavel Brazil 40 

Marmon-Harrington armored cars Britain 24 

Armored infantry fighting vehicles 

VAB-VCI, 20mm cannon France 27 

Armored personnel carriers 

Leonidas Greece 16 

VAB-VTT France 100 

EE- 11 Urutu Brazil 15 

BTR-50P Soviet Union 17 

Towed artillery 

M-116A1, 75mm United States 4 

M-42, 76mm Soviet Union 18 

25 pounder Britain 52 

M-1944, 100mm Soviet Union 18 

M-101, 105mm United States 18 

M-56, 105mm Soviet Union 18 


81mm, some self-propelled n.a. 71 

M-41/43, 82mm, some self-propelled Soviet Union n.a. 

M-2, 107mm United States 12 

Multiple rocket launchers 

Yug M-77, 128mm Yugoslavia 8 

Recoilless rifles 

M-18, 57mm United States 189 

M-40, 106mm -do- 126 

Antitank guided weapons 

Milan France n.a. 

HOT -do- n.a. 

Air defense weapons 

M-55, 20mm gun Yugoslavia 100 

Oerlikon GDF-003 35mm gun Switzerland 8 

40mm, 94mm gun n.a. n.a. 

SA-7 surface-to-air missile Soviet Union 20 


SA-342 Gazelle helicopters France 6 

Pilatus PC -9 trainer Switzerland 1 

Pilatus BN-2A Maritime Defender Britain 1 


Coastal patrol boat, 95 tons, 40mm gun .... -do- 1 
n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, London, 1989, 85; 

and Christopher F. Foss, "Cypriot Rearmament Completed," Jane's Defence Weekly 
[London], March 12, 1988, 445. 



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Chapter 3 

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(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
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[London]; Neue Zurcher Zeitung [Zurich]; Sunday Times [London]; 
Times [London].) 

Chapter 4 

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Cyprus: A Country Study 

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Chapter 5 

Adams, T.W. "Cyprus." Pages 459-61 in Richard F. Staar (ed.), 

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Cyprus: A Country Study 

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(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the 
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Daily Report: Western Europe; Jane's Defence Weekly [London]; Joint 
Publications Research Service, Translations on Western Europe; Kees- 
ing's Record of World Events [London]; New York Times; and Washington 



Cyprus pound — (C£) — Republic of Cyprus monetary unit consist- 
ing of 100 cents. At independence C£l was worth US$2.80. 
The average annual exchange rate for C£l in 1979 was 
US$2.82; in 1982, US$2.11; in 1985, US$1.64; in 1986, 
US$1.94; in 1987, US$2.08; in 1988, US$2.14; in 1989, 
US$2.03; and in 1990, US$2.19. 

European Community (EC — also commonly called the Commu- 
nity) — The EC comprises three communities: the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Com- 
munity (EEC, also known as the Common Market), and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Each 
community is a legally distinct body, but since 1967 they have 
shared common governing institutions. The EC forms more than 
a framework for free trade and economic cooperation: the sig- 
natories to the treaties governing the communities have agreed 
in principle to integrate their economies and ultimately to form 
a political union. Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many) are charter members of the EC. Britain, Denmark, and 
Ireland joined on January 1, 1973; Greece became a member 
on January 1, 1981; and Portugal and Spain entered on Janu- 
ary 1, 1986. Cyprus became an associate member in June 1973. 

European Economic Community (EEC) — See European Com- 

gross domestic product (GDP) — The total value of goods and ser- 
vices produced by the domestic economy during a given peri- 
od, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed 
by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, compen- 
sation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of capi- 
tal). Most GDP usage in this book was based on GDP at factor 
cost. Real GDP is the value of GDP when inflation has been 
taken into account. 

gross national product (GNP) — Obtained by adding GDP (q. v. ) 
and the income received from abroad by residents less pay- 
ments remitted abroad to nonresidents. Real GNP is the value 
of GNP when inflation has been taken into account. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q. v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations that takes responsibility for 
stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its mem- 
bers when they experience balance of payment difficulties. 
These loans often carry conditions that require substantial in- 
ternal economic adjustments by the recipients. 
Latin — See Roman Catholic. 

Roman Catholic — In historical use, the Latin Church refers to the 
western wing of Christianity using Latin as its liturgical lan- 
guage, jurisdictionally related to the bishop of Rome (the pope) 
rather than one of the other patriarchs, and generally cor- 
responding to the area of the Western Roman Empire rather 
than the Eastern Roman or Byzantine section. After the Great 
Schism of 1054, those churches accepting papal authority be- 
came known as Catholic in contrast to the Orthodox; the vast 
majority of these were Latin rite or Roman Catholic. Since 
the religious conflict in Lusignan and Venetian Cyprus was 
as much cultural as one of hierarchical structure, Roman 
Catholics have continued to be known in Cyprus as Latins; 
the term also is used to distinguish the descendants of the former 
Lusignan and Venetian elites from Greek Cypriots. 

Turkish lira (TL) — Monetary unit used in "Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus." Also known as Turkish pound. Consists 
of 100 kurus. In terms of the United States dollar, the annual 
average exchange rate was TL19.3 in 1977, TL76.0 in 1980, 
TL522.0 in 1985, TL674.5 in 1986, TL857.2 in 1987, 
TL1,422.3 in 1988, TL2,121.7 in 1980, and TL2,608.6 in 

Value-added tax (VAT) — A tax applied to the additional value 
created at a given stage of production and calculated as a per- 
centage of the difference between the product value at that stage 
and the cost of all materials and services purchased as inputs. 
The VAT is the primary form of indirect taxation applied in 
the EEC (q.v.), and it is the basis of each country's contribu- 
tion to the community budget. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund ad- 
ministered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to fur- 
nish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier 
terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, found- 
ed in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through 



loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the 
growth of productive private enterprises in less developed coun- 
tries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD 
hold the same positions in the IFC . The three institutions are 
owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their 
capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states 
must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (q.v.). 



ABC Plan, 176-77, 203, 204; opposition 

to, 177 
abortion, 59 
Abu Nidal, 224 

ACDA. See United States Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency 
Achaean Coast, 5 

Achaeans: as settlers, 5; trade with, 5-7 
Acheson, Dean, 36 
Acheson Plan, 36, 40 
ADISOK. See Democratic Socialist Re- 
newal Movement 
Aegean Islands, 4 

AFL-CIO. See American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organi- 
Africa: trade with, 157 
Agricultural Bank, 122 
agricultural cooperatives, 64, 122, 149 
Agricultural Research Institute, 111, 119 
agricultural products, 117, 122-24; 
barley, 53, 149; cereal, 117, 123, 149; 
citrus, 117, 123, 145, 149; exports of, 
140, 141, 149, 150; fruit, 123, 149; 
grapes, 123-24, 149, 150; industrial, 
150; legumes, 123; potatoes, 123, 150; 
production, 122; tree crops, 123, 149, 
150; value added, 122; vegetables, 123; 
wheat, 53 

agricultural work, 68; part-time, 119; 
Turkish Cypriots in, 90, 141 

agriculture, 109, 110, 116-19, 146-47; 
land for, 148; employment in, 89, 108, 
117, 145; flight from, 62-63; moderni- 
zation of, 62, 147; as percentage of 
GDP, 62, 109, 116, 117, 146, 147, 149; 
productivity, 111; subsidies for, 113, 
117, 123; in "Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus," 146-47, 149; un- 
employment in, 117 

airports, 111, 115, 134, 156, 234 

AKEL. See Progressive Party of the Work- 
ing People 

Akinci, Mustafa, 196 

Akinci, Sabahattin, 231 

Akritas Plan, 34-35 

Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area, xxii, 32, 

Alexander, 9 
Alexander IV (pope), 13 
Alexander the Great, 54 
Aloneftis, Andreas, 226, 228, 231 
Amathus: as city-kingdom, 8; as Roman 
district, 9 

American Federation of Labor-Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (AFL- 
CIO), 146 

Ananeotiko Dimokratiko Sosialistiko 
Kinima (ADISOK). ^Democratic So- 
cialist Renewal Movement 

Anatolia, 4 

ancient period, 5-10; crafts in, 5; in- 
fluence of Crete on, 5; trade in, 5 

Anglican Church. See Church of England 

Annual Development Budget, 143 

Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou 
Laou (AKEL). See Progressive Party of 
the Working People 

Antioch: patriarch of, 10, 11 

Aoun, Michel, 224 

Aphrodite, 7 

Arab countries, 208, 209; exports to, 129, 
140, 150-52; imports from, 140 

Arab-Israeli issues, 207 

Arabs: attacks by, 12 

armed forces (see also National Guard), 
224-33; foreign, 225; home guard, 228; 
Turkish Cypriots in, 167 

Armenians, 57, 221; ancestors of, 57; un- 
der 1960 constitution, 165 

Asha (Pasakoy), 231 

Asia: trade with, 157, 158 

Asia Minor, 50 

Assyrian rule, 8, 224 

Atakol, Kenan, 232 

Atatiirk, Kemal, 87; influence of, on 
Turkish Cypriots, 96, 98; opposition to, 
99; reforms of, 88, 98, 99; "Six Ar- 
rows" of, 87 

Athens: pro-enosis demonstrations in, 

Athens University, 28 

Attila Line, 43, 220 

Atun, Hakki, xxix 

Augustus (emperor), 9 

Australia: emigration to, 60, 61, 84 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Austria: in United Nations Peace-keeping 
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 236 

balance of payments, 140-41; deficit, 138 
Bangladesh, 209 

banking, 111, 122, 137, 149, 154-55 

Bank of Cyprus, 137 

Barnabas (apostle), 3; missionary work of, 
10; tomb of, 3, 11 

Bartholemew, Reginald, 204 

Basic Principles, 38 

baslik parasi, 91 

Battle of Issus, 9 

Battle of Lepanto, 17 

Bayrak Radio and Television Corpora- 
tion, 157 

Bellapais, 152 

Berengaria of Navarre, 12, 13 

Bese§ler, Aytac, 197 

Bitter Lemons (Durrell), 50 

Boghaz (Bogaz), 152 

Boston University, 26 

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, xxx 

Bozkurt, ismail, 196, 198 

Brazil: materiel from, 229, 231 

Britain, xxi, 4, 215; aid from, 21-22; 
emigration to, 60, 61, 84; exports to, 
140, 158; imports from, 140, 158; in- 
tervention by, 169, 216; involvement 
of, in intercommunal talks, 176; loans 
by, to Cyprus, 21 ; loans by, to Turkey, 
20-21; military bases of, on Cyprus, 
xxii, 32, 62, 224, 225; military troops 
of, on Cyprus, 117, 233; police train- 
ing in, 238; relations with, 200; in Unit- 
ed Nations Peace-keeping Force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP), 216, 236; univer- 
sity students in, 75, 101 

British Army, 225, 233, 234 

British Commonwealth, 34 

British Empire, 4 

British rule, xxi, 3, 19-32, 225; annexa- 
tion under, 21-23; as cause of inter- 
communal conflict, xxv, 85, 86; 
Church of Cyprus under, 22-23, 25; 
civil service under, 23; commencement 
of, 4, 19-20; dictatorial phase of, 22; 
economic growth under, 23; education 
under, 23, 57, 72, 73, 99; enosis un- 
der, xxiv, 20, 55; Evkaf Idaresi under, 
97; government of, 25; Greek Cypriot 
nationalism under, 20; improvement of 

infrastructure under, 23, 147; indepen- 
dence from, xxi, 3, 4, 32; land use un- 
der, 148; loans by, to Cyprus, 21; in 
medieval period, 55; modernization un- 
der, 23; religion under, 71; seculariza- 
tion under, 98; social welfare under, 
103; taxes under, 22; trade under, 23; 
villages under, 186 

Bronze Age, 7 

budget deficits, 110, 113 

Buffavento, 152 

buffer zone, xxxii, 172, 220-21, 222, 236 

Bulla Cypria, 13-14 

business services, xxvi, 135 

Buyukunal, Bilgi, 232 

Byzantine rule, 10-13, 54; government 
in, 11; legacy of, 54-55; religion un- 
der, 10-11, 54-55; serfs under, 11; so- 
cial structure under, 11 

Byzantium {see also Constantinople), 10, 

cabinet. See Council of Ministers 

Camillion, Oscar, 181 

Canada: involvement of, in intercom- 
munal talks, 176; in United Nations 
Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP), 216, 236 

Carter, Jimmy, 176 

CCB. See Cooperative Central Bank 

cehiz, 92 

censuses, 58, 84 
Central Bank of Cyprus, 111 
Central Bank of North Cyprus, 154 
Central Land Consolidation Authority, 

Chapman, Christian, 204 
Charlotte, 16 

child care (see also day care), 82, 88, 93, 

Christianity (see also under individual sects): 
introduction of, 3, 10; predominance 
of, 10; under Ottoman rule, 17-18, 55 

Christian Maronite Church, 96 

Chrysostomos (archbishop), 71, 164, 189 

Churchill, Winston, 21, 24 

Church of Cyprus (see also Christianity; 
Greek Orthodox church), 3, 49, 70; at- 
tempts by, to overthrow Makarios, 41 ; 
clergy in, 3, 22-23, 41, 55, 57, 71; un- 
der British rule, 22-23, 25; contribu- 
tions of, to defense spending, 230; and 



enosis, 26, 55; and Greek nationalism, 
19; independence for, 54, 70; land 
owned by, 119; monasteries of, 71-72; 
monks in, 72; structure of, 71; ritual 
in, 72; role of, in millets, 18; secular in- 
fluence of, 11-12, 18, 26, 187, 189; 
services of, 72; and state, connection 
between, 11; status of, 10 

Church of England, 96 

Cicero, 9 

Cilicia, 12 

civil service {see also public sector), 191; 
under British rule, 23; ethnic ratio in, 
167, 168, 169; Turkish Cypriots in, 83, 
84, 90, 141, 143, 145, 167 

class structure, 64-65, 90 

Claudius, 10 

clergy {see also Makarios), 71; election of, 

22-23; as ethnarch, 3, 57; exiled by 

British, 22; reduction of power of, 41; 

role of, 3, 55 
Clerides, Glafkos, xxvii, xxviii, 38, 40, 

44; as acting president, 43, 174, 189; 

as party leader, 186, 206; talks of, with 

Denkta§ 174-75, 177 
climate, 53-54; rainfall, 53, 147, 148, 149 
College of Forestry, 75, 125 
commercial class, 64 
Committee for Cyprus Autonomy, 23 
Committee on Missing Persons, 179 
Commonwealth: membership in, 200 
Communal Chambers, 33, 168 
Communal Liberation Party (TKP), 

xxix, 45, 196, 198, 199 
communists, 30, 187, 217; parties of, 24 
community centers, 81 
community, social, and personal services, 


commuting, 63, 64, 90 
Comnenos, Isaac, 12; deposed, 13 
Conference on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe (CSCE): membership in, 

200; role in, 201 
conscription, 217, 226, 233 
Constans (emperor), 12 
Constantia {see also Salamis), 12 
Constantine, 10 
Constantine (king), 21 
Constantinople {see also Byzantium), 10 
Constituent Assembly ("TRNC"), 193 
constitution: proposals for (1948), 25; 

proposals for (1955), 31 

Constitutional Commission ("TRNC"), 

constitution of 1882, 21 

constitution of 1960, 165-67; branches of 
government under, 165, 184; collapse 
of, 167-70; cabinet under, 185; educa- 
tion under, 74; executive under, 
165-66, 185; instituted, 33; judiciary 
under, 166, 185; legislature under, 166, 
185; military under, 225-26; minori- 
ties under, 165; proposals to amend, 
163, 169; Turkish Cypriots under, 165 

construction, 127, 130-32, 152, 154; 
boom, 107, 130, 131; commercial, 130; 
effect of Turkish invasion on, 130; em- 
ployment in, 89, 154; growth rate, 131; 
housing, 130, 135, 154; incentives for, 
131-32; industrial, 130, 131; for infra- 
structure, 130, 154; as percentage of 
GDP, 109, 153, 154; for tourism, 130, 
131, 154; workers, 130 

Consultative Assembly, 25 

contraceptives, 59 

Cooperative Central Bank (CCB), 122 
cooperatives, agricultural. See agricultural 

Cooperative Winery SODAP Ltd., 122 
Coordination Committee, 208 
copper, 5, 53 

Cornaro, Caterina (queen), 16 

Council for the Promotion of Exports, 141 

Council of Judicature, 194 

Council of Ministers, 166, 185, 194; eth- 
nic ratio in, 32; of Vassiliou, 191 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
(United States Department of State), 

coup d'etat of 1974, xxvi, 4, 42, 189, 213, 
218-19, 226; international reaction to, 
42; planning of, 42; role of Greece in, 
4, 42, 49, 171, 202, 218 

courts, communal, 167, 168 

court system, 194, 241; under constitu- 
tion of 1960, 166-67; lower, 194-95 

Crawshaw, Nancy, 34 

credit unions, 149 

Crete, 4, 12; ancient influence of, 5 
crime: arrests, 240-41; incidence of, 

240- 41; punishments for, 242; types of, 

Crimean War, 20 

criminal justice system, 241-42; appeals, 

241- 42; defendants' rights in, 242; 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

jurisdictions in, 241; prisoners in, 242; 
punishments in, 242; trial procedures 
in, 241 
Crusades, 12 

CTIS. See Cyprus Turkish Islam Society 

CTO. See Cyprus Tourism Organisation 

CTP. See Republican Turkish Party 

Cumhuriyetci Turk Partisi (CTP). See 
Republican Turkish Party 

currency, 144, 155 

current account balance, 138 

Customs Union Agreement, 110, 112-13, 
124, 141; effects of, on manufacturing 
sector, 127, 129; terms of, 141 

Cyprus Airways, 134 

Cyprus Army (see also armed forces; Na- 
tional Guard), 215, 225-26; ethnic ra- 
tio in, 33, 34, 168, 215, 225 

Cyprus Bar Association, 185 

Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, 135, 

Cyprus Commercial Bank, 155 
Cyprus Convention (1878), 20, 21, 84 
Cyprus Credit Bank, 155 
Cyprus Development Bank, 111 
Cyprus Employers' and Industrialists' 

Federation, 116 
Cyprus Information Service, 238 
Cyprus Petroleum Refinery Ltd., 130 
Cyprus Regiment, 225 
Cyprus Science Wakf, 101 
Cyprus Tourism Organisation (CTO), 


Cyprus Tribute, 20; discontent with, 

21-22; sum of, 20 
Cyprus Turkish Industrial Enterprises 

Holding Company, 143 
Cyprus Turkish Islam Society (CTIS), 98 
Cyprus Turkish Maritime Company, 143 
Cyprus Turkish Minority Association, 28 
Cyprus Turkish Peace Force, 231 ; num- 
ber of troops in, 231 
Cyprus Turkish Tourism Management 

Company, 143 
Cyprus Workers' Confederation (SEK), 

Cyril III (archbishop), 22 
Czechoslovakia: as source of materiel, 

Darius (king), 8 

Davies, Roger, 204 

Davos process, 203 

day care centers, 80, 81, 82, 93 

debt: foreign, 113; domestic, 113 

deforestation, 53 

Demetriades, Lellos, 196 

Demirel, Siileyman, 197 

Democratic Front, 164, 187 

Democratic Party (DIKO), xxvii, xxviii, 

44, 186, 187; election results for, 187; 

leadership of, 186; platform of, 186-87 
Democratic Party (DP), xxix 
Democratic Rally (DISY), xxvii, xxviii, 

44, 186, 187 
Democratic Socialist Renewal Movement 

(ADISOK), 187 
Democratic Struggle Party (DMP), xxix, 

196, 198, 199 
Demographic Report, 61 
Demokratik Miicadele Partisi (DMP). See 

Democratic Struggle Party 
Demokratik Parti (DP). See Democratic 


Denkta§, Rauf, xxviii, xxix, xxxi, 38, 43, 
44, 195, 197-99; background of, 197; 
influence of, 198; in intercommunal 
talks, 181, 197; as president of "Turk- 
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus," 44, 
164, 180, 190, 197; reaction to, 198; 
statehood declared by, 179; talks of, 
with Clerides, 174; talks of, with 
Makarios, 175-77; as president of 
Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, 
38, 171 

Denmark: in United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 
xxxii, 216, 236 
Department of Fisheries, 124 
Department of Forestry 152 
Department of Forests, 119 
Department of Geological Survey, 119 
Department of Public Works, 156 
Department of Water Development, 119 
DeVezin (British consul in Syria), 83 
DEV-i§. See Revolutionary Trade 

Unions' Federation 
Devrimci i§ci Sendikalan Federasyonu 
(DEV-i§). See Revolutionary Trade 
Unions' Federation 
Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, xxii, 32, 

Dhinglis, Pavlos, 187 
Dighenis, 30 



DIKO. See Democratic Party 
Dimokratiko Komma (DIKO). See 

Democratic Party 
Dimokratikos Synagermos (DISY). See 

Democratic Rally 
Diocletian, 10 

Directorate of Medicine and Health, 102 

Directorate of Social Welfare, 102-3 

DISY. See Democratic Rally 

divorce, 66; rate, 67; in "Turkish Repub- 
lic of Northern Cyprus," 93 

DMP. See Democratic Struggle Party 

DP. See Democratic Party 

Draft Framework Exercise (1985-86), 

drahoma, 91-92 

drainage, 53 

droughts, 10, 53 

drug offenses: arrests for, 240-41; traffick- 
ing, 206, 240, 242 
Durduran, Alpay, 198 
Durrell, Lawrence, 50 

EAC . See Electricity Authority of Cyprus 

earthquakes, 9, 10, 18, 53 

Eastern Europe, 223; imports from, 140 

Eastern Mediterranean University 
(EMU): employment in, 154; enroll- 
ment, 100, 154; foreign exchange from, 

EC. See European Community 
Ecevit, Biilent, 42 

economic blockade, xxviii, 93, 141, 142, 

economic development: acceleration of, 
62; effect of, on migration, 60; invest- 
ment as percentage of, 115; projects, 
111; in "Turkish Republic of North- 
ern Cyprus," 142-45 

economic plans (see also emergency eco- 
nomic action plans), 77, 111; for 
1962-66, 110; for 1967-71, 111, 127; 
for 1972-76, 111 

economic planning, 143; indicative, 110 

economy, Greek Cypriot (see also agricul- 
ture; banking; construction; exports; 
gross domestic product; gross national 
product; manufacturing sector; service 
sector), xxvi, 49; development of, 
110-13; effect of Turkish invasion on, 
108, 111; growth of, 107 

economy, Turkish Cypriot (see also 
agriculture; banking; construction; ex- 
ports; gross domestic product; gross na- 
tional product; manufacturing sector; 
service sector), 88; effect of Turkish in- 
vasion on, 108, 111; growth of, 108,; 
problems in, 108, 143-45, 158 

Ecumenical Councils of Nicaea, 10-11 

EDEK. United Democratic Union of 

Eden, Anthony, 24 

education (see also schools), xxvi, xxviii, 
18, 72-75; accessibility of, 49, 59, 68; 
under British rule, 23, 57, 72, 73, 99; 
as cause of intercommunal conflict, 85; 
compulsory, 68, 74; under constitution 
of 1960, 74; as percentage of govern- 
ment budget, 73; as percentage of 
GNP, 73; preprimary, 74; primary, 74; 
as reason for urban migration, 63; sup- 
port of Greek government for, 73; sys- 
tem, 57, 73; in "Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus," 99-102; value of, 
63-64, 67; for women, 68, 73, 75 

Education Law (1895), 72 

education, higher, xxvi, 68, 73-75, 
100-02; foreign, 68, 75, 99, 100-02; 
graduates of, xxvi, 99, 115; percentage 
of students in, 75 

education, secondary, 68; enrollment, 
74-75; stages of, 74 

EEC. See European Economic Com- 

Egypt, 14, 29; invasion by, 5 

Egyptian rule, 8, 9, 224 

elections: proposals for, 25-26; suspend- 
ed under British, 22 

elections, local: of 1943, 24; of 1946, 25; 
of 1976, 195; of 1979, 186; of 1980, 
195; of 1986, 195 

elections, national: of 1960, 33; of 1968, 
38, 171; of 1970, 40; of 1976, 44, 178, 

186, 187, 195, 196; of 1981, 44, 186, 

187, 195, 196; of 1985, 44, 186, 187, 
195, 196; of 1988, 181, 190, 191; of 
1990, 195, 196, 198-99; of 1991, xxvii, 

elections, presidential: of 1959, 33; of 
1968, 38; of 1975, 164; of 1978, 164; 
of 1981, 164; of 1983, 44, 164; of 1988, 
44, 45, 164, 181, 190, 191; of 1990, 
164, 198-99; of 1993, xxviii 

electricity, 111, 130, 153-54 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC), 

emergency (1955-59), 30-32, 214-15 

emergency economic action plans, 108, 
111; first (1975-76), 112, 128; second 
(1976-78), 112, 132; third (1979-81), 
112, 132; fourth (1982-86), 112, 132 

emigrants: demographics of, 60, 61; num- 
bers of, 59-61 

emigration (see also urban migration), 
59-61; destinations for, 60, 61, 84 

employers' associations, 77, 116 

employment, 115-16; in agriculture, 89, 
108, 117, 145; in civil service, 143; in 
construction, 89, 154; in Eastern 
Mediterranean University, 154; in for- 
estry, 152; in tourism, 132 

energy, 107, 152; firewood for, 129; pe- 
troleum for, 129, 153; production, 
127; resources, 129-30, 153-54; solar, 

Eniaion. See Unified Democratic Party 

Eniea Dimokratiki Enosis Kyprou 
(EDEK). See United Democratic Union 
of Cyprus 

enosis, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, xxvi, 3-4, 49, 
171, 174, 187, 217; under British rule, 
20, 21; church support for, 26; foreign 
activities on behalf of, 23; Greek sup- 
port for, 29, 40; guerrilla activities sup- 
porting, 221; history of, 3-4, 19, 55, 
214; versus independence, 188-89; op- 
posed by Turkish Cypriots, 28; petition 
for, 27, 28; support for, by Progressive 
Party of the Working People, 24-25; 
support for, by Grivas, 27, 41; support 
for, by Makarios, 27; during World 
War II, 24 

EOKA. See National Organization of 
Cypriot Fighters 

EOKA B. See National Organization of 
Cypriot Fighters B 

Ercan Airport, 156 

Eroglu, Dervi§, xxix, 195 

ethnarch, 57; archbishop as, 3, 57; 
responsibilities of, 18 

Ethnarchy Council, 26 

ethnic: attitudes, 87-88; values, 87-88; 
violence, 35-37 

ethnic conflict: origins of, 4; in partition, 
40; psychological grounds of, 87-88 

ethnic distribution: under Ottoman rule, 

ethnicity (see also under individual ethnic 

groups), 54-58, 85-88 
ethnic ratios: in armed forces, 33, 34; in 

government, 83 
Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston 

(EOKA). See National Organization of 

Cypriot Fighters 
Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston B 

(EOKA B). See National Organization 

of Cypriot Fighters B 
European Community (EC): application 

for full membership in, 206; associate 

membership in, 205; relations with, 


European Economic Community (EEC): 
economic aid from, 142; exports to, 
109, 129, 140, 157, 158; imports from, 
140, 157, 158 

European Parliament, 205 

European Telecommunications Satellite 
Organisation (Eutelsat), 135 

European Trade Union Confederation, 

Eutelsat. See European Telecommunica- 
tions Satellite Organisation 

Evagoras, 8-9 

Evdokas, Takis, 38 

Evkaf. See Evkaf Idaresi 

Evkaf Idaresi (Turkish Religious Trust) 
(Evkaf), 97; bank of, 155; under Brit- 
ish rule, 97; forests owned by, 152; land 
owned by, 148-49 

exchange-of-population agreement, 172 

exports, 128, 158; agricultural, 140, 141, 
149, 150; to Arab countries, 129, 140, 
150-52; to Britain, 140, 158; of canned 
goods, 127; to European Economic 
Community, 109, 129, 140, 157, 158; 
to Greece, 140; increase in, 128, 
138-40; of livestock, 150-52; by 
manufacturing sector, 128, 153; to 
Middle East, 109, 129, 157, 158; of 
minerals, 62, 110, 125, 213; threats to, 

Famagusta (Gazimagusa), 17, 196, 214; 
agriculture near, 149; ceded to Genoa, 
14; conquered by Ottomans, 17; police 
in, 239-40; port, 112, 134, 156; Roman 
Catholic church in, 13; Turkish Cypri- 
ots in, 88, 89 



Famagusta Bay, 53 

Famagusta district, 195; population of, 62 

family: extended, 91, 92; households, 65; 
importance of, 49, 65, 90; nuclear, 91, 
92; planning, 59; roles in, 92-93; size, 
59; structure, 65; types of, 91 

famines, 18 

Feissel, Gustave, 181 

feminist movement, 50, 70 

feudal system, 14, 55; abolished, 17, 18; 
serfs under, 14 

financial sector, 109, 113, 132, 135 

Finland: in United Nations Peace-keeping 
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 216, 

fishing, 116, 122, 124, 147, 149, 152; as 

percentage of GDP, 152 
Foot, Hugh, 31 

foreign aid, 115; from Britain, 21-22; 
from European Economic Communi- 
ty, 142; from Turkey, 153; to "Turk- 
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus," 
142, 144; from World Bank, 142 

foreign exchange, 155; from Eastern 
Mediterranean University, 154; from 
offshore enterprises, 137; for petroleum 
products, 130; reserves, 138; from 
tourism, 108, 109, 132, 138, 157 

foreign policy, 199-209; diplomatic efforts 
in, 199; internationalization of, 

forestry, 116, 122, 125, 147, 149, 152; 
employment in, 152; as percentage of 
GDP, 152 

forests: destruction of, 53; owned by Ev- 
kaf Idaresi, 152; products, 213; refor- 
estation program, 23, 148, 152; types 
of trees in, 152 

France: loans from, 231; materiel from, 
229, 230, 231; military training in, 227 

GDP. See gross domestic product 

Gecitkale Airport, 156 

Gecitkoy, 148 

gender relations, 49-50 

Genoa, 224; Famagusta ceded to, 14; 

trade with, 14 
geography, 50-54; climate, 53-54; 

drainage, 53; terrain, 50-53 
Georkajis, Polykarpos, 218 
Germany: imports from, 140; Turkish 

support of, in World War II, 21 

Gerst, Marvin, 87 

Gobbi, Hugo, 178 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 204 

government: and church, connection be- 
tween, 11; debate over, 172; district- 
level, 185, 195; exports encouraged by, 
128; manufacturing encouraged by, 
129; Turkish Cypriot boycott of, 163, 
168, 185, 195; village-level, 185-86, 

government budget: development, 
114-15; education as percentage of, 73; 
expenditures, 114; military spending as 
percentage of, 231; ordinary, 114; 
revenue, 114; special relief fund, 114, 

Government House: burned, 22, 214 

government sector, 113-15; balanced 
budget policy of, 113; debt of, 113; as 
percentage of GDP, 113, 144; reduc- 
tion of, in "Turkish Republic of North- 
ern Cyprus," 144 

Great Depression, 22 

Great Schism, 70 

Greco-Turkish War (1920-22), 27 

Greece: emigration to, 61; exports to, 
140; foreign policy of, 203; interests of, 
in Cyprus, 213; intervention by, xxiii, 
169; islands ceded to, xxi, 4, 224; loans 
from, 231; materiel from, 229; as mem- 
ber of North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation (NATO), 28; police training in, 
238; relations with, 199, 200, 202-3; 
role of, in 1974 coup, xxiii, 4; support 
by, for enosis, 29; support by, for guer- 
rilla organizations, xxiii, 34, 214, 216; 
university students in, 75 

Greek Army, 225, 226 

Greek Cypriot nationalism, 24; under 
British rule, xxiv, xxv, 20; characteris- 
tics of, 88; origins of, 19; Turkish 
Cypriot reaction to, 82 

Greek Cypriots: ancestors of, 7, 54; 
church influence on, 26; conflict among, 
217-19; conscription of, 217; culture 
of, 16-17; economic blockade of "Turk- 
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus" 
by, 93, 141, 142, 158; economy of, 107; 
and enosis, 21, 26; ethnic identity 
of, 85; in Karpas Peninsula, 82, 89, 
221; in Legislative Council, 21; para- 
military force of, 168, 213; in polit- 
ical office, 32; religion of, 96; in 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Turkish invasion, 219; in "Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus," 96; 
unification desired by, 165, 174, 200, 

Greek government: donations from, 73; 
opinion of Makarios, 4, 40-42; peti- 
tioned for enosis, 27; support of, for 
education, 73 
Greek junta: attempts by, to overthrow 
Makarios, 41, 171, 202, 217; collapse 
of, 43; coup d'etat in, 41-42; funding 
by, of enosis activities, 40, 218; United 
States and, 204 
Greek Military Academy, 27, 227 
Greek nationalist movement, 55, 71 
Greek Orthodox Church (see also Chris- 
tianity; Church of Cyprus): competi- 
tion of, with Roman Catholic church, 
13-14; legacy of, 54-55; secular role of, 

Greek War of Independence, 18, 214 

Green Line, 35, 220 

Grivas, George, 30, 33; death of, 41, 218; 
education of, 27; guerrilla activities of, 
30, 40, 41, 216, 218; and Makarios, 
relationship between, 28; National 
Guard commanded by, 36, 216, 217; 
reconnaissance trip by, 28-29; support 
by, for enosis, 27; as threat to Maka- 
rios, 41 

gross domestic product (GDP): agricul- 
ture as percentage of, 62, 109, 116, 117, 
146, 147, 149; construction as percent- 
age of, 109, 153, 154; fishing as per- 
centage of, 152; forestry as percentage 
of, 152; government sector as percent- 
age of, 113, 144; increase in, 108, 112; 
industry as percentage of, 142; 
manufacturing as percentage of, 109, 
111, 128, 153; mining as percentage of, 
125, 154; service sector as percentage 
of, 109, 111, 142; tourism as percent- 
age of, 109; trade as percentage of, 132; 
Turkish Cypriots' contribution to, 142; 
of "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus," 142 

gross national product (GNP): education 
as percentage of, 73; military spending 
as percentage of, 231; in 1973, 109; in 
1988, 108-9; social insurance as per- 
centage of, 79 

guest workers, 84, 115, 142, 145 

Gulf Crisis (1990-91), xxxii, 184 

Haass, Richard, 204 
Harding, John, 31 

health care, 76-77, 102; facilities, 23, 76, 
102; improvements in, 76-77; private, 
76; professionals, 70, 102; socialized, 
102; subsidies for, 76 
health, public: history, 75-76; improve- 
ments in, 76 
Hellenic Mining Company, 125 
High Administrative Court, 194 
High Court of Justice, 166, 167, 170, 185 
Higher Technical Institute, 75, 100, 111 
Holy League, 17 
Homer, 7 

Hopkinson, Henry L., 28 

hospitals: under British rule, 23; number 

of, 76, 102; types of, 76, 102 
hostels for the aged, 82 
Hotel and Catering Institute, 75, 111 
Hotel and Catering Training Center, 157 
hotels, 109, 132, 157 
house: importance of ownership of, 66, 67 
House of Representatives, xxvii-xxviii, 

32-33, 166, 169, 185; elections for, 33, 

40, 44, 186-87; ethnic ratio in, 33, 166; 

veto power in, 169; voting in, 166 
housing: construction, 130, 135, 154; 

problems, 81; programs, 81-82; for 

refugees, 81, 112, 130-31 
Housing Finance Corporation, 131 
Hugh III (king), 14 

Iacovou, George, 191 

ICFTU. See International Confederation 

of Free Trade Unions 
Iliad (Homer), 7 

immigration, 60; from Turkey, 83, 89 
Immovable Property (Tenure, Registra- 
tion, and Valuation) Law (1946), 120, 

imports, 158; from Arab countries, 140; 
from Britain, 140, 158; dependence on, 
140; from Eastern Europe, 140; from 
European Economic Community, 140, 
157, 158; from Germany, 140; from 
Italy, 140; from Japan, 140, 157, 158; 
of livestock, 124; of oil, 129-30, 154; 
from United States, 140 

Incentive Scheme for the Reactivation of 
Refugees, 81 

income, 90; per capita, 107, 108, 142 



independence: from Britain, xxi, 3, 4, 
215; versus enosis, xxvi, 188-89; 
negotiations for, 32; from the Ottoman 
Empire, 3; from Persian Empire, 9; 
struggle for, 30-32, 214-15 

Independents, 40 

industrial: construction, 130, 131; de- 
velopment, 127; parks, 127 

industry: employment in, 89; as percent- 
age of GDP, 142 

inflation, 108, 144, 155, 208 

infrastructure, 110; construction for, 130, 
154; improvements in, 110, 114-15 

inheritance, 120 

Inonii, Ismet, 36 

insurance, 109, 135, 138 

intelligence gathering: by police, 238 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Organization, 135 

intercommunal: conflict, xxv, 4, 35-37, 
85, 168, 170, 215-17; contact, 85 

internal migration, 61-62; rate of, 61 

internal security, 221-24 

International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU), 146 

International Criminal Police Organiza- 
tion (INTERPOL), 240 

international incidents, 224 

International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 226 

International Labour Organisation, 78 

International Monetary Fund: member- 
ship in, 34 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Organization (Intelsat), 135 

INTERPOL. See International Criminal 
Police Organization 

invasion, Turkish. See Turkish invasion 

Ioannides, Dimitrios, 42 

Ioannides, George, 177 

Ionian Islands: ceded to Greece, 4 

Ireland: in United Nations Peace-keep- 
ing Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 216, 

Iron Age, 7 

irrigation, 53, 62, 116, 149; crops requir- 
ing, 123; projects, 111, 115, 117, 148 

Islam (see also Muslims), 93; five pillars 
of, 96-97; Hanafi, 97; sharia, 98, 99, 
102; Shia, 97; Sunni, 97, 99; theology 
of, 96 

Islamism, 98, 101 

Israel, 207, 223 

Italy: imports from, 140; loans from, 231 

James II (king) ("the Bastard"), 16 

Janus I (king), 14 

Japan: imports from, 140, 157, 158 

Jerusalem, 13 

John of Austria (don), 17 

John II (king), 16 

Johnson, Lyndon B., 36 

Jordan, 209 

judiciary, 166-67, 170, 185, 193-95 

Kalecik port, 156 
Kantara, 152 

Karamanlis, Constantinos, 43, 202 
Karpas Peninsula, 50; attacked by Otto- 
man Turks, 17; Greek Cypriots in, 82, 
89, 221; police in, 239-40; rainfall in, 

Kartal, 152 

Khrysokhou Irrigation Project, 115 
Kibns Turk Emniyet Kuvvetleri. See 

Turkish Cypriot Security Force 
Kibns Vakiflar Bankasi, 155 
Kinyras (king), 7 

Kition, 7; as city-kingdom, 8; metro- 
politanate of, 71 

Knights Templars, 13 

Koordinasyon Komitesi. See Coordination 

Kormakiti (Korucam), 82 

Kotak, ismet, 196, 199 

Kourion: as city-kingdom, 8 

Kucuk, Fazil, 4, 33, 34, 35, 168, 169, 
197; as president of Turkish Cypriot 
Communal Chamber, 38, 171 

Kurds, 221 

Kykko Monastery, 26 

Kyprianos (archbishop), 18 

Kyprianou, Spyros, 44, 181; in intercom- 
munal talks, 181 , 203; as party leader, 
186; as president, 164, 176 

Kyprianou-Denktas. Communique 
(1979), 177-80 

Kyrenia (Girne), 17, 196; as city- 
kingdom, 8; conquered by Ottomans, 
17; metropolitanate of, 71; police in, 
239-40; port of, 156; Turkish Cypri- 
ots in, 89 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Kyrenia district, 195 
Kyrenia Range, 50-52, 148, 152 
Kythrea (Degirmenlik): military forces in, 

labor relations, 115-16, 145-46 
labor unions, 77; civil servants', 116; 
membership, 115, 145; number of, 
146; in "Turkish Republic of North- 
ern Cyprus," 145-46 
land consolidation, 120-22 
Land Consolidation Law (1969), 120 
Land Development Corporation, 131 
land ownership: by Church of Cyprus, 
119; communal, 119, 120, 148; by Ev- 
kaf Idaresi, 148-49; fragmentation of, 
120; private, 119, 120, 148; state, 119, 
120, 148 

land tenure, 116, 119-22, 148-49; 

problems in, 120 
land use, 119-22, 148-49; under British 

rule, 148; under Ottoman rule, 148 
language: Turkish Cypriot, 88 
Lapithos (Lapta); agriculture in, 149; as 

city-kingdom, 8; as Roman district, 9 
Larnaca, 7, 214; industrial parks in, 127; 

petroleum refinery, 127, 130; port of, 

134-35; Turkish Cypriots in, 88 
Larnaca Airport, 115, 134 
Larnaca Bay, 50 
Latins, 57-58 

Lebanon, 207; refugees from, 224 

Ledsky, Nelson, 184, 204 

Lefka (Lefke), 98; agriculture in, 149; 
mining in, 154 

Lefke University, 98, 100, 101; founded, 
101; reaction to, 102 

Lefkoniko (Gecitkale), 232 

Legislative Assembly, 194; elections for, 
xxix, 195, 196, 197, 198-99 

Legislative Council, 25-26; Greek Cypri- 
ots in, 21; proposals for, 25-26; Turk- 
ish Cypriots in, 21 

legislature. See House of Representatives; 
Legislative Assembly 

Lemesos (see also Limassol), 12 

Leontios (bishop), 22; death of, 25; elect- 
ed archbishop, 23 

Libya, 223; assistance from, to Turkish 
Cypriots, 98, 224 

Limassol (see also Lemesos), 214; de- 

stroyed by Ottoman Turks, 17; indus- 
trial parks in, 127; metropolitanate of, 
71; port of, 134; Roman Catholic 
church in, 13; Turkish Cypriots in, 89 

Limassol district: agriculture in, 123; 
population of, 62 

linobambakoi, 55 

literacy rate, 72, 99, 100 

livestock, 113, 117, 124, 150-51; export 
of, 150-52; import of, 124; population, 
150; processing, 152; subsidies for, 124; 
value added, 122 

Loizos, Peter, 65 

London Conference, 32 

Lusignan, Amaury de, 13 

Lusignan, Guy de, 13 

Lusignan rule, 13-16, 55, 57, 224; 
religion under, 70-71 

Lyssarides, Vassos, 40, 187 

Macmillan, Harold, 32 

Macmillan Plan, 32 

Makarios II (archbishop). 25 

Makarios III (archbishop) (Michael 
Christodoulou Mouskos), xxii-xxiv, 3, 
30, 36, 96, 171, 186, 203; address of, 
to United Nations, 27; arms purchases 
for, 40-41; assassination attempt on, 
38; attempts to overthrow, 40, 202, 
213, 217, 218, 222, 234; as bishop, 
26-27; death of, 176; education of, 26; 
Greek government opinion of, 4; and 
Grivas, relationship between, 28; Gri- 
vas as threat to, 41; influence of, 188; 
overthrown, 218-19; as president, 4, 
33, 41, 71, 163, 168, 169, 216, 226; 
support by, for enosis, 27; support for, 
41; talks of, with Denkta§, 175-77 

Makarios-Denkta§ Accords (1977), 

malaria, 76; eradication of, 76 
Mamluks, 14; kidnap of King Janus I by, 

manufacturing sector, 110, 125-32, 
152-54; diversification of, 107; employ- 
ment in, 153; enterprises, 127; exports 
by, 128, 153; government policies 
toward, 127, 129; number of employees 
in, 127; obstacles to, 127; as percentage 
of GDP, 109, 111, 128, 153; plants, 
127, 128; principal products of, 128-29; 



production, 127; productivity in, 111; 
restructuring of, 141; of "Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus," 144 
Marion, 8 

Mark (apostle), 3, 11; missionary work 
of, 10 

Markopoulos, Panayotis, 229 
Maronites, 57, 82, 221; ancestors of, 57; 

under 1960 constitution, 165; religion 

of, 96 

marriage: age, 67; arranged, 66, 91; at- 
titudes toward, 66; bride's obligations 
in, 66, 91; ceremonies, 92, 98; dowry 
for, 65-66, 91-92; engagement, 92; im- 
portance of, 49, 67, 90; interethnic, 83; 
rate, 67; social insurance benefits for, 

materiel: from Brazil, 229, 231; from 
Czechoslovakia, 40-41; from France, 
229, 230, 231; from Greece, 229; of 
Greek Cypriot police, 238; for 
Makarios, 40-41; for National Guard, 
231; from Soviet Union, 229, 230; from 
Switzerland, 229; of Turkish Army, 
232; from United States, 232; from Yu- 
goslavia, 229 

media: Greek Cypriot, 188; Turkish 
Cypriot, 197 

medieval period, 10-17; outside rulers 
during, 55 

Menderes, Adnan, 31 

Mesaoria plain, 5, 50; agriculture in, 123; 
rainfall in, 53; temperatures in, 54 

Meteorological Service, 119 

middle class: and marriage, 66-67 

Middle East, 223; exports to, 109, 129, 
157, 158 

Middle East Marketing Research Bureau, 

military: careers, 227; training, 227 
Military Balance, 1989-90, The (Interna- 
tional Institute for Strategic Studies), 

military forces, ethnic, 213 
military forces, foreign: Greek, 33; Turk- 
ish, 33 

military spending, 230-31; amount, 231; 

budgets for, 230; as percentage of 

GNP, 231; sources of, 230 
millets, 3, 18, 55, 83 
millet system, 3, 55, 96; under British rule, 

55; under Ottoman rule, 64, 83 
Milner, Clive, 236 

minerals: exports of, 62, 110, 125, 213 

mining, 109, 116, 125, 152, 154; of cop- 
per, 125; employment in, 125; as per- 
centage of GDP, 125, 154 

Ministry of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources, 75, 119, 152 

Ministry of Economy and Finance, 143; 
Coordination, Executive, and Techni- 
cal Assistance Section, 143; State Plan- 
ning Section, 143 

Ministry of Education, 73, 75; estab- 
lished, 74 

Ministry of Education, Sports, and 
Youth, 100 

Ministry of Finance: Income Tax Depart- 
ment, 79; Planning Bureau, 110 

Ministry of Health, 75, 76 

Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 

Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance, 
75; Department of Social Welfare Ser- 
vices, 79, 80; Industrial Relations Sec- 
tion, 116 

Ministry of Tourism and Culture, 157 
Mitsotakis, Constantinos, 203 
Mobile Reserve, 86, 215 
moneylenders, 64 

Morphou (Guzelyurt): agriculture in, 
149; metropolitanate of, 71; military 
forces in, 231; police in, 239-40; Turk- 
ish Cypriots in, 89 

Morphou plain, 53 

mountain systems, 50, 152 

Mount Olympus, 50 

Mouskos, Michael Christodoulou. See 
Makarios III 

Muawiyah, 12 

Miicahit forces, 232 

mufti, 97-98 

Muhammad (prophet), 96 

municipalities, 168, 169 

Muslims (see also Turkish Cypriots), 21; 

under Ottoman rule, 55 
Mustafa Pasha, Lala, 17 
Mycenaeans: as settlers, 5; trade with, 


Nadir, Asil, 145, 197 
NAM. See Nonaligned Movement 
National Council, 187; resurrected, 190 
National Guard, xxiii, 213, 225, 226; 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

buildup of, 226; capabilities of, 226; 
conscription for, 217, 226; equipment 
of, 229-30; established, 36, 170, 216, 
226; fighting by, 217; Greek officers in, 
42, 202, 216, 226; insignia, 228; 
materiel for, 231; modernization of, 
214; morale, 228; Naval Command, 
230; noncommissioned officers in, 
226-27; officers in, 226-27; organiza- 
tion of, 229; personnel, 226-28; ranks, 
228; reserves, 227-28; retention, 228; 
role of, in coup d'etat, xxiii, 37, 42, 
171; role of, in police force, 238; ser- 
vice, 227; size of, 226, 228; as threat 
to Makarios, 218, 226; uniforms, 228; 
wages, 228; weaknesses in, 229 

National Organization of Cypriot Fight- 
ers (EOKA), xxii, 30; disbanded, 215; 
guerrilla activities of, 30, 31-32, 214; 
resurgence of, 34 

National Organization of Cypriot Fight- 
ers B (EOKA B), 30, 218, 222; at- 
tempts by, to overthrow Makarios, 41, 
42, 171; banned, 42; purged, 222 

National Unity Party (UBP), 43, 195, 198 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Or- 

New Dawn Party (YDP), 196-97, 198, 

newspapers, 40, 188, 197 

Nicosia (Lefko§a), 17, 196, 214; con- 
quered by Ottomans, 17; industrial 
parks in, 127; police in, 239-40; Ro- 
man Catholic Church in, 13; situation 
of, 53; Turkish Cypriots in, 88, 89 

Nicosia Central Prison, 242 

Nicosia district, 195; population of, 61 

Nicosia International Airport, 111, 134, 

Nicosia-Limassol Highway, 115 
Nonaligned Movement (NAM), 199, 
200, 225 

North America: emigration to, 60, 61 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), xxxii, 28, 171-72, 201, 203, 

213, 224 

occupations: mobility among, 65; of Tur- 
kish Cypriots, 90; urban, 68 
Odyssey (Homer), 7 

Office of the Registrar of Cooperative So- 
cieties, 149 

offshore enterprises, 109, 113, 132, 135, 
137; activities of, 137-38; foreign ex- 
change earning of, 137, 138 

oil {see also petroleum): imports, 129-30, 
154; price increases, 107, 112 

Onan, Umit Suleyman; as negotiator, 
175, 177 

Onesilos (king), 8 

Organization of the Islamic Conference 

(OIC), 209 
Ottoman Empire, 20 
Ottoman Porte, 19 

Ottoman rule, 3, 17-19, 55, 82, 224; 
bureaucracy under, 64; independence 
from, 3; land use under, 148; religion 
under, 58, 71; uprisings against, 18 

Ottoman Turks: attacks by, 17; Chris- 
tians under, 17-18, 55; conquest by, 3 

Ozal, Turgut, 190 

Ozgiir, Ozker, 196 

Pakistan, 209 

Palaeologos, Helena (queen), 16 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 

223, 224 
Palestinians, 207, 224 
Panagrarian Union of Cyprus (PEK), 24 
Panagrotiki Enosis Kyprou (PEK). See 

Panagrarian Union of Cyprus 
Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labor (PEO), 

25, 115-16 
Pancyprian Gymnasium, 26, 27 
Pankypria Ergatiki Omospondia (PEO). 

See Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labor 
Papadopoulos, Tassos, 175, 176 
Papandreou, Andreas, 179, 203 
Paphos, 10; as city-kingdom, 8; metro- 
politanate of, 71; port of, 135; Roman 
Catholic Church in, 13; as Roman dis- 
trict, 9; temples in, 7; Turkish Cypri- 
ots in, 89 

Paphos district: agriculture in, 123; popu- 
lation of, 62 

Paphos International Airport, 134 

partition, xxvi, 3, 5, 40, 45, 49, 57, 213, 
220-21; effects of, 50, 88, 107, 117, 
134, 142; political systems under, 44; 
problems caused by, 43, 82; rural- 
urban ratio affected by, 89; threatened, 
38, 166 

Paschalides, Paschalis, xxviii 



Patriotic Front, 186 

Paul (apostle), 3; missionary work of, 10 

peasant associations, 24 

Pedagogical Academy, 75 

Pedhieos River, 53 

PEK. See Panagrarian Union of Cyprus 
Pentadaktylos Mountain (Be§parmak 

Mountain), 152 
PEO. See Pan-Cyprian Federation of 


Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 177, 180, 181, 

Persian rule, 8, 54, 224; city-kingdoms 
under, 8; independence from, 9; revolt 
against, 8 
petroleum refineries, 127, 154 
Phoenicians, 224; as settlers, 7; trade 
with, 7 

PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organi- 

police, Greek Cypriot, 237-38; materiel 
of, 238; organization of, 237-38; 
recruitment of, 238; training of, 238; 
units of, 238 

Police Organization, Turkish Cypriot, 
238-40; organization of, 238-39; 
provincial, 239-40; units of, 239 

political culture, 190-92 

political demonstrations: against British 
bases, 224; against British policies, 22, 
214; against Cyprus Tribute, 21-22; 
against Ottoman rule, 18; against par- 
tition, 222-23; pro-enosis, 29, 30-31; 
supporting Makarios, 41; by the unem- 
ployed, 115 

political dynamics, 188-90 

political institutions, Greek Cypriot, 
184-86; Turkish Cypriot, 193-95 

political parties (see also under individual par- 
ties), xxvii-xxix, 24-25, 33, 40, 44-45, 
186-88, 190, 195-97, 198-99, 224 

Polly Peck International, 145 

population, 58-62, 82-85; age-sex distri- 
bution, 60, 84-85, 86; birth rates, 
58-59; in eighteenth century, 83; ex- 
tramarital births, 67; fertility rates, 58; 
increase rates, 84-85; infant mortality, 
76; life expectancy, 76; of rural areas, 
6 1 ; in sixteenth century, 83 ; of urban 
areas, 61 

ports (see also under individual ports), 111, 

112, 125, 134-35, 156 
pottery, 5, 7 

poultry, 124, 150-52 
president, 32, 165-66, 169, 171, 184-85, 

primary sector. See agriculture 

private sector: government support for, 
110, 112 

Progressive Coalition, 40 

Progressive Party of the Working People 
(AKEL), xxvii, 44, 186, 187, 206, 224; 
activities of, 24-25, 234; banned, 187; 
election results for, 187; and enosis, 
24-25, 26; founded, 24, 181; in parlia- 
ment, 33, 40 

Progressive People's Party, 196 

Proximity Talks (1984), 180 

Psychiatric School of Nursing, 75 

Ptolemaic period, 9 

Ptolemy (king), 9 

Public Service Commission, 185, 191 
Public Service Law (1967), 185 

quarrying, 125 
Quran, 96 

Radcliffe (lord), 31 
radio, 135, 157, 188, 197 
rainfall, 53, 147, 148, 149; distribution 
of, 53 

real estate, 109, 135; investments, 65; 
owned by Evkaf Idaresi, 148; value of, 

Red Cross, International Committee of, 

refugees, Greek Cypriot (see also resettle- 
ment), 80-82, 111; emergency relief 
services, 80-81, 222; government sup- 
port for, 49, 80-82, 108; housing for, 
81, 112, 130-31, 154; number of, 220; 
political strength of, 1 76; return of, 175 

refugees, Turkish Cypriot (see also reset- 
tlement), 111; resetdement of, 89, 135, 

religion (see also under individual sects), 
70-72, 93-99; under Byzantine rule, 
10-11, 54-55; under foreign rule, 
70-71; observance of, 72; symbiosis in, 
55; syncretism in, 55 

Republican Turkish Party (CTP), xxix, 
45, 196, 198, 199 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

resettlement {see also refugees, Greek 
Cypriot; refugees, Turkish Cypriot), 89 

restaurants, 109, 132 

Revolutionary Trade Unions' Federation 
(DEV-iS), 146 

Richard I (Lion-heart), 12 

rivers, 53, 119 

roads {see also transportation), 111; under 
British rule, 23; network, 134, 156; 
service network, 122 

Roman Catholic Church {see also Chris- 
tianity), 96; competition of, with Greek 
Orthodox church, 13-14 

Roman Catholicism: under 1960 consti- 
tution, 165; suppressed by Ottomans, 

Roman Empire: division of, 10 
Roman rule, 54, 224; improvements in 
infrastructure under, 9-10; religion un- 
der, 3 

Royal Air Force (RAF), 233, 234 
rural areas: birth rates in, 59; families in, 
91; fertility rates in, 59; health-care fa- 
cilities in, 76; political affiliations in, 40; 
population in, 61; Turkish Cypriots in, 
88, 89 

rural-urban dichotomy, 59 
Russia, 20 

St. Hilarion Castle, 35 
Saladin, 13 

Salamis {see also Constantia), 12, 71; as 
city-kingdom, 8; destruction of, 9; dis- 
covery of ruins of, 10; as Roman dis- 
trict, 9 

Sampson, Nicos, xxiii, 42, 43, 219, 222; 

as provisional president, 171 
Sargon II, 8 

Saudi Arabia: assistance from, to Turkish 
Cypriots, 98, 101 

School of Midwifery, 75 

School of Nursing, 75 

schools, 81; academic, 73; attendance, 
72-73, 100; under British rule, 23, 72; 
courses of study, 73; ethnic segregation 
in, 85-86; preprimary, 73, 100; pri- 
mary, 72, 73, 74, 100; public, 73, 100; 
religious instruction in, 93; secondary, 
73; special, 73; vocational, 73, 74 

secondary sector. See manufacturing 

secularization, 85, 87; under Atatiirk, 87; 

under British rule, 98; in "Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus," 93 

SEK. See Cyprus Workers' Confederation 

Selim II (sultan), 83 

Serakhis River, 53 

serfs: under Byzantine rule, 11; under 
feudal system, 14; freed, 17 

service sector, 89, 109, 132-34, 154-58; 
as percentage of GDP, 109, 111, 142; 
productivity in, 111 

settlement process, 43, 45, 171, 172-84, 
190, 198, 204, 221, 225; international 
support for, 200; Soviet policy toward, 

settlement talks, intercommunal (1968- 
76), 171, 172-75; agreements in, 174; 
between Clerides and Denkta§, 174-75; 
differences in, 174-75; issues in, 38-40; 
United Nations involvement in, 177; 
led by Waldheim, 221 

settlement talks, intercommunal (1977), 
45, 175-177; ABC plan in, 176-77; de- 
mands in, 175; guidelines for, 175; 
proposals in, 176 

settlement talks, intercommunal (1979), 
45, 177-180; proposals in, 178; Unit- 
ed Nations agenda for, 178 

settlement talks, intercommunal (1984), 

settlement talks, intercommunal (1985- 
86), 45, 180-81 

settlement talks, intercommunal (1988- 
90), 181-84, 201; collapse of, 182; flex- 
ibility in, 182; ideas paper in, 181 

settlement talks, intercommunal (1992), 

sexual morality, 66-67, 70 

Sheyh Nazim Adil Kibnsh, 98-99 

shipping, 135 

Singapore: loans from, 231 

Sisco, Joseph J., 42 

Social Assistance Services Office, 102 

social insurance, 77-79; contributions to, 

78-79; funds, 79; as percentage of 

GNP, 79 
Social Insurance Fund, 103 
Social Insurance Law (1980), 78 
Social Insurance Scheme, 68, 77-78; 

benefits, 78; coverage, 79 
Socialist Party EDEK. See United 

Democratic Union of Cyprus 
Socialistiko Komma EDEK. See United 

Democratic Union of Cyprus 



social welfare, 79-80, 102-3; under Brit- 
ish rule, 103; child and family, 79-80; 
economic assistance under, 80; objec- 
tives of, 82; services, 79; social defense 
services, 79 

Society of Worldwide Interbank Finan- 
cial Telecommunications (SWIFT), 

Soli: as city-kingdom, 8 
Southern Conveyor Project, 114, 119 
Sovereign Base Areas, xxii, 32, 225, 233; 
Cypriot attitude toward, 234; intelli- 
gence gathering in, 233; personnel 
strength in, 233-34; as training sites, 

Soviet Union, xxxii, 24; materiel from, 
229, 230; policy of, toward settlement, 
204-5; relations with, 203-5 
Special Cyprus Coordinator, 204 
Special Service for the Care and Rehabili- 
tation of Displaced persons, 80-82; 
emergency relief, 80-81 
SPO. See State Planning Organisation 
standard of living, xxvi, 65; of Greek 
Cypriots, 57, 64; improvements in, 59, 
65, 107; of Turkish Cypriots, 44, 145 
State Laboratories Directorate, 102 
State Planning Organisation (SPO), 143 
state-sponsored entities, 143-44 
storage, 134 
Storrs, Ronald, 20 

strategic importance, 109, 224-25, 199; 
to Crusaders, 13, 14; economic, 132; 
in World War II, 24 
strikes: general, 30; outlawed, 31 
subsidies: for agriculture, 113, 117, 123; 
for health care, 76; for livestock produc- 
tion, 124; from Turkey, 208 
Suez Canal zone, 29 
suffrage: male, 25-26; universal, 33; 

women's, 26 
Supreme Constitutional Court, 33, 

166-67, 170, 185, 194 
Supreme Council of Judicature, 185 
Supreme Court, 170, 185, 194 
Sweden: in United Nations Peace-keeping 
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 216, 

SWIFT. See Society of Worldwide Inter- 
bank Financial Telecommunications 

Switzerland: loans from, 231; materiel 
from, 229 

symferon, 67 

Synomospondia Ergaton Kyprou (SEK). 

See Cyprus Workers' Confederation 
Syria, 12, 223 

Tactical Police Reserve, 238; organized, 

taksim, 4, 49, 57, 168 

Taliotis, Yiannakis, 

Tamassos: as city-kingdom, 8 

tariffs: instituted, 127; reduced, 113; re- 
moved, 127, 129, 141 

Tanm Sigortasi, 147 

Taurus Mountains, 50 

taxes: and agriculture, 117; under Brit- 
ish, 22; income, 114, 170; proposed, 
114; remissions of, 127; revenue from, 
114, 115; used for defense, 230 

teachers, 73; training, 100; women as, 70 

telecommunications, 109, 111, 134, 135, 

telephones, 135, 157 

television, 135, 157, 188, 197 

Tenzel, James H., 87 

terrain, 50-53 

terrorism, 223-24 

tertiary sector. See service sector 

Thutmose III, 5 

TKP. See Communal Liberation Party 
TMT. See Turkish Resistance Organi- 

Toplumcu Kurtulus, Partisi (TKP). See 
Communal Liberation Party 

tourist industry, xxvi, xxxiii, 54, 110, 
132, 144, 157; construction for, 130, 
131, 154; effect of Turkish invasion on, 
132; employment in, 115, 132, 145; ex- 
pansion of, 43-44, 65, 107, 108, 
132-34, 154, 157; foreign exchange 
from, 157; as percentage of GDP, 109; 
receipts, 110, 138; as source of foreign 
exchange, 108, 109; upgrading of, 107, 
113, 133-34 

tourists, 117; demographics of, 133; num- 
ber of, 109, 132, 157 

trade, 109, 132, 157-58; in ancient peri- 
od, 5; deficit, 110, 112, 138, 140-41, 
158; exhibitions, 128; in medieval peri- 
od, 14; as percentage of GDP, 132; 
value added by, 132 

trade unions. See labor unions 

Trade Unions Law, 146 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

training centers, 127 
transportation, 109, 132, 134-35, 155-56 
Treaty of Alliance (1959), xxi, xxiii, xxxi, 
166, 202; as basis for 1960 constitution, 
32; considered illegitimate, 35, 168; ex- 
ternal intervention under, 33, 169, 213, 
215, 217, 226; foreign policy implica- 
tions of, 200; status of, 163-64 
Treaty of Establishment (1959), xxi,xxii, 
166, 213; as basis for 1960 constitution, 
32; considered illegitimate, 168; status 
of, 163-64 
Treaty of Guarantee (1959), xxi, xxiii, 
xxxi, 166; as basis for 1960 constitu- 
tion, 32; considered illegitimate, 35, 
168; external intervention under, 33, 
42, 169, 213, 215, 219; foreign policy 
implications of, 200; status of, 163-64 
Treaty of Lausanne (1923), 21, 28 
Tripartite Conference (1955), 30 
Troodos Mountains, 50-52; agriculture 
in, 123; resort areas in, 54; water 
resources in, 148 
Turk Bankasi, 155 

Turkey, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxxi, xxxii, 
215; aid from, 153; British loans to, 
20-21; economic agreement of, with 
"Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus," 144; emigration to, 84; in- 
terests of, in Cyprus, 28, 101, 213; in- 
tervention by, 169; as member of North 
Adantic Treaty Organization, 28; mili- 
tary training by, 217; opposition of, to 
enosis, 30-31; relations with, 199, 200, 
207-8; subsidies from, 208; support by, 
for guerrilla organizations, 34, 216; de- 
pendence on, 143, 144-45, 192, 208; 
in World War II, 21 

Turk I§ci Sendikalari Federasynou 
(TURK-SEN). See Turkish Cypriot 
Trade Union Federation 

Turkish Air Force, 219 

Turkish Army, 43, 213-14, 219, 225, 
231; arms and equipment of, 232; mis- 
sions of, 232 

Turkish Cypriot Airlines, 156 

Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, 
97; established, 38; reaction to, 38 

Turkish Cypriot Cooperative Central 
Bank, 149, 155 

Turkish Cypriot enclaves, 172, 216; es- 
tablished, 36 

Turkish Cypriot military forces, 217 

Turkish Cypriot Police Organization. See 
Police Organization, Turkish Cypriot 

Turkish Cypriots, 5, 30, 55, 221; ances- 
tors of, 7-8, 17, 82-83, 225; attitude 
of, toward military, 225; characteristics 
of, 87-88; in civil service, 84; class 
structure of, 90; conscription of, 217; 
enosis opposed by, 28; ethnic identity 
of, 85; family structure of, 91; in inter- 
communal talks, 176; in Legislative 
Council, 21; mufti and, 97-98; under 
1960 constitution, 165; paramilitary 
force of, 168, 213; in political office, 32; 
religion of, 93-99; separation desired 
by, 165, 174; social structure of, 88-90; 
transitional administration of, 37-38, 
170-71; in Turkish invasion, 219; and 
Turkish nationalism, 87; withdrawal of, 
from Cypriot government, 35, 38, 40, 
163, 168, 185, 196 

Turkish Cypriot Security Force, 225, 232, 
238; budget, 232-33; conscription, 233; 
number of troops in, 233; reserves, 233 

Turkish Cypriot Trade Union Federation 
(TURK-SEN), 146 

"Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" 
("TFSC"), 44, 163, 164, 197 

Turkish invasion (1974), xxiii, 4-5, 36, 
42-43, 49, 171-72, 219-20; and cease 
fire in, 219-20; and construction indus- 
try, 130; and economy, 108, 141; and 
fishing, 124; and forests, 125; and 
international relations, 202; and manu- 
facturing, 127; and mining, 125; 
problems caused by, 78, 82, 107; refu- 
gees from, 80-82; role of United Na- 
tions Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) in, 234-36; and tourism, 
132; violations by, of cease fire, 219-20, 

Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, 98 

Turkish nationalism, 87, 96 

Turkish Religious Trust. See Evkaf Idaresi 

"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" 
("TRNC"), 164, 197; agriculture in, 
146-47, 149; area of, 148; banking in, 
154-55; brain drain from, 101; consti- 
tution of, 93, 165, 193-95; currency, 
144; districts in, 195; economic agree- 
ment of, with Turkey, 144; economic 
blockade of, 93, 141, 142, 158; 
economic dependence of, on Turkey, 
143, 144-45; economy of, 143, 144; 



education in, 99-102; electricity for, 
130; established, 5, 44-45, 163, 179; 
executive in, 194; foreign policies of, 
207; free economic zones in, 143; gross 
domestic product of, 142; isolation of, 
199; judiciary in, 194-95; lack of recog- 
nition for, 5, 108, 142, 158, 163, 184, 
192, 207, 208-9; legislature in, 194; 
manufacturing in, 153; military forces 
in, 231-33; municipalities of, 195; po- 
litical institutions in, 193-95; political 
parties, 195-97; population, 82-85; 
power plant in, 153-54; relations of, 
with Turkey, 207-8; religion in, 93; 
representation missions of, 208; State 
Planning Organisation, 84; tourism in, 
144; trade in, 157-58; villages in, 195 

Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT), 
29, 195, 215, 216, 232; resurgence of, 
34, 171, 216; in Turkish invasion, 219 

Turk-Islam Sentezi. See Turkish-Islamic 

Turk Mukavement Te§kilati (TMT). See 
Turkish Resistance Organization 

TURK-SEN. See Turkish Cypriot Trade 
Union Federation 

Tyre: siege of, 9 

UBP. See National Unity Party 
Ucok, Orhan, 197 

Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP). See National 
Unity Party 

unemployment: in agriculture, 117; com- 
pensation, 78; among Greek Cypriots, 
107, 108, 112, 115; after Turkish in- 
vasion, 78, 107, 112; among Turkish 
Cypriots, 145 

UNFICYP. See United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force in Cyprus 

Unified Democratic Party (Eniaion), 40 

United Democratic Union of Cyprus 
(EDEK), xxvii-xxviii, 44, 188; election 
results for, 187; formed, 187; platform 
of, 187 

United Nations: Makarios's addresses to, 
27, 31; membership in, 33, 200; peti- 
tioned for self-determination, 27, 28; 
position on Cyprus, 29-30 

United Nations Convention on the Elimi- 
nation of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, 68 

United Nations Peace-keeping Force in 

Cyprus (UNFICYP), xxiii, xxxii, 36, 
41, 117, 204, 214, 220, 225, 234-37; 
buffer zone guarded by, 172, 220-21; 
command of, 236; countries participat- 
ing in, 236; duties of, 237; establish- 
ment of, 4, 35, 170, 216; funding for, 
236-37; maintenance costs of, 236; 
mandate of, 234; number of, 35, 234; 
organization of, 236; role of, in Turk- 
ish invasion, 234-36; salaries of, 236; 
support for, 233, 234; surveillance by, 
236; troop rotation in, 236; uniforms 
of, 236 

United Nations Security Council, 170, 
226, 234; intervention of, in ethnic ten- 
sions, 35; intervention of, in intercom- 
munal talks, 177; Resolution 649 in, 

United States, 224; cooperation of, with 
British, 233; forces, 233; imports from, 
140; intelligence gathering by, 224; in- 
volvement of, in intercommunal talks, 
176, 184; materiel from, 232; medita- 
tion by, 217; relations with, 203-5; 
trade with, 157; university students in, 
75, 101 

United States Arms Control and Disarm- 
ament Agency (AC DA), 230-31 

United States Department of State, 204, 

University of Cyprus, 75 

University College of North Cyprus, 100 

urban areas: birth rates in, 59; families 
in, 91; fertility rates in, 59; occupations 
in, 68; political affiliations in, 40; popu- 
lation in, 61; Turkish Cypriots in, 88 

urbanization, 49, 61, 89-90; circum- 
stances of, 63, 89; and marriage, 66 

urban migration, 59-61; for education, 63 

U Thant, 35, 38 

value-added tax (VAT), 114 

Varosha issue, 175, 177 

Vasilikos: port of, 125, 135 

Vassiliou, George, xxx, 201; attempts by, 
to change government, 191-92; back- 
ground of, 190; cabinet of, 191; election 
campaign, 191; platform of, 190-91; as 
president, 44, 113, 164, 181, 184-86, 
187, 189, 203, 229; skills of, 191 

Vassiliou-Denktas. Meetings (1988-90), 


Cyprus: A Country Study 

Veniamin, Christodoulos, 191 
Venice: Famagusta ceded to, 14; trade 
with, 14 

Venetian rule, 16-17, 55, 57, 224; ori- 
gins of, 16; Ottoman attacks under, 17; 
religion under, 70-71 

Venizelos, Sophocles, 27 

Veterinary Service, 119 

vice president, 32 

village councils, 185-86; elections for, 186 
villages: family contacts in, 67 
Volkan, 28-29, 215 
Volkan, Vamik, 83, 87 

wage: increases, 116; indexation, 116; 
military, 228; minimum, 145; real, 145 

Waldheim, Kurt: evaluation by, of talks, 
179; intercommunal talks led by, 171, 
175-77, 221 

water resources (see also climate), 119, 
147-48; collection of, 119, 147; dams, 
53, 119, 147, 148; development 
projects, 148; inland waterways, 53 

weather. See climate 

welfare system, 49, 65; community 
centers in, 82; protective legislation in, 
68; social insurance, 77-79; social wel- 
fare, 79-80 

WFTU. See World Federation of Trade 

Wilkenson, James, 204 

wine, 123-24 

women (see also gender relations): demon- 
strations by, 214, 220, 222-23; dis- 
crimination against, 50; education of, 
68, 73, 75; emigration of, 61; as house- 
wives, 70, 92; in marriage, 66, 92-93; 
in military, 228; as mothers, 70; occu- 
pations of, 70; protection of, 68; social 
insurance benefits for, 78; status of, 
68-70; in work force, 50, 59, 66, 68, 93 
Women's Walk Home, 222-23 
workers: construction, 130; shortage of, 

work force: in agriculture, 117, 145-46; 

women in, 50, 59, 66, 68, 93 
World Bank: economic aid from, 142; 

membership in, 34 
World Council of Churches, 26 
World Federation of Trade Unions 

(WFTU), 146 
World War II, 21 ; Cypriot volunteers in, 

23-24, 225 

YDP. See New Dawn Party 

Yeni Dogus. Partisi (YDP). See New Dawn 

Yialias River, 53 

youth: centers, 80, 82; services, 80 
Yugoslavia: loans from, 231; materiel 
from, 229 

Zeno (emperor), 11 


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